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Public polarization about the issue of immigration is a significant source of deepening 
divisions in society. To better understand public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the 
welfare state, this research takes a novel, qualitative approach to studying public attitudes 
through social interaction during democratic forums conducted in Norway and in the United 
Kingdom in 2015.  
The research analyses people’s understanding of the issue of immigration and how they 
articulate their attitudes and interact with others. It finds that attitudes to immigrants’ 
inclusion involve diverse considerations and create ambivalence, as people have both 
positive and negative perceptions of immigration and immigrants. Furthermore, as people 
differentiate between immigrants, preferences for inclusion and exclusion vary depending 
on the group of immigrants. Changes in attitude can be identified considering the specific 
social contexts, needs, and interests related to the in-group, to the welfare state in the 
country of destination, and to the social situations that immigrants face. Therefore, this 
research stresses the dynamism of attitude-formation and argues that public attitudes to 
immigrants should not be simplified to one single attitude either ‘for’ or ‘against’ the 
inclusion of immigrants, as preferences range between pro-inclusive and pro-exclusive 
depending on the specific group of immigrants and the specific social context under 
consideration.  
Furthermore, this research provides new evidence about how specific institutional features 
are discursively reproduced through interaction during debates. The research argues that 
especially differences in the institutional and social context explain the differences between 
the inclusive approach to immigration in the Norwegian and the restrictive approach to 
immigration in the British democratic forums. These findings draw attention to the power of 
the framing of issues in the wider public- and political discourse, and to the role of the 
homogeneity and heterogeneity of views. While a homogeneity of views and prevailing 
consensus within group discussions (and within the wider social context) can limit the scope 
of attitude-formation and restrict the reconsideration of stances for or against inclusion, a 
heterogeneity of views and competing preferences engender more comprehensive 
discussion that includes consideration of a wider range of aspects and measures concerning 
the inclusion of immigrants.  
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In analysing the dynamism of attitude-formation and the diversity of considerations behind 
public attitudes, the research makes significant theoretical and methodological contributions 
to the knowledge in the field of welfare attitudes. The research findings complement existing 
research into attitudes to immigrants’ access to welfare provision, which predominantly 
relies on public opinion surveys. Furthermore, the research has important implications for 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Public polarization on the issue of immigration is especially concerning as European 
populations are ageing. Considering the need for an active-age labour force for the 
maintenance of European welfare systems, the question is not about the need for a foreign 
labour force, but more about how to manage immigration in the future. The political 
salience of immigration is increasing, support for right-wing populist parties is on the rise, 
and negative tendencies, often expressed as welfare chauvinism is emerging across Europe 
(Akkerman, 2015; Alonso and Fonseca, 2012; Svallfors, 2012). Therefore, we need to better 
understand public attitudes towards immigration, we need to know more about people’s 
considerations behind attitudes. This research pioneers a specific methodology to improve 
our knowledge on and means to study public attitudes, which provides the basis to better 
understand and to better manage public concerns about immigration. Accordingly, this 
research analyses public attitudes through social interaction during democratic forums 
conducted in Norway and in the United Kingdom in 2015. One of the most prominent 
benefits of conducting democratic forum is that it grants high level of autonomy to 
participants to shape the discussions, to share their understanding of the issue. Taking 
away the control from researchers, democratic forums shed light on issues people perceive 
that might not have been considered by researchers so far. Thus, giving rise to innovation 
and new approaches that can help to reduce tensions and facilitate inclusion of immigrants 
in the welfare states.  
 
1.1 THE SOCIAL CONTEXT AND THE AIMS OF THE RESEARCH 
European welfare states enjoy stable and relatively strong public support (Svallfors, 2012). 
However, the increasing pressures affecting welfare states raise questions about their long-
term sustainability. An increasing number of researchers are pointing out the fact that the 
viability of welfare states will depend on the states’ capacity to reconcile social and ethnic 
heterogeneity with popular support for the welfare state, emphasising inclusiveness, social 
cohesion, and the extension of social solidarity to immigrants (Banting and Kymlicka, 2017; 
Crepaz, 2008; Larsen, 2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2008). However, the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 
the consequent welfare retrenchments (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2017), and changes in mass 
migration, including the 2015 Refugee Crisis, have contributed to the intensification of public 
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concerns about immigration. Intergroup differentiation has become prevalent both in public 
and political discourse, which tends to deepen social divisions. Such divisions unfold not only 
in the relations between immigrants and nationals, but increase polarization within society 
itself. These trends significantly hinder the strengthening of social cohesion that could ensure 
the sustainability of welfare states.  
Such trends throughout Europe calls for a more in-depth investigation of public attitudes to 
immigrants’ inclusion. Believing in the value and benefits of social inclusion, this research 
is devoted to examining public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state in 
order to better understand the conditions of immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state. 
While previous research has examined the impact of immigration on welfare states with a 
focus on trust, social cohesion, and the institutional and political factors that enhance 
popular support for the welfare state (Banting, 1998; Taylor-Gooby, 2005; Goul Andersen, 
2006; Soroka et al., 2006; Banting and Kymlicka, 2006; Crepaz, 2008), this research aims to 
take a step further and analyse the dynamics of attitude-formation. More specifically, it aims 
to contribute to the growing body of research by examining the mechanisms underlying 
public preferences for the inclusion of immigrants in the welfare state. Adopting a 
qualitative approach, the research aspires to analyse processes of differentiation between 
in-groups of nationals and out-groups of immigrants.  
 
1.2 A UNIQUE RESEARCH APPROACH  
The research analyses democratic forums conducted in the Welfare State Futures – Our 
Children’s Europe 1  (WelfSOC) international research project. WelfSOC was the first 
international research effort to adopt democratic forums (DF) in the field of welfare attitude 
research. This deliberative method represents a genuinely different approach to the research 
of attitudes as it enables the analysis of attitudes as articulated by participants through 
social interaction. In contrast to public opinion surveys, which are most frequently used in 
attitudinal research (Ervasti et al., 2012; Sundberg and Taylor-Gooby, 2013), DF encourage 
participants to share their opinions, to justify their stances, and to discuss ambivalences and 
 
1 WelfSOC (2015-2018) aimed to analysing people’s opinions, aspirations, and preferences for a future 
welfare state in 2040. It adopted a qualitative research design that included the use of democratic 
forums and focus groups. The research was conducted in Denmark, Germany, Norway, Slovenia, and 




various aspects of the issues under examination. Thus, they offer the possibility to examine 
the process through which attitudes are expressed, and to disentangle the reasons and 
justifications behind articulated attitudes.  
Within WelfSOC, the DFs involved two days of discussion about the future of welfare states 
in five European countries. However, the present research is restricted to a comparative 
analysis of DF discussions in Norway and in the United Kingdom. Through the analysis of DF 
discussions, the research aims to examine (Research Question 1) how people’s attitudes to 
the inclusion of immigrants emerge and evolve in the debates. Applying discourse analytical 
methods, it intends to analyse (RQ2) what considerations affect the way people discuss 
immigration, and what mechanisms shape people’s attitudes toward inclusion and/or 
exclusion. It is expected that through interaction and raising a diversity of views, arguments 
and interests, and taking into account different contexts and situations, the imaginary 
boundary between inclusion and exclusion will flexibly shift during the debates. Thus, at the 
heart of this research is to identify such shifts in attitudes and examine the dynamics of 
attitude-formation. Furthermore, it aims to analyse (RQ3) when and under what 
circumstances do such effects and shifts occur in the DF discussions.  
Considering the challenges that increasing immigration and the wider scale social 
diversification of societies pose, the research assumes that the viability of welfare states will 
depend on states’ capacities to reconcile social diversity with popular support for welfare 
states. This is the primary reason it aims to investigate what considerations enhance, or, on 
the contrary, undermine the development of a more inclusive welfare state. This 
consideration was taken into account in the selection of Norway and the United Kingdom as 
case study countries.2 These two countries represent two different welfare regimes with 
differing public understandings of and attitudes towards welfare. Norway is a stable, social 
democratic welfare state with a high level of provision and a regulated labour market. The 
UK represents a liberal-leaning regime that offers a lower level of benefits and has an open, 
deregulated labour market. Furthermore, the DF discussions about immigration 
demonstrated distinctive approaches to the inclusion of immigrants. In the UK, participants 
were defensive and cautious about immigrants. In Norway, the debates concerned finding a 
suitable way of dealing with immigration and integrating immigrants for the benefit of the 
 
2 For a more elaborate justification of country choice, see Section 1.3.1 
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country.3 It was the latter distinction that influenced the choice of these two countries to 
examine (RQ4) why people are more inclusive in one country than in the other.  
The DFs were conducted in October and November 2015, after the Refugee Crisis peaked 
in the summer of 2015, and prior to the campaign on the Brexit referendum in 2016 in the 
UK. These happenings genuinely affected the course of discussions and accentuated 
immigration-related issues. Therefore, the timing of the forums provided an outstanding 
opportunity to analyse attitude-formation in the polarized and heated social atmosphere 
that characterized the debates about the Refugee Crisis and the pre-Brexit period in the UK. 
The latter makes the cross-country comparison more challenging, but also more interesting, 
as there are profound differences with regard to how immigration is approached in the 
British and Norwegian discussions. 
While the research aims to approach attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state 
in their complexity, it is essential to specify the scope of the research setting the key 
theoretical foundations on which this research draws, and to clarify the key terms used 
throughout the research.  
 
1.3 THE SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
The first step in delineating the scope and theoretical framework of this research is to define 
the understanding of public attitudes. In contrast to the traditional conceptualisation of 
public attitudes that are viewed as relatively fixed and stable evaluative responses to issues 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Wilson and Hodges, 1992), this research adheres to the social 
constructivist understanding of public attitudes. This conceives of public attitudes as a set 
of considerations which are shaped by the social context, public discourses, and social 
interactions, with a stress on their fluidity and context-dependency (Converse, 2006; 
Tourangeau et al., 2000; Wilson and Hodges, 1992).  
Accordingly, the first hypothesis of this research is that attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion 
in the welfare state change depending on the specific group of immigrants, and on the 
specific social aspects, contexts, and situations considered. Therefore, this research argues 
that attitudes should not be reduced and simplified to binary terms such as ‘in favour of’ or 
‘against’ the inclusion of immigrants. On the contrary, within the scope of this research, 
 
3 The policy proposals formulated during the DFs are available in Table 1 – Appendix 1 
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attitudes are conceptualised to range along an abstract continuum between inclusion and 
exclusion, along which they can shift depending on specific considerations. This flexible and 
dynamic approach also allows us to identify ambivalences and contradictory claims behind 
articulated attitudes and to understand how such competing views are reconciled within 
groups. 
Our second hypothesis concerns the considerations4 that influence changes in preferences 
for inclusion and exclusion. Acknowledging the intergroup context of immigration, this 
research argues that the considerations behind attitudes are not only shaped by 
perceptions of immigrants – i.e. in terms of differentiating specific groups of immigrants, 
assessing their achievements and efforts in the country of destination, etc. Instead, it claims 
that perceptions of the in-group – i.e.  perceptions of the status of the in-group in society, 
perceptions about collective interests and societal aims, and perceptions about the role and 
functions of welfare state – are equally important in shaping attitudes to immigrants’ 
inclusion. This hypothesis draws on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel et al., 1971) 
that asserts that group membership influences individual identity and induces intergroup 
differentiation. Thus, it is argued that group membership and perceptions of the in-group set 
the benchmark and provide the lenses through which immigrants and their conduct are 
judged in the society. Considering such interactions related to perceptions of the in-group 
and the out-group, within the scope of this research intergroup differentiation is 
understood as a means of accessing, analysing, and better understanding attitudes to 
immigrants’ inclusion.  
To further narrow the scope of the analysis and to specify what is meant by the concept of 
inclusion in a welfare state, the research draws on Welfare Deservingness Theory (Van 
Oorschot, 2000, 2006; Van Oorschot et al., 2017). On the one hand, we may assume that 
people prefer to include immigrants whom they see as deserving. On the other hand, making 
a differentiation between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ welfare beneficiaries is a common 
and easily accessible means of justifying access to state support (Petersen et al., 2012). It 
was thus expected that deservingness judgements would naturally emerge in the discussions 
and provide authentic reasoning for or against the inclusion of immigrants. Therefore, 
throughout the research, attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion are approached through an 
analysis of perceptions of immigrants’ deservingness based on the five deservingness 
 
4 Such considerations can be the perceived motivations of immigrants to migrate, immigrants’ skills, 
reflections on discrimination of immigrants in the labour market, etc. For the in-depth analysis, see 
Chapter 5 and 6. 
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criteria (Cook, 1979; Swaan, 1988; Van Oorschot, 2000). The analysis of (in-group) 
perceptions of immigrants’ deservingness is intended to investigate people’s use and 
understanding of deservingness principles, which currently remains an under-researched 
area (Van Oorschot and Roosma, 2015). It is expected that both the understandings and the 
salience of particular deservingness criteria vary depending on specific groups of immigrants 
and specific social contexts. Therefore, the analysis provides a suitable means of testing our 
first hypothesis about the dynamism of attitude-formation. Furthermore, as deservingness 
judgements reflect the specific relation between the state and immigrants including the 
rights and duties of immigrants in the country of destination, the analysis allows us to test 
the second hypothesis about the role of and interactions between in-group and out-group 
perceptions.  
Focusing on the interactions between the in-group and out-group perceptions leads to the 
third hypothesis: that the institutional and social context affect in-group and out-group 
perceptions. Building on the dynamic institutionalist approach to the study of welfare 
attitudes (Mau, 2003; Larsen, 2006, 2013; Sundberg, 2014), this research argues that the 
institutional and social context influences attitude-formation, and interactions between the 
institutional and social context are a significant driver of changing attitudes. Institutions 
provide a relatively stable framework, defining specific meanings and understandings of the 
world through sets of regulations and policies that are in line with and reinforce social values, 
norms, and expectations (March and Olsen, 2008). However, the salience of specific aspects 
of institutions – e.g. adherence to the principle of equal opportunities – can vary in the light 
of changing social contexts. For instance, in the context of the Refugee Crisis, the principle 
of equal opportunities might be overshadowed by preferences for security and control 
measures that are also embedded in institutions. This implies the need to analyse the 
specificity of the social context – including public and political discourses – as the social 
context is more prone to respond and to adjust to new developments and changing 
circumstances.  
Taking an institutional approach, this research provides new evidence about how specific 
institutional features are discursively reproduced through interactions during the debates. 
There are distinct ways of thinking about immigration and welfare states, and the salience 
of these considerations can significantly vary (Kulin et al., 2016). Therefore, throughout the 
research particular attention is devoted to examining how perceived changes in the social 
context induce changes in attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state. 
Furthermore, this is the point at which the comparison of Norway and the UK becomes 
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relevant. The following section provides a review of the key differences and similarities 
between the two countries. 
 
1.3.1 Country selection 
Drawing on scholarship about welfare attitudes, the differences in the Norwegian and 
British welfare systems were one of the key arguments for the comparison of these two 
countries. While researchers are polarized about how to categorise the countries into 
specific regimes, there is consensus that support for equality, redistribution, and state 
intervention are most prominent in social democratic welfare states and weakest in liberal 
regimes (Svallfors, 2010). Studies of the relation between immigration and welfare states 
(Crepaz, 2008; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Swank and Betz, 2003), and studies focusing on 
welfare chauvinism (Crepaz and Damron, 2009; Mewes and Mau, 2013; Van Der Waal et al., 
2013), highlighted the differences between comprehensive welfare states such as Norway, 
which are characterised by universal access to welfare provision, and liberal welfare states 
as the UK, with their higher share of means-tested benefits. Differences also concern how 
the labour market is organised and regulated, which together with welfare institutions might 
considerably affect perceptions of social inequalities in these two countries (Larsen, 2006). 
As perceptions of social inequalities and insecurities can be drivers of intergroup 
differentiation and anti-immigrant attitudes (Crepaz, 2008; Larsen, 2013), the way 
institutions address the issue of social insecurities is highly important. While perceptions of 
social inequalities might not be so important in relation to other dimensions of welfare 
attitudes, in relation to immigrants such perceptions tend to strengthen.    
In relation to the issue of immigration, these two countries share certain features. The share 
of immigrants (foreign-born) in the population is similar, amounting to 14-15% (Eurostat). 
However, due to the difference in the size of the countries, there is a huge difference in the 
absolute number of immigrants. Consequently, it is crucial to find out more about 
(mis)perceptions concerning the proportion of immigrants in these two countries, which 
might have a significant effect on debates concerning immigrants (Van Der Waal et al., 2010; 
Mewes and Mau, 2013; Meuleman et al., 2018). Norway, as part of the European Economic 
Area, is subject to regulations concerning the free movement of people. Therefore, in both 
countries there is a dual system of immigration policies for EU (and EEA) citizens and non-EU 
nationals. However, from a historical perspective, post-colonial migration distinguishes the 
position of the UK concerning public reactions to immigration and contact with immigrants.   
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Right-wing populist parties are present in both countries and both parties us the issue of 
immigration for political mobilization –. However, there are significant differences in the 
right-wing populist party UKIP and the Progress Party in Norway. The parties were supported 
with 12.6% (2015) and 16.3% (2013) of all votes, respectively (Döring and Manow, 2019). 
While these electoral results are relatively similar, due to the differences in the electoral 
system there is a huge gap between these two parties in terms of the share of mandates and 
their role in national parliaments. Moreover, the Progress Party is a member of the 
Norwegian government.  
During the DF discussions the issue of immigration was one of the top themes in both 
countries. However, the discussions revealed substantial differences. While in the UK the 
discussion concentrated on border controls, and the monitoring of immigrants entering the 
country was primarily associated with the exclusion of immigrants, in Norway debates 
focused on the need to integrate immigrants for the benefit of the country. This elemental 
difference encouraged us to examine the discourse that developed during DFs to scrutinise 
the contexts in which intergroup differentiation gains sense, attitudes to immigrants’ 
inclusion or exclusion are articulated, and the mechanisms behind these attitudes can be 
better identified. 
There exist a series of international comparative analyses that include these two countries 
both in relation to welfare attitudes and attitudes to immigration. However, as argued 
before, our knowledge about the dynamics of attitude-formation is under-researched. 
Therefore, the selection of these two countries produced a highly interesting comparison to 
test the above-described three hypotheses.  
The former sections intended to define the scope of the research by elaborating on the three 
hypotheses and the four theories that create the foundations for the research. Social 
Constructivism is present as an overarching theory, affecting the essential understanding and 
approach to public attitudes as dynamic social concepts. Furthermore, the other three 
theories also draw on and employ the social constructivist approach. Both Social Identity 
Theory and Welfare Deservingness Theory provide the specific tools and framing along which 
the scope of the research was narrowed down and the conceptualisation of inclusion in 
welfare states was operationalized. Last, the institutionalist approach complements the 
research approach for explaining the similarities and differences identified in the Norwegian 
and British DF discussions both in terms of the content and process of attitude-formation. In 
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line with the described logic and motivation behind the research, the following section 
specifies the structure of the thesis.  
 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The analysis of the considerations behind public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the 
welfare state and the dynamism of attitude-formation requires a step-by-step approach 
intended to gradually specify the research approach, and then present the research findings. 
Accordingly, the following Chapter 2 reviews the academic literature about the relation 
between immigration and welfare state support, and studies that specifically focus on 
attitudes to immigrants’ access to welfare provision. Following up on the literature review, 
Chapter 3 introduces the chosen methodological approach. It intends to justify that the 
combination of DF and discourse analysis is suitable for answering the research questions. 
Throughout the research, particular attention is devoted to understanding the role of the 
institutional and social context in attitude-formation. Therefore, Chapter 4 offers a 
comparative overview of the institutional and social context in Norway and in the UK. 
Accordingly, Chapter 4 depicts trends in attitudes to immigration and immigrants’ access to 
welfare provisions, elaborates on the development of immigration-, welfare-, and labour 
market policies, and the related public and political discourses. While the first part of the 
thesis captures the gradual development of the research approach, the second part of the 
thesis presents the research findings.  
Within the research, attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state and the 
dynamism of attitude-formation are examined from four distinctive perspectives that are 
presented chapter-by-chapter. Chapter 5 addresses what considerations affect attitudes to 
immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state through an analysis of (in-group) perceptions of 
immigrants’ welfare deservingness (addressing RQ2 and RQ4). The chapter proposes a new 
approach to explain the identified differences between Norwegian and British participants’ 
understanding of deservingness criteria. Drawing on and deepening the findings of Chapter 
5, Chapter 6 analyses the practise of constructing the welfare deservingness of refugees 
and economic migrants as the two most widely discussed groups of immigrants. While 
Chapter 5 elaborates on DF participants’ use and understanding of deservingness criteria, 
Chapter 6 shows how the relevance and ranking of the five deservingness criteria change 
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depending on the specific group of immigrants, and on the time dimension (short- or long-
term) considered by participants (addressing RQ2 and RQ4).  
Chapter 7 and 8 complement the findings of the content analysis presented in Chapter 5 and 
6 by shifting attention to the process of attitude-formation. By analysing one Norwegian and 
one British case study, Chapter 7 examines the process of attitude-formation in groups 
analysing the interactions between participants, the role of group dynamics, and the 
potential effects of the homogeneity and heterogeneity of opinions in group discussions 
(addressing RQ1, RQ3 and RQ4). Chapter 8 looks at the dynamism of attitude-formation 
from the perspective of individual participants. To scrutinize the development of individual 
attitudes through interactions, Chapter 8 proposes a joint analysis of the narrative as well as 
pre- and post-deliberation survey5 responses of DF participants (addressing RQ1, RQ3 and 
RQ4). Accordingly, the chapter includes two Norwegian and two British case studies. The 
thesis concludes with Chapter 9. After a brief overview of the main research findings, the 
final chapter highlights the theoretical and methodological contributions of this research and 
delineates its policy implications.  
The challenge of studying attitudes to such a polarizing issue as immigration is due to the 
complexity, multi-dimensionality, and context-dependency of attitudes. This research 
proposes a novel qualitative approach to the study of attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion. The 
use of DF as method of data collection and discourse analysis as method of data analysis 
offers a new opportunity to analyse attitudes as they are shared by ordinary people, to learn 
about the considerations behind articulated attitudes, and to examine the dynamism of 
attitude-formation. Thus, the research aims to contribute to a better understanding of 
attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion, and to increase understanding of the conditions of 
inclusion. It intends to complement the growing body of research that is based 
predominantly on international public opinion surveys. Recognizing the limits of this 
research means acknowledging that it cannot fully and comprehensively address the 
complexity, multi-dimensionality, and context-dependency of attitudes. However, it 
attempts to reveal how people debated immigration and shared their attitudes in Norwegian 
and British groups in the context of heightened debates about immigration following the 
peak of the 2015 Refugee Crisis and in pre-Brexit Britain. The research draws attention to the 
analysis of the dynamism of attitude-formation in order to reveal what makes a difference 
 
5 As part of DF, participants were asked to fill out a survey before starting the discussions on Day 1 
and after finishing the discussions on Day 2 – for further details see Section 3.3.1.5 
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and what changes attitudes to immigration. Thereby, revealing the potential drivers and 
barriers to creating a more inclusive welfare state. As a first step towards fulfilling these aims, 
the following chapter introduces theoretical discussions about immigration and welfare state 
support, and presents an overview of the key findings about attitudes to the inclusion of 
immigrants.   
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The focal point of this thesis is analysing public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the 
welfare state. The long-term sustainability of welfare states requires a great amount of 
inclusivity (Banting and Kymlicka, 2017; Crepaz, 2008; Larsen, 2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2008). 
However, in contrast to the anticipated inclusion of immigrants, we have recently observed 
the deepening of social divisions fuelled by populist discourses and welfare chauvinism 
throughout Europe (Akkerman, 2015; Alonso and Fonseca, 2012; Svallfors, 2012). This 
contradiction and the need to better understand the conditions of inclusion inspired this 
research. Considering the complexity of the relation between immigration and the welfare 
state and the diversity of considerations behind public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion, the 
research draws on four main theories.  
First and foremost, Social Constructivism creates the basic pillar of the research through its 
understanding of public attitudes as dynamic social concepts (Converse, 2006; Tourangeau 
et al., 2000; Wilson and Hodges, 1992). Abraham Tesser (1978: 297–298) argues that “an 
attitude at a particular point in time is the result of a constructive process. … there is not a 
single attitude toward and object but rather, any number of attitudes depending on the 
number of schemas available for thinking about the object”. This definition captures the aim 
of this research: to study the constructive process as it happens through social interactions. 
The remaining three theories – namely, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel et al., 
1971), Welfare Deservingness Theory (Van Oorschot, 2000; Van Oorschot et al., 2017), and 
Institutionalism (Larsen, 2006; Mau, 2003; Sundberg, 2014) – guide the investigation of this 
constructive process by focusing on intergroup differentiation, perceptions of deservingness, 
and the specificities of the institutional and social contexts affecting attitude-formation. The 
four theories are closely intertwined and constitute a coherent approach. Social 
Constructivism and Social Identity Theory stress how social identities are formed, creating a 
basis for disentangling how welfare deservingness and immigrants’ inclusion are understood, 
with attention to the importance of institutional contexts and to the variability between 
welfare states. The DFs provide a framework in which this constructive process of attitude-
formation can unfold, enabling us to analyse how identities, attitudes, and criteria of 
inclusion are shaped and re-shaped through social interaction. 
This chapter provides an overview of the key research findings in order to delineate and 
justify the theoretical approach of this research. As a starting point of this literature review, 
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research on relation between immigration and popular support for welfare state is revisited. 
Second, the expanding literature on welfare chauvinism is reviewed with particular attention 
to: 1) the impact of intergroup relations on perceptions of immigration, 2) perceptions of the 
welfare deservingness of immigrants, and 3) institutional approaches to the study of welfare 
attitudes.  
 
2.1 WELFARE STATES AND THE RELEVANCE OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 
Immigration is often categorized as one of the complex and interrelated social processes – 
along with technological advancement and globalisation, the restructuring of the labour 
market  and demographic changes, etc. – which are increasing the pressure on welfare states 
but also providing new opportunities (Emmenegger et al., 2012; Svallfors, 2012; Taylor-
Gooby et al., 2017). Such processes challenge the social consensus and solidarity between 
the working and middle class on which European welfare states were built (Baldwin, 1990; 
Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1983). They also give rise to new social divisions (Svallfors, 
2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2008), which can be easily misused in political competition to increase 
the popularity of right-wing populist parties. While it is hard to separate the effects and 
changes these individual social processes bring about, immigration stands out as it confronts 
the nation-state conception that welfare states grant and restrict access to social rights 
based on national membership and a shared sense of national belonging (Bommes and 
Geddes, 2000; Wolfe and Klausen, 1997). 
The development of welfare states has been part of nation-building efforts and the 
consolidation of nation-states (Clarke, 2005; Wimmer 1998 in Mau and Burkhardt, 2009). 
The gradual expansion of the social rights of citizens was frequently adopted to reduce social 
divisions in the population and to promote commonalities, collective aims, and entitlements 
(Tilly, 1994). Thus, welfare states have created a closed collective of individuals – an ‘in-
group’ – which functions on the basis of a widely shared and institutionally-embedded 
consensus about citizenship and common good that promotes a certain way of life, social 
behaviour, and morals (Clarke, 2005; Mau, 2003; Wolfe and Klausen, 1997). Immigration 
challenges this situation, especially the collective boundaries of welfare states. This thesis is 
therefore specifically devoted to exploring how flexible and permeable the boundaries 
between the in-group – i.e. citizens, members of the collective – and the out-group of 
immigrants are in the eyes of ordinary people. 
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The social rights the welfare state provides to its members have become an integral part of 
in-group identity which can act to override individual interests, mitigate internal social 
divisions, and provide a firm basis for redistribution (Baldwin, 1990; Korpi, 1983). This nation-
state conception of welfare states demonstrates the tenets of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 
1982; Tajfel et al., 1971), which stresses how the identity of individuals is shaped by group 
membership, and how individuals adopt and adapt to group norms and values. However, we 
need to note that the understanding and the salience of group identification can greatly vary 
person-by-person, but also over time depending on the specific social contexts (Brown, 
2020). Investigating what contexts trigger group identifications is relevant as group 
membership also gives rise to differentiation between the in-group – ‘us’ – and the out-group 
– ‘them’ (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1975). While this differentiation 
strengthens in-group identity and social cohesion within the in-group, it also reinforces 
divisions in relation to the out-group (Kramer and Brewer, 1984). It is especially this aspect 
– the analysis of social categorization and intergroup differentiation – that is the focus of this 
research. Through the lens of intergroup differentiation, the research aims to elaborate on 
how the in-group define themselves, and how such perceptions of the in-group – including 
perceptions of their own role within the welfare state, as well as the relationship between 
the individual and the state – emerge in characterisations of and expectations from 
immigrants. Throughout the thesis such characterisations and expectations, as shared by 
research participants, will be analysed to identify the boundaries between preferences for 
the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants from the welfare state. The key expectation is that 
DF discussions can reveal how dynamically such boundaries can change depending on the 
specific social contexts and considerations.  
Many researchers treat nation-state conceptions unquestionable and unproblematic, and 
take for granted the existence of internal cohesion and unity within them (Sager, 2016). 
However, we are now witnessing a shift from citizenship-based eligibility to residence- and 
contribution-based social rights that is challenging the role and value of citizenship 
(Sainsbury, 2012). While some researchers argue that nation-states and national identity are 
essential for the sustainability of welfare states (Calhoun, 2002; Miller, 1995), others suggest 
that social cohesion should be extended beyond national identity in order to identify new 
platforms for cohesion that also permit the inclusion of immigrants (Banting and Kymlicka, 
2017; Crepaz, 2008; Larsen, 2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2008). Issues regarding the compatibility of 
increasing immigration and the high level of support for the welfare state have heightened 
debate among scholars and given impetus to a new wave of welfare attitude research, 
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especially in relation to the future of European welfare states. The next section provides a 
review of the literature about the so-called ‘progressive dilemma’ (Goodhart, 2004; 
Koopmans, 2010).  
 
2.2 THE PROGRESSIVE DILEMMA – DOES IMMIGRATION REDUCE PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR 
THE WELFARE STATE?  
The key argument contained in the progressive dilemma is that increasing ethnic diversity – 
as a result of immigration – weakens social trust, which diminishes willingness to share 
solidarity and to redistribute resources to others with whom people do not identify or trust 
(Banting and Kymlicka 2006). Such negative effects was pinpointed by Freeman (1986) and 
Alesina and Glaeser (2004). Based on a study of fifty-four countries, Alesina and Glaeser 
(2004) find that ethnic heterogeneity negatively affects welfare state support, which is 
sensitive to the level of in-group solidarity. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) claim that it is 
primarily ethnic diversity and a lack of in-group solidarity that blocked the development of 
strong support for a generous welfare system in the US, compared to that of European 
welfare states. Based on the American experience, they warn that increasing immigration 
will endanger social solidarity in Europe, leading to declining support for welfare.  
Talking about the effects of increasing ethnic diversity, it is worth to stress that the term 
ethnic diversity covers a heterogenous group of people including members of autochthonous 
ethnic minorities, indigenous people, immigrants as well as immigrants’ descendants (Castles 
and Schierup, 2010). The recently contested ‘increasing ethnic diversity’ concerns primarily 
the latter two categories. However, even within these two categories lies high level of 
heterogeneity. Diversity stems from the specific legal types of migrants distinguishing 
refugees, economic migrants, family migrants and international students. Evidence suggests 
that public conceptualisation of the specific groups of immigrants has relevant implications 
for formation of public opinion and attitudes towards immigrants and their inclusion 
(Blinder, 2015). However, research also shows that public perceptions are often based on 
distorted views of immigrants and misperceptions of the volume of specific groups of 
immigrants (Blinder, 2015; Blinder and Allen, 2016; Herda, 2010). The diversity within 
immigrant population further increases in relation to the second- or third-generation 
migrants, who have at least one migrant parent or grandparent and/or are coming from 
mixed marriages, which can entail acquirement of citizenship or dual citizenship at birth 
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having important implications on their legal and social status. Although the above described 
diversity reflects only on the legal status of migrants, it reveals crucial differences between 
(1) first generation (temporary or long-term) migrants and (2) second- and third-generation 
migrants. However, these two categories are often conflated in the literature, which points 
at the challenges of identification and definition of immigrants (Anderson and Blinder, 
2019).6 
While the challenges posed to European welfare states have not been undermined or 
underestimated, the claim that increasing ethnic diversity might change support for welfare 
states has been questioned by many researchers. Goul Andersen (2006) emphasizes the 
aspect of timing in developing welfare states. He argues that the European welfare systems 
developed and stabilized in ethnically homogenous societies. 7  Established welfare 
institutions have become part of public norms and values and are considerably resistant to 
change. Goul Andersen (2006) therefore argues that while immigration might raise 
challenges, established welfare systems are able to mitigate the distributional conflict 
engendered by diversity. Banting (1998) also refers to the path-dependence of the gradual 
extension of social rights and entitlements in Europe, questioning whether people would 
accept a loss of rights. Furthermore, he argues that consensual policy-making also 
contributes to better reconciling ethnic diversity and welfare redistribution. Crepaz (2008) 
points at the differences between the institutions and the normative expectations of 
governments in Europe and the US, which he claims will lead to different strategies for coping 
with increasing diversity. Moreover, he argues that “societies that developed welfare states 
before immigration occurred were able to build up a stock of trust with a capacity to reduce 
nativist resentment, thereby ensuring to continue viability of the welfare state” (Crepaz, 2008: 
251). He further states that the increase in anti-immigration attitudes in Europe needs to be 
taken into account in order to introduce policies to counter them, instead of building political 
rhetoric on them.  
Taylor-Gooby (2005) disproves Alesina and Glaeser’s (2004) conclusions by reconstructing 
and analysing the same data-set. The author highlights that Alesina and Glaeser failed to 
 
6 The critical review of the definition and public understanding of the term immigrant is addressed in 
Section 2.3. 
7 While in most of European countries there has been high level of ethnic homogeneity, we need to 
note the existence of ethnic minorities in these countries, too. Furthermore, the development of 
welfare states and extension of citizens’ social rights also provided means to incorporate ethnic 




address the role of left-wing political parties in defending welfare policies that act to limit 
the negative impacts of immigration on popular support for welfare. Soroka, Banting and 
Johnston (2006), who study the effect of immigration on welfare spending, also observe the 
effects of left-wing parties in mitigating the impact of immigration. The authors find that in 
countries with considerable left-wing representation in government, welfare spending 
remained intact, while in other countries welfare spending tended to decrease when the 
share of the immigrant population increased.  
A further difference is that commitment to welfare policies is shared by all parties across the 
political spectrum in Europe. Although, divisions between political party stances surface 
about the appropriate range, target population, and entitlement criteria for benefits and 
services (Kitschelt and McGann, 1997). Swank and Betz (2003) argue that comprehensive 
welfare systems themselves weaken the chance of diversity-based retrenchment by better 
addressing and reducing economic inequalities. Based on an analysis of national elections, 
the former claim that universal welfare states limit support for right-wing populist parties 
and motivations for welfare chauvinism. The same conclusions are drawn by Crepaz and 
Damron (2009) who argue that a comprehensive welfare state can limit nativist opposition 
to immigrants by reducing the social gaps between nationals and immigrants. 
Mau and Burkhardt (2009) examine the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on welfare state 
support. They find a weak effect on support for welfare redistribution. Furthermore, the 
authors find that these effects were mediated through GDP, the unemployment rate, and 
welfare regimes, among other factors. The authors also look at popular support for the 
inclusion of immigrants, where they also found a negative but weak association. However, it 
is important to stress that the negative effect was mitigated by the welfare regime typology 
and the presence of left-wing parties. Therefore, the researchers conclude that the role of 
institutional factors and the politics of interpretation are especially crucial in this respect.  
Focusing on perceptions of competition in the labour market and perceptions of social 
insecurity, Finseraas (2008), Burgoon et al. (2012) as well as Brady and Finnigan (2014) find 
evidence for increasing support for the welfare state in the case of increasing immigration. 
While taking different approaches, all of these studies highlight individuals’ interest in 
protecting themselves from social insecurities and supporting redistribution in occupational 
sectors more exposed to immigration (Burgoon et al., 2012) or in response to rapid flows of 
immigration (Brady and Finnigan, 2014). These findings show how the welfare state gains 
relevance as a response to increasing immigration. Emmenegger and Klemennsen (2013) 
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complements the central role of self-interest in attitude-formation by highlighting  other 
forms of individual-level motivation driven by egalitarianism or humanitarianism. The 
authors argue that such motivations also shape attitudes towards immigration and support 
for redistribution.  
Approaching the issue from the perspective of multiculturalism, Banting and Kymlicka (2006)  
argue that the trade-off between immigration and a generous welfare state tends to be 
exaggerated. According to them, there is no evidence that multicultural policies of immigrant 
integration lead to welfare retrenchment, nor that multicultural policies lead to the erosion 
of social solidarity (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006, 2017).  
Considering the variability of immigrant populations within countries, there are new 
research initiatives that focus on the regional instead of the national level. Studies about 
Germany and Sweden show that a greater share of immigrants in regions have a negative 
effect on support for welfare programmes (Eger, 2010; Eger and Breznau, 2017). Stichnoth 
(2012) also finds that support for the unemployed decreases in regions where the share of 
foreigners among the unemployed is large. These findings reflect on a new aspect of the 
issue suggesting that further investigation of perceptions of immigration are needed to 
unravel the information that nationally aggregated data tend to hide.  
In a recent article, Kulin et al. (2016) analyse attitudinal profiles, focusing on combinations 
of pro-/anti-welfare and pro-/anti-immigration attitudes, finding evidence for tension 
between pro-welfare and pro-immigration attitudes. However, they also point at the 
differences between and within countries and emphasise the need to acknowledge that 
people’s understanding of social issues varies. This finding also strengthens previous 
arguments about the relevance of how institutions deal with social issues, and how such 
issues are framed in political and public discourse (Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Soroka et al., 
2006). Therefore, even though there is no firm research evidence for the progressive 
dilemma and the threat to welfare support from immigration, the notion and the arguments 
can easily be kept alive in the political and public discourse, justifying the need to continue 
research into this phenomenon. These findings stressing the socially constructed character 
of framings and public understandings of issues encourage us to follow-up and take a social 
constructivist approach within the research. This applies to the theoretical understanding of 
public attitudes as social constructs that represent a particular set of considerations, 
including beliefs, feelings, and knowledge about issues (Tourangeau et al., 2000), which are 
influenced by the social context, public discourses, and social interaction (Converse, 2006; 
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Tourangeau et al., 2000; Wilson and Hodges, 1992). Adhering to the social constructivist 
tradition prompts us to focus more on the social and institutional contexts surrounding 
individuals, focusing on the power of the political framing of issues affecting attitude-
formation (Larsen, 2013; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Sundberg, 2014).  
In contrast to the above-mentioned studies that primarily used public opinion survey data, 
this research focuses on public attitudes as shared by ordinary people: participants of DF. 
Therefore, the analysis enables us to better understand people’s perceptions of the tension 
between immigration and the welfare state, and the reasons behind such perceptions. 
Furthermore, the analysis of DFs allows us to elaborate on how the key features and 
elements of political and public discourse emerge and influence the discussions.  
As this review shows, there is a wide variety of approaches to the study of the relation 
between immigration and the welfare state. Research has pointed at the complexity of the 
related relationships and highlighted various factors that can mitigate potentially negative 
effects of immigration. Moreover, we need to bear in mind that there is huge variation in 
how the related questions are operationalized, such as how researchers define and measure 
increases in ethnic heterogeneity, whether they measure impact on social spending or on 
welfare attitudes, whether they consider objective indicators of increases in immigration or 
perceptions of an increase in immigration, etc. (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). While there 
is no firm evidence for the negative effects of immigration on popular support for the welfare 
state in Europe, negative tendencies have been identified in relation to preferences for 
welfare chauvinism that restricts immigrants’ access to welfare provision (Brady and 
Finnigan, 2014; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Van Der Waal et al., 2013), which can be 
understood as a response to the progressive dilemma.  
While the term ‘welfare chauvinism’ refers to the exclusion of immigrants from accessing 
social rights and benefits, this research approaches the issue from the positive side, seeking 
to find out more about the conditions for immigrants’ inclusion. Furthermore, a focus on 
inclusion is justified as international public opinion surveys show that only a small minority 
of Europeans would prefer the total exclusion of immigrants from the welfare state 
(Meuleman et al., 2018; Mewes and Mau, 2013; Van Der Waal et al., 2010). While there is 
some variation between specific preferences in European countries, a majority of 
respondents support conditional access to the welfare state, which also points at the need 
to better understand the conditions of inclusion. Therefore, we need to familiarize with the 
findings of previous research. However, before turning to the review of the literature on 
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welfare chauvinism, we first need to critically appraise who are the immigrants? This 
question is especially pressing as immigration is a cross-cutting social issue evoking 
perceptions of racial, ethnic, cultural and religious divisions, etc. (Song, 2018). This 
complexity challenges not only the scholars resulting in diversity of approaches to the study 
of immigration as described above, but also diversifies public understanding of immigration 
and people’s vision of immigrants. 
 
2.3 WHO ARE THE IMMIGRANTS? 
Studies show that public attitudes to immigrants tend to vary depending on the particular 
characteristics of immigrants such as race, ethnicity or class (Blinder, 2015; Ford, 2011; 
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Considering the heterogeneity of immigrants, it is especially 
important to address who are the attitude objects – who are the immigrants? Public opinion 
surveys do not allow respondents to reflect on who they consider as immigrants when 
responding to survey questions (Hellwig and Sinno, 2017). It remains unclear whether 
respondents focus on legal or illegal migrants, do they consider the specific legal categories 
of migrants, male or female, skilled or unskilled, temporary migrants or migrants staying 
long-term in the country, whether respondents rely on their direct contact with immigrants 
or on other external sources. This section is intended to briefly review how immigrants are 
defined starting with the most frequent, nationally framed understandings, the 
shortcomings of these definitions in grasping the diversity of immigrants. 
The terms immigration and immigrant raise ambiguity. Stressing the international mobility, 
the movement between states, both the process as well as immigrants (as subjects to this 
process) are defined in binary terms distinguishing citizens and migrants or insiders and 
outsiders taking for granted the nation-states framing (Wimmer and Schiller, 2003). Most 
scholarly work on immigration uses country of origin, country of birth or country of 
citizenship to identify and define immigrants (Anderson and Blinder, 2019). However, these 
definitions hide the high level of heterogeneity within the group of immigrants. Focusing 
strictly on citizenship or country of origin, we are unable to reflect on the differences 
between legal categories of immigrants and the differences between their entitlements 
deriving from their legal status (Anderson et al., 2018). Furthermore, it raises issues of 
objective and subjective identification of immigrants – i.e. who fulfils the formal criteria of 
being an immigrant and who is perceived to be an immigrant in the public. Citizenship or 
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origin in itself is unable to reveal the (actual or perceived) social status of immigrants in the 
country of destination. For instance, despite holding citizenship, second- and third-
generation migrants are more likely to be considered as immigrants than certain migrants – 
such as highly educated, multilingual migrants, who are often invisible or perceived 
unproblematic by the public (Anderson et al., 2018; Will, 2019). Furthermore, definition of 
or considering somebody as an immigrant may entail further factors such length of stay in 
the country of destination, reasons for migration (Crawley and Skleparis, 2018), ethnic or 
religious identities (Hellwig and Sinno, 2017), perceptions of employability and work ethic 
(Bansak et al., 2016), etc. The factors considered influence the conception of immigrants, 
which can imply variation in attitudes to them and variation in preferences for their access 
to welfare benefits and services. Acknowledgement of this variation justifies the need to 
take a more dynamic approach to the study of attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion with 
particular focus on potential shifts between preferences for inclusion or exclusion based 
on the specific groups of immigrants and the specific characteristics of immigrants 
considered.  
Seeing the shortcomings of the formal – academic or institutionally set – definitions as well 
as the gap between these definitions and public conceptions of immigrants (Anderson et al., 
2018; Blinder and Allen, 2016; Crawley and Skleparis, 2018), this thesis aims to shed more 
light on the later investigating what are those aspects and factors that affect ordinary 
people’s vision of immigrants, how they perceive and define who they view as immigrants. 
In order to fulfil this ambition, particular attention is devoted to study social categorisation 
of immigrants during DF discussions and analyse whether and how people differentiate 
between specific groups of immigrants. Throughout the research, we do not expect that DF 
participants will come up with full-fledged definitions of immigrants or will fully comprehend 
immigration which cuts across contested issues and divisions based on race, ethnicity, social 
class, etc. However, we consider it important to study how people talk about immigration, 
what aspects do they consider relevant, what makes them uncertain about immigration and 
immigrants and more importantly, how the thus articulated conceptions of immigrants affect 
their preferences for inclusion of immigrants to the welfare state.  
This section was intended to acknowledge and discuss the challenges of defining who 
immigrants are in academic and public discourse and to place our approach in this regard. 
Keeping in mind these critical appraisals, we now proceed to the review of the available 
literature on immigrants’ access to welfare provision and gauging what the findings on 
welfare chauvinism reveal about the conditions of immigrants’ inclusion. Throughout this 
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chapter the terms ‘welfare chauvinism’ and ‘public attitudes to immigrants’ access to welfare 
provision’ are used when discussing the literature, and reference to ‘attitudes to immigrants’ 
inclusion’ is used when describing the aims and ambitions of this research. 
 
2.4 WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRANTS’ ACCESS TO 
WELFARE PROVISION? 
The risk of growing welfare chauvinism is manifest both in the increasing political salience of 
the issue of immigration and also in the increase in support for right-wing populist, anti-
immigrant political parties (Akkerman, 2015; Alonso and Fonseca, 2012; Schumacher and van 
Kersbergen, 2016). Both of these phenomena stress the need to take the various 
manifestations of welfare chauvinism seriously and to focus more on the sources of such 
exclusionary preferences. The significance of the issue is proved by the expanding academic 
research on welfare chauvinism. This raises the question why and to whom does welfare 
chauvinism appeal, and under what conditions does it flourish? However, the related 
literature still tends to be limited – especially in comparison to the long-standing research 
into anti-immigrant attitudes. Research on welfare chauvinism primarily relies on 
international public opinion surveys (Ervasti et al., 2012; Sundberg and Taylor-Gooby, 2013) 
and the question specifically touching upon this issue was only introduced in 2008. 
Therefore, this chapter approaches the literature more broadly, drawing on research on 
welfare attitudes as well as on attitudes to immigration and immigrants. Considering the 
complexity, multi-dimensionality, and context-dependency of public attitudes, the subject 
has been approached from various perspectives, and both streams of literature offer 
important research findings about the potential mechanisms and factors that influence 
public attitudes to immigrants’ access to welfare provision. 
Welfare chauvinism is most commonly defined as a preference for restricting the privilege of 
accessing welfare benefits and services to “our own” (Goul Andersen and Bjørklund, 1990: 
212). Thus, supporting internal cohesion and strengthening the boundaries between the in-
group and the out-group. Welfare chauvinism as an anti-immigrant, pro-welfare political 
agenda has become widely dispersed throughout Europe, sometimes in combination with 
anti-EU sentiments (Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2016). While the term welfare 
chauvinism can cover a wide variety of exclusionary measures that differ in quantity, 
restrictiveness, and the extent of target groups (specific groups of immigrants as debated in 
the previous section), its appeal and strength are well-demonstrated by the public discourse 
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in the UK centring on migrants’ social rights which led to the Brexit referendum and vote to 
leave the EU in 2016 (Goodwin and Ford, 2017).  
To better understand support for welfare chauvinism, we need to familiarize with the 
literature concerning what micro- and macro-level factors affect attitudes to immigrants’ 
access to welfare benefits and services. The following sections explore the literature by first 
raising the question which individuals are most inclined to support welfare chauvinism, 
proceeding to the question why some people prefer to restrict immigrants’ access to welfare 
provision. The literature that investigates the latter will be reviewed according to three key 
theoretical approaches to attitudes to immigration and attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in 
the welfare state. These are: (1) Group Threat Theory, in conjunction with Social Identity 
Theory; (2) Welfare Deservingness Theory, and (3) the Institutional approach to the analysis 
of public attitudes. While the first theoretical approach has been influential in research into 
both attitudes to immigration and attitudes to immigrants’ access to welfare, the latter two 
are more closely related and developed within welfare attitudes research.  
 
2.4.1 Who supports welfare chauvinism?  
Considering the fact that the most exclusivist forms of welfare chauvinism are preferred by 
only a minority of people (Van Der Waal et al., 2010; Mewes and Mau, 2012; Meuleman et 
al., 2018), researchers have been interested in identifying which individuals are more 
inclined towards the exclusion of immigrants. The findings reveal various social cleavages 
related to social status – with a focus on education, employment status, and the more 
encompassing category of social class (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Kitschelt and 
McGann, 1997; Mewes and Mau, 2012; Raijman et al., 2003; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; 
Van Der Waal et al., 2010); along the urban-rural cleavage (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 
2009; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2013), and also based on age (Eger and Breznau, 2017; 
Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Raijman et al., 2003). The 
diversity of these factors points at how the issue of immigration and immigrants’ access to 
welfare requires a more complex and encompassing approach for understanding the drivers 
behind welfare chauvinism. Out of these cleavages, the most relevant and most widely 
studied is socio-economic status, with higher support for welfare chauvinism found among 
lower-educated, lower-skilled, and working class people who face greater insecurity in the 
labour market and who are themselves more reliant on welfare support (Scheve and 
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Slaughter, 2001; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Van Der Waal et al., 2010; Mewes and 
Mau, 2012).  
Within the welfare attitudes literature, especially lower-educated, lower-skilled, working 
class individuals tend to be firm supporters of welfare state measures and egalitarianism 
(Korpi, 1983; Svallfors, 2012). Therefore, findings that such individuals are those most 
strongly inclined to exclusive preferences are puzzling and might seem contradictory 
especially from the perspective of sustaining popular support for welfare states. Eger and 
Breznau (2017) even argue that findings about welfare chauvinism coincide with research 
about anti-immigrant attitudes much more than with those about welfare attitudes. 
Therefore, they suggest that welfare chauvinism might be a symptom of anti-immigrant 
attitudes and a form of prejudice against immigrants. However, this difference can also be 
understood as a demonstration of the multi-dimensionality of welfare attitudes (Roosma et 
al., 2013) – acknowledging that there might be strong support for the goals and mission of 
the welfare state in general, but more critical and differing attitudes to specific issues such 
as immigrants’ access to welfare.  
This research agrees with the latter proposition, understanding welfare chauvinism and 
attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state as a form of welfare attitude. As this 
research is devoted to elaborate on the complexity, multi-dimensionality, and context-
dependency of public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion, it takes a dynamic approach to the 
study of public attitudes, arguing that attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion should not be 
reduced to either pro-inclusion or pro-exclusion. In contrast, it is expected that public 
attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion vary depending on specific considerations, specific 
groups of immigrants, and specific social contexts. In other words, this means that while the 
studies mentioned above found evidence for higher support for welfare chauvinism and 
restrictive attitudes among lower-educated, working class people, this research argues that 
restrictive attitudes may be shared by non-working class people in relation to specific issues 
– e.g. refusal to provide any support to illegal migrants. Similarly, working class people might 
have more inclusive attitudes to involuntary migrants. With this approach we can reflect not 
only on the changing and ambivalent character of attitudes, but also draw attention to the 
diversity within the immigrant population and the variability in their social contexts and 
situations which might change attitudes and the level of solidarity towards them. 
Throughout the research, the identification and analysis of this dynamism of attitude-
formation is in focus. However, in order to embrace the diversity of considerations behind 
attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion, it is essential to draw on existing research. We are 
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particularly interested in mapping literature that investigates why people are more inclined 
to support welfare chauvinism. 
 
2.4.2 Why do people support welfare chauvinism? 
Group Threat Theory has been one of the most influential theories within the field of anti-
immigrant attitudes – especially in the study of prejudices (for a review see Quillian, 2006). 
However, it has also been widely adopted within the literature on welfare chauvinism 
(Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009; Van Der Waal et al., 2010; 
Mewes and Mau, 2012). Group Threat Theory, as introduced by Blumer (1958), stresses the 
perceptions of intergroup relations, and more specifically, collectively and historically 
developed perceptions of the positions of the in-group and the out-group. The central 
argument is that perceptions of group threat and seeing immigrants as competitors for 
resources increases the salience of group boundaries and gives rise to anti-immigrant 
attitudes and intergroup hostility (Blumer, 1958; Blalock, 1967; Quillian, 1995; Fetzer, 2000; 
Scheepers et al., 2002; Dancygier, 2010). Such feelings are expected to intensify in relation 
to perceptions of a growing immigrant population (Blalock, 1967; Ceobanu and Escandell, 
2010; Quillian, 1995), especially if immigrants hold similar social positions and become 
employed in the same sectors as members of the in-group (Coenders et al., 2009). As 
perceptions of group threat can mobilize anti-immigrant sentiments, they can also create 
significant barriers to the inclusion of immigrants. Thus, we need to look at the sources of 
these perceptions. The literature primarily distinguishes between the economic and cultural 
threats posed by immigrants (Semyonov et al., 2006; Sides and Citrin, 2007), as detailed in 
the following sections.  
 
2.4.2.1 Perceptions of economic threat 
The literature on attitudes toward immigration and immigrants elaborates on the various 
forms of economic threat that can influence people’s attitudes, and highlights the variance 
in people’s exposure to and (subjective) perceptions of threat. Scheve and Slaughter (2001), 
in focusing on preferences for immigration policies in the US, find that uneducated workers 
were more inclined to want to limit immigration due to changes in wage levels associated 
with immigrant involvement in the labour market. Gang et al. (2013) also evidence 
opposition to immigrants in the sectors in which people were most likely to compete for jobs 
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with immigrants. Fetzer (2000) highlights that the impact of socio-economic factors unfold 
through categories of occupations. Hanson (2005) and Mayda (2006) claim that attitudes are 
shaped especially by income. Escandell and Ceobanu (2009) and Malchow-Møller et al. 
(2009) show that opposition to, and prejudices against immigrants are greater among 
unemployed nationals. Fears of immigrants’ misuse of the welfare system (Boeri, 2010) are 
of considerable concern, resulting in greater opposition towards low-skilled immigrants in 
manual jobs, and towards unemployed immigrants (Crepaz, 2008). While studies find no 
significant welfare gap between natives and immigrants in Europe (Boeri, 2010; Castronova 
et al., 2001; Corrigan, 2010), these perceptions and concerns are highly influential and easily 
manipulated in political and public discourse.  
These findings illuminate the diversity of socio-economic factors and potential 
considerations that can emerge as relevant arguments in the DF discussions. Drawing on 
these findings, and on the scholarship on welfare attitudes, researchers have embarked on 
examining how these economic concerns and socio-economic vulnerabilities influence 
preferences for welfare chauvinism. Van der Waal et al. (2010) do not find evidence for the 
impact of a weak economic position on preferences for welfare chauvinism. In contrast, 
Mewes and Mau (2012) identify the impact of socio-economic factors, but also stress that 
this impact is significant only in the case of subjective indicators – namely, perceived material 
risk. In the case of objective indicators of socio-economic status such as income, Mewes and 
Mau (2012) reach the same conclusions as Van der Waal et al. (2010), highlighting the 
stronger effect of socio-cultural than socio-economic factors. Thus, Mewes and Mau (2012) 
draw attention to two important findings. First, that support for welfare chauvinism is driven 
by both cultural and economic concerns. Second, the relevance of subjective perceptions of 
socio-economic status, which can change more dynamically in response to economic and 
social developments. On the one hand, these findings encourage us to explore in greater 
depth the interactions and potential linkages between economic and cultural concerns, 
which currently tend to be under-researched. On the other hand, emphasising perceptions 
underlines the need for a more qualitative approach to their study as they emerge through 
social interaction. However, before elaborating on the research approach, we review the 




2.4.2.2 Perceptions of cultural threats 
Perceptions of cultural threats represent the second dimension raised by Group Threat 
Theory to explain the higher level of opposition to immigrants and immigrants’ access to 
welfare among lower-educated, lower-skilled, and working class. The central argument is 
that people with lower socio-economic status rely more on group identity to have a positive 
self-image, triggers greater sensitivity to any threat to the position of the in-group (Tajfel, 
1982). The perceived 'otherness' of immigrants is considered to have a damaging effect on 
dominant national culture, and challenges widely accepted values and social norms, the 
social order and way of life (Barry, 2002; McLaren and Johnson, 2007). Therefore, immigrants 
tend to be considered as risks to the cultural and social dominance of natives. The key 
motivation behind this perception is the need to maintain a positive group identity (Ben-Nun 
Bloom et al., 2015).  
Wright’s research (2011) on national identity and immigration also demonstrates that people 
react to heightened flows of migrants by narrowing the boundaries of their national 
communities – finding clear tendencies towards exclusivity. Kymlicka (2015) also argues that 
cultural considerations tend to be more dominant. Moreover, he claims that perceptions of 
cultural risk trigger perceptions of economic threat. Ivarsflaten (2005), as well as Sides and 
Citrin (2007), argue that perceptions of cultural threats and a preference for cultural unity 
tend to have the strongest impact on opposition to immigrants.  
Comparing ethnic, cultural, and civic conceptions of nationhood, Wright and Reeskens (2013) 
find tendencies towards exclusivity and welfare chauvinism in all three types of national 
identification. Wright and Reeskens (2013) show the relevance of culturally-informed 
symbolic boundaries and refute the expectation that civic or “thinner” conceptions of nation 
are more inclusive to immigrants. Using the 2008 ESS data on welfare chauvinism, Van der 
Waal et al. (2010) as well as Mewes and Mau (2012) tested the power of economic and 
cultural threats, as already mentioned. Van der Waal et al. (2010) examined three potential 
explanations – the effects of political competence, weak economic position, and cultural 
capital – for the higher level of support for welfare chauvinism among lower-educated 
people. However, their conclusions revealed that only the impact of education and cultural 
capital shape restrictive preferences. The authors argue that limited cultural capital induces 
an inclination to authoritarianism and greater exposure to cultural insecurity, which affects 
the perception of immigrants as a threat to the socio-cultural position of the in-group. 
Similarly, Mewes and Mau (2012) put emphasis on authoritarian values and conceive of 
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education as a predictor of authoritarianism, thereby confirming the findings of Van der Waal 
et al. (2010). In addition to these findings, Koning (2013) stresses the important role of 
political framing. He argues that even a low level of welfare dependence can be used and 
interpreted as a cultural threat, thus mobilizing welfare chauvinist measures, while a high 
level of welfare dependence may not mobilize welfare chauvinism if the former is not framed 
as a cultural threat. These conclusions are in line with Hopkins’ (2010) arguments that 
perceptions of both economic and cultural threats intensify only if politicised at the local or 
national level. These findings draw attention again to social constructivism and the need to 
be vigilant to the influence of the public and political discourse surrounding this issue.8  
So far, we have discussed the issues, factors, and perceptions that induce preferences for 
exclusion. However, it is essential to mention Contact Theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; 
Pettigrew and Tropp, 2000), which argues that an increase in the level of interaction between 
nationals and immigrants has a positive effect on the intergroup relations that shape 
attitudes toward immigrants. Laurence (2014) studies interethnic relations at a local level 
and finds that ties connecting individuals with different ethnic backgrounds improve 
perceptions of diversity and attitudes toward immigrants.  
While in quantitative surveys it is difficult to test Contact Theory, Eger and Breznau’s study 
(2017) provides interesting insight into how immigrants’ entitlement to social rights is 
viewed at the regional level. The authors find that people in regions with a higher presence 
of immigrants are less opposed to granting them social rights. This finding suggests the 
positive implications of contact, but Eger and Breznau (2017) also point out the potential for 
the reverse explanation: that immigrants move to places where people are more inclusive. 
Mewes and Mau (2013) partially draw on Contact Theory when they examined the effects of 
globalization on preferences for welfare chauvinism. The authors differentiate societal and 
economic globalization, expecting the former to facilitate openness to immigrants through 
increasing connections to immigrants and expecting the latter to strengthen perceptions of 
group threat and competition. The findings show that neither form of globalization affects 
exclusionary preferences at the aggregate level. Focusing on specific socio-economic groups, 
the positive effect of societal globalization emerges only in relation to people with high socio-
economic status, but only in countries with a low level of economic globalization. These 
inconclusive results reflect the complex interplay between the effects of contact and the 
perception of competition, which needs further elaboration.  
 
8 The role of political and public debates is further discussed in Section 2.4.2.4 
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Cappelen and Peters (2018) compare the impact of Group Threat Theory and Contact Theory 
in relation to preferences for welfare chauvinism in relation to EU migrants and Eastern 
European migrants in particular. Focusing on EU migrants, Cappelen and Peters (2018) find 
evidence for the positive impact of contact and reduction in welfare chauvinism. However, 
the tendencies are reversed and preferences for welfare chauvinism increase in areas with a 
greater presence of Eastern Europeans. Considering that DFs were conducted in Birmingham 
(UK) and Oslo (NO) – two cities with a considerable EU and Non-EU migrant population, we 
can assume some contact between the in-group and immigrants. Furthermore, the groups 
include also participants with a minority ethnic or immigration background and the DFs offer 
participants the opportunity to elaborate on their lived experiences and contact with 
immigrants. Based on these aspects of the research, Contact Theory is taken into account 
during the analysis of the discussions. However, it does not play a central role in the 
theoretical framework as we lack the information, and the appropriate means, to control for 
the type, length, and quality of contact and relations participants have had. Therefore, while 
participants’ references to contact with immigrants are taken seriously and inform the 
analysis, these findings are not interpreted through Contact Theory to avoid any 
misunderstanding.9  
To sum up, studies about Group Threat Theory – i.e., a focus on economic and cultural 
threats – reveal the complexity of potential considerations behind preferences for welfare 
chauvinism and the wide variety of drivers of perceptions of group threat. While the 
literature is inclined to treat economic and cultural threats separately, and to compare which 
of them are more significant in anti-immigrant attitudes or in relation to welfare chauvinism, 
more recent studies have pointed out that both are important (Kymlicka, 2015; Mewes and 
Mau, 2012). However, our knowledge is still limited about the interactions and linkages 
between perceptions of economic and cultural threat. Therefore, throughout the research 
special attention is devoted to the economic and cultural framing of arguments for or against 
the inclusion of immigrants in the welfare state.  
In line with the distinction between economic and cultural threats, the literature tends to 
stress the role of self-interest in relation to the perception of economic threat, and reflects 
on group interests in relation to the perception of cultural threat. Accordingly, the role of 
 
9 While deliberative methods can provide the platform for researching Contact Theory, the research 
design needs to be adjusted to this purpose and facilitate the discussions to reveal such details. As the 
WelfSOC DFs had no such intentions and did not employ any specific arrangements, the use of Contact 
Theory could be easily misinterpreted and findings might not be solid enough.  
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Social Identity Theory is articulated only in relation to cultural threat (Ceobanu and Escandell, 
2010), arguing that individual identities and interests are shaped and filtered by group 
membership (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel et al., 1971). However, this research argues that Social 
Identity Theory and group membership are relevant for the study of both economic and 
cultural threat perceptions – i.e. how people see the position of the in-group and how 
people see 'others’. It is especially this collective aspect that is the focus of this research, 
which argues that attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion are shaped both by perceptions of the 
in-group and by the perceptions of the out-group. In this respect, social categorization and 
intergroup differentiation play a crucial role in defining the boundaries between the in-group 
and the out-group (Turner, 1975; Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1982; Lamont and Molnár, 2002). 
These boundaries are important to protect the position of the in-group and to justify the 
exclusion of the out-group. To better understand what facilitates or obstructs the inclusion 
of immigrants, we need to analyse how people conceptualize and draw such boundaries 
between the in-group and the out-group. This is the point, where we expect that DFs will 
reveal variation in people’s preferences for inclusion and exclusion. This research argues that 
through the process and social practise of intergroup differentiation, people express their 
conceptualisation of the in-group and the out-group. Furthermore, the perceptions of the in-
group and out-group shape people’s understanding of immigration and preferences for 
inclusion or exclusion. However, we need to be cautious regarding the analysis of intergroup 
differentiation as the weight and salience of such in-group and out-group perceptions can 
greatly vary person-by-person and case-by-case discussed during the DFs. The high level of 
variation can give rise to heterogeneity of views and to conflicting stances among 
participants, what needs to be reconciled during DFs. This is one of the key areas where DFs 
can contribute to our better understanding of attitude-formation and shifts in attitudes to 
inclusion of specific groups of immigrants.10 
While we draw on Group Threat Theory, in the theoretical framework of this research the 
accent is put on Social Identity Theory which provides a more encompassing approach to the 
analysis of perceptions of immigrants. On the one hand, we consider it important to identify 
and analyse perceptions of group threats in the DFs to map barriers to inclusion. On the other 
hand, this research focuses on positive perceptions of immigrants that can facilitate the 
inclusion of immigrants. The analysis of both aspects – including an examination of the 
interplay between the economic and cultural framing of arguments – can reveal important 
 
10 The role of heterogeneity/homogeneity of views in group discussions is elaborated in Section 3.3.3 
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findings about the in-group and how the perceptions of the in-group shape perceptions of 
the out-group. 
This literature review started by raising the question who supports welfare chauvinism, and 
why. In line with the literature on anti-immigrant attitudes, research on welfare chauvinism 
stresses that lower-educated, low-skilled, and working class people tend to be the main 
supporters of the former. First, Group Threat Theory was explored as a potential rationale 
for preferences for welfare chauvinism. Keeping our focus on the role of intergroup relations, 
the following section reviews the theory of welfare deservingness. The finding that 
immigrants are perceived as the least deserving group of welfare beneficiaries (Van 
Oorschot, 2000, 2006) is understood by many researchers as a manifestation of welfare 
chauvinism that is fundamentally related to the boundaries between the in-group and out-
group. Therefore, the following section focuses on studies about the welfare deservingness 
of immigrants, and elaborates why immigrants are seen as least deserving.  
 
2.4.2.3 Perceptions of welfare deservingness 
While according to Group Threat Theory preferences for the exclusion of immigrants from 
the welfare state are a response to perceptions of threat, perceptions of deservingness 
directly raise the question of inclusion or exclusion. Deservingness perceptions touch upon 
the relation between the state and the individual and establish the extent and conditions of 
collective obligations towards the individual. Who deserves the support of the welfare state? 
Who is worthy of accessing welfare benefits and services, and which ones? These questions 
may be extended to immigrants as a group of welfare beneficiaries. Findings show that 
immigrants are considered the least deserving group, ranking after elderly people, the sick 
and people with disabilities, and unemployed people (Van Oorschot, 2000, 2006, 2008). As a 
result, Welfare Deservingness Theory has inspired many researchers to study the potential 
mechanisms behind such preferences for the exclusion of immigrants. This section aims to 
review this specific stream of literature, first focusing on the understanding and 
conceptualization of welfare deservingness and deservingness criteria. Second, up-to-date 
research findings are appraised, highlighting the new approaches to the study of immigrants’ 




2.4.2.3.1 The understanding of welfare deservingness and the five deservingness criteria 
Considerations of welfare deservingness, and whether beneficiaries deserve the support 
they receive are one of the most straightforward and automatic responses of individuals 
(Larsen, 2006; Petersen et al., 2012). Accordingly, the main tenet of welfare deservingness 
theory is the claim that public support for welfare benefits and services substantially 
depends on perceptions of the deservingness of the specific groups of welfare beneficiaries 
(Cook, 1979; Coughlin, 1980; Swaan, 1988; Van Oorschot, 2000; Van Oorschot et al., 2017). 
Petersen et al. (2010) argue that deservingness judgements function as cognitive categories 
that people can easily access and use in any situations. Thus, deservingness judgements – 
called “deservingness heuristics” by Petersen et al. (2010) – offer a shortcut to forming 
opinions. Therefore, an analysis of deservingness judgments and the perceptions on which 
they rely can represent a relevant tool for approaching attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion and 
to revealing how people view immigrants and their role in the country of destination.   
Besides acknowledging the spontaneity, easy accessibility and understandability of 
deservingness judgements, we also need to reflect on the complexity of relations 
deservingness judgements embody. Willen (2012) understands deservingness judgements as 
highly relational, situational, and context-dependent. They are relational as deservingness 
judgements encompass not only the perceptions of people whose deservingness is assessed, 
but also the characteristics of the person making the judgement – the individual’s personal 
values and contact with the people in question (Willen, 2012). They are context-dependent 
as the political, economic, social, and cultural context considerably shape these 
considerations (Willen, 2012). Last, they are situational as deservingness claims can shift in 
the light of new information or changing circumstances (Willen, 2012). All these three 
aspects reveal important information about the reasons for such judgements – i.e. what 
social situations, what social contexts, what considerations and values make a difference in 
perceptions of deservingness. Deservingness judgements do not only reveal what is expected 
from the out-group, but also what is important for the in-group. Therefore, this research 
aims to exploit the spontaneity of deservingness judgements, expecting that participants will 
engage in these. Furthermore, it is expected that through the interactions between 
participants in DFs, the interplay between perceptions of the in-group and the out-group will 
emerge and reveal the thresholds of inclusion – defining what is perceived to make an 
immigrant worthy of receiving welfare support. 
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The literature distinguishes five deservingness criteria (DC) that affect perceptions of 
deservingness. Drawing on and synthesising previous literature (Cook, 1979; Coughlin, 1980; 
Swaan, 1988), Wim van Oorschot (2000) specifies these as Need, Control, Reciprocity, 
Attitude, and Identity. All of these principles assess a particular aspect of individuals’ conduct 
and behaviour. Moreover, group cues and public images of specific groups of beneficiaries 
are especially influential (Petersen et al., 2012; Larsen, 2006, 2013; Kootstra, 2016, 2017). 
Therefore, both perspectives about the individual and the group of welfare beneficiaries 
need to be considered in relation to all DC. The principle Need refers to the perception of the 
neediness of welfare beneficiaries, while the criterion Control refers to welfare beneficiaries’ 
responsibility for and control over their neediness. The principle Control is considerably 
based on appraisals of whether individuals are making sufficient effort to secure their own 
welfare. This is best illustrated with the popular differentiation between being “lazy” and 
being “a victim of circumstances” (Larsen, 2006; Petersen et al., 2012).  
The criterion Reciprocity encompasses considerations of past or future contributions of the 
individual. The greater the individual’s past or prospective future contributions to the 
welfare system, the greater the justification for receiving state support. The criterion 
Attitude represents a more encompassing principle which expects compliance and 
gratefulness for the support the individual receives. Last, the principle Identity reflects on 
the phenomenon of the greater willingness of people to perceive deservingness if they can 
identify with the beneficiaries (Van Oorschot, 2000; Van Oorschot et al., 2017). In a broader 
understanding (within the in-group of nationals), this identification can mean sharing a 
common interest, a common past, or an expected forthcoming experience which can trigger 
greater solidarity with welfare beneficiaries – e.g. toward the elderly, or parents 
representing particular life stages. However, in relation to immigration, Identity is typically 
associated with national identity.  
The attitude studies conducted by Van Oorschot (2006, 2008; 2017) suggest that these 
deservingness principles are universally applicable throughout the world. However, it is 
widely acknowledged that there might be great variability in relation to which DC, or which 
combination of criteria, are the most relevant for specific groups of beneficiaries (Reeskens 
and van der Meer, 2017, 2018; Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012). This also implies the need 
to critically reappraise the universal applicability of these principles and shed light on how 
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the deservingness of specific groups and subgroups of welfare beneficiaries11 is constructed. 
Furthermore, it is important to stress that these five DC are deduced from the wider research 
on welfare states and welfare attitudes. While they are based on empirical findings and 
have been operationalized and measured in public opinion surveys, our knowledge tends 
to be limited about people’s understanding and use of deservingness principles (Van 
Oorschot and Roosma, 2015). Moreover, the above-described definitions of these five 
principles are rather vague and require specification when talking about concrete groups of 
beneficiaries. This is especially the case with immigrants, who are the only group of 
beneficiaries to represent an out-group that falls outside the nationally-framed welfare 
community.  
 
2.4.2.3.2 Studies about immigrants’ deservingness 
Focusing specifically on immigrants, Reeskens and Van Oorschot (2012) argue that 
immigrants are associated with deservingness primarily in relation to the principles of 
Reciprocity, Identity, and Control. First, considering Reciprocity, immigrants tend to make 
limited contributions to the welfare system, and future contributions cannot be foreseen 
partially due to their greater international mobility. Second, their deservingness is affected 
by the in-group seeing them as an out-group, which shows that the Identity principle is 
understood in terms of national identity. Third, in their case the principle of Control is 
interpreted as control over migration – i.e. taking responsibility for their choice to migrate. 
This means that perceptions of immigrants’ deservingness decrease if their responsibility for 
migrating is seen as higher. However, the concrete mechanism that shapes perceptions of 
deservingness and ordinary people’s understanding and use of these principles has not been 
scrutinized yet. Research into immigrants’ deservingness has primarily focused on the 
individual- and the context-level effects. 
Studies have thus far confirmed the effects of self-interest-driven considerations (Reeskens 
and Van Oorschot, 2012; Van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007), along with the effects of egalitarian 
values (Van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007), and redistribution preferences (Reeskens and Van 
Oorschot, 2012) on perceptions of the deservingness of immigrants. Focusing on 
redistribution effects, Reeskens and van Oorschot (2012) found a greater tendency to 
welfare chauvinism in liberal welfare systems in comparison to conservative or social 
 
11 The subgroups are meant to reflect on the heterogeneity within the five groups of welfare 
beneficiaries included in studies on welfare deservingness. 
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democratic welfare regimes.12 Furthermore, findings disprove the expectation that a higher 
level of welfare spending or higher level of immigration necessarily reduces solidarity 
towards immigrants (Van Oorschot, 2008; Van Oorschot and Uunk, 2007). However, the 
mechanisms behind such patterns need to be further investigated. This is primarily due to 
the fact that the literature on welfare deservingness predominantly relies on international 
and national public opinion surveys (Van Oorschot and Roosma, 2015), which represent a 
strictly top-down approach. Public opinion surveys raise a limited number of questions that 
resemble researchers’ interests and conceptions of social issues, and do not allow 
participants to elaborate the reasons for their answers (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012). In 
recognition of this gap in the literature, we can observe an increase in new approaches to 
the study of deservingness.  
More recent studies have avoided comparing the deservingness of various welfare 
beneficiaries and focused more on the deservingness gap that unfolds in relation to 
immigrants (Kootstra, 2016, 2017; Reeskens and van der Meer, 2018). Using different survey 
experiments, both Kootstra (2016) and Reeskens and van der Meer (2018) found evidence 
for substantial double standards in the perceptions of deservingness of unemployed people 
from the in-group and the out-group (when distinguishing different regional and ethnic 
backgrounds). However, their findings diverge with regard to whether the deservingness gap 
can be reduced (yes: Kootstra, 2016; no: Reeskens and van der Meer, 2018). The issue of 
overcoming deservingness gap is especially relevant for our research as it indicates potential 
changes in perceptions of immigrants as more or less deserving. Moreover, these 
inconclusive findings about reducing the deservingness gap imply divisions about the 
possibility and conditions of immigrants’ inclusion. It is expected that such divisions will 
emerge in the DFs, allowing us to analyse how such competing views are deliberated by 
participants, helping clarify the key conditions for inclusion. 
Further developing the research on immigrants’ deservingness, Kootstra (2017) identified 
differences between deservingness perceptions concerning various ethnic minorities and 
immigrants in the UK. She claims that considerations of the five DC matter more in relation 
to negatively perceived ethnic minority groups and immigrants than to positively perceived 
groups. While Kootstra (2017) finds the principles of Attitude, Reciprocity, and Identity to be 
most relevant, she also warns about overgeneralizing due to the limited number of 
 
12 The institutional line of reasoning concerning welfare chauvinism and the deservingness of 
immigrants is further discussed in Section 2.4.2.4.1 
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statements applicable to some of the criteria within the experiment. While these studies 
shed light on people’s considerations behind deservingness judgements and reveal which 
principles are prioritised and make a difference, research experiments still reproduce the 
top-down approach and design of public opinion surveys. Therefore, the issues relating to 
peoples’ understanding and use of these principles requires further investigation.  
So far, there have been only a few studies about people’s understanding and use of 
deservingness principles in relation to immigrants. Osipovic (2015) and Kremer (2016) 
conducted single-country studies with a focus on labour migrants’ attitudes to the welfare 
state in the UK and in the Netherlands, respectively. Keeping our attention on the study of 
majority (in-group) welfare attitudes, two recent articles should be mentioned – both of 
which analysed focus groups conducted within the WelfSOC research project.13 Laenen et al. 
(2019) focus on the use of DC (in general), comparing Danish, German, and British focus 
groups as representatives of the three welfare regimes. The findings reveal the centrality of 
principles of Reciprocity, Need, and Control in all three countries. However, the authors also 
identify patterns of institutional differences, as greater emphasis was put on Need in the UK, 
and on Reciprocity in Germany. In Denmark, none of the principles stood out as intensively 
deployed by participants. In relation to Reciprocity, the researchers find a crucial difference 
between the responses of people who evaluated past contributions, and those who 
considered the future contributions of beneficiaries as reasons for deservingness. This 
differentiation is especially relevant for immigrants, whose perceived deservingness tends 
to decrease in the case of the former respondents, and increase in the case of the latter.  
Nielsen et al. (2020) examine perceptions of immigrants’ deservingness by analysing focus 
group discussions in four countries. Their findings show the use of all five deservingness 
principles, but put greater emphasis on Reciprocity, Attitude, Need, and Control. The authors 
also point at the different understandings of the specific principles, which are used in parallel 
in the discussions. Furthermore, they found that Reciprocity and Attitude; and Need and 
Control were closely linked in the arguments of focus group participants. These research 
findings shed new light not only on the different meanings people associate with 
deservingness principles and justifying deservingness of welfare beneficiaries, but also reveal 
the interplay of principles in perceptions of deservingness. This research aims to contribute 
to this stream of literature by going beyond the static picture of attitudes expressed in 
 
13 WelfSOC involved conducting DF in 2015 and focus groups in 2016. However, this research uses 
only the DF data.  
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surveys in response to a pre-defined list of questions. It aims to further our knowledge and 
understanding of the key considerations behind immigrants’ deservingness.  
Moreover, recalling Willen’s (2012) conceptions of deservingness as relational, context-
dependent, and situational, this research intends to identify how deservingness judgements 
change in relation to different groups of immigrants, different social contexts and situations, 
and how the interplay between the in-group and out-group play out in justifications for or 
against immigrants’ deservingness. Taking this dynamic approach is further underlined by 
the fact that studies have so far presented inconclusive findings about the variability in 
salience and importance of these deservingness principles. It is expected that perceptions of 
immigrants’ deservingness will be constructed of different DC depending on the specific 
groups of immigrants and social contexts. Similarly, the importance of specific DC will also 
change depending on the specific social contexts and situations. It is especially these 
dynamically changing considerations that may shift preferences along the earlier described 
continuum of pro-inclusion and pro-exclusion attitudes.  
This section has been devoted to reviewing the literature on welfare deservingness theory 
and its application to the study of attitudes to immigrants’ access to welfare provisions. Each 
of the five DC reflect on specific considerations that can shape and inform attitudes to 
immigrants’ inclusion. Furthermore, perceptions of welfare deservingness are considered to 
provide a useful means of analysing attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion as deservingness 
judgements are easily accessible to people, and are widely deployed in public and political 
discourse to justify access to welfare benefits and services. Therefore, it is expected that 
participants will use deservingness judgements naturally in their arguments for or against 
immigrants’ inclusion. As deservingness is used in public and political debates, this also raises 
the issue of how the social and institutional context shapes such perceptions of 
deservingness. This leads us to the third stream of literature which specifically focuses on 
the impact of institutions. The following section is devoted to a discussion of how the 





2.4.2.4 The institutionalist approach to the study of welfare attitudes  
The third major research approach to the study of restrictive preferences for immigrants’ 
access to welfare provisions is represented by the institutionalist approach to welfare 
attitudes that stresses the impact of institutions in attitude-formation.  
This literature review has stressed the high level of political salience of the issue of 
immigration as well as the role of political and public discourse in shaping public attitudes. 
Considering the heightened political debate on immigration in relation to the 2015 Refugee 
Crisis throughout Europe right before the conduct of the DF discussions, the analysis of the 
effects of political discourse (Zaller, 1992; Schmidt, 2002; Chilton, 2004; Leruth and Taylor-
Gooby, 2019) emerges as a relevant and compelling approach to pursue in order to examine 
how the political discourse on the issue of immigration and immigrants’ access to welfare 
benefits and services is reproduced in the DF. 14  However, within this research 
institutionalism is chosen as a more comprehensive approach. Institutionalism incorporates 
and duly considers political discourse, but the analysis is not limited to this one aspect but 
being more vigilant how key institutional features are used and reproduced both in political 
and public discourse, how policies develop and respond to social changes and processes.  
The thermostatic model of public opinion change (Soroka and Wlezien, 2009; Wlezien, 1995) 
is another popular theoretical approach in attitude research. The thermostat effect relies on 
the assumption that changes in the social and political contexts – e.g. perceptions of increase 
in social insecurity – can alter attitudes and policy preferences. Following up on the above 
example, studies show that an increase in the perception of social insecurity implies greater 
social solidarity and preference to spend more on social benefits (Baumberg Geiger, 2014). 
Thermostatic effects were evidenced also in relation to attitudes to immigration to explain 
the complex relations between public opinion and policy changes (Ford et al., 2015; Jennings, 
2009). While these findings and the proven importance of changes in social and political 
context were duly taken into account, Institutionalism was seen as a more comprehensive 
theory, which builds on these fine details and is sensitive to changes in social and political 
contexts. All in all, for the purposes of this research, Institutionalism has been considered 
more suitable to grasp the complexity of interactions between political and public discourse 
 
14 Within the WelfSOC project Leruth and Taylor-Gooby (2018) analysed the adoption of political 
parties’ electoral programmes in the British DF discussions specifically focusing on preferences for 
restricting immigrants’ access to welfare benefits and services.  
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and the diverse public reactions to social and policy developments within a particular 
institutional context. 
The roots of the institutionalist approach within welfare attitudes research can be traced 
back to the tenets of historical neo-institutionalism (March and Olsen, 2008: 4) that views 
institutions as “a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in 
structures of meaning and resources”. In this regard, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) major 
contribution in theorizing and categorising welfare regimes accents the role of welfare 
institutions, and the values, rules, and principles the three types of welfare regimes 
represent. The former has given impetus to research studies to find evidence how 
differences between welfare regimes emerge, and in which areas they are most salient. This 
chapter has already touched upon some key institutional arguments, first when discussing 
the effect of immigration on welfare state support (Goul Andersen, 2006; Banting, 1998; 
Crepaz, 2008; Taylor-Gooby, 2005; Soroka et al., 2006; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009). Second, 
institutional factors were briefly raised in the review of literature on perceptions of economic 
and cultural threats (Van Der Waal et al., 2010; Mewes and Mau, 2012; Koning, 2013). Third, 
the institutional approach has been influential in relation to perceptions of welfare 
deservingness (Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012; Van Oorschot, 2006). This section explores 
studies that raise institutional arguments. The review starts by presenting 1) literature that 
finds support for the impact of institutional factors, followed by 2) literature that introduces 
a more dynamic approach to the analysis of the role of institutions. 
 
2.4.2.4.1 The impact of institutions on preferences for welfare chauvinism 
Considering the categorisation of three welfare regimes, the identification of evidence for 
welfare-regime-specific patterns in relation to public support for the welfare state have 
tended to be inconclusive (for a review see Jaeger, 2009). However, in relation to the study 
of welfare chauvinism differences have emerged. Crepaz and Damron (2009) focus on the 
differentiation between selective and universal welfare states, finding that the latter are 
more likely to restrict the spread of welfare chauvinism. The authors argue that people in 
selective welfare systems – i.e. in liberal welfare regimes – are more susceptible to the 
discourse of targeted and differentiated approaches to beneficiaries, which induces greater 
inclination to increase the conditionality of immigrants’ access to welfare provisions. Mau 
and Burkhardt’s findings (2009) also suggest that the role of institutional factors and the 
politics of interpretations are especially crucial in relation to public support for the inclusion 
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of immigrants. From an examination of the effect of ethnic diversity on support for 
immigrants’ access to welfare provision, the authors found a negative, but weak association. 
However, their findings also showed that the welfare regime typology and left-wing parties 
are important for reducing the effects of ethnic diversity. They also identified greater 
openness towards immigrants’ access to welfare in social democratic welfare states.  
Van der Waal et al. (2013) compare welfare chauvinism across the three welfare regimes. 
The authors conclude that welfare chauvinism is present in all of them, but to a different 
extent. Contrary to expectations, they identify two types of welfare chauvinism and state 
that liberal and conservative regimes are more inclined to welfare chauvinism than social 
democratic welfare states. Although their results also underline that greater selectivity 
regarding eligibility for benefits leads to higher welfare chauvinism, they could not find 
evidence that universal access to benefits is the reason for a lower level of welfare 
chauvinism in social democratic regimes. They do not find any effect of labour market 
trajectories or ethnic competition. However, they observe that a higher level of income 
inequality leads to a higher degree of welfare chauvinism. The authors conclude that policies 
and institutions aimed at reducing economic inequalities contribute to coping with welfare 
chauvinism.  
Approaching the study of welfare chauvinism from the perspective of deservingness theory, 
Reeskens and Van Oorschot (2012) compare support for welfare chauvinism according to 
three welfare-regime-specific redistribution preferences – namely, need-, merit- and 
equality-based redistribution preferences. Their findings show that only needs-based 
redistribution preferences imply higher support for welfare chauvinism. The authors argue 
that with needs-based redistribution preferences the self-interest of the needy tend to 
dominate, which accents intergroup differentiations and the motivation for the in-group to 
keep limited resources for themselves. Merit- and equality-based redistribution preferences 
infer greater openness to granting immigrants access to the welfare state. Furthermore, 
Reeskens and Van Oorschot (2012) find that merit-based redistribution preferences are the 
most resistant to welfare chauvinism, stressing reciprocity as a condition of access to 
welfare. 
The findings of the above-mentioned studies are coherent in that they point at the greater 
susceptibility of liberal welfare regimes to welfare chauvinism. This is underlined by the 
dimension of selectivity and universalism and redistribution preferences, as well as the level 
of income inequality. However, the mechanism by which these specific institutions affects 
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individual attitudes remains overshadowed, raising the questions how these institutional 
aspects affect individuals, and how the related contextual factors interact with individual-
level factors and perceptions. To address some aspects of this question, Mau (2003, 2004) 
and Larsen (2006, 2007) have suggested taking a more dynamic institutionalist approach to 
the study of welfare attitudes. 
 
2.4.2.4.2 Dynamic institutionalist approach 
Both Mau (2003, 2004) and Larsen (2006, 2007) revisit the fundamental questions of why 
people support the welfare state, and how welfare institutions affect people’s attitudes. 
Both authors challenge the popular theories and claims that individual self-interest and class 
interests underlie support for the welfare state. While searching for the answers what 
influences public attitudes and policy preferences, theories on self-interest and theories on 
class interests juxtapose the individual and collective social aspects. In contrast, Mau and 
Larsen show how self-interest and class interest are connected to and influenced by the 
institutional context. Their findings and arguments were key to give priority to the dynamic 
institutionalist approach in this research instead of analysing the effects of self-interests 
(Chong et al., 2001; Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Jæger, 2006; Svallfors, 2012), or the role of 
class interests (Kulin and Svallfors, 2013; Svallfors, 2006) in attitude-formation in relation to 
the issue immigration. As described later in Chapter 3, this does not mean the role of self-
interest or collective interests is disregarded during the analysis, but they figure in the 
theoretical approach as conceived by Mau and Larsen as connected and shaped by the 
institutional context. None of their studies focus on immigration or immigrants’ access to 
welfare provisions. However, their contributions and approach inform us about the role of 
welfare institutions in people’s thinking.  
To grasp the normative dimension of welfare states, Mau (2004: 58) acknowledges that 
“social transactions are grounded upon a socially constituted and subjectively validated set of 
social norms and shared moral assumptions.” Elaborating on the moral dimension of the 
welfare states, the author highlights that welfare states 1) produce and validate specific 
conception of social justice, and 2) justify the common need for and commitment to “the 
distribution of welfare burdens and benefits” (Mau, 2003: 560). Through these moral 
assumptions and social norms, widely internalized by people, institutions construct what is 
socially appropriate and acceptable and define the norms of reciprocity; which according to 
Mau is the central social logic behind the popular support for welfare states. However, 
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institutions define not only norms but also collective interests, which shape people’s 
understanding of issues and their interests. Acknowledging people’s embeddedness in social 
ties and networks, Mau (2003) places individual attitudes and individual support for welfare 
policies into a more dynamic and complex context. He argues that people as “public spirited 
citizens” form welfare attitudes based on a combination of self-interest, collective interest, 
moral concern and moral judgements about what is appropriate and justified.  
Similarly, Larsen (2006, 2007) understands individual attitudes as the attitudes of a more 
reflexive “political man” which are shaped by perceptions of reality. He argues that 
perceptions of reality are considerably influenced by welfare institutions and the way social 
issues are framed and interpreted in the welfare state. Both Mau’s and Larsen’s definitions 
extend the scope of considerations affecting attitude-formation and highlight the dynamic 
interplay between them, in which welfare institutions, the media, public and political 
discourses, and the specific framings of social issues play a crucial role. Sundberg (2014) also 
elaborates on the role of the institutional context on individual attitudes, arguing that 
individual attitudes adapt to changes in institutional and social contexts, which further 
increases the significance of political interpretations and framings and the potential shifts 
they can generate.  
As immigrants are not genuinely part of the moral community of the welfare state – as 
described by Mau (2003) – the role of political framings and public discourse are even more 
relevant as these create and shape how immigrants fit into the common understanding of 
social justice and fairness in the welfare state, and how social norms and moral assumptions 
apply in relation to immigrants and their access to welfare. In other words, the narratives of 
what is appropriate for immigrants and what is expected from immigrants are continuously 
being shaped. Throughout the analysis of DFs, particular attention is devoted to identifying 
how social norms and values emerge and are reproduced in participants’ arguments for or 
against the inclusion of immigrants. In this way we intend to scrutinize the role of institutions 
and the role of public and political discourse on attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion.  
Furthermore, drawing on the above-presented findings about the differences between 
welfare regimes’ impact on support for welfare chauvinism, the comparison of the 
Norwegian and British discussions also allows us to analyse whether and how welfare-
regime-specific characteristics unfold and shape the discussions. In this regard, Mau’s (2003) 
findings about the welfare regime-specific norms of reciprocity, and Larsen’s (2006, 2007) 
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findings concerning how welfare institutions affect the public perceptions of poor and 
unemployed people also inform our approach to the analysis of DFs.   
  
2.5 THEORETICAL APPROACH 
The academic literature on public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state 
reviewed above provided guidance and inspiration for defining the scope and theoretical 
approach of this research. Despite the growing literature on welfare attitudes that focuses 
specifically on immigrants, our knowledge tends to be limited concerning why and in what 
specific contexts people support an inclusive or exclusive approach to immigrants’ access to 
welfare provisions. The reason for this gap is the dominance of a quantitative approach to 
the study of public attitudes that uses international public opinion surveys (Ervasti et al., 
2012; Sundberg and Taylor-Gooby, 2013). These surveys provide important, internationally 
comparable data about people’s preferences. However, among other factors the top-down 
approach and the strict design of the surveys do not allow us to study the reasons and 
considerations behind the responses or the attitudes which are expressed (Goerres and 
Prinzen, 2012). To address this gap and improve our understanding of public attitudes to 
immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state, this research takes a qualitative research 
approach. 
Social Constructivism makes up the backbone of the research – starting with the social 
constructivist understanding of public attitudes, and affecting the remaining three theories 
(Social Identity Theory, Welfare Deservingness Theory, and Institutionalism) that are applied 
in this research. In contrast to the traditional view of attitudes as enduring and stable 
dispositions (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975), social constructivists argue that attitudes are shaped 
by the social and institutional context surrounding the individual, by public discourse and by 
social interactions (Converse, 2006; Tourangeau et al., 2000; Wilson and Hodges, 1992). 
Thus, attitudes are viewed as being substantially context-dependent and subject to change, 
which forms the key theoretical argument and contribution of this research. This 
understanding encourages us to study attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state 
through social interactions during DFs – to analyse how attitudes are shared, how attitudes 
develop and change. Accordingly, this research is committed to examining the specific 




Immigration is a complex and highly polarizing social issue, at the epicentre of which are 
intergroup relations. As welfare states are based on group membership, the issue of 
intergroup relations is even more salient when discussing immigrants’ access to welfare 
provision. This is the reason that Social Identity Theory (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel et al., 1971; 
Turner, 1975) is considered particularly relevant for this research. Furthermore, the key 
tenets of Social Identity Theory regarding the connections between perceptions of the in-
group and perceptions of the out-group encouraged us to look at the practice of intergroup 
differentiation (differentiating “us” from “them”) and to analyse attitudes to immigrants’ 
inclusion through the intergroup differentiation raised by participants during the discussions.  
Immigrants’ access to welfare is often viewed as challenging the well-defined boundaries of 
the welfare state and implicitly raising the question of under what conditions should they be 
allowed to gain access to it. In other words, when and under what conditions should 
immigrants – or specific groups of immigrants – be included or excluded? This research 
intends to disentangle the specific arguments for or against inclusion, to elaborate on the 
processes of inclusion and exclusion as developed by the participants in order to illuminate 
what facilitates inclusion, and what considerations and concerns hinder it. Drawing on Group 
Threat Theory (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Quillian, 1995) the research distinguishes 
whether immigrants are perceived as threats, costs, as potential resources, benefits to the 
country under analysis. Furthermore, this research argues that these perceptions can co-
exist and participants will differentiate and clarify which groups of immigrants are considered 
as costs or benefits moving along the mentioned abstract continuum of inclusion and 
exclusion. This way, we can better reveal how participants understand heterogeneity of 
immigrants, how participants characterise what they expect from immigrant and delineate 
how immigrants can move from one category to another – from being perceived negatively 
to positively.  
To further specify the scope of this research, and particularly the term inclusion, the research 
draws on Welfare Deservingness Theory (Van Oorschot, 2000; Van Oorschot et al., 2017) and 
will analyse people’s perceptions of immigrants’ deservingness. First, deservingness 
judgements are easily accessible and used in many situations to form welfare-related 
opinions (Petersen et al., 2010). Therefore, it is expected that deservingness judgements will 
be widely used during the DF discussions. Second, as argued by Willen (2012), deservingness 
judgements are relational, situational, and context-dependent. Accordingly, within the 
discussions – when participants have time and might be specifically asked by others to 
elaborate on their views and preferences – it is expected that deservingness judgements will 
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shed more light on relational aspects both in terms of intergroup relations, and in terms of 
the desired relation between the state and individual immigrants. Moreover, deservingness 
judgments allow us to analyse the specific contexts and situations in which immigrants are 
perceived as deserving and worthy of inclusion, or perceived as undeserving and rejected. 
As participants interact and raise competing views, it will be important to scrutinize how 
boundaries of inclusion and exclusion shift during the discussions. Third, within this research 
particular attention is devoted to the analysis of how people understand and use the five 
deservingness principles (Van Oorschot, 2000), as this is still an under-researched area within 
the theory. While analysing how participants construct the welfare deservingness of 
immigrants, it is not only the use of the five criteria that will be scrutinized, but also the 
hierarchy and the specific relations and interplay between the five criteria.   
The fourth theoretical pillar of the research is constituted by Institutionalism, or more 
specifically, by the dynamic institutionalist approach to the study of welfare attitudes (Mau, 
2003, 2004; Larsen, 2006, 2007; Sundberg, 2014). In the dynamic institutionalist approach, 
people are conceived of as reflexive individuals embedded in a specific social and 
institutional context. This social and institutional embeddedness implies a particular vision 
of society and of social justice. Furthermore, it implies (tacit) knowledge of and adherence 
to social norms and values. Accordingly, attitudes are also understood to be shaped by the 
social and institutional context that includes the specific and more dynamically changing 
political framings of issues, and public discourses.  
While theories on the impact of political discourses and thermostat effects on changes in 
public opinion were duly considered as useful theoretical approaches to the analysis, 
Institutionalism and more specifically the dynamic institutionalist approach offered a more 
comprehensive approach. It enables us to identify and analyse greater variation of patterns 
emerging in the DF discussions. It is believed that people’s vision of society and 
understanding of social reality is highly influenced by the institutional context including the 
development of the political and public discourse, the diverse (individualised) perceptions of 
and direct or indirect experiences of the social and policy changes. As these influences are 
highly interactive, this research aims to approach them in their complexity. The effects of the 
social and institutional context are expected to emerge with regard to perceptions of 
immigrants’ welfare deservingness and preferences for specific forms of inclusion or 
exclusion. Drawing on the comparative research on welfare states, attention to the 
institutional context is further justified for testing and elaborating on the similarities and 
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differences between the British and Norwegian DF discussions about immigration and 
immigrants’ inclusion.  
This chapter was devoted to reviewing the literature related to the study of immigration and 
the welfare state, and more specifically, the study of welfare chauvinism and attitudes to 
immigrants’ access to welfare provision. The literature review has presented the diversity of 
approaches to the research on this issue, with particular attention to four theories which 
have inspired and influenced the thematic specification and theoretical and methodological 
approach applied in this research. Following the identification of the key gaps in the 
literature, and definition of the key objectives of this research, the next chapter is devoted 
to introduce the chosen methodology.   
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3 METHODOLOGY  
 
Following the review of the academic literature and identification of under-researched areas 
in relation to public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state, this chapter 
presents the methodology applied in this research. Furthermore, it justifies why the use of a 
combination of the methods of Discourse analysis (DA) and Democratic forums (DF) is 
suitable for addressing the research questions about the complexity of considerations 
behind attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion, and the process of attitude-formation. The 
methodological contribution this research aims to make is twofold. First, it applies these two 
methods to extend our understanding of attitudes to immigrants’ access to welfare and 
thus complements knowledge that has primarily been based on international public 
opinion surveys (Sundberg and Taylor-Gooby, 2013). Second, as the application of these two 
methods has been rare in the field of welfare attitudes, it critically assesses the applicability 
of these methods, reflecting on their strength and potential, as well as disadvantages.   
It is argued that public attitudes, especially attitudes to complex issues such as immigration 
and the welfare state, can be better examined through social interaction, as participants 
engage in deliberation during DFs. When participating in a discussion, people can express the 
opinion, values, and beliefs that underlie their attitudes, can elaborate on potential 
ambivalences or contradictory views, can contest others’ opinions and to readdress their 
own. The deliberative method of DF was adopted to provide a structured framework for the 
development of a discussion about the future of welfare state, in which participants act as 
co-producers of knowledge. However, the core of the research is formed by DA as applied to 
the data thus gathered. The following section: 1) describes the research methodology, 
including the ontological and epistemological approaches that guide the research process; 
2) justifies the choice of methods of data collection and data analysis; and 3) introduces the 
research design and the process of data analysis. 
 
3.1 RESEARCH APPROACH 
The theoretical understanding of public attitudes – as described in detail in Chapter 2 – 
essentially influenced the research approach and methodological planning. Understanding 
attitudes as dynamic social concepts (Converse, 2006; Tourangeau et al., 2000; Wilson and 
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Hodges, 1992), the research follows a social constructivist approach, which claims that 
social reality is always in the process of formation (Denzin and Lincoln, 2017). Social actors 
construct and re-construct the meaning of social reality, social practices, and attitudes 
through interaction (Bryman, 2015). Therefore, social constructivism suggests reflecting on 
and examining the social contexts – including norms, values, dominant interpretations, etc. 
– that influence how people share specific aspects of their identities and attitudes, how they 
speak about social issues. Emphasis is put on how reality is understood and interpreted by 
people, and on accepting that there are multiple ways of making sense of the world and that 
these interpretations may be modified as the social context changes (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2017).  
In line with this approach, the research does not intend to produce and describe a single, 
objective reality, but is rather designed to extend our knowledge about attitudes through an 
analysis of meanings and interpretations shared by the DF participants. To address the 
research questions, primarily discourse analytical methods are applied. DA is strongly linked 
to the social constructivist understanding of social issues and process. The bottom-up 
approach characteristic of DA represents an exploratory analytical framework to reflect on 
how people understand and (re-)construct reality (Taylor, 2013). According to discourse 
analysts, perceptions and interpretations of social reality are situationally embedded in 
discourses and always reflect a particular perspective; a set of values and interests (Taylor, 
2013; Wodak et al., 2009). Meanings and framings of social issues change with the context 
in relation to what is being debated. In line with this constructivist approach, the current 
research conceives that there is no clear demarcation between inclusion and exclusion, 
and that the boundaries between the inclusion and exclusion of immigrants move along 
an imaginary continuum; likewise, attitudes to inclusion depend on specificities (related to 
the visions of specific groups of immigrants) and contexts. 
Acknowledging the complexity, multi-dimensionality, and context dependency of attitudes, 
the research is ambitious in considering and dealing with a wide spectrum of variables and 
focusing on the interplay between various factors, contexts, and actors. Accordingly, the 
research adheres to qualitative research traditions utilizing the richness of discursive data. 
However, it does not follow a fully data-driven and inductive approach, but draws on some 
of the key principles of critical realism. In line with critical realism, the research applies a 
theory-driven approach that incorporates an explicit acknowledgement of the fallibility of 
theory which permits a more flexible and experimental coding and analytical process 
(Archer et al., 2016; Fletcher, 2017). In practice, this means that the first list of codes draws 
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on Social Identity Theory and Institutionalism, as outlined in Chapter 2. Moreover, a high 
level of flexibility was maintained during the coding and analysis to incorporate the details 
that unfolded during the DFs. Thus, the process of coding and analysis became a significant 
learning pathway which included familiarization with the discussions and the participants, 
and deepening the researcher’s understanding of the discussions and the emerging 
attitudes. This step-by-step process enabled the gradual specification of the scope of the 
research devoting attention to emerging patterns. A good example of this is the identification 
of patterns regarding participants’ use and understanding of deservingness criteria, which 
became a key pillar of the research (see Chapters 5 and 6).   
 
3.2 APPROACHING THE STUDY OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES THROUGH DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
The current research understands attitudes as dynamic social concepts which are formed in, 
and in relation to, social contexts (Wilson and Hodges, 1992). The importance associated 
with attitudes may greatly vary; consequently, the strength of contextual effects and 
people’s openness to considering others’ views may also change depending on the issues 
(Howe and Krosnick, 2017). Welfare attitudes can involve uncertainty, ambiguity, and even 
contradictory claims (Roosma et al., 2013; Svallfors, 2010; Van Oorschot and Meuleman, 
2012). Moreover, some issues are not considered by some people, who thus do not have any 
prior attitudes toward them. To better understand such specificities of welfare attitudes, we 
consider discursive processes more suitable for encouraging people to elaborate on their 
opinions, views, and attitudes. Furthermore, through the discursive processes we can also 
analyse the process of attitude-formation.  
Gee (1992: 107) argues that “Each Discourse involves ways of talking, acting, interacting, 
valuing, and believing, as well as the spaces and materials ‘props’ the group uses to carry out 
its social practices. Discourses integrate words, acts, values, beliefs, attitudes, social identities, 
as well as gestures, glances, body positions, and clothes.” Accordingly, discourses embrace a 
wide range of aspects, revealing often unspoken considerations and latent attitudes which 
help us better understand how people make sense of the world. DA was adopted to utilize 
and deal with the complexity of information discourses carry.  
DA offers a wide range of methods such as critical discourse analysis, conversation analysis, 
and narrative analysis, just to name a few. The focus of DA can also vary from content analysis 
with its focus on the function of language in discourse, analysis of the process of discourse, 
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narrative analysis, etc. (Whetherel et al., 2001). This research aspires to take a pragmatic 
approach to DA and focuses specifically on the process of exchanges of opinions and 
interactions through which DF participants’ stances about inclusion and exclusion develop. 
First, using DA the research aims to identify and analyse the thematic and discursive 
patterns of DF discussions. It intends to map how people talk about immigration and 
immigrants’ access to the welfare state, focusing on key arguments, considerations, and the 
use of values, principles and interests. Second, the research aims to analyse the dynamics of 
discussions and interactions to elaborate on the process of attitude-formation.   
As a second method, narrative analysis was considered to represent a micro-level approach 
in the research. The aim was to analyse narratives of participants with specific profiles for 
the whole period of the DFs. Accordingly, a pilot analysis was conducted. The essence of 
narrative analysis is to identify how participants’ narratives develop with their adoption of 
different social identities within debates. In other words, how specific issues induce solidarity 
based on social status, gender, age, or national identification (Squire, 2005). In contrast to 
these expectations, the narratives of even the most active participants were not extensive 
enough for such an in-depth analysis. The pilot analysis showed that this approach did not 
work well in the context of group interactions. One of the potential reasons for the limited 
applicability of this specific method may have stemmed from the specific design of the 
WelfSOC.15 Presumably, the creation of smaller discussions groups and the incorporation of 
fewer discussion topics could have enhanced its applicability. Although the narrative analysis 
was not applied in this particular research, we argue that, with special arrangements for the 
design of DFs, the method could be utilized in the future. While the use of narrative analysis 
was thus eliminated, the aim of analysing the micro, individual level of attitude-formation 
was maintained and accomplished using the techniques of DA (see Chapter 8). 
 
3.2.1 Three perspectives for examination  
DA can help elaborate how attitudes toward the inclusion of immigrants are represented in 
DF discussions. The analysis focuses on three perspectives. First, discourse analytical tools 
enable us to identify thematic patterns in the debates and analyse what ideas, aspects, and 
issues are raised concerning immigration. It is expected that attitude-formation shall be 
mobilized in light of new information, and convincing arguments (Goodin and Niemeyer, 
 
15 The research design is described in Section 3.3.1 
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2003; Luskin et al., 2002). Besides identifying the diversity of thoughts, it is important to 
follow-up how and when such new ideas and opinions are shared by participants, and how 
they contextualize and justify their stances and preferences (see Chapter 5 and 6). DA 
enables us to analyse what arguments make a difference in relation to the perception of 
immigrants, and what factors affect people’s understanding and make them re-consider 
their standpoints. Particular attention is devoted to investigating how participants formulate 
their arguments, including how they distinguish what is acceptable and who deserves to be 
included. This way, the analysis aims to scrutinise the dynamics of attitude-formation.  
Second, DA enables us to analyse arguments according to types of considerations 
(economic/cultural), interests (individual/collective) and sources of knowledge, and the 
interplay of these in participants’ contributions to the debate (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
Focusing on the details of arguments and on the reactions they prompt, contributes to the 
analysis of the process of discussions. The dynamics of the debate – in terms of agreements, 
disagreements, and contestations, etc. – constitute the third perspective this research aims 
to investigate by employing DA. In this regard, the analysis of contested views enables us to 
identify what type of statements trigger disagreement, and to better understand why 
specific issues polarize participants, thereby leading to more inclusive or exclusive stances. 
Moreover, silence and “silent” agreement – i.e. issues and understandings which are not 
contested in the debates – also deserve attention, as these provide important information 
about what aspects are taken for granted (Kitzinger, 1994). In addition to agreements, 
disagreements, and contestations, attention is devoted to introducing new perspectives and 
new ideas concerning the topic under discussion, which also reveal the diversity and richness 
of discussions. Focusing on the interactions between the participants, DA enables us to 
track the dynamism of the process of discussions, and to reflect on shifts in the debates 
and examine how interactions shape participants’ attitudes (see Chapters 7 and 8).  
As both the welfare state and immigration are complex issues which can be approached from 
different perspectives – from abstract, normative aspects to practical considerations and 
lived experiences –, DA can make a valuable contribution by extending our knowledge about 
attitudes towards immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state, and on the conditions of 
reconciling immigration and welfare state support. On the one hand, DA helps with exploring 
in which contexts intergroup differentiations are triggered and immigrants’ access to the 
welfare state is thematized. On the other hand, DA facilitates reflection on the diversity of 
issues, and on complex, ambivalent and contradictory attitudes. Therefore, we now turn to 
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a discussion of the DF, the method of data collection. The following section describes the 
research design used in WelfSOC and assesses its strengths and weaknesses. 
 
3.3 DATA COLLECTION 
The shift to a social understanding of attitudes gave rise to new approaches in attitudinal 
research which aim to capture attitudes in the process of formation through social 
interaction (Burchardt, 2014). This is how deliberation as a research tool entered the field of 
attitudinal research. Within this research, the minimalist definition of deliberation proposed 
by Bächtiger et al. (2018: 3) is applied, understanding deliberation as “mutual communication 
that involves weighing and reflecting on preferences, values, and interests regarding matters 
of common concern […] deliberation take place in contexts of equal recognition, respect, 
reciprocity, and sufficiently equal power for communicative influence to function.”  
This definition defines the subject of discussions as issues of common concern, but also 
foresees a heterogeneity of views and preferences being discussed in an open, respectful 
way. The origins of deliberative methods, including these fundamental principles of 
deliberation, reach back to the normative theory of deliberative democracy (Floridia, 2018). 
Proponents of deliberative democracy argue for the need to improve democratic decision-
making and increase the legitimacy of representative democracy by organising deliberations 
prior to voting and to support the policy-making process (Dryzek, 2010; Goodin, 2008). The 
key rationale for deliberation is to engage citizens in public debates, to encourage them to 
think about social issues and consider different aspects, thus attaining a better 
understanding of issues that leads to an informed opinion (Chambers, 2003; Dryzek, 2010). 
While the act of decision-making is still reserved for the political elite, public deliberation 
encourages people to voice their opinions, interests, and preferences, thus informing policy-
making (Chappell, 2012; Fishkin, 2011). It is argued that listening to people’s ideas and 
concerns leads to better and more legitimate policies (Goodin, 2008). Furthermore, Dryzek 
(2005) emphasises that deliberation can help to reduce differences through learning about 
others’ opinions and arguments. While in theory all the individuals concerned should have 
the chance to engage in deliberation, in practice there are crucial limitations to inclusivity. 
This is the main reason that deliberative initiatives have been restricted to local and regional-
level initiatives (Elstub et al., 2016). However, even in such cases, inequality of access persists 
(Goodin, 2008).  
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In qualitative research – with special emphasis on attitudinal research – deliberation is 
conceived of as a process through which participants co-produce knowledge about a specific 
issue (Burchardt, 2014; Evans and Kotchetkova, 2009). Through the discussions, researchers 
can better access and explore how people perceive specific issues, examine what they 
consider as important and why they stand for specific ideas, views, and policies, etc. 
(Burchardt, 2014). Furthermore, social learning as a central feature of deliberation implies 
that participants are willing to re-consider their views in light of new information (Luskin et 
al., 2002; Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003) – especially in relation to issues about which they 
hold less firm views (Dryzek, 2010; Howe and Krosnick, 2017). Thus, changes in perceptions 
can be observed, enabling us to study the process of attitude-formation, too. In this regard, 
it is important to stress that – in contrast to other research projects that used deliberative 
methods –, this research is not necessarily interested in investigating concrete changes in 
attitudes as a result of DF; instead, it focuses on the process of attitude-formation and 
shifts between pro-inclusive and pro-exclusive stances and attitudes during the 
discussions. 
To a certain extent, discussions attempt to reproduce the real-life situations and 
spontaneous human interactions through which attitudes are shaped. However, as social 
interactions and views that are shared tend to adjust to specific contexts, the research 
situation itself can considerably influence how people interact and articulate their attitudes 
(Burchardt, 2014; Evans and Kotchetkova, 2009). By giving voice to participants, DFs enable 
them to re-create the social realities and specificity of the social contexts through 
interaction, including how they frame issues and discuss arguments concerning issues of 
public concern (Elstub et al., 2016; Fishkin, 2018). These considerations were duly taken into 
when planning the DF in WelfSOC. The following section introduces the specificities of the 
research design and highlights the key methodological decisions that are critical to this 
research. 
 
3.3.1 Democratic forums in Welfare State Futures – Our Children’s Europe research 
The Welfare State Futures – Our Children’s Europe (WelfSOC) research project was 
designed to explore the views and priorities of ordinary citizens about the future of welfare 
states with a particular focus on the assumptions and values underlying these aspirations. It 
aimed to analyse how the changing social, political, and economic context of welfare policy 
interacts with people’s expectations and attitudes, and what cleavages and solidarities 
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emerge in welfare debates (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018). The research design was formulated 
by the research consortium, which included distinguished social scientists from Denmark, 
Germany, Norway, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom. As I was not personally involved in the 
planning process, I fully rely on the methodological design developed by the consortium. 
However, this special “outsider” position enables me to identify the limitations of the 
research design and to critically assess how the research design helps to answer the research 
questions raised. 
 
3.3.1.1 Selection of participants 
The principles of the selection and recruitment of participants are one of the most debated 
issues relating to deliberative approaches. In practice, the number of participants can range 
from small groups – 10-12 members – to large groups of one thousand people. WelfSOC DFs 
involved 34-35 participants in each country. In Norway and in the UK, the recruitment 
process and the DF discussions were carried out by a private research company. In Norway, 
the capital Oslo was chosen as the location, while in the UK Birmingham was selected. The 
participants of WelfSOC DFs represented a diverse group of people roughly representative 
of the national population based on age, gender, education, marital and employment status, 
household income, ethnicity, and electoral preferences.16 Fishkin and Luskin (2005) argue 
that representative samples should attempt to reproduce the “real-world” distribution of 
public views and attitudes. A heterogeneity of groups is viewed as important for increasing 
the diversity of views and thus increasing the scope for accessing new information (Luskin et 
al., 2002, 2007). 17  However, many researchers oppose this approach, claiming that it 
reinforces social inequalities and disregards the opinions of minority members (Wakeford et 
al., 2007). To mitigate this disadvantage, in WelfSOC the over-sampling of specific minorities 
was applied in the break-out group sessions, which constituted the major part of DFs.  
As this research focuses on ordinary people’s attitudes towards the inclusion of immigrants, 
the use of a diverse, roughly representative sample is justified. However, considering the 
thematic focus of this research, the representation of people of a minority ethnicity and their 
views is particularly important as we expect that their perspective about the issue of 
immigration might enrich and broaden the scope of debates on immigration. Therefore, the 
 
16 For further information on the distribution of the breakout groups and the socio-demographic 
characteristics of participants, please see Table 2 - Appendix 1. 
17 The role of heterogeneity of views is further elaborated in Section 3.3.3 
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involvement of participants with minority/immigration background in the discussions 
received special attention during the analysis.  
Considering the low overall number of participants, ensuring representativeness in relation 
to all eight characteristics represented a notable challenge. In this regard, the recruitment of 
participants with an ethnic/immigrant background may be perceived as demanding. 
However, in both countries the target share of participants in terms of ethnic 
minority/immigration background was met. Moreover, as shown in Table 1 in both countries 
participants with ethnic minority background were over-represented compared to the 
national population. While the extent of over-representation is smaller in Norway, in the 
British DF their share in the group reflected better the share of ethnic minority members in 
the locality of the DF, in Birmingham. However, this situation raises questions about the 
measurement and availability of data on ethnicity, too. The over-representation of 
participants with an ethnic minority background resulted in a greater level of participation in 
the discussions about immigration in the UK. However, this effect was strengthened by the 
fact that in one of the small groups the ethnic minority background was the guiding principle 
of over-sampling.  
Table 1 – Detailed review of the representativeness of the British and Norwegian DF participants in relation to 
age, education, and ethnic minority background 
  DF UK UK Birmingham DF NO NO Oslo 
Age 25-34 35% 14% 15% 31% 14% 21% 
 45-54 23% 12% 15% 22% 14% 12% 
Education Upper 
secondary 
55% 35% 47% 8% 41% 30% 
 Tertiary, BA 35% 32% 38% 40% 23% 30% 
 Tertiary, MA or 
above 
0% 12% 46% 9% 19% 
Ethnic minority background 41% 14% 47%  
(Non-White 
British, 2011) 
21% 16% 32% 
 Born in the 
country 
23% - - 12% 3% 7% 
 Foreign-born 18% 14% 22% 9% 13% 25% 
Sources: UK - Eurostat 2015 (age, education, foreign-born population) and UK Census 2011 (Ethnic minority 
background); Norway - Statistics Norway 2015 
 
 
Focusing on the remaining seven characteristics that guided the selection process, we should 
highlight age and education, in relation to which the final composition of the British and 
Norwegian group tended to diverge from the national population. As shown in Table 1, in 
both countries the age groups 25-34 and 45-54 were over-represented. However, focusing 
 67 
 
on the discussions on immigration, participation in the discussions involved specific age-
related differences only in Norway, because small groups were created by over-sampling 
participants based on age. More importantly, over-representation was identified in relation 
to level of education. In Norway, tertiary-educated participants, while in the UK participants 
with an upper-secondary education were overrepresented. The dominance of these groups 
of participants also emerged in the discussions on immigration, which reinforces the need to 
take this difference into account when interpreting the research findings.  
As a last note about the selection of participants, we should highlight the effects of multiple 
identities. In this regard, O’Doherty and Davidson (2010) argue that during debates 
participants may switch their positions, thereby reflecting various identities depending on 
the issue, context, or interests. Therefore, even if people with specific socio-demographic 
characteristics are represented in DFs, this might not mean that they will contribute to the 
debate in that specific role. Therefore, especially in the case of participants with an ethnic 
minority/immigration background, it was considered important to focus on how they engage 
in the discussions about immigration, what aspects of their identities and attitudes they 
share, and whether they represent the minority opinion or remain silent in relation to 
divisive issues. As noted above, narrative analysis as a specific method was intended to 
scrutinize this particular issue. While the narrative analysis was not fully implemented, 
Chapter 8 addresses the related questions.  
While the WelfSOC research design employed specific arrangements to recruit a diverse 
group of people to discuss the future of welfare states as well as to give voice to certain 
minorities, the critical question of inclusivity remains and forms the key limitation of this 
deliberative research method. Together with the high level of context-dependency of DF 
discussions, this limitation needs to be duly taken into account during the analysis. However, 
these limitations are to be considered together with the possibilities and prospects the 
method offers in attitude research complementing the findings of quantitative methods. The 
following sections focus especially on these aspects of the research design. 
 
3.3.1.2 Duration of deliberation  
Deliberations vary substantially in relation to the duration and timing of events (Burchardt, 
2014). The main rationale of extending the timespan of deliberative events is to increase the 
quality of discussion. In WelfSOC, the DFs took place on two days, with a two-week break 
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between the two meetings. They were scheduled on Saturday, enabling people to 
participate. Participants who were invited were offered a generous financial incentive (in the 
UK, 150 GBP/day; in Norway appr. 850GBP/day) to increase the equal participation of people 
with various socio-economic statuses and to compensate for potential loss of free-time and 
income. The financial incentive may have encouraged attendance at the events – especially 
for low-income people. However, the incentive itself could not guarantee equal participation 
in the debates.18  Accordingly, we can observe considerable differences in the extent of 
engagement of participants during DFs.  
In WelfSOC DFs, each day started and finished with a plenary session. In-between, 
discussions were conducted in three break-out groups.19 The research goals were particularly 
ambitious, as discussion of five topics was planned for both days, which meant that 25-30 
minutes were available for each break-out session. Although the schedule allowed some 
flexibility, the agenda was quite tight. A setup including fewer than five topics but enabling 
more time for discussion about specific issues would have been an alternative strategy. Time 
pressure was especially clear on the second day when the participants had the special task 
of preparing three policy recommendations per topic. Availability of more time would have 
been especially important in relation to the discussions on complex social issues such as 
immigration. The key strength of the method is to encourage people to articulate and 
elaborate on their views and attitudes, to negotiate conflicting views. Therefore, the longer 
timeframe – what actually took place in some groups having longer sessions on immigration 
– would have been useful. 
The overall longer duration of the discussions added significant value to the DF as 
participants had more time to process and think about the issues that were discussed on Day 
1. Furthermore, on Day 2 participants were already familiar with the process of discussions 
and had got to know each other, which may have affected their engagement in the debates 
and how they articulated attitudes. The longer duration of DF also facilitated shifts in 
opinions and attitudes, allowing us to analyse the dynamics of attitude-formation. Therefore, 
it was considered worth comparing the discussions on Day 1 and Day 2 regarding how 
participants talked about immigration, justified their preferences for inclusion and/or 
 
18 The issue of equal participation in deliberation and its implications is thoroughly studied by Gerber 
et al. 2014 and 2016. 
19 Please see the detailed agenda Table 3 – Appendix 1. 
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exclusion, and whether they reacted differently to others’ opinions. This topic is addressed 
in Chapters 7 and 8 in particular.  
 
3.3.1.3 Moderation and facilitation of deliberation 
The nature of moderation largely affects how deliberations are conducted. The role of 
moderators is significant as they define the framework of discussion and make participants 
adhere to the rules of deliberation, giving voice to each participant, and preventing any 
dismissive behaviour (Elstub, 2015). The purpose of the deliberation itself considerably 
determines the extent of facilitation. The purpose of WelfSOC DFs was rather exploratory, 
focusing on how people talk about certain social issues and the meanings attached to these 
issues, and was less concerned about reaching a consensus (Taylor-Gooby and Leruth, 2018). 
DFs followed a specific structure, which constituted of a learning phase on Day 1, and a 
deliberative phase on Day 2 (Taylor-Gooby and Leruth, 2018). Therefore, moderation 
inclined towards a “light-touch” approach, limiting moderators’ influence in the discussion. 
This was especially the case in relation to the discussions on Day 1, which granted extensive 
liberty to participants to raise issues they considered the most important for the future of 
welfare states. Thus, a naïve discussion could develop without prior stimulus and letting 
topics emerge. In the UK, participants selected Immigration, Lack of money, Unemployment, 
Overcrowding/ageing population, and Lack of/access to education as topics for discussion. 
In Norway, the topics were Work/employment, Education, Financing, Health and 
Environment. However, we need to stress the specific timing of DFs, in the Fall of 2015 – 
following the peak of the Refugee Crisis, but before the Brexit referendum –, which may have 
influenced the choice of topics for Day 1 discussion. 
Day 2 was more structured. It is widely argued that if the need to achieve a concrete outcome 
is specified, then participants are more motivated (Elstub, 2015). Elstub (2015) further 
argues that even in purely research-oriented deliberations, it is beneficial to embed 
discussions into a wider policy context. Accordingly, in WelfSOC a role-play was created in 
which participants were expected to act as policy advisors and to discuss and agree on 
policy recommendations for the future government in 2040. The main rationale was to 
make sure participants were forward-looking and discuss the future of welfare states. This 
way, the focus of discussions shifted from the identification of concerns to mapping the 
causes of problems and finding suitable measures for fixing them. On Day 2, the topics of the 
break-out group sessions were imposed by the research consortium. This was justified by the 
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priority of ensuring consistency and the cross-country comparability of results. The proposed 
topics – namely, income inequality, immigration, gender, intergenerational issues, and the 
labour market – coincided with the topics discussed on Day 1. The discussions often touched 
upon overlapping issues, which also reduced the demarcation of thematic areas and the 
potentially negative effects of imposed topics. Moderation was limited on Day 2, too. 
However, moderators were specifically asked to urge participants to discuss the possible 
(positive and negative) implications of the suggested policy recommendations. Each group 
was required to present their policy recommendations at the afternoon plenary session, 
which were then briefly discussed. A final vote was conducted to appraise overall support 
for these policy measures. 
The proposed structure of DF seemed particularly useful in this research. On Day 1, 
discussions allowed participants to freely raise their concerns about welfare states, through 
which their understanding of the welfare state and immigration could be examined. The role-
play on Day 2 proved useful for focusing the discussions. The task of formulating policy 
recommendations encouraged participants to articulate and reason their views and 
preferences regarding what is viewed as socially acceptable and desirable and what is not. 
This also helped us to analyse what types of arguments and information affect preferences 
for inclusion and exclusion. Moreover, we should note the differences between the quality 
of policy recommendations in relation to specific policy areas. For instance, it was apparent 
that participants were more creative in relation to the issue of an aging population than in 
relation to immigration, where familiarity with the issue was at a different level. 
Furthermore, uncertainty about the future implications of immigration also made it more 
complicated to relate to this topic. The latter aspect was explicitly communicated by 
Norwegian and British participants.  
 
3.3.1.4 Provision of evidence  
It is disputed whether it is beneficial to provide information and additional evidence during 
the course of deliberative processes. Some researchers claim that expert evidence is 
detrimental to the flow of discussion, especially as the means of presentation of evidence 
might differ from and interfere with the language used in the discussions (Burchardt, 2014; 
Gleason, 2011). In contrast, Neblo (2011) argues that the distribution of such information is 
natural in real-life public discourse. Within the WelfSOC project a mixed approach was 
applied. In the morning plenary session, facilitators presented the key characteristics of 
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welfare states in very general terms. While the information was minimal – not including any 
specific graphs or data –, it still might have had an effect on the following discussions. On 
Day 1, at the end of the afternoon plenary session, participants were asked what kind of 
information they would require for the second day of discussions. Tailored information 
packages were accordingly prepared for the next session and sent two days before the 
second meeting. The information package was also presented in the morning plenary session 
by the WelfSOC researchers.20  
As immigration was one of the areas in which evidence was demanded, the effects of the 
information packages represent an additional aspect for analysis concerning attitude-
formation. Previous research found that deliberations have a transformative character and 
participants tend to re-consider their views in light of new information (Goodin and 
Niemeyer, 2003; Luskin et al., 2002). Moreover, literature shows that people tend to 
misjudge the size of the immigrant population (Blinder and Allen, 2016; Herda, 2010), and 
immigrants’ share of welfare-use, and they overestimate the cost of benefits accessed by 
immigrants (Baumberg Geiger, 2016).21 Therefore, the information might have challenged 
unacknowledged biases and enriched the discussion (Mercier and Landemore, 2012). The 
provision of information enabled us to study how people treat factual information, and 
whether they recognise its validity.  
During British and Norwegian the DFs we could observe different approaches and uses of the 
provided information. Within the discussions on immigration specifically, there were more 
direct references to the information packages in the UK. While the provided information 
raised important aspects in the debates and there were no issues with its understanding, in 
the British discussions the desired effects of statistical information to shake unacknowledged 
biases tended to be weak and as described in Chapter 7 highly dependent on the interactions 
within the group. While the validity of the data was explicitly questioned by only one British 
participant, the value of statistical information tended to be lower as it was often overruled 
by other (non-statistical) arguments. In future research, provision of information could be 
further developed by conducting experiments during the DFs testing provision of different 
information (in terms of thematic coverage and extensiveness) to the small groups and its 
effects on the group discussion.  
 
20 Please see the information packages in Appendix1. 
21 Further details about misperceptions concering immigration in the UK and Norway are discussed 
in Chapter 4.  
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3.3.1.5 Pre- and post-deliberation surveys 
For many researchers, one of the most appreciated benefits of DFs – and deliberative 
methods in general – is collective learning and the transformation of views and attitudes 
through interaction (Dryzek, 2005; Fishkin, 2018; Luskin et al., 2002). In order to capture such 
potential changes, pre- and post-deliberation surveys are conducted, which can provide 
evidence about the potential changes the process of deliberation has made to individual 
participants’ attitudes. Although the WelfSOC DFs were not designed to change participants’ 
attitudes, a copy of the standardized 2008 ESS survey was used and filled out before the 
morning plenary session started on Day 1, and right after the concluding plenary session on 
Day 2. From a methodological point of view, these surveys enable us to reflect on how the 
initial positions indicated in the pre-deliberation survey were articulated through the 
discussion (what similarities and contradictions arose during the discussions). This also 
allowed us to examine in what respect deliberative processes can complement data collected 
in individual settings with the help of questionnaires. This particular issue is addressed in 
Chapter 8. 
Furthermore, the use of the standardised ESS questionnaire allows us to test the 
representativeness of the sample by comparing the survey results to the findings of 2016 
ESS. While the WelfSOC pre-deliberation survey included four immigration-related 
questions, only one question was part of the 2016 ESS survey. Figure 1 presents a comparison 
of DF participants’ pre-deliberation attitudes (Fall of 2015) and the representative ESS 
findings (data collected in Summer 2016 – Spring 2017). In both countries the results of the 
DF pre-deliberation survey and the 2016 ESS survey are very similar, and only minor 
differences were found between attitudes. Additionally, it should be highlighted that in both 
countries there were many indecisive participants – six Norwegian participants who 
indicated “don’t know” and four British participants who did not respond to the question.22 
It is important to stress that this research was not specifically focused on examining the 
concrete changes in individual participants’ attitudes, and shares scepticism about the 
chance of generating durable changes in attitudes after two days of discussion (for a recent 
review of attitude change see Albarracin and Shavitt, 2018). Instead, this research examines 
the process of attitude-formation that DF discussions can trigger and initiate, thus the 
focus is on analysing how attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion are shaped through social 
 
22 This issue and post-deliberation attitudes will be analysed in Chapter 7 and 8. 
 73 
 
interactions, and under what conditions and in relation to which arguments and 
considerations do attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion shift.  
Figure 1 - Preferences for immigrants' access to welfare benefits and services - DF Before survey 2015, ESS 2016 
 
  Source: WelfSOC DF UK and WelfSOC DF NO (2015), ESS 2016 
 
This section has described and evaluated the research design of WelfSOC DFs, which is 
followed by the review of the key strengths of DFs in comparison to other research methods 
used in attitudinal research.   
 
3.3.2 The strengths of Democratic forums in comparison to other research methods 
Openness, mutual respect, and social learning as the key principles of deliberation contribute 
to the creation of a dynamic framework of discussions in which attitudes can unfold 
without raising direct questions regarding participants’ stances about the inclusion of 
immigrants in the welfare state. Utilizing group dynamics and interactions between 
participants, DFs are considered to be more suitable for the exploration and analysis of 
complex, value-laden issues (Fishkin, 2011). In this respect, the key strengths of DFs 
correspond to the weaknesses of public opinion surveys in which a structured format does 
not allow respondents to provide reasons for their responses. In contrast, DFs provide a more 
nuanced picture of attitudes towards issues (Fishkin, 2018). Through interaction, participants 
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can better describe what they understand by the term “welfare state”, and what they think 
about immigration and inclusion, who they consider as immigrants. Participants have more 
time to explain their stances from multiple perspectives, thus allowing the discussion of 
uncertainties, ambiguities, and conflicting views. This interactive character makes DF 
especially attractive for attitudinal research in order to complement the findings of public 
opinion surveys, which is the most commonly used method to study attitudes. From a 
methodological perspective, DFs resemble focus groups. However, it is particularly the time 
frame, the different levels of moderation, and the involvement of homogenous groups of 
participants in focus groups (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012; Wakeford et al., 2007) that mark 
the key differences that have implications for the potential to generate shifts in attitudes and 
offer the possibility to analyse attitude-formation.  
Second, in an ideal scenario, deliberation involves reasoned debate, whereby people justify 
their stances and the force of better arguments affects the discussion (Bächtiger et al., 2018; 
Chambers, 2003; Fishkin and Luskin, 2005; Habermas, 1996; Mansbridge et al., 2010). 
However, in practice the nature of discussions can greatly vary and statements often do not 
reflect informed opinion (Rosenberg, 2014). People’s capacity to process information and 
express their views varies (Mendelberg, 2002). Similarly, reasoning can take different forms 
– ranging from references to norms and principles, value statements and personal stories, to 
concrete examples and comparisons – through which people try to justify their thinking to 
others (Young, 1996). While the quality of data considerably depends on the information 
that is shared and the reasoning for this, how statements – even ones without real 
arguments – are formulated transmits information regarding the topic’s relevance for the 
participant and participant’s uncertainty or “non-attitude” toward the topic (Kitzinger, 
1994). In this respect, group interaction gains greater sense, as fellow participants may ask 
for details, follow-up or contest (vague) statements, thus exploring heterogeneous views and 
clarifying potential misunderstandings (Mansbridge et al., 2010). This also helps to deepen 
the discussion, to make people reflect on their views, and foster attitude-formation. This 
way, the analysis of the process of DF discussions can shed light on the mechanisms and 
dynamics of attitude-formation and shifts between preferences for the inclusion or exclusion 
of immigrants. 
Third, in research methods that address respondents individually, respondents tend to focus 
on their own interests. This was demonstrated in Chapter 2, as self-interest has a dominant 
role in studies of welfare attitudes, attitudes to immigration and immigrants. In DFs we can 
identify different tendencies, as group-based methods encourage people to talk about 
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common goods, and to take into account the wider context and wider collective interests 
(Mansbridge et al., 2010). This might be especially the case in relation to debating 
immigration, which is usually reckoned to be a national issue that activates concerns about 
the collective instead of the individual (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Hatton, 2016). 
However, this does not mean that self-interest does not arise or matter in group discussions. 
Mansbridge et al. (2010) argue that self-interest is crucial to clarifying conflicting views. 
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that individuals are embedded in their family 
and social networks (Mau, 2003). Thus, self-interest should not be limited to concrete 
individuals as reflected in the demographic characteristics of survey respondents, but might 
be shaped by the interests, experiences, and perceptions of their connections, which can be 
better revealed during group discussions. While it is expected that debates about 
immigration rather draw on the collective dimension, the research examines how self-
interest and wider social interests are formulated and how these interests interact, 
complement, or compete during deliberations.  
Last, the role of the researcher in the implementation process also distinguishes DFs from 
other quantitative and qualitative research methods (Burchardt, 2014; Fishkin, 2018; Taylor-
Gooby et al., 2018). An important added value of DFs is their facilitation of bottom-up 
discussions, letting participants express what they consider relevant. During the process of 
implementation, the researcher has no or only a limited opportunity to affect and interfere 
in the process of discussion, apart from by creating the research design (Burchardt, 2014). 
Participants interpret and contextualize issues, which in many cases can differ from academic 
conceptions (Fishkin, 2018; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018). Thus, DFs allow the researcher to 
distance from previous academic interpretations and focus on people’s interpretations. 
Thus, giving rise to innovation – exploring new ideas, which might not have been considered 
by researchers. At the same time, this also means a high level of dependence on the quality 
of debates. DFs are highly context-dependent so the quality of data that is gathered is 
affected by various conditions, ranging from the purpose of the research, the composition of 
the group of participants, formal and informal rules of interaction, the reproduction of power 
relations, etc. (Bryman, 2015; Burchardt, 2014; Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2007; Luskin et 
al., 2007; Sunstein, 2002). The following section reflects on some of the critical issues, with 
particular attention to the potentially detrimental effects of group dynamics. It also points 
at how careful methodological planning can mitigate these potentially negative effects 
(Elstub, 2015).  
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3.3.3 Critical issues and limitations of democratic forums 
While group dynamics can significantly foster diverse debates, they are also associated with 
disadvantages (Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2007; Sunstein, 2002). Human interaction is 
adapted to social contexts and typically follows norms, habits, and assumptions associated 
with that specific context, which tend to reproduce social inequalities, involving giving voice 
to socially, culturally, and personally more dominant people and silencing others (Elstub, 
2015; Forsyth, 2010; Young, 1996). This is one of the reasons why the selection of 
participants, addressing inequality in participation, and the quality of moderation require 
thorough methodological planning and consideration to facilitate a diversity of 
considerations within discussions, thus increasing the quality of the discussions and the 
quality of the data to be analysed (Mansbridge, 2010).  
Considering the aims of deliberative methods in relation to improving people’s 
understanding of social issues and to acquiring informed opinion, a heterogeneity of opinions 
is considered especially important for bringing different opinions and competing arguments 
to light that help participants re-consider their own positions (Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003; 
Luskin et al., 2002). While a heterogeneity of views represents the positive and desirable side 
of group dynamics, a high level of like-mindedness increases potentially negative 
implications. The dominance of a majority opinion and a high level of consensus within 
groups can hinder the articulation of minority views (Mercier and Landemore, 2012). A 
homogeneity of views can also hinder the contestation of public misperceptions, which are 
influential in relation to immigration (Blinder and Allen, 2016; Herda, 2010). Furthermore, it 
can lead to group polarization, understood as when participants “move toward a more 
extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ [participants’] pre-deliberation 
tendencies” (Sunstein, 2002: 176).  
Concerns about like-mindedness in group discussions is underlined by the findings from 
social psychology that group influence promotes the dominance of majority opinion 
(Forsyth, 2010). Group influence stems from both informational and normative influences. 
Informational influences refer to the tendency of people to compare their views with other 
participants’ opinions. Especially in situations when people are uncertain or lack sufficient 
information about the topic of discussion, they tend to turn to others’ opinions and 
arguments – using others’ views to clarify, define, or confirm their own position(s) (Deutsch 
and Gerard, 1955; Festinger, 1954; Forsyth, 2010). A homogeneity of views can also be 
reinforced by normative influences as individuals are inclined to present themselves and 
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their opinions as being in line with social norms, standards, and conventions (Forsyth, 2010). 
Therefore, in the public sphere people might strategically position themselves as supportive 
of dominant opinions (Isenberg, 1986). Furthermore, the pressure for normative conformity 
can influence what attitudes are articulated and what attitudes are silenced in group 
discussion. ‘Spiral of silence’ theory also emphasises that people who hold unpopular views 
might be deterred from expressing them to avoid conflict within  groups (Noelle-Neumann, 
1993). Confirmation bias, the tendency to be more susceptible toward arguments that 
confirm an individual’s initial views, also bolsters the dominance of majority opinions and 
makes it more challenging to contest them publicly (Mercier and Landemore, 2012). 
Considering such risks of group dynamics, Sunstein (2002, 2009) argues that group 
polarization is likely to emerge in the absence of conflicting views when participants raise 
and consider only a limited “pool of arguments” and their ability to recognize and to deal 
with information biases is limited.  
In response to objections based on the risks of group polarization, deliberative research 
methods – including DF – have adopted specific arrangements to ensure that diverse and 
informed discussions occur. So far, studies found that representative sampling, the inclusion 
of diverse groups of people, the provision of balanced information, the availability of experts 
during discussions, and professional moderation, all contribute to the de-polarization of 
attitudes (Farrar et al., 2009; Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003; Himmelroos and Christensen, 
2014; Luskin et al., 2007). These findings underline the benefits and significance of careful 
research design. This touches upon the need to find the right balance between inclusivity 
and homogeneity to ensure that participants feel secure and relaxed enough to share their 
views – including minority views – on the one hand; and to encourage a heterogeneity of 
opinions to increase the potential impact of forum discussions on participants’ opinion-
formation.  
The search for the right balance in WelfSOC is well-represented in the sampling method – 
the recruitment of a diverse group of people, but using the over-sampling technique for the 
creation of small discussion groups. While WelfSOC did not aim to change people’s attitudes, 
it was interested in the process of attitude-formation – what attitudes, preferences, and 
aspirations participants share, and how these positions emerge and develop through 
interaction. This interest in the process of attitude-formation further justifies the need to 
devote particular attention to the analysis of the impact of group dynamics on the 
development of discussions and more specifically to the examination of the homogeneity or 
heterogeneity of views that emerge in the discussion. This issue is especially important in 
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relation to such a complex and divisive issue as immigration and immigrants’ inclusion in the 
welfare state, where both informational and normative influences can be strengthened and 
participants might be less open to changing their predispositions (Smets and Isernia, 2014). 
The key limitations of DFs concern inclusivity, inequality in participation, a high level of 
context-dependency, and a high level of dependence on the quality of data – i.e. what is 
and how extensively is discussed in the debates. The previous sections were intended to 
critically assess these limitations, and to present what arrangements were put in place to 
mitigate them in WelfSOC. While these limitations require thorough attention throughout 
the planning, execution and analysis of the debates, DFs do represent an alternative 
research method which can strongly complement research findings, especially in regard to 
the analysis of the process of attitude-formation. The key added value is that DFs encourage 
bottom-up discussions and represent a more dynamic analytical framework to analyse 
attitudes through social interaction. Responding to the main weaknesses of survey methods, 
DFs can complement the knowledge collected by public opinion polls (Fishkin, 2018; Taylor-
Gooby et al., 2018). Although small group discussions might not reveal major differences in 
attitudes toward immigration according to demographic and socio-economic characteristics, 
as the findings of quantitative surveys can do, it is expected that discussions reveal important 
patterns about the considerations that shape people’s attitudes (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018). 
Thus, DFs can provide explanations for the findings of polls, identify relevant issues for 
inclusion in future polls, and can inform researchers about how to specify and refine how 
questions and responses are framed and worded in polls. 
Acknowledging the limitations and the great potential of DFs is also essential during the 
process of data analysis. Here, the task is to identify the means that can grasp the dynamism 
of interactions, the process of attitude-formation, and the complexity of arguments for or 
against the inclusion of immigrants. Additionally, we need to bear in mind and be vigilant to 
the above-described concerns about group dynamics. The following section presents the 
details of the process of data analysis and the specific measures that were taken to guarantee 






3.4 PROCESS OF DATA ANALYSIS  
3.4.1 The process of coding  
As this research operates with a wide range of variables and a high level of context-
dependency, it required a comprehensive coding scheme which was sensitive to the 
dynamism and nuances of attitude-formation. In contrast to an inductive, fully data-driven 
approach, the research draws on a critical realist approach. Accordingly, data processing is 
theory-driven, but with the acknowledgement of the fallibility of theory. Thus, allowing for 
a high level of flexibility to permit the identification of new tendencies and discursive 
patterns emerging from the data (Archer et al., 2016; Fletcher, 2017). Discourses might 
reveal often unspoken considerations, thoughts, and beliefs, which are poorly captured by 
other (non-discursive) methods (Kitzinger, 1994; Krzyżanowski, 2008; Taylor, 2013).  
Coding of data supported the identification of key thematic and discursive patterns in DFs 
concerning attitudes to inclusion and exclusion. For the coding and analysis, NVivo 11 
software was used. The analysis of DF data was carried out in three stages, devoting 
sufficient time for the coding. The first round of coding was intended to be the most 
comprehensive, with the widest focus on the details of the DF debates. Due to the extensive 
volume of discussions, after the assessment of the findings of the first round of coding the 
scope of the coding was narrowed down to the specific discussions on immigration. After 
each round, the coding scheme was revisited and the codes were refined as necessary. 
During the process, dozens of additional codes emerged, which were aimed at further 
specifying the emergent patterns. As the analysis advanced, the number of specific codes 
substantially increased. In both countries, two separate analyses were conducted and the 
comparative analysis commenced after the assessment of the second round of coding. The 
third round of coding served to double-check the coding and prepare for the analysis, the 
findings of which are presented in the following chapters. 
Although the research only partially used the coding scheme developed within WelfSOC,23  
their availability and the coded transcripts provided a firm starting point for this research. All 
topics discussed (and coded) in DFs affected and complemented the discussions on 
immigration in many respects. However, as this research centres on how people understand 
immigration and how participants argue for or against inclusion, it was important to extend 
the WelfSOC codes drawing on the research findings reviewed in Chapter 2 and based on 
 
23 For the final coding scheme, see Table 4 – Appendix 1. 
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research findings on deliberation and deliberative methods described in earlier sections of 
this chapter. The extended coding scheme was constructed closely following the aims and 
methodological considerations and specificities of this particular piece of research (Creswell, 
2015). Thus, codes about rationale were extended, differentiating the source of knowledge 
(such as rationality, emotions, sentiments, intuitions, etc.), and the motivations and 
interests that were raised in the arguments (self-interest and collective, societal interests); 
and last to identify whether the arguments are associated with economic or cultural 
concerns. In relation to the interests and motivations stressed in the arguments, it was 
considered important to observe if participants framed statements as individuals or as 
members of a larger collective. Therefore, individual and collective framing were added as 
child nodes under economic and cultural arguments.  
Focusing on intergroup differentiation, specific codes were introduced to mark the 
perceptions and characteristics people attach to the in-group and out-group. In addition to 
differentiation based on ethnicity/immigration status, further cleavages were added 
focusing on: 1) age with respect to concerns about an aging population, and 2) socio-
economic status, considering the perceptions of social inequalities. The initial reason for 
incorporating additional social cleavages was to compare the nature and dynamics of 
discussions that triggered interethnic differentiation and differentiation within the in-group. 
However, due to the wealth of data and findings on immigration specifically, we needed to 
be strict and narrow down the scope of the research. Therefore, after the first round of 
coding, the idea of comparing inclusion criteria in relation to different cleavages needed to 
be left behind to give priority to an in-depth analysis of perceptions of the welfare 
deservingness of immigrants and to the process of attitude-formation.24  
Last, to elaborate on the interactions and dynamism of DF discussions, specific codes were 
introduced. While the codes described so far served primarily the aims of content analysis, 
the discussion-dynamics codes were included to capture the process of discussions. In this 
respect, the findings of the German WelfSOC research team on changing preferences in 
relation to welfare redistribution in Germany (Zimmermann et al., 2018) provided substantial 
inspiration for this specific devotion to interactions within group discussions.  
 
24 The data was suitable for the comparison based on cleavages and in the future it would be worth 
undertaking a comparative analysis as it would offer another relevant perspective regarding how 
criteria for inclusion in the welfare state shift, and how the mechanisms behind preferences for 
inclusion/exclusion change concerning different groups of beneficiaries. 
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In addition to the identification and coding of agreements and disagreements as specific 
forms of interaction, it was considered relevant to track the diversity of views introduced in 
relation to the discussed issues. Therefore, the code “New perspective” was used to identify 
when participants introduced a new issue or a new argument to the debate. The novelty of 
the argument was broadly approached during the coding. It was used to refer to a new target 
group – e.g. shifting attention to another subgroup of immigrants, or to a new context such 
as stressing the living standards in the country of origin. The effects of “New perspective” as 
a form of interaction widely varied. It was often used to shift attention to a completely new 
(sub)topic, but it was also applied to deepen the discussion by mentioning further relevant 
considerations. Equally important was following up what arguments and stances were 
challenged or contested by other participants. Accordingly, “Contestation” code was used 
when participants raised questions for clarification or when they proposed specific counter-
arguments. The role of “Contestation” as a form of interaction was especially important in 
relation to encouraging other participants to elaborate on their attitudes and preferences, 
but also to questioning previous arguments and to changing the focus of discussions.  
During the actual process of coding, further codes were introduced such as “Repetition, 
repeating an earlier raised new perspective”. This specific code was added as a child node 
under “New perspective”. The rationale for adding this specific code was to study how 
specific arguments are raised again and again, and also to see if participants take up and use 
others’ arguments during the discussions. Furthermore, the repetition of arguments was also 
considered important as an indicator of the importance of the argument in relation to the 
given topic. The additional codes “Response to new perspective” and “Response to 
contestation” were introduced, too. However, the role of these as specific forms of 
interaction was rather insignificant. “Turning point” and “Interruption” were also considered 
important for indicating significant moments in discussions, and helped in the analysis of the 
process of attitude-formation (see Chapter 7 and Chapter 8).   
 
3.4.2 The analysis of over forty hours of discussion 
 “Coding is the process of analysing qualitative text data by taking them apart to see what they 
yield before putting the data back together in a meaningful way”. Creswell’s (2015: 156) 
formulation grasps the dimensions of coding and analysis of data, starting with a very close 
scrutiny of references, statements, and reactions to these. Overall, the British and Norwegian 
DF discussions represent more than forty hours of discussion. The wealth of the data 
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required a comprehensive approach. Furthermore, as I did not participate nor observe the 
conduct of DFs, in-depth familiarization with the data was considered inevitable.  
The coding process was closely intertwined with the process of analysis during the three 
stages. Coding in NVivo ensured easy access to summaries about the frequency and 
dominance of specific codes and, accordingly, specific understandings and framings in the 
discussions. On the one hand, this allowed the analysis of the overall use of these specific 
issues – captured by codes – on a one-by-one basis, devoting specific attention to the 
specificity of the context in which it was raised, the antecedents, and the reactions to the 
coded references. On the other hand, particular attention was devoted to treating the five 
discussions in all six break-out groups (three British and three Norwegian groups of 10-11 
participants) as one unit in order to analyse the broader discursive context of the group 
discussion and the links that participants made. Therefore, the process of analysis was an 
iterative one positioned between taking a close-up perspective about the use of specific 
codes, and a broader analysis that embedded references in their wider discursive context.  
This was followed by a comparative analysis of the three small groups in both British and 
Norwegian DFs. The aim was to find differences and similarities in how the participants of 
different small groups approach, discuss, and raise different or similar arguments and 
justifications concerning the same issues. Furthermore, it was considered important to 
identify what issues trigger more conflict, or, in contrast, uncontested agreement within the 
small groups and how participants react and deal with such conflicts or build on such 
consensus.   
In the research, multiple coding was used, requiring the analysis of overlaps between the 
specific categories of codes – for instance, whether economic considerations were linked to 
specific groups of immigrants, or to specific subtopics of immigration such as immigration 
control in the UK. The findings about overlaps between specific framings also contributed to 
narrowing down the scope of the research and to concentrating more specifically on 
intergroup differentiations, the use of deservingness principles and group dynamics, and 
finally, on a comparison of emerging patterns in the British and Norwegian DFs. The results 
of the analysis created the core of the four analytical chapters. While Chapters 5 and 6 rely 
on the findings of the content analysis – focusing on the themes, arguments, and 
justifications that shaped discussions about immigrants’ inclusion –, Chapters 7 and 8 focus 
on the details of the process of attitude-formation during the DFs. 
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Last, the analysis included the examination of emerging patterns related to participants’ 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics, and based on their pre- and post-
deliberation survey responses. This aspect of the analysis was primarily utilised in Chapter 8 
focusing on individual attitude-formation.  
As described above, the coding and analysis of the data involved a long journey of 
familiarizing with and exploring the British and Norwegian DF discussions and further 
specifying the codes to deepen understanding of the emerging patterns. As the coding 
process is based on a subjective assessment of the references and the discussions, the three 
rounds of coding were justified as a critical approach for ensuring a high quality of analysis 
and minimising any misunderstandings or misinterpretation of data. In relation to the 
analysis of the Norwegian discussion, special arrangements were made to check the 
authenticity of the English translation.  
The process of coding and analysis became an important learning path. As a result of the 
highly flexible and open research approach, numerous patterns emerged during the coding 
and analysis. The emerging patterns confirmed initial expectations, but there were some 
issues – e.g. perceptions of trust – which were not as salient within the discussions either in 
Norway or in the UK as expected based on the available literature. Moreover, the findings 
of the coding and analysis suggested plenty of new opportunities and directions within the 
research that significantly shaped the final structure of this thesis and the content of the 
following chapters. 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION  
The novelty of this research stems from its unique methodological approach, which adheres 
to the social constructivist understanding of public attitudes (Converse, 2006; Tourangeau et 
al., 2000; Wilson and Hodges, 1992). Acknowledging the impact of public discourse, access 
to information, and social interaction on public attitudes, the research adopted a 
combination of the deliberative method of DFs and DA to examine public attitudes to 
immigrants’ inclusion as such attitudes are articulated by ordinary people through social 
interaction. This chapter was devoted to describing and justifying the chosen research 
approach and presenting details about the data collection and data analysis.  
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DFs conducted in the WelfSOC research project granted a high level of autonomy to 
participants to shape discussions about the future of welfare states. Although DFs operate 
within a carefully designed research context, the discussions and participants’ interactions 
can dynamically develop. This dynamically changing nature of discussions opens the space 
for exploring and examining attitude-formation through exchanges of views, contestations, 
justifications, and the reconciliation of conflicting opinions. DA as the method of data 
analysis was chosen for its capacity to embrace even the smallest details of this dynamism 
and the complexity of the discussions and the reasons behind participants’ attitudes. This 
chapter was also written to reflect not only on the benefits and the potential of the use of 
these two methods, but also on the potential limitations, which required special attention 
throughout the analysis and interpretation of data. After describing the theoretical and the 
methodological approach, the following chapter focuses on providing an introduction to the 
two countries selected for the research. More precisely, it examines the development of 
immigration, welfare and labour market policies, and the key trends in attitudes to 




4 STANCES FOR INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN THE BRITISH AND 
NORWEGIAN INSTITUTIONS – A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
Chapter 3 proposed a unique methodology for analysing public attitudes to immigrants’ 
inclusion and emphasised the significant role of context in shaping public attitudes. 
Following-up on this central argument, this chapter analyses the institutional and social 
context in which the DFs took place in the autumn of 2015. This chapter compares the British 
and the Norwegian context to reveal the key similarities and differences between the 
countries that justify their selection as suitable and interesting for analysis.  
As welfare states provide a means of reducing social divisions within the national population 
(Clarke, 2005; Tilly, 1994), the former have created a framework for and developed tools and 
practices of inclusion and exclusion. However, as much as the understanding of “common 
good” or social justice varies across welfare regimes (Mau, 2003; Wolfe and Klausen, 1997; 
Clarke, 2005), practices of inclusion and exclusion also vary country-by-country. Therefore, 
it is important to analyse how institutions define inclusion and exclusion and how the latter 
applies to immigrants specifically. As shown in Chapter 2, research findings stress the divide 
between social democratic and liberal welfare regimes, arguing that the former are more 
inclusive, while the latter represent a more selective approach to immigrants (Crepaz and 
Damron, 2009; Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012; Swank and Betz, 2003; Van Der Waal et 
al., 2013). Following Sainsbury (2012), this chapter extends the scope of institutions to 
immigration policies and labour market policies, in addition to welfare policies. This chapter 
argues that despite the fact that inclusiveness in Norway and selectivity in the UK are 
important principles at the level of institutions, differentiation processes and balancing 
between inclusion and exclusion take place in all three policy areas, which closely interact 
with political and public discourses.  
As immigration cuts across various cleavages – like ethnicity, age, socio-economic status, etc. 
– the reasons for public polarization concerning the issue of immigration can be multiple and 
widely intertwined with social processes and socio-economic changes. Therefore, this 
chapter cannot provide an exhaustive review of differentiation processes, but focuses on the 
role of institutions in shaping social divisions. The scope of this chapter is limited to reviewing 
the period between 1998 and 2015, which captures the most recent significant wave of 
immigration in Norway and in the UK until the time of the DFs. During this period, post-2004 
intra-EU labour mobility substantially changed the context of migration, which might have 
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fostered social categorisations. The first part of the chapter describes and compares trends 
in public opinions about immigration in light of the changes in the context of immigration in 
Norway and in the UK. It continues by investigating changes in immigration policies and the 
related public discourse. The second part of the chapter examines the institutional features 
of the social democratic and liberal welfare systems and the position of immigrants in 
welfare states. The last section analyses developments in labour market policies and its 
implications for immigrants.  
 
4.1 THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF MIGRATION  
The growth of an immigrant population and rapid inflows of immigrants have a considerable 
effect on perceptions of group threats and narrowing intergroup boundaries (Quillian, 1995; 
Wright, 2011). In this respect, the period between 1998 and 2015 was significant in both 
countries as net migration doubled by 2015, as depicted Figure 2 and Figure 3. The share of 
foreign-born people increased from 7.8% in 1998 to 13.5% – accounting for 8.7 million 
people – in 2015 in the UK. In Norway, the increase was even more significant, from 4.9% in 
1998 to 14.4% – equivalent to 670 thousand people – in 2015.25  
The share of immigrants in the national population is very similar in the two countries and 
lower than in many other European countries (Eurostat, 2015). However, we should stress 
the differences in the size of these two countries’ national populations and immigrant 
populations, which may create different dynamics in terms of the public perceptions of 
immigration. We should also consider the share of specific types of immigrants, which can 
also affect perceptions of immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Last, we need to 
highlight the differences in the history of immigration between Norway and the UK as the 
latter is substantially affected by a legacy of post-colonial immigration (Bloom and Tonkiss, 
2013). While these differences are fundamental, focusing on the period from 1998 to 2015 





25 The Norwegian Statistics distinguish first-generation immigrants and persons born to two foreign-
born parents. The data referred to above refer to first generation immigrants only.  
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Figure 2 - Immigration, emigration, and net migration in Norway (1980-2015) 
 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
Figure 3 - Immigration, emigration, and net migration in the UK (1980-2015) 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
First, considerable changes have occurred in the ethnic composition of the population, 
which reflect both the effect of natural changes and net international migration.26 Census 
data in England and Wales show that the share of majority White British decreased to 80.5% 
in 2011 (ONS, 2013). As a result of the expansion of intra-EU migration, the largest increase 
in ethnic minority groups occurred in relation to the “Other White” category, which includes 
the majority of EU citizens. This increased by 1.1 million people to represent 4.4% of the total 
population in 2011. Indians (2.5%), Pakistanis (2%), and Black Africans (1.8%) followed as the 
 






















next most numerous ethnic minorities. Similarly, there were considerable changes in the 
composition of immigrants in Norway. Although migrants from non-European countries 
constituted almost half of the immigrant population, the share of Nordic country nationals 
dropped considerably from 20% to 10% as the inflow of Eastern European immigrants 
intensified. Poland was by far the largest country of origin in 2015 with 90 thousand migrants 
living in Norway. This was followed by Sweden (37 thousand), Lithuania (36 thousand) and 
Somalia (27 thousand).  
 
Figure 4 - Share of immigrants in regions of Norway in 1998 and 2015 
 
Source: Statistics Norway (1998, 2015) 
 
Second, the increase in the number of immigrants also affected the regional distribution of 
immigrants. However, this did not change the dominance of the capitals – London and Oslo 
– as the key destinations for immigrants. In 2015, the share of foreign-born was 36.5% of the 
population in London, followed in terms of proportion of immigration by the regions closest 
to the capital: the South East with a share of 12.3%, and East with a share of 8.6% of the 
resident population (Kone, 2018). In Oslo, the share of foreign-born reached almost 25% in 
2015, closely followed by the Drammen region with 20%, which is in the vicinity of the capital. 
If we focus on changes over time – comparing Figure 4 and Figure 5 – we can observe a more 
dramatic increase in the share of immigrants in resident populations in Norway, as in some 
















































Figure 5 - Share of immigrants in regions of the UK in 2001 and 2015 
 
Source: ONS, Local Area Migration Indicators, UK (2001 was the earliest year for which data were available in 
the UK) 
 
Third, changes also occurred in relation to the legal classification of immigration, which 
distinguishes labour, family, education, and asylum as reasons for migration. Figure 6 and 
Figure 7 illustrate the significant differences between Norway and the UK. Focusing on 
changes over time, we see more extensive re-structuring in Norway. While refugee and 
family unification constituted the main reasons for migration in 1998, by 2015, due to the 
restrictive asylum policies and the liberalization of labour migration, labour became the key 
reason for migration. As Figure 6 shows, migration for education doubled in this period, but 
remained minor in comparison to other types. In contrast to this, in the UK education has 
played an important role, even out-numbering labour migration in the period between 2009 
and 2012.  
All three issues considered above contributed to changes in the context of immigration in 
Norway and in the UK. However, it is even more important how the changes depicted in the 
data were perceived by individuals. As raised in Chapter 2, the question remains who 
ordinary people view and perceive as immigrants. Studies show that visions of immigrants 
depend on wide variety of characteristics people take into account (or disregard) when 
formulating their opinions about immigrants (Bansak et al., 2016; Blinder and Allen, 2016; 
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for migration, length and permanency of stay in the country of destination, perceptions of 
racial, ethnic or religious differences as well as perceptions of immigrants’ qualifications and 
employability, etc. Perceptions of any of these characteristics or combinations of these 
characteristics shape ordinary people’s conceptions of immigrants and influence their 
understanding of immigration.  
As noted by Anderson et al. (2018) migration tends to be associated with problematic 
mobility, which in itself calls for greater scrutiny of how people conceptualise immigrants,  
what considerations make a difference and how these conceptualisations affect public 
understanding of immigration. These are especially pressing questions as public polarization 
and the political salience of the issue increased in both countries in the observed period 
(Fangen and Vaage, 2018; Jennings, 2009). Furthermore, in the UK immigration was 
considered one of the top two national concerns after the early 2000s  (Eurobarometer 2003-
2015, Ipsos-MORI Issue Index, 2016), which may be due to the reaction to the influx of 
Central-European migrants after 2004 (Ford et al., 2015). However, specific events such as 
the terrorist attacks experienced in these two countries may also have shaped perceptions 
of immigration and visions of immigrants. In this regard, we should note the specificity of the 
2012 terrorist attacks in Oslo, where the attacks were committed by an extreme right-wing 
advocate (Fangen and Vaage, 2018) in what was intended as a reaction to increasing 
immigration and to government policies.  
 
Figure 6 - Immigration according to reason for migration in Norway (1998-2015) 
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Figure 7 - Immigration according to reason for migration in the UK (1998-2015) 
 
Source: ONS (1998-2015) 
 
Research shows that public concerns can be greatly magnified by misperceptions. Herda 
(2010) argues that people in all the 22 European countries included in his study over-
estimated the size of the immigrant population. He found a greater gap – 15% – between the 
estimated and actual size of the immigrant population in the UK compared to the 5% gap in 
Norway. Among other factors, Herda (2010) associates the variability in the identified gaps 
with differences in economic inequality, the reading of politically biased newspapers, and 
contact with immigrants. In the UK, Duffy and Frere-Smith (2014) found that immigrants 
were thought to constitute 31% of the population, which is more than double the actual 13% 
measured in 2013. The same survey showed that respondents thought asylum-seekers made 
up 21% of the immigrant population, in contrast to the actual proportion of 4% (Duffy and 
Frere-Smith, 2014). These findings reflect how far public perceptions tend to stray from 
reality, further underlining the need to focus more on public (mis)perceptions when 
analysing public attitudes and to scrutinise how people talk about immigrants and 
immigration. 
 
4.2 PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS  
The previous section described the significant changes in the social context of immigration. 
However, the question remains how the Norwegian and British public perceived and 
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immigration and immigrants in the period between 1998 and 2015, seven questions from 
the European Social Survey are examined and the related tendencies in the two countries 
are compared. We need to stress again, that most of these survey questions do not specify 
who immigrants are singling out only one specificity (such as race, country of origin, etc.) or 
provide a very vague definition (see Figure 10) with an overall tendency to undermine the 
heterogeneity of immigrants as well as the wide variation in how immigrants are 
conceptualised by respondents.  
Despite the above-described changes in the context of immigration, the findings of ESS in 
Norway show an overall positive shift in public attitudes towards immigration and 
immigrants between 2002 and 2015.27 Comparison of the 2002 and 2014 data (see Figure 8) 
shows that openness and willingness to permit immigrants to enter the country increased, 
regardless of the distinctiveness of race or ethnicity or the socio-economic status of 
immigrants. While we can see specific changes in the hierarchy respondents create, 
opposition to people of a different race or ethnic background decreased. Concerning 
immigrants from poorer countries outside of Europe, almost 70% of respondents were more 
inclined to allow immigrants to come to Norway. 
In contrast to these positive tendencies in Norway, the British data show stagnation and even 
deterioration in receptiveness. Openness towards permitting immigrants’ entry into the UK 
is significantly lower than in Norway. While the race and ethnicity of immigrants does not 
seem to make a big difference in attitudes, the worse socio-economic status of non-
European countries triggered greater opposition in 2014. These data indicate a more 
restrictive approach to immigration in the UK. Preferences for immigration control are even 
more powerfully articulated in national opinion polls. While we should note that the question 
in the British Social Attitudes survey asked about preferences for reducing immigration – 
instead of allowing in different groups of immigrants, as included in ESS – the finding that 
since the early 2000s almost 80% of respondents preferred a reduction in the number of 




27 These questions about immigration were introduced in 2002. In the case of ESS and ISSP surveys, 
the year 2014 is used as the closest year to the DFs.  
28 See Figure 2 - Appendix 2 
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Figure 8 - Public preferences concerning entry of immigrants of different/same race and ethnic group, or from 
poorer countries outside Europe 
 
Source: ESS 2002, 2014 
Differences in British and Norwegian attitudes also emerge concerning the assessment of 
the economic and cultural benefits of immigration. As depicted in Figure 9, perceptions of 
immigration as good for the economy and of immigration as enriching cultural life increased 
in Norway, but the extent of the increase was not major. Additionally, we can note that there 
is greater division in relation to perceptions of immigrants’ contribution to, or immigrants’ 
use of, welfare provision. In 2014 relatively equal shares of people held positive, neutral, and 
negative views about the contributions of immigrants. The picture drawn by the British data 
is more complex. Perceptions about economic benefits improved and considerations that 
immigrants take out more than they contribute also decreased, which implies a positive 
change in terms of the inclusion of immigrants. However, we can also observe a higher level 
of polarization among British respondents in 2014, as the data indicate that individuals with 
positive, neutral, and negative attitudes on immigrants’ contributions are almost equally 
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Figure 9 - Public attitudes towards immigrants’ contribution to cultural life, economy, and welfare system 
 
Source: ESS 2002, 2014 
Comparing these findings, the issue of contributions to the welfare system stands out, in 
relation to which both Norwegian and British respondents seem to be more critical. While 
concerning economic and cultural benefits Norwegian respondents have become more 
positive, in regard to welfare-related issues they are more divided, which are confirmed by 
and better demonstrated in national public opinion surveys in Norway.29 Based on these ESS 
results, we can conclude that concerns about immigrants’ welfare use are greater in the UK 
than in Norway.  
In relation to public preferences for immigrants’ access to welfare benefits and services,30 
the 2016 findings show a mixed picture in Norway, further refining the perceptions of the 
relation between immigration and welfare. In comparison to other countries, Figure 10 
shows a relatively strong preference for immediate access or access after one year, 
regardless of work or contributions to the system (12.4% and 14.7%, respectively). 
Additionally, preferences are relatively supportive (34%) of the requirement to acquire 
citizenship. Comparison of the 2008 and 2016 data shows that only minor (1-3 percentage 
points) changes occurred.31 These findings also reflect that the public is more divided, and 
 
29 See Table 1 – Appendix 2. 
30 This specific question was raised only in 2008 and 2016. Therefore, here we use the 2016 data, the 
nearest year to the date of DFs.  
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preferences for a more restrictive approach have emerged requiring citizenship as a 
condition for accessing the same social rights as the in-group.  
Figure 10 - International comparison of public attitudes towards immigrants' access to welfare benefits and 
services (“With regard to people who come to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they 
should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?”) 
 
Source: ESS, 2016 
The British data show very strong support for the principle of reciprocity. In 2016, 58.4% of 
respondents shared the view that immigrants should contribute for at least one year before 
accessing benefits – see  
Figure 10. The extent of preferences for requiring at least a year of contribution in the UK is 
outstanding in European comparison. Furthermore, compared to preferences in 2008, we 
can see a 10% increase in the preference for one year’s contribution at the expense of 
preferences for citizenship, which indicates a notable shift in attitudes. However, the 
response “at least a year” is vague about the preferred nature of restrictions and strength of 
welfare chauvinism in the country. In this respect, it is worth recalling responses to the 2013 
BSA survey question “How soon, if at all, should they [immigrants working and paying taxes] 
be able to access the same welfare benefits as British citizens?” The results32 showed that 
respondents were divided about the length of the ideal contributory period, with roughly 
equal shares of respondents requiring at least a year (20-23%), at least three years (25%) or 
at least five years of contributions (22%). While these findings show that calls for at least one 
year of employment cover a relatively wide range of more inclusive and more exclusive 
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preferences, it should be noted that, based on ESS, the UK is not one of the countries in the 
EU with the most restrictive preferences.  
The review of the above survey results intended to briefly review the development of 
attitudes in the period between 1998 and 2015. Overall, we can identify more positive 
attitudes in Norway and a greater level of polarization and a tendency towards more 
restrictive attitudes in the UK. However, the issue of granting access to welfare provisions 
reveals some contradictory patterns as the UK seems to be more inclusive and Norway more 
exclusive. While these findings are significantly influenced by the survey methodology, they 
imply more complex considerations and a mix of pro-inclusive and pro-exclusive preferences. 
It is argued that institutions – related to immigration, welfare and labour market policies – 
include both inclusive and exclusive elements, which are applied to immigrant-related issues 
differently and with changing salience depending on the specific social context. The interplay 
of these specific aspects is further explored in the following sections by analysing policy 
legacies and policy changes in these three areas as well as the related political and public 
discourse.  
 
4.3 POLICY LEGACIES 
4.3.1 Immigration policies and integration  
The development of immigration policies has led to various tensions in both countries. 
Perceptions of the need for a foreign labour force were counterbalanced by preferences for 
immigration control. The dilemmas involved in immigration control were closely intertwined 
with 1) fears about the challenges immigrants might pose in the labour market and the 
welfare state, 2) fears of deepening social conflict due to the different cultural and social 
backgrounds of immigrants and 3) the need to protect the interests of nationals (Brochmann 
and Hagelund, 2012; Ford and Lymperopoulou, 2017). While the timing, extent, and 
historical reasons for immigration differ in Norway and the UK, these considerations were 
dominant in both countries when people sought to justify a halt to immigration (Brochmann 
and Hagelund, 2012; Ford et al., 2015).  
In the 2000s, these tensions reached a new level as the policy aim of regulating immigration 
and the aim of liberalizing the movement of a labour force needed to be reconciled 
(Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012; Ford et al., 2015; Veggeland, 2016). Immigration was soon 
interpreted both as a problem and a solution to meeting labour shortages and to sustaining 
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the welfare state in light of an aging population. These tensions and conflicts of interest 
considerably influenced the way immigration and integration policies and the related 
discourse developed in Norway and in the UK. This section analyses these policy shifts and 
the related intergroup differentiation processes. 
 
4.3.1.1 The legacies of immigration control in the British and Norwegian immigration 
systems 
Considering the relatively long-term colonial history of migration in the UK, the public has 
largely accepted that some migration is beneficial. However, the pragmatism underlying 
public preferences for specific groups of immigrants has been coupled with preferences for 
keeping immigration under control. The development of British immigration policies show 
clear patterns of policy cycles as respective governments invested considerable effort in 
managing immigration in line with public preferences (Ford et al., 2015; Jennings, 2009). The 
settlement of co-nationals from Commonwealth countries, family reunification, and refugee 
rights were gradually restricted (Sainsbury, 2012). This responsiveness of governments and 
the perception of controlled immigration has prevailed in British society and thus created a 
legacy for demanding controlled immigration (Ford et al., 2015).  
Similarly to the controlled immigration in the UK, a more exclusive immigration system was 
adopted in Norway. By the end of the 1980s, labour migration was restricted, and only Nordic 
nationals were allowed free movement (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). As a result of 
these restrictions, refugee and family reunification became the dominant formal channels of 
immigration, which were perceived as a challenge to the welfare state (Brochmann and 
Hagelund, 2012). Therefore, further restrictions were adopted concerning the requirement 
of attaining residence permits. The key argument behind these restrictions involved the 
state’s capacity to manage immigration to ensure equal treatment and equal access to 
benefits and services (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012).  
While we can identify specific parallels in the development of the Norwegian and British 
immigration policies, it is important to stress the difference in approaches to the integration 
of immigrants. In Norway there were efforts to integrate immigrants from the very beginning 
to prevent the emergence of a marginalised and segregated social group. Emphasis was put 
on labour market integration and language skills, which were considered a precondition for 
increasing understanding the functioning of the society and facilitating immigrants’ 
adaptation to it (Veggeland, 2016). In the UK, instead of integration measures anti-
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discrimination policies were enacted to reduce the social exclusion of ethnic minorities, 
including immigrants (Schierup et al., 2006). Although the UK is considered a multicultural 
society, it has not been free of inter-ethnic conflicts and racism, creating fertile ground for 
ethnic differentiation (Schierup et al., 2006).  
 
4.3.1.2 The 1990s – steps towards more selective immigration policies 
The 1990s brought a turning point in immigration policies in both countries. In Norway 
throughout the 1990s there were important economic, political, and social events – like the 
bank crisis, the referendum that rejected Norway’s accession to the EU, and the consequent 
discussions about the terms and conditions of cooperation with EU countries – that created 
the context in which questions concerning immigration emerged (Brochmann and Hagelund, 
2012). In the UK, the election of the New Labour government brought a new approach and 
a new discourse about immigration in light of the increase in economic growth, and need for 
a foreign labour force to improve the UK’s productivity and international competitiveness 
(Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014; Spencer, 2011). Furthermore, as a result of escalating 
political conflicts abroad in the late 1990s, both countries were faced an increase in the 
number of asylum-applications (see Figure 6 and Figure 7). These developments induced a 
series of changes in immigration policies. First, they led to a shift towards a more selective 
immigration policy in both countries that combined a more restrictive approach to asylum-
seekers and the liberalization of labour migration. Second, EU free movement policies 
introduced a new phase of dualized immigration policies as EU and EEA nationals were 
subject to differentiated status.  
 
4.3.1.3 The effects of 2004 EU enlargement on the development of immigration policies 
and the related discourse 
While these two countries shared the challenges of increasing labour immigration, the British 
and Norwegian immigration systems substantially differed both in terms of the pace of 
accommodating labour migration, and in the volume of immigrants arriving to these two 
countries.  
In the UK, the New Labour government engaged in the extensive liberalisation of 
immigration, launching specific schemes to attract high-skilled migrants and entrepreneurs 
and easing the process of acquiring a work permit (Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014; 
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Sainsbury, 2012). The government promoted the new policies as “managed migration” 
(Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014). The number of immigrants increased. However, as these 
new schemes were demand-driven, the state preserved the capacity to control who entered 
the country. Furthermore, the ability to regulate immigration was demonstrated in 
restrictions concerning asylum-seekers (Jennings, 2009). The perception of controlled 
immigration was exposed once the government decided not to impose any transitional 
labour market restrictions on citizens of Member States that had joined the EU in 2004 (A8 
countries)33 (Anderson, 2017). 
The volume of EU migration was significantly underestimated by the government. While 
estimations predicted 5 – 13 000 migrants per year, more than 290 000 migrants arrived in 
the UK between May 2004 and September 2005 (OECD, 2009). Although the booming British 
economy absorbed the increase in the inflow of migrants, A8 nationals were 
overrepresented in low-skilled jobs (Fernández-Reino and Rienzo, 2017). Therefore, public 
perceptions of EU migration tended to change. Before 2004, EU migrants were largely 
employed in professional, high-skilled jobs. While the public viewed their contributions as 
significant and their integration as unproblematic, the contribution of low-skilled migrants 
was less clear-cut; consequently, A8 migrants were less favoured (Anderson, 2017). 
Moreover, as EU citizens they were entitled to welfare support after one year of employment 
(Ruhs, 2015; Sainsbury, 2012). Although previous research found limited evidence for the 
detrimental impact of EU immigration (Dustmann et al., 2003; Dustmann and Frattini, 2014; 
Manacorda et al., 2012)34, public concern about immigration rose and intensified fears about 
the potential abuse of the welfare system (Ford et al., 2015).  
The government misjudged the strength of differences in values and failed to pay attention 
to the economic, social, and cultural impact of mass immigration on society (Spencer, 2011). 
It was especially working class people who perceived that they were receiving a limited share 
of the benefits of economic growth and that it was “others” – bankers, employers, and 
immigrants – who were enjoying its advantages (Finch and Goodhart, 2010). Consequently, 
the New Labour government faced increasing public anxiety about immigration, which was 
reinforced by criticism from the opposition and media. The key cornerstone of the debate in 
the media framed the uncontrolled inflow of migrants as imposing excessive pressure on 
 
33 On the occasion of EU enlargement, old Member States had the opportunity to limit freedom of 
movement. In 2004, only three countries – Sweden, Ireland, and the UK – opened their borders to 
A8 migrants. 
34 For further elaboration of these findings, see Section 1.3.2.2.2 and Section 1.3.3.3  
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nationals’ employment prospects and increasing pressure on housing, education, and 
healthcare services (Balch and Balabanova, 2016).  
The introduction of a five-tier, point-based system (adopted in 2006 and implemented from 
2008) intended to moderate public concerns about immigration  (Finch and Goodhart, 2010). 
Furthermore, in the following round of enlargement the UK imposed restrictions on the 
movement of Romanian and Bulgarian nationals (A2 countries) who could enter the country 
through the points-based system (Ruhs, 2015). However, it could not restore the perception 
of controlled migration.  
After 2010, the Coalition government extended control mechanisms through a process of 
stricter selection and monitoring. However, these initiatives primarily affected non-EU 
migrants.35 The Coalition government was unable to fulfil its promises to restrict immigration 
(Morris, 2018), what further increased disillusionment with the mainstream political parties. 
This benefited mostly the United Kingdom Independence Party as its popularity increased 
and the party gained ownership of the issue (Dennison and Goodwin, 2015). The fact that 
the Prime Minister, David Cameron, committed the government to holding a referendum on 
EU membership – an idea previously publicly advocated only by UKIP – confirmed the latter 
party’s influence and ability to set the agenda without being present in Parliament 36 
(Goodwin and Ford, 2017).  
In Norway, two discourses had emerged in relation to immigration by the end of the 1990s 
(Fangen and Mohn, 2016). One involved approaching the issue from a moral perspective, 
viewing refugees as the most deserving group of immigrants. The other discourse stressed 
the economic benefits of labour migration – favouring an expansion of labour migration and 
the considering refugees and asylum-seekers as a burden on the state. The policy changes in 
the 2000s largely followed the latter approach in Norway – leading to the liberalization of 
labour migration and restrictions on refugee entry to the country, as in case of the UK. The 
“unified refugee policy” that was adopted was underlined by a new understanding of the 
responsibility for refugees through their limited protection until they could return to their 
country of origin (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). In contrast, labour migration was 
publicly embraced and labour migration rapidly increased after 2003 (see Figure 6). 
Following the 2004 EU enlargement, Norway was the top destination for immigrants, 
 
35 For a detailed review of post-2010 policy changes, see Shutes, 2016 and Morris, 2018. 
36 Due to the majoritarian electoral system, UKIP attained its first and only one parliamentary seat in 
the 2015 Parliamentary Elections. 
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attracting more than half of all EU migrants who moved to Nordic countries (Dølvik and 
Eldring, 2008). Although Norway introduced transitional arrangements, these were relaxed, 
allowing migrants six months to find employment, and granting permits to stay for those 
who were in full-time employment (Dølvik and Eldring, 2008). In contrast to the free 
movement policies within the Nordic countries, the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement posed a 
new challenge, as migrants generally came from poorer countries with lower living and 
working standards, which raised the issue of wage competition and social dumping (Friberg 
and Eldring, 2013).37 
Recognition of the failure of integration policies in the 1990s led to the reformulation of 
integration policies. The Introduction Act aimed to encourage the activation and social 
participation of immigrants, including labour and family migrants, except for EU and EEA 
citizens (Breidahl, 2017). As part of the Introduction Act (2003, 2005), a more comprehensive 
Introduction programme was adopted to foster the employment of immigrants and promote 
their acquisition of language skills. Attendance at the Introduction programme was linked to 
a flat-rate introduction benefit to motivate participation. Furthermore, later attendance in 
the Introduction programme was defined as a precondition of attaining residency permit. 
The Introduction programme is a clear example of an increase in the obligations and duties 
of immigrants towards the state (Breidahl, 2017). While such integration programmes are 
often claimed to be key instruments of inclusion, they have exclusionary elements, too. 
Integration programmes serve as a means of screening those immigrants who are liable to 
integrate and provide an opportunity for the government to manifest its ability to control 
borders, and to communicate towards immigrants the priority of maintaining cultural 
cohesion and national identity (Goodman, 2011).  
Corresponding to these policy changes, the issues of immigration and integration also 
emerged in the public discourse. The focus of the discourse shifted to the recognition of 
diversity and enhancing individual freedoms. Additionally, there were increasing 
expectations that immigrants should adapt to society, with stress on the existence of rules 
and values that should be respected (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). Therefore, in Norway 
we can observe a specific form of dual approach – i.e. efforts to construct a new and more 
inclusive sense of national identity, but also efforts to shape immigrant groups and make 
them adapt to Norwegian norms and the Norwegian way of life (Brochmann and Hagelund, 
2012). This duality can be found in public attitudes, too. In terms of preferences for 
 
37 For further details, see Section 1.3.3.2 
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immigrants’ access to social benefits and services, we can identify the emergence of both 
more inclusive attitudes – i.e. support for immediate access to social rights – and a more 
exclusive approach – the requirement of citizenship – as preconditions for accessing social 
rights (see Figure 9).     
The discourse on immigration was greatly fuelled by the right-wing populist Norwegian 
Progress Party (FrP), which together with the Conservative Party formed a coalition 
government in the past two parliamentary elections. FrP is the only political party in Norway 
which openly uses the threat of Islamization, a clash of cultures, and the negative effects of 
cultural diversification as core arguments for restrictive immigration policies, which are then 
further linked to negative economic impacts and presenting immigrants as a burden on 
Norwegian taxpayers (Fangen and Vaage, 2018). Being in the government, FrP’s public 
stances on immigration became more moderate. Still, the restrictions that have been 
introduced since 2013 prove the success of the party in shaping immigration policies. Cultural 
threats and fears about the sustainability of the Norwegian welfare state are sufficient 
reasons to keep intergroup differentiations alive in the political and public discourse. 
 
This section has reviewed the key social and political changes in relation to immigration 
policies in Norway and UK which affected the development of public perceptions about 
immigration and the inclusion of immigrants in the period between 1998 and 2015. In the 
UK, the rapid increase in immigration and related more inclusive but unpopular policy 
changes strengthened the narrative of a lack of control and fostered the politicization of the 
issue of immigration. In Norway, we can observe notable dualities in the means of regulating 
and debating immigration. While in the 2000s there was a considerable change in policies 
stressing commitment to the integration of immigrants, this change was also driven by 
concerns about the cultural divisions between immigrants and Norwegian nationals. 
Therefore, both in political and public debates, differentiation processes along cultural and 
ethnic lines became dominant. As concerns about the welfare state are central to public 
perceptions of immigration, the following section focuses on the British and Norwegian 




4.3.2 Welfare policies  
The British and the Norwegian welfare states represent two different welfare regimes. As 
differences in institutional characteristics affect inclusion in the welfare state, this section 
provides an analysis of processes of inclusion and exclusion as these are shaped and 
reproduced by the British and Norwegian welfare states. First, key institutional 
characteristics are reviewed, stressing the potential impact of institutions on intergroup 
differentiation. Second, immigrants’ social rights and access to social benefits are examined.  
 
4.3.2.1 Welfare-regime characteristics 
The Norwegian tax-financed welfare state is based on a combination of full employment and 
extensive redistribution through active social and economic policies (Halvorsen et al., 2016). 
An emphasis on labour market participation and achieving a high level of productivity ensure 
the financial viability of social democratic welfare systems (Dølvik et al., 2015). Therefore, 
the functioning of the former system assumes a two-way, reciprocal process of “rights” and 
“duties”. Accordingly, the social value of work and expectation to contribute are strong in 
Norwegian society. In return, the state provides extensive social protection and moderates 
the social insecurity that affects people’s lives and society by reducing inequalities, striving 
to equalize life chances, providing high level employment protection, and offering help in the 
form of benefits and services by extensive risk-pooling (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Halvorsen et 
al., 2016).  
Within the British welfare state, employment plays a central role, too. However, the logic 
justifying this centrality is different due to the claim that only employment can ensure a 
decent living for members of society. Consequently, the welfare state is supposed to focus 
on needs which are not met by the labour market and to support those people who are not 
able to work (Dwyer, 2000). Welfare policies shift the focus to market forces – keeping taxes 
low, allowing people the freedom to organize their lives, fostering greater individual 
responsibility with limited state intervention and extending reliance on private provision 
(Dwyer, 2000; Taylor-Gooby et al., 2017). The UK has developed the most deregulated labour 
market in Europe and has increasingly shifted towards implementing a targeted system of 
means-tested social provision (Taylor-Gooby, 2008).  
This situation is fundamentally different to the Norwegian welfare state, where access to 
benefits is universal, while in the UK there is a largely tax-financed residual welfare system 
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that grants universal access to major social services – such as healthcare, education, etc. – 
and non-contributory, means-tested benefits based on specific requirements of neediness 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). However, the question remains how these differences affect 
perceptions of and preferences for immigrants’ inclusion.  
 
4.3.2.1.1 The role of universal vs. selective welfare systems in intergroup differentiation 
processes 
Focusing on how universal and selective welfare systems affect processes of intergroup 
differentiation, research highlights the inclusivity of universal social democratic countries 
and the higher exposure to differentiation in selective welfare systems (Crepaz and Damron, 
2009; Larsen, 2006; Van Der Waal et al., 2013). As argued by Rothstein (1998), the more 
selective the welfare system, the more it draws attention to the “otherness” of the needy. 
Larsen (2006) argues that a higher level of social inequality reinforces perceptions of a 
lifestyle divide between the most vulnerable and the majority of citizens, who may view the 
poor as deviant and not deserving of access welfare benefits. Furthermore, while universal 
access limits, selectivity and means-testing fosters the stigmatization of welfare recipients 
(Larsen, 2006). While these studies focus on welfare beneficiaries within the in-group of 
nationals, emerging internal tensions and patterns of opposition are easily re-produced to 
the out-group of immigrants.  
As shown in Figure 11, differences between the two countries are indicated by the level of 
income inequality, which is the highest in the UK among Western European countries. In 
contrast, Norway’s achievements at reducing social inequalities are outstanding in European 
comparison (Dølvik et al., 2015). Figure 12 also depicts considerable differences concerning 
poverty and social exclusion in these two countries. Both sets of data underline that, in 
relation to income inequality and economic conditions, the Norwegian welfare state 
performs better, which implies that the in-group is less exposed socially and economically. 
Therefore, perceptions of intergroup competition and seeing immigrants as a threat (Blumer, 
1958; Scheepers et al., 2002; Semyonov et al., 2006) might be less and openness toward the 
inclusion of immigrants higher, as suggested in the positive trends related to public attitudes 




Figure 11 - Level of income inequality in EU Member States and Norway in 201538 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2015 
 
In contrast, in the UK both a higher level of income inequality and poverty – as shown in 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 – indicate greater exposure to perceptions of intergroup competition 
and consequently to preferences for restricting immigrants’ access to welfare provision 
(Crepaz and Damron, 2009). Recalling the development of public attitudes to immigration 
(Figure 9), and the strong preference for immigration control, also indicates such tendencies.  
Figure 12 - Population at risk of poverty, in low work intensity households and materially deprived household in 
EU Member States and Norway, 2015 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2015 
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4.3.2.1.2 Social protection expenditure 
As perceptions of competition intensify under perceptions of scarcity (Coenders et al., 2009; 
Dancygier, 2010; Semyonov et al., 2006), it is considered relevant to review the extent of 
social protection expenditure and the generosity of welfare systems.39 Both Norway’s and 
the UK’s expenditure on social protection accounted for 27% of GDP in 2015, which is in line 
with the EU average (Eurostat). However, focusing on expenditure per inhabitant (in EUR), 
Figure 13 shows a huge gap between the two countries. In Norway, the volume of 
expenditure per inhabitant considerably surpassed the EU average. Moreover, in terms of 
trends Norwegian expenditure continuously increased, while in the UK the trends are less 
progressive, showing weaker commitment to redistribution.   
Figure 13 - Social protection expenditure per inhabitant (in EUR at constant 2010 prices), 1998-2015 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2015 
Furthermore, using the Social Welfare Generosity Index (Scruggs, 2014), Figure 14 shows an 
increase in  the generosity of social benefits in Norway in contrast to other Nordic and 
Western European countries. The main reason Norway was able to increase the generosity 
of benefits is the fact that the country has not faced major internal or external pressures for 
retrenchment (Halvorsen et al., 2016; Sørvoll, 2015). This marks another distinguishing 
 
39 Although people’s perceptions of the generosity of the welfare system may differ from the 












1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EU average United Kingdom Norway Germany
 107 
 
feature in comparison to the British case, as in the British welfare state the shift to neo-
liberalism has fostered and justified periods of welfare retrenchment (Taylor-Gooby, 2016).  
Figure 14 - Welfare Generosity Index based on sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, and old-age pensions 
 
Source: Scruggs, Lyle, Detlef Jahn and Kati Kuitto (2014). Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset 2, Version 
2014-03, University of Connecticut and University of Greifswald, in Dølvik et al. (2015) 
 
In Norway, the stability and prosperity of the national economy – primarily due to oil 
production – have secured firm support for social protection both financially and politically 
(Dølvik et al., 2015). On the one hand, this long-term stability strengthens perceptions of 
social safety and might reduce public perceptions of threat. On the other hand, awareness 
of the generosity of the welfare systems and the financial costs of maintaining it might also 
increase public concern about the misuse of the welfare state, thus leading to a mixture of 
positive or negative effects on perceptions of immigrants’ inclusion.  
In contrast to this, in the UK financial and political support for social protection is more fragile 
and exposed to changes in the national economy (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2017). Considering the 
past decade, some of the harshest austerity measures were adopted by the Coalition 
government (Dwyer and Wright, 2014; Taylor-Gooby, 2016). In comparison to the stability in 
Norway, these developments in the British welfare state decreased perceptions of social 
security, especially at the bottom of society (Dwyer and Wright, 2014; McEnhill and Taylor-
Gooby, 2018) and contributed to the politicisation of immigration. Furthermore, the 
discourse on austerity policies legitimised restriction as a solution to the needs of British 
society. These phenomena contributed to an increase in intergroup differentiation that 
protects the in-group, and preferences for restrictive measures towards the out-group.   
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4.3.2.1.3 Collective vs. individual responsibilities 
The tendency towards individualization in the UK points at the contrast between these 
welfare regimes, stressing individual and collective responsibilities. As summarized by 
Svallfors (2010: 246), “while targeted systems tend to demand of citizens that welfare 
recipients should be docile and grateful and do their best to move away from their current 
‘needy’ status, a universal system gives rise to questions about how the larger collectivity is 
able to solve its problems of security and sustenance.” In this respect, Mijs et al. (2016) argue 
that especially processes of individualization and neo-liberal policies strengthen intergroup 
boundaries. The authors claim that the economic competition inherent to neoliberalism 
fosters differentiation processes that protect the privileges of the in-group. Moreover, the 
individualization of risk implies greater acceptance of inequalities in society and a stronger 
tendency to disregard the impact of structural issues. Therefore, shifting the responsibility 
for inequalities to individuals further reduces the collective responsibility and solidarity 
required to support people in vulnerable situations in the UK.   
The popular discourse on welfare dependency draws on these notions in the UK. The political 
elite – regardless of political orientation – have presented welfare dependency as a by-
product of welfare provision, discouraging people from seeking employment and locking in 
poverty, inter-generational worklessness, and other anti-social behaviour (Jensen and Tyler, 
2015; Wiggan, 2012). The welfare dependency discourse draws attention to perceptions of 
benefit fraud and portrays welfare recipients as abusers of the system (Jensen and Tyler, 
2015; Wiggan, 2012). While the discourse on welfare dependency considerably relies on 
misperceptions and misunderstandings about the British welfare system 40  (Baumberg 
Geiger, 2016), it creates clear patterns and practices of differentiation which are largely 
reproduced in the discourse on immigrants that portrays the latter as abusers of and burdens 
on the welfare state (Balch and Balabanova, 2016; Hoops et al., 2016; KhosraviNik, 2010).  
While the sections so far reviewed the key institutional factors of the Norwegian and British 
welfare state and stressed their potential implications for increasing or decreasing 
intergroup differentiation, the following sections elaborate on immigrants’ social rights and 
positions within the welfare states.  
 
 
40 Baumberg (2016) finds evidence for people’s misperceptions and limited understanding of the 
British welfare system. For instance, 61% of respondents tended to overestimate the level of fraud; 
and 91% overestimated the share of expenditure on unemployment benefits.  
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4.3.2.2 Immigrants’ entitlements in the Norwegian and British welfare states 
Changes in immigration policies – described in Section 4.3.1 – were supplemented by 
differentiated access to employment and social rights which functioned as additional control 
mechanisms for regulating immigration in both countries. The issue of granting access to 
welfare provision creates a dilemma between 1) granting access and promoting the 
integration of immigrants by reducing inequalities in access to employment and welfare 
benefits, and 2) restricting entitlements to those who have already contributed to the 
functioning of the system (Spencer 2011). In this regard, we can observe differences in the 
way the Norwegian and British welfare states responded to the increase in immigration. 
 
4.3.2.2.1 Immigrants and the Norwegian welfare state 
Past policy changes in Norway marked a shift towards prioritising the integration of 
immigrants. These changes were considerably driven by concerns about immigrants’ lower 
living standards being a potential reason for deepening social inequalities and the 
marginalization of the latter (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). In line with overall trends in 
welfare policies, activation measures were implemented in the form of the earlier mentioned 
Introduction programme, and the Qualification programme. 41  Both programmes were 
designed to increase the employability of long-term welfare recipients (Gubrium and 
Fernandes Guilherme, 2014).  
Despite these targeted measures, studies show that immigrants are more exposed to 
economic deprivation and their access to and long-term dependence on specific welfare 
benefits are higher (Sørvoll, 2015). As Figure 15 shows, the risk of poverty affects 20% of 
foreign nationals, indicating a 9% difference in comparison to Norwegians. While the risk of 
poverty is only slightly higher for EU nationals, non-EU nationals are twice as likely to face 
social exclusion as the Norwegian-born. In public perceptions, the reasons for such 
inequalities are associated with the lower level of employment of immigrants and are thus 
interpreted as a problem of cultural differences and a lack of integration and adaptation to 
the Norwegian way of life (Friberg and Midtbøen, 2018). However, it is important to highlight 
that working immigrants tend to be concentrated in lower-paid and temporary jobs (Dølvik 
et al., 2015). Furthermore, the high living standard in Norway is ensured by the dual-earner 
 
41 The programme is available to a wider group of beneficiaries, but immigrants constituted 40% of 
all programme participants in 2010 (Naper 2010 in Gubrium and Fernandes 2014). 
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family model, which less frequently occurs in families of immigrants (Brochmann and 
Hagelund, 2012; Dølvik et al., 2015). 
Figure 15 - Individuals at risk of poverty or social exclusion by broad classification of country of birth (population 
aged 18 and over), 2015 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2015 
 
Underlining the findings on exposure to poverty, data show that immigrants’ income lags 
behind the national median income significantly, leading to a 30% difference between non-
EU immigrants and Norwegian nationals. 42  We see similar trends with regard to the 
composition of income.43 While the occupational income of immigrants from EU and other 
Western countries exceeds that of the majority population, immigrants from Asia and Africa 
face more difficulties and show greater dependence on social transfers. Analysis of income 
from specific types of social benefits reveals the differences in the needs of specific groups 
of immigrants.44 While nationals from old EU Member States increasingly draw on old-age 
pensions, A8 and A2 nationals draw more on sickness benefits and family support. In relation 
to non-EU nationals, a more diverse picture emerges due to their long-term residence in 
Norway and more variable demographic characteristics. Considering these specificities, the 
data show a higher level of use of social assistance, disability pensions, and work assessment 
allowances, and participation in the Introductory programme.  
While these data inform us about the differences between specific groups of immigrants and 
their access to welfare provisions, it is questionable whether and how such information 
 
42 See Table 3 - Appendix 2 
43 See Figure 5 - Appendix 2 
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reaches the public. In this regard, it is important to recall the case of disability pensions in 
Norway. The take-up rates of disability pensions among non-European immigrants increased 
in the 2000s. Bratsberg et al. (2010), who studied the causes of this phenomenon, pointed 
at a complex interplay of social and institutional factors. In the 2000s, disability pensioners 
could access supplementary benefits if they had a dependent spouse and a number of 
children in the household. Consequently, the disability benefit, together with the 
supplementary benefit, often exceeded the typical income of low-wage earners. While 
Bratsberg et al. (2010) highlighted the imperfections and shortcomings of institutions that 
failed to incentivise return to work, in the public debate this situation was framed as an issue 
of the non-conformity of non-Western immigrants and reinforced perceptions of 
immigrants’ misuse of the welfare state.  
Concerns about misuse of welfare benefits also increased after 2004. In relation to A10 
migrants, the issue of the exportation of benefits was raised. However, a recent study finds 
that the exportation of benefits involves a very small share (2%) of the state’s total social 
expenditure (Hatland 2015 in Sørvoll, 2015), and is primarily attributable to Norwegian 
pensioners living abroad. While this finding reveals that concerns about the exportation of 
benefits are exaggerated, in the public discourse this issue remains influential in shaping 
public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion.  
 
4.3.2.2.2 Immigrants and the British welfare state 
In comparison to Norway, where specific integration measures were adopted to reduce the 
inequalities between immigrants and Norwegians, in the UK there have been tendencies 
towards restricting immigrants’ access to welfare provisions. Correspondingly, immigrants’ 
access to social benefits was gradually curtailed for non-EU migrants by the mid-1990s. With 
the adoption of the ‘no-recourse-to-public-funds’ rule, access to benefits became conditional 
on the acquirement of a residence permit with varying criteria for length of uninterrupted 
stay depending on the specific entry category (Sainsbury, 2012). Despite such restrictions, 
critical stances persisted in public discourse that demanded the prioritisation of nationals in 
relation to specific benefits such as social housing (Ruhs, 2015).  
The issue of accessing non-contributory benefits became especially salient concerning A8 
migrants’ social rights. As Eastern Europeans were coming from economically less advanced 
countries, public concerns about their motivations were central in public debates. Although 
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one full year of legal employment was a prerequisite for becoming eligible to claim benefits, 
A8 migrants were accused of misusing the latter (Ruhs, 2015).  
In contrast to these assumptions, research has found that both EU and non-EU migrants are 
less likely to rely on social benefits (Dustmann and Frattini, 2014). Moreover, Dustmann and 
Frattini (2014) show that immigrants’ tax contributions were higher than the public spending 
on benefits and services acquired by immigrants between 2001 and 2011. Focusing on EU 
migrants, contributions exceeded £20 million (£15 million from EU15 and £5 million from 
A10 migrants). Data from 2014 from the Department of Work and Pension also confirm that 
EU and non-EU migrants are underrepresented in relation to the uptake of all working-age 
benefits.45 Focusing specifically on young EU migrants, Spreckelsen and Seeleib-Kaiser (2016) 
find a high employment rate and a low probability of receipt of Jobseekers Allowance. 
Focusing on tax credit claims, the key provision for people with a low-income, Vargas-Silva 
(2019) found based on an analysis of LFS data that non-UK migrants were more likely to 
receive (15%) tax credits than UK nationals (11%). However, data also show that the vast 
majority of EU nationals who were claiming tax credits stayed in the country for more than 
four years – i.e. had contributed before accessing tax credits. Furthermore, instead of finding 
evidence for excessive reliance on social benefits and services, qualitative research findings 
pointed at how uncertain and unaware EU migrants are of their social rights (Ehata and 
Seeleib-Kaiser, 2017). 
Although the currently available evidence invalidates the key assumptions of the public 
discourse, as Figure 9 shows more people think that immigrants take out more than they 
contribute to the welfare system. Furthermore, Duffy and Frere-Smith (2014) identified 
significant misperceptions related to immigrants’ access to social benefits. 45% of 
respondents estimated that more than 300 000 migrants were receiving unemployment 
benefit, while the real figure was roughly 60 000. According to respondents’ average 
estimations 38% of immigrants were claiming unemployment benefits, while the real 
number was only 10%. Such misperceptions were reinforced by the media (Balch and 
Balabanova, 2016; Hoops et al., 2016) and by political parties (Cappelen and Peters, 2018). 
Similarly to Norway, concerns about the exportation of benefits by EU migrants heightened. 
The issue of claiming child benefits for children living outside UK was especially controversial 
and contributed to the adoption of restrictions in relation to unemployment, housing and 
child benefits in 2014 (Ruhs, 2015).  
 
45 See Tables 5-6 – Appendix 2 
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The balance between employment and welfare redistribution is crucial in both welfare states 
and in the public perceptions of immigration. While the current section touched on the 
interactions between the labour market and welfare policies several times, the following 
section intends to scrutinize the development of labour market policies affecting perceptions 
of immigration and intergroup differentiation.  
 
4.3.3 Labour market policies 
Within the institutional comparison of Norway and the UK, the regulated and unregulated 
labour market represent another distinction. Unregulated labour markets offer relatively 
easy access to the labour market, resembling an inclusive approach. However, the limited 
level of job protection creates greater exposure to social insecurity, especially for low-skilled 
jobs, and gives rise to mechanisms of exclusion, which are further aggravated by public 
opposition to low-skilled migrants (Ruhs, 2015). In contrast to this, regulated labour markets 
offer a high level of employment protection both in terms of wages and working conditions. 
However, the higher price of labour implies stricter preconditions for entering the labour 
market, which creates exclusory mechanisms in relation to low-skilled immigrants (Halvorsen 
et al., 2016; Veggeland, 2016). This section elaborates more on such specificities related to 
regulated and unregulated labour markets and their impact on intergroup differentiation.  
 
4.3.3.1 Transformation of the labour market and society 
As in any other European country, the shift to a post-industrial society, technological 
development, globalisation, increasing international labour mobility, and an aging 
population affected the restructuring of the Norwegian and the British labour market 
(Emmenegger et al., 2012). However, these two welfare states responded and dealt with 
these issues differently. Norway has one of the most regulated labour markets in Europe, in 
which employees' rights are safeguarded by the wide network of trade unions and tripartite 
negotiations (Dølvik et al., 2015). The system of compressed wages is designed to ensure 
sufficient income for all occupations and contributes to maintaining a relatively low level of 
income inequality in the country (see Figure 11). In the late 1990s, Norway's need for foreign 
labour force was publicly acknowledged (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012). While earlier, 
women represented the key "new human resource", now immigrants are seen as a means 
of meeting labour market needs. In light of an aging population, immigration is also 
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considered as a way of attracting an economically active population to sustain the welfare 
state, which encourages a more positive approach to the former.  
The deregulated British labour market stands out in Europe. The limited state interference 
with the free operation of markets substantially contributed to the relatively stable and high 
level of employment (Emmenegger et al., 2012). However, as highlighted by Iversen and 
Wren (1998), job growth is achieved at the expenses of increasing inequality in the labour 
market, along with limited social security and protection for employees and a lower level of 
productivity. The shift to a post-industrial economy contributed to an increase in the gap 
between the highly skilled in protected jobs, and the low-skilled in precarious jobs 
(Emmenegger et al., 2012). Employment in the growing service sector is more exposed to 
the dynamics of global market competition, offering limited social security, especially for the 
low-skilled. The weakening position of trade unions also fostered decline in job protection 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2016). Recently, the UK has one of the weakest job protection legislation in 
Europe (OECD, 2013).46  
As a result of these changes in the British labour market, the social security that full-time 
employment was supposed to ensure deteriorated. The higher risk of the labour market 
exploitation of low-skilled workers, the relatively high incidence of low-paying jobs, poor job 
quality and the limited prospects of mobility (Machin, 2011; Yoon and Chung, 2016) 
considerably affect perceptions of social insecurity. This labour market context in which 
flexibility, risks, and precariousness are typical elements of working life make people more 
sensitive to competition for jobs and induce intergroup differentiation. 
 
4.3.3.2 The position of immigrants in the Norwegian and British labour market 
In the UK, five million foreign-born people were active in the labour market in 2015, 
constituting 16% of the national labour force. In comparison with 1998, the share of foreign 
workers has doubled. In Norway, similarly, foreigners constituted more than 15% of the 
labour force in 2015. In European comparison, both countries have stable and high level of 
employment.47 Mean hourly earnings are higher than the EU15 average in both countries.48 
Furthermore, in Norway, the first decile of earnings is twice as high as the EU15 average, 
creating a significant pull factor for immigrants. While in the UK the wage levels are not as 
 
46 See Table 7 - Appendix 2 
47 See Figure 6 – Appendix 2 
48 See Table 8 – Appendix 2 
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generous as in Norway, the relative ease of entry to the labour market and familiarity with 
the language are important factors in attracting immigrants (Anderson, 2017).  
Looking at the employment rate of immigrants, we can identify a gap between non-Western 
(non-EU) immigrants and the national population in Norway and in the UK, which has not 
considerably decreased in either country. However, to better understand the position of 
immigrants in these labour markets, it is important to review in which sectors immigrants 
obtain employment. 
In the UK, the composition of the labour force changed during the observed period, which 
brought the expansion of high-skilled jobs and a decline in low-skilled occupations (Migration 
Advisory Committee, 2014). The participation of immigrants in both high-skilled and low-
skilled jobs increased at a similar pace and in 2013 immigrants in high-skilled jobs 
outnumbered low-skilled migrants.49 However, focusing on the specific regions of origin, A8 
and A2 migrants stand out as the only group for which participation in low-skilled sectors 
was significantly greater than for high-skilled employees; it is the former group that became 
the target of the public anxiety about immigration.  
Figure 16 - Employment rates by country of birth: People aged 20+ (Norway) 
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Figure 17 Employment rates by country of birth: People aged 16 - 64 
 
Source: Labour Force Survey - Office for National Statistics 
In comparison to British employees, A8 and A2 migrants are younger, better educated, and 
more likely to be employed (Ruhs, 2015). However, newly arriving migrants are more willing 
to accept jobs under their actual level of qualification50 (Dustmann and Frattini, 2014), to 
work for lower wages, and are more flexible in terms of working conditions and working 
hours (Ruhs, 2015). Therefore, besides perceptions of competition and wage depression, 
low-paid workers’ contributions are less and they are more exposed to social insecurity, 
which implies a stronger demand for welfare support triggering perceptions of misuse of 
welfare benefits.  
Similarly, to the situation in the UK, the composition of the labour force changed in Norway, 
too. The high level of social mobility within Norwegian society contributed to a decline in 
interest in typical working class jobs (Friberg and Midtbøen, 2018). Thus, the need for labour 
force has been largely met by immigrants, especially in sectors which do not require a high 
level of competence or language skills (Dølvik et al., 2015; Friberg and Midtbøen, 2018). In 
Norway the share of immigrants is much higher in low-skilled and lower paid jobs along with 
the proportion of immigrants that have temporary contracts or who are employed by 
agencies specializing in temporary work (Dølvik et al., 2015). Thus, the segmentation of the 
Norwegian labour market is increasing (Friberg and Midtbøen, 2018).  
 
50 One-third of the British workforce are overqualified for the jobs they are doing, which is the 






















































































































































































































Public concerns have intensified in relation to migrants employed in low-skilled sectors in 
Norway. The low-skilled sectors offer the lowest average wages, and these are the sectors in 
which the role of trade unions weakened the most and coverage of collective agreements 
declined in the past decade (Dølvik et al., 2015). These findings reflect the vulnerability of 
immigrants, even in the highly regulated Norwegian labour market. Although coordinated 
wage setting aims to reduce precariousness, it is argued that it creates specific exclusion 
mechanisms for low-skilled people due to the existence of high entry-level wages (Halvorsen 
et al., 2016; Veggeland, 2016). On the one hand, in this system a low-skilled labour force is 
expensive – especially in international comparison – which means that employers expect 
skills, experience and high productivity. However, for immigrants, language barriers and 
issues with supplying formal proof of qualifications might be problematic (Veggeland, 2016). 
As a result of these developments, issues of social dumping and the potential impact of low-
wage competition on wage policies are at the centre of public discourse as representing a 
risk to the maintenance of the comprehensive Norwegian welfare state (Friberg and Eldring, 
2013).  
 
4.3.3.3 The effects of immigration on the labour market participation of the majority 
While studies analysing the overall impact of the increase in immigration on the labour 
market find limited evidence of a negative effect in both countries (Kahanec and 
Zimmermann, 2009), research examining the effect on nationals’ labour market participation 
find negative effects among low-skilled nationals who compete for the same jobs. In the UK, 
Dustmann et al. (2005) identified a minor negative effect on UK nationals with an 
intermediate-level education. The recent research of the Migration Advisory Committee 
(2014) emphasised the relevance of economic downturns and found a specifically negative 
impact for non-EU immigration on unemployment in the period between 1995 and 2010. 
However, in relation to EU immigration, such a negative impact was not statistically 
significant.   
Most studies that focused on examining the impact of immigration on changes in average 
wages found no or a relatively small effect on average wages (Bratsberg et al., 2013; 
Dustmann and Frattini, 2014; Manacorda et al., 2012; Reed and Latorre, 2009). In both 
countries, such effects were more likely to occur in low-skilled sectors, but the impact was 
small (Bratsberg et al., 2013, 2013). However, Bratsberg et al. (2013) stress that these effects 
are more significant for immigrants as the employment of immigrants is rather 
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complementary to the employment of nationals. These findings are in line with the 
conclusions of Manacorda et al. (2012) in the UK, who argue that new migrants tend to 
substitute resident immigrants in workplaces. Therefore, the related impacts are stronger 
for immigrants than for UK nationals.  
As presented above, research into the impact of immigration tends to be inconclusive. 
Moreover, there seems to be agreement that there is no or only a very limited negative effect 
on the employment of nationals or on average wages. Despite this, concerns about and 
opposition to immigration remain prevalent in the public discourse in both countries. In the 
UK, the deregulated labour market contributed to the dualization of the labour market, 
putting low-skilled workers in disadvantaged positions, thereby increasing perceptions of 
competition and perceptions of the intergroup as a threat – especially as the recent influx of 
A8 and A2 immigrants typically enter these sectors.  In relation to the regulated Norwegian 
labour market, we have already flagged up the adverse effect of wage-setting mechanisms 
and the deepening segmentation of the labour market which shape specific practices of 
exclusion and contribute to the vulnerability of immigrants in the Norwegian labour market. 
The interactions between labour market institutions and welfare institutions represent an 
important element in the debates in both countries, as labour market exclusion triggers 
greater use of welfare support. This creates a vicious circle that challenges the expected 
balance between high labour market participation and contributions on the one hand, and 
access to welfare benefits and services on the other.  
 
4.4 CONCLUSION  
This chapter was devoted to examining the key changes in the institutional and social context 
in Norway and in the UK, which could affect tendencies for intergroup differentiation and 
accentuate processes of inclusion or exclusion of immigrants. Both countries experienced 
considerable change in the context of immigration due to external pressures and internal 
policy changes. It is important to stress the complex interactions between immigration, 
welfare, and labour market policies, which in both countries complemented efforts to 
restrict or to liberalize immigration. In relation to immigration policies, Norway and the UK 
share legacies of immigration control, which started to transform in the late 1990s and the 
2000s when both countries introduced more selective immigration systems. In addition to 
these measures, Norway placed greater emphasis on the integration of immigrants. 
However, these efforts were largely intended to foster immigrants’ adaptation to Norwegian 
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society to protect the in-group and reduce social inequalities – threats to the Norwegian 
welfare system.  
In the UK, the liberalization of labour migration and granting immediate access to A8 
migrants to the British labour market triggered substantial tension which reinforced 
preferences for the exclusion of immigrants. These preferences have thematized British 
immigration policy and public discourse since then. Furthermore, the analysis showed that 
that British welfare institutions, the way the British welfare state shifted to a more selective, 
means-tested benefit system and the increasing individualisation of risks also underlined 
differentiation processes and justified the perceived need to control immigration and to 
curtail immigrants’ social rights. In contrast to this, the Norwegian universal welfare system, 
the low level of income inequality, and stable financial and institutional support for 
redistribution offers a good starting point for the inclusion of immigrants. Moreover, this 
chapter pointed at the high level of polarization based on cultural considerations 
(Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012), which can strengthen intergroup differentiation and 
shape public attitudes towards exclusive stances.  
This chapter revealed that both the British and the Norwegian institutions include inclusive 
and exclusive elements, and thus represent particularly interesting cases for an analysis of 
how these institutional features, processes of inclusion and exclusion, and the described 
themes of public discourse emerge and develop in the DF discussions. The next chapter 
focuses in particular on the differentiation of deserving and undeserving immigrants in order 
to better understand what the key conditions of the inclusion of immigrants are in the 
Norwegian and British welfare states.   
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5 HOW ARE PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE WELFARE DESERVINGNESS 
OF IMMIGRANTS SHAPED? 
 
The British and the Norwegian DF discussions took two distinctive directions – the former 
representing a more exclusive approach to immigration, and the latter a more inclusive one. 
While the policy proposals reflect these general approaches, the small group discussions 
reveal much more diversity and shifts between preferences for inclusion and exclusion in 
both countries. The current chapter intends to approach attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion 
through an analysis of perceptions of immigrants’ welfare deservingness that sheds light 
on the diversity of considerations behind changing preferences for immigrants’ inclusion 
in or exclusion from the welfare state (related to RQ2 and RQ4).  
Welfare deservingness is often characterized as consideration of “who should get what, and 
why?” and “who is worthy of receiving help?” (Van Oorschot, 2000). In political and public 
discourse, deservingness is used (1) as a tool to differentiate between “deserving” and 
“undeserving” beneficiaries, and (2) to establish and justify the extent of collective 
obligations and responsibilities towards others. As immigrants are considered the least 
deserving group throughout Europe (Van Oorschot, 2006, 2008; Van Oorschot et al., 2017), 
this chapter aims to examine the considerations that affect (in-group) perceptions of 
immigrants’ deservingness, and also preferences concerning the share of collective and 
individual responsibilities.  
Chapter 2 introduced the five deservingness criteria – namely,  Reciprocity, Control, Need, 
Attitude, and Identity (Cook, 1979; Swaan, 1988; Van Oorschot, 2000). Scholars consider 
these five principles as key determinants when assessing welfare deservingness. 
Furthermore, Petersen et al. (2012) argue that these principles tend to work as 
“deservingness heuristics” – i.e. as cognitive categories that people can easily access and use 
in any situation. As the vast majority of the research on welfare deservingness relies on 
survey methods, our knowledge is limited concerning how these deservingness criteria (DC) 
are employed by ordinary people. This is the area, where this research and this chapter aims 
to contribute through the analysis of DF discussions on immigration.  
To provide more details on the character of discussions on immigration, we should stress 
again that participants, their understanding of immigration and visions of immigrants shape 
the development of discussions. This also implies certain precaution as we cannot and should 
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not expect participants to be experts on immigration policy, to comprehend the complexity 
of the issue, to know the eligibility criteria or the extent of entitlements related to specific 
legal categories of immigrants. Their references may not rely on verified information about 
immigrants. However, their references and interactions are important to analyse in order to 
better understand what considerations dominate people’s perceptions of immigrants. This 
is the reason why welfare deservingness is especially relevant and useful to analyse what 
character and qualities do people associate with immigrants, under what conditions do they 
see them as deserving and worthy to be included. Each of the five DC highlight a specific 
behaviour, personal qualities and efforts that make welfare beneficiaries more or less 
deservingness. This chapter aims to find out how these DC are understood, used and framed 
in relation to immigrants and their inclusion.  
In an individual setup (e.g. being a respondent in a survey) it might be less likely that 
individuals reflect on the complexity of the issue or on the heterogeneity of the immigrant 
population based on legal categories, country of origin, skill-level, length of stay or 
immigrants’ achievements in the country of destination, etc.51 In contrast to the individual 
setup, it is expected that in a group discussion, interactions encourage participants to 
consider numerous perspectives on the issue, to differentiate between the groups of 
immigrants and consider the particular circumstances and motivations of refugees, 
economic migrants or family migrants that can make a difference in perceptions of 
immigrants’ deservingness. Seeing and acknowledging the heterogeneity of immigrants is 
considered particularly important to have a more diversified view of immigration and 
distinguish the benefits and the potential costs of immigration, which can unfold in shifts 
between preferences for inclusion and exclusion. It is expected, that interactions will reveal 
in what respect do people perceive the heterogeneity of immigrants. Accordingly, we aim to 
examine what characteristics and qualities do DF participants consider or disregard, what 
perceptions and misperceptions dominate their visions of (deserving/undeserving) 
immigrants.  
Each of the five DC raise different aspects of deservingness and stress different qualities of 
immigrants as welfare beneficiaries. The emergence of DC in the debates may be identified 
by analysing DF participants’ expectations about immigrants’ life and conduct in the country 
of destination, their preferences regarding when and under what conditions immigrants 
 
51 The analysis of how DF participants differentiated between specific groups of immigrants is 
elaborated in Chapter 6. 
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should get access to welfare benefits and services. The analysis of DF shows the application 
of all five DC in both countries. In terms of the frequency and salience of raising specific 
criteria, we find very similar patterns in the discussions, but there are significant 
differences in how these criteria are understood and used by DF participants depending on 
the specific social context, and on the specific group of immigrants. 
Taking an institutional approach to the analysis, this chapter argues that the differences in 
the use and understanding of the five DC can be traced back to the institutional differences 
between the British and the Norwegian welfare states. First, the in-group’s perceptions of 
their own collective needs are essentially shaped by the norms, values, ideals, and 
understanding of the role of the welfare state and the relationship between the individual 
and the collective within that welfare state. Such in-group perceptions are embodied in the 
country-specific and institutionally embedded visions of “Good Citizens”. Second, the in-
group’s expectations of immigrants also replicate these values and collective aims, setting 
high standards for immigrants to achieve, reflected in visions of “Good Immigrants”. In order 
to disentangle these interactions between in-group and out-group perceptions this chapter 
develops the “Good Citizen – Good Immigrant” Model to analyse how country-specific values 
and understandings of the welfare state are transformed into expectations towards 
immigrants and to highlight which areas are viewed as most important for their inclusion. 
The “Good Citizen – Good Immigrants” Model relies on the analysis of political discourses, 
which raises the relevance of applying political discourse analysis as a theory (Chilton, 2004; 
Zaller, 1992). However, this research chose Institutionalism as a more comprehensive theory.  
Besides the aim of analysing the role of political discourses, it intends to investigate how 
discourses use, reproduce and strengthen the significance of these social values, norms and 
expectations dominating visions of Good Citizen and as shown below the vision of Good 
Immigrants.    
The first part of this chapter describes the use of DC during the DF discussions. The chapter 
continues with a more detailed analysis of various understandings of the DC. To approach 
the analysis, visions of “good citizens” are first presented in both countries, which are then 





5.1 THE USE OF DESERVINGNESS CRITERIA – THE DOMINANCE OF RECIPROCITY AND 
ATTITUDE 
Welfare deservingness theory specifies five DC, thereby reflecting on various aspects of the 
deservingness of welfare beneficiaries. However, as described in Chapter 2 the literature 
provides relatively vague definitions of Reciprocity, Control, Need, Attitude, and Identity, and 
we need to investigate how these criteria are used and understood by individuals and how 
these criteria relate to each other in relation to immigrants’ deservingness. Through an 
analysis of DF discussions, we can identify the emergence of all these principles in 
participants’ arguments. As these arguments were not raised in response to specific 
questions about welfare deservingness, the use of these principles helps to define cases and 
contexts in which DC are seen as important by the participants. While participants do refer 
to and describe these principles, they do not name them as DC. These are interpreted as DC 
by the author. For the purpose of clarity, the presented citations – in this and the next 
chapter – always highlight the identification of principles within the statements. 























Reciprocity 26 122 244 - 14 33 90 8 
Control 15 45 94 14 - 9 33 1 
Need 23 86 191 33 9 6152 43 11 
Attitude 30 249 443 90 33 43 - 24 
Identity 16 34 87 8 1 11 24 - 
NORWAY 
Reciprocity 24 79 347 - 10 30 69 3 
Control 14 43 179 10 - 8 25 3 
Need 25 76 375 30 8 5753 43 6 
Attitude 31 222 709 69 25 43 - 9 
Identity 14 19 79 3 3 6 9 - 
Note: The table shows the number of references to the five DC coded, the number of participants using the specific 
deservingness criterion, the number of sentences in references to the DC and the number of references using 
combinations of DC in DF discussions on immigration 
 
52 No. of references to In-group needs. The role of In-group needs is discussed in Section 5.3 
53 No. of references to In-group needs. 
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As Table 2 depicts, all DC are raised in both countries. Whether we look at the number of 
participants who refer to the specific DC, at the total number of references, or the number 
of sentences, we can clearly see that the shares for specific DC are very similar in the two 
countries under analysis. The criteria Attitude (75% of all references made in the UK and 79% 
in Norway) and Reciprocity (38% in the UK and 29% in Norway) tended to dominate the 
discussions. The Need principle (26% in the UK and 27% in Norway) received a little less 
attention in terms of frequency. The least mentioned out of the five were the Control (14% 
in the UK and 15% in Norway) and Identity principles (10% in the UK and 7% in Norway).54  
These findings indicate very similar patterns in terms of the salience of DC. However, the 
analysis found substantial differences in the understanding and use of these criteria during 
the discussions. These differences are related to the different approach to immigration and 
different policy measures that are proposed. One area where we can see similarity in relation 
to DC is in how these criteria are linked together and often overlap. Although Table 2 depicts 
these overlaps, Diagram 1 better illustrates the dominance of specific criteria within debates 
about immigration, which is indicated by the size of the circles. Furthermore, Diagram 1 
highlights the links and the parallel use of these criteria in relation to perceptions of welfare 
deservingness. These overlaps also stress that the same context and the same expectations 
are approached and judged using different perspectives of deservingness. The following 
section briefly reviews the definitions of DC and contrasts them with the meanings and 
understandings of DC that emerged in the discussions.  
The principle Attitude reflects greater willingness to see somebody as deserving if that 
person shows compliance and conformity with the standards of the majority society. While 
in the literature Attitude has not been considered among the most relevant principles, in the 
DF discussions references to Attitude dominate and are articulated by the vast majority of 
participants. This high salience suggests that expectations about compliant behaviour are 
linked to various facets of life and are not articulated only in relation to perceptions about 
access to and use of welfare benefits and services. One key area to which Attitude is strongly 




54 Percentages reflect the share of specific DC in the discussions. However, due to the high number of 
references where parallel use of DC was identified, these percentages exceed 100%. There was a total 
of 329 references to DC in the British discussion, and 280 references in the Norwegian discussions. 
 125 
 




The literature considers Reciprocity to be the most important criterion in relation to 
immigrants (Reeskens and van der Meer, 2018; Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012; Van 
Oorschot, 2008). Reciprocity reflects on past and future contributions as forms of justification 
for deservingness. In DF discussions Reciprocity is linked to employment and payment of 
taxes, thus to earning entitlement to social rights. However, the discussions reveal that not 
only the economic but also social aspects of contributing to society are seen as important in 
both countries. Furthermore, in many cases Reciprocity emerges in the discussions as a 
reflection on two-way processes and expectations of mutuality between the in-group and 
the out-group.  
The principle Need is usually considered in relation to perceptions of immigrants’ neediness. 
The literature does not mention it as being among the most relevant DC in relation to 
immigrants’ deservingness (Kootstra, 2017; Reeskens and van der Meer, 2018; Reeskens and 
Van Oorschot, 2012; Van Oorschot, 2008). However, based on the findings of the analysis 
the principle of Need should be interpreted in relation to the in-group, too. The DFs reveal 
that perceptions of In-group needs influence perceptions about immigrants’ deservingness. 
In-group needs usually refer to the interests of the state and of society. They also encompass 
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references to the institutional and financial capacities of the state. In the discussions, In-
group needs tend to function as limits, within which the welfare deservingness of immigrants 
is considered. As indicated in Table 2, references to Need are predominantly associated with  
the in-group (more than 70% of references to Needs in both countries), which also shows the 
importance of In-group needs, and the limited concern about immigrants’ needs. 
Previous research interpreted the principle of Control as responsibility over neediness mostly 
in relation to immigrants’ decision to migrate (Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012; Van 
Oorschot, 2008). In practice, this means that people see immigrants as less deserving if they 
are believed to be in control of their migration. This idea finds support in the DF discussions. 
However, another aspect of Control was raised – immigrants’ control over their situation and 
control over their contribution to the society. On the one hand, such perceptions emerge in 
relation to immigrants’ long-term stay in the country of destination. On the other hand, 
expectations about immigrants being in control of their situation significantly depend on the 
socially accepted relationship and share of responsibilities between individuals and the 
collective.  
Last, the literature treats the principle of Identity as the most exclusivist criteria (Kootstra, 
2016, 2017; Reeskens and van der Meer, 2018). While in relation to the other four principles 
immigrants themselves can make efforts to improve their deservingness, in relation to 
Identity it is difficult to bridge the gap between the in-group and the out-group. Identity was 
the least used DC in the discussions. Moreover, it was not only raised in relation to nationality 
or citizenship – to reflect on cultural and ethnic differences, as the literature suggests –, and 
was not used necessarily in an exclusivist manner as something that could not be acquired 
by immigrants.  
This brief review of DC intended to provide extended definitions of DC in light of the DF 
discussions. The more elaborate analysis which follows is designed to highlight how the 
understanding and framing of these criteria emerge in relation to the specific social contexts, 
and what explains the differences between the described content of DC. As argued earlier in 
Chapter 2, deservingness judgements are embedded in a relational, situational, and context-
dependent environment (Willen, 2012). Therefore, understanding intergroup differentiation 
is especially important for better understanding attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the 
welfare state. It is not sufficient to analyse only the perceptions of the out-group. Equally 
important are the perceptions of the in-group towards itself because these are presumed to 
function as the basis for comparison; as the ideal to which immigrants are expected to grow. 
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Therefore, before turning to an analysis of deservingness principles, it is important to first 
present the in-group visions of “good citizens” in the two welfare states and through these 
depictions proceed to a more detailed analysis of the expectations through which the related 
DC emerge in the debates.  
 
5.2 COUNTRY-SPECIFIC VISIONS OF “GOOD CITIZENS”  
Deservingness theory is closely linked to intergroup relations and intergroup differentiations. 
In general, all DC are aimed at screening immigrants’ behaviour and actions as individuals. 
However, we cannot ignore the role of the in-group and the power of institutions, values, 
and social norms in shaping what is considered “good enough” or “deserving”. Focusing 
specifically on intergroup differentiation based on ethnicity/immigration status, 273 
references to out-group characterisation were identified and coded in the Norwegian DF and 
247 in the British. References to in-group characterisations were much less frequently made 
– 81 references in the Norwegian and 55 references in the British discussions. The findings 
showed that DF participants did not explicitly exemplify and contrast the conduct of the in-
group and the out-group, as it was initially expected. Nonetheless, in a more implicit and 
subtle way intergroup differentiations did unfold in the discussions, in which we could 
identify how preconceptions about “good citizens”, the endorsement of social values, and 
collective social aims influenced expectations about immigrants.  
Van Oorschot (2006) also suggests that deservingness judgements are part of the welfare 
culture and can work as survival or protection mechanisms against “others” who do not 
conform, or who are suspected of being a burden on the welfare state within the in-group 
(e.g. the unemployed) or the out-group (such as immigrants). Previous research found 
evidence for differences in perceptions of welfare deservingness between welfare regimes – 
primarily between liberal regimes on the one hand, and social-democratic and conservative 
regimes on the other (Reeskens and Van Oorschot, 2012). Drawing on these findings, this 
chapter argues that the effects of cultural and institutional contexts need to be duly taken 
into account, thus the following sections reflect on these aspects and describe how they 




5.2.1 “A good Norwegian citizen” – emphasis on responsibility towards society 
In the Nordic welfare model, employment plays a central role, as embedded in the Lutheran 
values that have affected the way Nordic welfare states developed (Kuhnle and Hort, 2004). 
Employment is not only considered a way of expressing individual growth in terms of 
personal development and financial security, but also as a duty towards society. The Nordic 
welfare states, including the Norwegian welfare state, offer extensive social rights and a high 
level of social security to all based on egalitarian values (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Pedersen 
and Kuhnle, 2017). As the state is the key provider of welfare support, there is 
acknowledgement that the system is financially and institutionally viable only if people are 
committed to contributing to it an adequate amount that the state can then manage and 
redistribute. This logic certainly implies a specific relationship between the individual and 
the collective, in which collective interests tend to outweigh individual interests – or, better 
put, individual interests are framed in the light of the collective interests, values, and social 
objectives of welfare state projects. Therefore, “good Norwegian citizens” endorse the 
responsibility to be economically active. Accordingly, they not only strive to secure a 
livelihood for themselves (and their families), but also contribute to the functioning of the 
welfare state and the production of the common good.  
The achievements of Nordic countries in relation to the low level of income inequality, and 
reducing gender inequality, also strengthen the role of redistribution, equality, and 
inclusiveness as part of the welfare culture and welfare identity (Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017). 
In addition to participation in working life, participation in society is viewed as important. 
Therefore, “a good Norwegian citizen” appreciates the comprehensive welfare state, the 
benefits and high living standards it provides, and is therefore motivated to contribute to it 
by participating in working life and in society. These social values and expectations 
delineating the visions of “good citizens” emerge throughout the DF discussions on various 
welfare issues (Chung et al., 2018; Schøyen and Hvinden, 2018).  
  
5.2.2 “A good British citizen” – the notion of working for a better life 
Similarly, in the British discourse engagement in employment is considered the most 
important feature of a good citizen. However, the relevance of employment has a more 
individualistic framing. In this understanding, work is the key source of income and the key 
source of social security of the individual. Labour market participation is perceived as the 
way to succeed, to improve one’s life. In this respect, hard work and individual effort to 
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progress and achieve are acknowledged and praised in British society (Evans and Tilley, 
2017). In relation to the state and society, employment implies making tax payments that 
contribute to the functioning of the state. Employment is also expected to create financial 
independence from the state, and consequently to reduce the responsibility of the latter. 
For the working of a liberal-leaning welfare state, financially independent citizens who are 
considered responsible, who have control over their life, who contribute to the functioning 
of the state and the national economy, and who are expected to make less demands on 
welfare support represent ideal citizens (Dwyer, 2000; McEnhill and Taylor-Gooby, 2018).   
Stressing the value of freedom to organize one’s own life and greater individual responsibility 
with limited state intervention certainly shifts the focus to self-interest. The collective 
interests related to redistribution are limited to helping people in need, which means 
targeted support for the vulnerable (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The centrality of individual 
responsibility and preferences for targeted support was clearly articulated throughout the 
DF discussions (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2018; Taylor-Gooby and Leruth, 2018) and gave greater 
scope for differentiations in the debates – arguing who should and should not get support.   
 
5.2.3 Welfare regimes reflected in visions of “good citizens” 
Comparison of the visions of “good citizens” in Norway and in the United Kingdom indicates 
that welfare regimes tend to essentially shape expectations about citizens behaviours within 
their borders. As argued in details in Chapter 3, welfare institutions define the role of 
individuals within society, but also the relations between the individual/citizen and the state. 
In Norway, there is a strong commitment to contribute and to support collective interests 
such as maintaining a comprehensive welfare system, and achieving equality and social 
inclusion through redistribution. In contrast, in the UK the values of individualism, freedom 
of choice, and a strong belief in the free market are the dominant features of the welfare 
regime. In this case, self-interests seem to prevail and achieving social well-being is expected 
from individuals. However, Mijs et al. (2016) argue that increasing levels of individualism 
strengthen the symbolic boundaries between the in-group and the out-group and weaken 
the sense of community, which might be a relevant distinction between the approaches to 
immigration in Norway and the UK. The following sections investigate the details of the use 
of specific DC. As much as the key characteristics of the welfare regimes are reflected in the 
visions of “good citizens”, we expect similar impacts in relation to the use and specific 
meanings attached to DC. The following analysis starts with a review of In-group needs, 
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wherein perceptions of the relationship between the state, the in-group, and immigrants 
affect what is expected from immigrants.  
 
5.3 PERCEPTION OF IN-GROUP NEEDS – DEFINING THE LIMITS OF IMMIGRANTS’ 
WELFARE DESERVINGNESS  
One of the main findings of this research is that the principle of Need not only relates to the 
neediness of the out-group, but also to perceptions about In-group needs. Perceived In-
group needs and interests reflect concrete social aims that DF participants see as important 
and expect migrants to contribute to achieving. Thus, perceived In-group needs provide an 
important framework within which expectations towards immigrants are defined. 
Participants use them to strengthen their arguments and justify their preferences for 
inclusion or exclusion, depending on which is seen as more suitable for meeting these in-
group needs.  
The analysis also found that perceived In-group needs were more promptly presented and 
defended by participants in both countries, as shown in Table 2. In the UK, 71% (61 
references) and in Norway 75% (57 references) of all references to the principle of Need 
concerned the in-group rather than the out-group. Perceptions of In-group needs primarily 
pertained to macro-level factors such as the level of unemployment, labour market needs 
and skills shortages in the economy, as well as available state capacity – both financially and 
institutionally. Previous research tended to include these macro-level factors as contextual 
elements that influence the development of trends in attitudes and explain differences 
between various countries. However, our research results suggest including and considering 
the perceptions of In-group needs as part of the deservingness model.  
It is highly important to stress the subjectivity of participants’ perceptions about these needs, 
which are not underpinned by concrete facts or statistics: they rather reflect participants’ 
views about the state of the country, economy or society, and perceptions of the challenges 
it faces. As emphasised in the literature on welfare state support and immigration, the 
political framing of these issues is especially crucial in relation to public perceptions about 
whether immigrants are seen as people who can help to resolve these issues, or as people 
who are likely to aggravate them (Koning, 2013; Larsen, 2014; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; 
Soroka et al., 2016). In this respect, we can identify differences between the UK and Norway 
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which are related to the interplay of institutional context and individual attitudes (Sundberg, 
2014).55 
 
5.3.1 The perceived need for immigrants  
During the discussions participants primarily focused on the need for a labour force and to 
making up skills shortages, in relation to which they accepted and expected the help of 
immigrants. In the British discussions, attracting foreign businesses and investment was also 
mentioned as a need in terms of strengthening the economy. In Norway, the need to counter 
the effects of an aging population was raised, referring to the need to have a sufficiently 
large active labour force, and to guaranteeing the availability of benefits and services for 
elderly people:   
33: “With the so-called elderly boom that we talked about, we need immigrants NEED. It can be very 
positive and dealt with very correctly.”(NO)56 
 
On the one hand, this means that immigrants were seen as contributors; part of the 
economically active population in Norway. On the other hand, they were also seen as 
producers of welfare, acknowledging the need for more care workers. Despite the awareness 
of the issue of an aging population, the British DF participants rather shared their fears about 
overpopulation due to immigration and argued for the need to control and better regulate 
immigration.57  
The above-mentioned economic and labour market needs served as rational justifications in 
favour of immigration and set the key expectations towards immigrants. As with all of the 
challenges related to the economy and sustainability of the welfare system, this expectation 
primarily referred to employment and tax contributions. In the discussions, it also meant a 
higher level of willingness to include skilled and working immigrants. In this regard we can 
identify some differentiation between immigrants based on their employability and their 
ability to contribute. An awareness of and wish to promote these In-group needs were seen 
as the guiding principles of proposals for a selective immigration system in the UK: 
44: “Points system, I've put down as the rationale as it must be incomers must bring something to the 
system, can't just keep take, take, take, ATTITUDE, RECIPROCITY there will be a lack of housing and space, so we 
 
55 Specificities of the institutional and social context in Norway and in the UK are elaborated in 
Chapter 4. 
56 The parts of quoted statements highlighted in grey were coded and interpreted as references to 
specific DC. 
57 This specific aspect is addressed in more detail in Chapter 7 – Section 7.2 
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need to minimise it NEED. […] There will be more ultimately more skilled people in the UK, leading to higher 
earners and more tax being paid into the system ATTITUDE, RECIPROCITY per the people that are here, do you 
know what I mean, there will be less unemployed ATTITUDE hopefully allowing us to offer more skills to 
companies that might come here NEED.” (UK) 
 
The vast majority of participants viewed controlled immigration and letting in only those 
immigrants who qualify and meet these needs as the way forward for the UK. Participants 
stressed the need for skilled and high-skilled migrants and almost ignored the need for a low-
skilled labour force. 58  This highlights the selectivity of participants in terms of their 
perceptions of the country’s needs – not considering the high level of reliance of the 
country’s economy on a foreign labour force in low-skilled jobs (Afonso, Devitt 2016). 
Therefore, the positive framing of immigration was restricted to skilled immigrants in the UK. 
Low-skilled migrants – primarily nationals of new EU Member States – were usually 
presented in a negative light as problematic immigrants, mirroring the public and political 
discourse in the UK.59 
Although in Norway the proposal for a more selective immigration system that focused on 
high-skilled immigrants was voted down, the need for a labour force considerably shaped 
the discussions:  
22: “Yes. We need manpower NEED in 2040 and ahead. Then we have to invest. We have to use the 
resources coming to the country NEED, RECIPROCITY. Make sure they are a resource and not a cost RECIPROCITY, 
NEED. That is an expense we have to take.” (NO) 
 
 
These In-group needs were often framed within the broader aim of making immigration 
benefit the respective country. In the Norwegian discussion, the maximization of benefits of 
immigration was based on a preference for viewing immigrants as bringing resources to the 
country. This is also the reason why participants supported integration and were willing to 
invest in it – to further increase these benefits. In the UK, we can see a more selective 
approach involving viewing primarily skilled and high-skilled people as a resource for the 
country. Low-skilled people are rather seen as a threat, whose migration needs to be 
controlled. Thus, in Norway we can observe greater openness towards the inclusion of 
immigrants, while in the UK selective inclusion prevails, which is seen as being a suitable 
approach for fulfilling these In-group needs. This difference resembles some of the 
 
58 The need for a low-skilled labour force was acknowledged when discussing the lack of interest of 
English people in taking low-paid jobs.  
59 For further information on the representation of post-2004 EU migration in the British media see 
Chapter 4 Section 4.3.1.3 
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institutional features of the welfare states – a higher level of inclusiveness in social-
democratic regimes, and higher level of selectivity in liberal welfare regimes.  
 
5.3.2 State capacities – limits on the need for immigrants 
The perceived concerns about state capacity that entered the discussions form the second 
category of In-group needs. Such concerns were primarily related to the capacity to accept 
and accommodate refugees, the capacity to integrate immigrants, and the need to cope with 
competition in the labour market. The framing and weight of these concerns about capacity 
varied between the two countries, but awareness of limited capacity drove participants to 
spell out and agree on priorities. This also informs us about how perceptions of different 
forms of scarcity shape attitudes to immigrants and how these capacity issues are used to 
justify placing limits on immigrants’ deservingness and their access to welfare.  
In the British discussion, these priorities targeted primarily the in-group – for example, 
concerning protecting their opportunities and dealing with internal social issues (such as 
homelessness) instead of supporting immigrants’ well-being. In this regard, we can identify 
how participants delineated circles of solidarity along which the Identity principle emerged 
in the debates. Such preferences were underlined by perceptions of increasing population 
growth due to immigration, resulting in greater competition especially in terms of 
employment:  
40: “But immigration could be simply because we have that fear of like others coming and taking over 
our [unclear]Over our space and the opportunities that we possibly could have had IDENTITY, (IN-GROUP) NEED. 
So, something that, like you know educating ourselves or trying to work ourselves, and the next minute 
someone else comes in and that’s it, they’ve taken your job opportunity because they’re a bit more 
skilled IDENTITY, ATTITUDE, you know you’ve been studying for four years and hoping to get that right sort of 
position but someone with more experience comes along and takes IDENTITY…” (UK) 
 
Capacity issues were articulated in relation to housing and education, but mostly in relation 
to the National Health Services (NHS). Participants were particularly critical about free access 
to NHS, which is one of the few universally accessible provisions of the British welfare system 
and is considered one of the greatest achievements of the British welfare state. Therefore, 
perceptions that the NHS is underfinanced and struggling with capacity issues were very 
strong. Furthermore, these issues were primarily associated with an increase in demand for 
healthcare services by immigrants. One of the groups even proposed restricting free access 
to the NHS for a period of two years for Non-EU migrants. Another group suggested 
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introducing extra tax payments for newly arriving immigrants which could cover the cost of 
infrastructural developments, including extending the capacity of hospitals.  
In contrast to these preferences for restrictions, Norwegian participants put emphasis on 
integration and capacity building. Accordingly, limits were envisioned based on the state’s 
capacity to integrate immigrants, which also included their social support, as stressed by 
Participant 5 in relation to refugees: 
5: “The first thing I write is how many? I think that the government should decide on how many they can 
take NEED. We should help and we should welcome. The people who come here should be treated right. 
Some demands have to be made, some clear rules of how things work here ATTITUDE. What happens to 
them when they come here? People have expectations, which opportunities they get to adapt to society. 
Some things should be clear: how things happen, what is expected of those who come here RECIPROCITY, 
ATTITUDE.” (NO) 
Participants discussed the considerable (but not specified) costs of integration, but they still 
viewed integration as worth investing in, especially when taking a long-term perspective. 
They seemed confident that Norway had the resources to allocate money for this purpose, 
which signals a lack of a perception of scarcity. At the same time, willingness to invest in 
integration also implied stricter demands for returns on this investment: 
22: “We must demand more from the money we spend NEED. If we don’t get anything in return for it 




Reflecting on potential issues with the financial sustainability of the welfare system,60 there 
were also suggestions that immigrants’ welfare entitlement should depend on the ability of 
the state to finance a comprehensive welfare state. This implies a potential shift towards the 
approach described in the case of the British discussions – i.e. drawing boundaries between 
the in-group and out-group and making access to welfare provision more restrictive.  
The perceived needs of the in-group and perceptions of limited capacity set the framework 
within which immigrants’ welfare deservingness and eligibility for welfare were judged. This 
finding draws on the relevance of perceptions of scarcity, which can be considerably 
influenced by the way the welfare state is organized, and how social issues are 
communicated and dealt with (Larsen, 2006). The differences between the social democratic 
and liberal-leaning welfare systems in terms of universal vs. means-tested benefits, 
 
60 During the DF discussions participants also discussed the probability of a financial crisis hitting 
Norway in the case of a decline in oil production, or for other reasons, and sought to agree on 
strategies for dealing with such a situation, how to revitalize the Norwegian economy, etc. These 
discussions were not related to immigration, but reveal that there is awareness about the limits of 
Norway’s favourable financial situation. 
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differences in the level of welfare benefits, and differences in the public discourse concerning 
social issues can explain the greater exposure to scarcity and the stronger inclination to 
restrictive measures in the British welfare system. At the same time, the stable financial 
background of Norway cannot be ignored when discussing (the lack of) scarcity perceptions. 
Perceived In-group needs are thus argued to define the limits of perceptions of 
deservingness. The following section explores what the content and understanding of other 
DC is, what the key expectations from immigrants are, and what makes an immigrant “good” 
and “deserving”.  
 
5.4 VISIONS OF “GOOD”, “DESERVING” IMMIGRANTS 
Assessments of welfare deservingness involve perceptions of immigrants in various areas of 
life. Through expectations about and requirements for immigrants, participants also 
delineate visions of “good” and “bad” immigrants – the positive and negative attitudes DF 
participants hold in relation to immigrants. Focusing on three aspects of life, this section 
explores the understanding of specific DC, and investigates how the latter are linked.  
 
5.4.1 Employment and the ability to contribute  
Labour market engagement was the ultimate expectation for immigrants. Formal 
employment and the ability to contribute were certainly key criteria for complying with 
expectations concerning Reciprocity. However, requirements for reciprocity and 
requirements for employment were usually also framed as the principle of Attitude – as 
compliance with the rules and duties in the society and country of destination. This also 
explains the high level of overlap between Reciprocity and Attitude presented in Table 2. In 
the UK, 74% of all 122 references to Reciprocity were identified as Attitude. In Norway, where 
references to Reciprocity in general were less frequent, 87% of all 77 references to 
Reciprocity were coded as Attitude, too.  
Respondents desired that immigrants should start working and contributing to the running 
of the state as soon as possible. On the one hand, employment is seen as the most direct 
way to contribute. The basic understanding is that if immigrants find employment, they can 
produce something, pay into the system, and enrich the country through their work and 
skills. Following this line of thought, further factors enter the debate in the form of the 
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consideration of immigrants’ skills, employability, work experience and work ethic, to name 
a few elements that focus specifically on the individual level. 
The discussions stress the relevance of Reciprocity, involving going beyond the mere 
consideration of past and future contributions, and pointing at the social dimension of 
employment and contributions. In the British discussions, employment was largely treated 
as an individual choice, and the argument was made that anyone – even those without skills 
– could find work if they wanted to. In the case of unemployment, participants expected 
immigrants (and then generalized this to all welfare beneficiaries) to contribute in the form 
of voluntary work. As articulated by Participant 89 in the citation below, voluntary work is 
seen as a sign of making an effort to give something back to the community, which shows 
the relevance of the social element of contribution:  
“89 And also with the two year you’ve got to be showing that you’re going to contribute RECIPROCITY 
whether you do voluntary.  I work full-time and I’ve been doing voluntary for 17 years ATTITUDE and it’s 
just giving back something to the community RECIPROCITY, ATTITUDE.  Now I’m looking at people can’t just be 
sitting there not doing nothing ATTITUDE.  Voluntary work, do some voluntary work.” (UK) 
 
In Norway, unemployment was perceived as disrespect for the “rights-and-duties” principle. 
While participants did not argue for limitations on immigrants’ social rights, there was a clear 
expectation that immigrants should start working and fulfil such duties, as stressed by 
Participant 1:  
1: “If we want them because of manpower NEED, then they have to work ATTITUDE, RECIPROCITY. Not just sit back 
and enjoy the benefits, they have to get out in the labour market ATTITUDE, RECIPROCITY.” (NO) 
 
Moreover, in the Norwegian discussions employment and the workplace environment were 
considered a key arena for integration, getting in touch with Norwegians, and learning about 
the Norwegian way of life. Understanding Norwegian society and the way it works was 
considered to be key to integration, to adapting and complying with rules and principles, and 
being motivated to take part in it. Therefore, non-employment tended to be associated with 
isolation from the majority society.61  
The principle of Control was also raised in relation to the question of whether immigrants 
have control over their employment and contributions. In the British discussions, becoming 
 
61 This aspect emerged more explicitly in the discussions involving the non-employment of 
immigrant women – for further details see Section 5.4.3  
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employed was considered the responsibility of the individual, and, accordingly, immigrants 
were viewed as being in control of their employment, regardless of skill level: 
69: “Circumstances will dictate how an individual, how much they can contribute to society but the 
bottom line is everybody can contribute to society if they worked or wanted RECIPROCITY, ATTITUDE, CONTROL 
and as long as they understand that ATTITUDE and they provide people those opportunities, there 
shouldn’t be any reason why people can’t earn their benefit. CONTROL” (UK) 
 
Being in control was considered a minimum requirement, and not something that would 
positively affect the deservingness of immigrants. In this regard, we can identify a different 
approach in the Norwegian discussions in which participants openly talked about the 
difficulties immigrants face in securing their own income from formal employment due to 
discrimination on the labour market: 
11: “Also a problem that if Norwegian workers see a foreign name, chances to get a job are smaller 
compared to a Norwegian name CONTROL. something to think about.” (NO) 
 
This acknowledgement of issues in the hiring process also meant acknowledging immigrants’ 
lack of control over their labour market situation that could lead to demands for welfare 
support even if they were looking for a job. According to this understanding, it is not only the 
individual who is expected to contribute and reciprocate, but integration is rather considered 
a two-way process. This also means that the In-group needs to get involved in reducing the 
barriers that affect immigrants’ ability to contribute.  
The understanding of the Control principle strongly manifests the institutional divide 
between the role of individual and collective responsibility in Norway and the UK. This divide 
is further reinforced if we analyse the principle of Attitude. The discussions reveal that, 
perceptions about and the recognition of immigrants’ contributions do not only depend on 
the ability to contribute but also on efforts to contribute.  
 
5.4.2 Immigrants’ efforts to contribute  
Perceptions about immigrants’ efforts to contribute positively affect assessments of their 
deservingness in general. In this respect, there are certain distinctions concerning in which 
areas participants expect immigrants to make an effort. In the British discussions, the strong 
work ethic of immigrants was clearly considered an important asset, as emphasised by 
Participant 83:  
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83: “So that’s why I agree with the whole Australian ethos is about you come in, you’ve got that strong 
work ethic and then you're going to boost the economy, bring some really valuable skills into that 
country and hopefully that will pass down the line to the next generations RECIPROCITY, ATTITUDE.  For me it’s 
about having containment, control, regulations and all of those things need to be put in” (UK) 
 
Hard work and willingness to work long hours and to work at low-paid jobs that English 
people were not interested in were appreciated and used in the debate in calls for greater 
recognition of immigrants’ contributions: 
89: “That's a good point there because [unclear] Britain also send the people to come here to help build 
the country and a lot of immigrants do contribute but it’s the same all round really RECIPROCITY, ATTITUDE, it’s 
not being highlighted properly because even in the NHS a lot of people are immigrant working RECIPROCITY, 
ATTITUDE , a lot of the jobs in this country as you rightfully say, a lot of people pick and choose what job 
they want ATTITUDE.” (UK) 
 
In this particular case we can observe how perceptions of the in-group or acknowledgement 
of the in-group’s fault or unfavourable behaviour stress the value and the benefit of having 
the out-group. While these positive acknowledgements are weighted and counterbalanced 
with other concerns about immigration, a strong work ethic, hard work, and a willingness to 
work one’s way up the ladder are definitely values the in-group appreciates and associates 
with the image of “good immigrants”. 
In Norway, the requirement of making an effort to contribute did not emerge in the form of 
a call for a good work ethic, but in expectations that immigrants should learn the language 
and participate in society. These expectations were framed in cultural terms, as stressed by 
Participant 28: 
28: “when you immigrate to something, you chose that culture that you immigrate to CONTROL. I believe 
the essence is to begin with language. Teaching language in order to teach culture. ATTITUDE Experience 
that this is related to both rights and duties ATTITUDE. When you enter a society you get some rights, but 
you get duties too RECIPROCITY. We have to make sure that they understand what that implies and that it 
is followed through ATTITUDE. For example get a job, learn the language, achieve to enjoy ATTITUDE. My first 
specific advice is the language. Intensify and provide that language teaching as soon as possible to 
ensure the cultural teaching.” (NO) 
 
Labour market engagement was considered an essential element as well as a means of 
understanding Norwegian society and Norwegian culture. Participants argued for the need 
to acquire language skills as this was seen as one of the key barriers to finding a job and to 
becoming more involved in society. The discussions illustrate the interlocking relationship 
between employment, language, and social participation that is considered important for 
becoming integrated and committed to contributing to the functioning of society.  
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In the British discussions, culturally framed expectations are much less salient. While the 
requirement to speak the language is mentioned, it is not framed as a strict condition of 
obtaining employment, which might be due to the status of English as a world language. 
Engagement in social life was not commonly raised in the debates. This may be due to the 
fact that the latter is seen as part of individuals’ freedom to decide. As noted, efforts to 
contribute in the form of a strong work ethic and hard work also stress the moral character 
of the individual. In Norway, expectations concerning employment and contributing were 
embedded in a wider cultural and social context aimed at maintaining the strength of 
community and reducing social division.   
 
5.4.3 Earning entitlement to welfare provision 
Another aspect of life which is duly considered regarding immigrants is assessing their 
conduct in times of need and vulnerability. This shifts the focus to the use of welfare benefits 
and services. In this respect, “good immigrants” are envisioned as immigrants who earn their 
benefits – by contributing first, and also being self-sufficient most of the time. They do not 
use welfare to further their own personal interests. Perceptions of immigrants’ welfare use 
are intertwined with expectations of Reciprocity and Attitude, and perceptions of 
immigrants’ Needs.  
In general, neediness was usually linked to a lack of paid employment, when the welfare 
state is supposed to help out. This welfare support takes different forms and dimensions in 
the UK and Norway, but in both DFs it was accepted that unemployment involving losing a 
job for various reasons can occur to anyone. Despite this acknowledgement, perceptions of 
immigrants’ neediness were rarely raised. In each country there were only 25 and 19 
references in the British and Norwegian discussions respectively, which touched upon 
immigrants’ needs. This means that only small proportion of references to Need focused on 
out-group needs. Furthermore, we also observed that the vast majority of references were 
associated with refugees’ needs and vulnerability. These numbers clearly show very limited 
interest in immigrants’ needs – especially economic migrants’ needs.62 
This lack of interest can be explained by highlighting expectations about the self-sufficiency 
of immigrants. Self-sufficiency was described as having one’s own income, being able to take 
care of oneself (and dependent family members, if any), and being financially independent 
 
62 The differences between the welfare deservingness of refugees and economic migrants are 
elaborated in Chapter 6.  
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from the state. In both countries this was raised as a form of fulfilling Reciprocity, and was 
rationally framed as reducing the state’s responsibilities and expenses related to immigrants. 
In the British discussions, self-sufficiency also meant that immigrants should be able to cope 
with unexpected situations – the loss of a job, the need for healthcare treatment – on their 
own without expecting state support. Emphasis on self-sufficiency was often associated with 
the aim of preventing welfare dependence among immigrants. In the Norwegian discussions, 
self-sufficiency was also linked to unproblematic immigrants. In one of the small groups, the 
need for self-sufficiency was raised in relation to highly skilled economic migrants and then 
generalized to all economic migrants as a condition for remaining in the country:  
8: “I think the request should be for the whole world. If you come from Africa, but support yourself and 
have a nice job RECIPROCITY, I feel it is weird to throw them out. If they pay tax, work RECIPROCITY, have a social 
life ATTITUDE.” (NO) 
 
 
It is important to stress that in relation to economic migrants we also see an inclination 
towards individualism and increasing individual responsibility in the Norwegian discussions. 
This is especially the case in the context of international labour mobility, freedom of 
movement, and uncertainty about immigrants’ long-term presence in the country. We 
observed how the acknowledgement of global trends and pressures shifted preferences 
towards more individualism, instead of a higher level of adaptation.63  
Due to the high level of sensitivity about perceptions of misuse of the welfare state, 
participants in both countries stressed that immigrants need to contribute first – i.e., they 
expected immigrants to earn their benefits:  
11: “You have to perform before you can enjoy the benefits ATTITUDE, RECIPROCITY. And contribute to get the 
goods ATTITUDE, RECIPROCITY.” (NO) 
 
84: “For me you’ve got to put two years’ worth of money into the system before you can take anything 
out or x amount of years RECIPROCITY.” (UK) 
 
In both countries at least two years were mentioned as the minimum requirement. However, 
no clear arguments were presented to explain why exactly this period of contribution should 
be covered, and not more or less. Furthermore, the use of welfare support was seen 
legitimate and acceptable if taken temporarily, or for a defined period of time. In the British 
discussions, perceptions about a lack of effort seeking new employment were immediately 
linked to the broader debate on welfare dependency. Shifting the responsibility onto the 
 
63 For further details about how such shifts between preferences occured, please see Chapter 7.    
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individual participants also questioned the moral character of those who would choose to 
live on benefits. This difference was pointed out by Participant 68: 
 68: “I think if you’re working for, you know, your own [unclear], for a better life, I think it’s totally 
different from people ATTITUDE, not just immigrants but, you know, people in general IDENTITY.  Sponging off 
the system and being lazy ATTITUDE.” (UK) 
 
In the Norwegian discussions, a lack of employment was understood rather as a reluctance 
to adapt to the Norwegian way of life. Therefore, it was framed as an issue of cultural 
difference. Accordingly, immigrants’ welfare deservingness was linked to the Identity 
principle. The latter emerged in relation to immigrant families and immigrant women’s lack 
of employment and lack of social involvement. Tensions arose between acknowledging the 
freedom of individuals to decide about private matters – such as the management of family 
life – and demands for labour market participation and the maintenance of a high level of 
gender equality: 
10: “I also agree that immigration is a very important resource for our country NEED. The challenge is 
perhaps the Asian and African immigrants with little participation in working life. It has to do with 
cultural differences, and I think we need to be harsher in respect of Norway being a country where both 
men and women work IDENTITY, NEED. […] I have interviewed immigrant women myself to get them 
apprenticeships and possibility for a long-term job. Then many of them say “No, I can’t wear trousers 
because I wear a long dress”. Then I have made adjustments as to how people can do things, but many 
say no, culturally IDENTITY, ATTITUDE. I think Norway has to be harsher in those cases. You have to work, and 
actually say yes to what is offered to you. Sort of a request for activity for immigrants ATTITUDE, RECIPROCITY.” 
(NO) 
 
In both countries we can identify concerns about immigrants’ use of welfare, but anxiety 
about welfare dependence was more dominant in the British discussion, as also reflected in 
policy proposals for limiting access to welfare benefits for a period of at least two years. The 
fact that discussions about immigrants’ welfare use shifted several times to a broader and 
more general discussion about welfare dependence and unemployment indicates the impact 
of the salient public discourse on welfare dependence and the “undeserving unemployed”. 
As highlighted in the literature, such social divisions tend to be reinforced by a liberal welfare 
state organized on the basis of need (Dwyer, 2000; Larsen, 2006; Sainsbury, 2012). The 
provision of means-tested benefits is associated with the higher risk of stigmatization (Jensen 
and Tyler, 2015). As described in Chapter 4, a high level of selectivity and a high level of 
income inequality, strengthen differentiation processes and exclusivist public discourses, 
which also affect opposition to granting immigrants access to welfare (Crepaz and Damron, 
2009; Reeskens and van Oorschot, 2013; Van Der Waal et al., 2013).  
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The analysis finds that perceptions of In-group needs, and especially perceptions of scarcity, 
significantly underlie preferences for a more restrictive and selective approach to 
immigration. The restrictive approach is also mirrored in perceptions of immigrants’ welfare 
deservingness. Expectations of Attitude and Reciprocity dominate the debates. Participants 
are less perceptive concerning the Neediness or lack of Control of immigrants over their 
situation in the UK, thereby shifting the responsibility to the individual.  
In the Norwegian discussions, concerns about immigrants’ welfare use were associated with 
the perception that, for immigrants, access to welfare benefits means disincentivising entry 
to the labour market. Non-employment was considered a crucial issue, affecting the 
functioning of the welfare state and increasing social inequality in the country. The 
Norwegian DF reveal that participants tend to frame this issue as a problem of cultural 
differences. Therefore, it is not surprising why language, an understanding of Norwegian 
society and culture, as well as demands for social participation are so closely intertwined 
with expectations of Reciprocity and Attitude. Despite perceptions of the exploitation of the 
welfare system in the form of exportation of benefits or the accumulation of various benefits, 
none of the Norwegian breakout groups proposed restrictions on accessing welfare benefits. 
All groups focused on integration as a way of addressing the issue of immigration and to a 
certain extent, teaching immigrants to understand and comply with the collective 
responsibility associated with the welfare system. In this respect, the role of the in-group is 
also recognized – the need to change majority attitudes and reduce discrimination. Still, as 
in the case of the British discussion, we see limited interest in or awareness of the Needs of 
immigrants. Therefore, immigrants’ welfare deservingness is largely determined through the 
interplay of In-group needs and expectations related to Reciprocity and Attitude. 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the use of deservingness criteria in the DF discussions. Each of the 
five deservingness criteria – Attitude, Reciprocity, Need, Control, and Identity – reflect on a 
different aspect of welfare deservingness. Analysis of the DF discussions revealed that, in 
terms of the salience of the specific DC, very similar patterns emerge, stressing the 
dominance of Attitude and Reciprocity. However, the particular understandings of these DC 
are considerably different in the British and the Norwegian discussions. Therefore, this 
chapter aimed to analyse these differences. Moreover, the analysis shed light on how these 
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DC relate to each other and interact. The overlapping and parallel use of the criteria indicate 
that in relation to the same issue, various aspects of deservingness are considered and linked 
together.  
One of the key findings of the analysis is that the principle of Need is not only applied in 
relation to immigrants’ neediness. The analysis revealed that perceived In-group needs affect 
the perceptions of immigrants’ welfare deservingness. Moreover, In-group needs play a 
much more dominant role in the discussions and set the framework within which 
immigrants’ deservingness is assessed. We can identify, that the dominance of expectations 
related to Attitude and Reciprocity are formulated to address the perceived In-group needs.  
The analysis found evidence that distinctions in the country-specific visions of “good citizens” 
in Norway and in the UK – each stressing specific values, norms, and social expectations – 
resonated in relation to perceptions of immigrants’ welfare deservingness and shaped the 
in-group’s expectations of immigrants. The analysis provided further evidence how key 
institutional features – such as the role and understanding of employment and contribution, 
the relations between the individual and the collective, the structure and aims of the welfare 
state, and the related values – were discursively reproduced and how they affected 
discussions about immigrants’ welfare deservingness and the thresholds of inclusion.  
While this chapter focused on the use of deservingness principles in the DF debates, the next 
chapter analyses how perceptions of welfare deservingness change depending on the 
specific group of immigrants. Chapter 6 is devoted to scrutinizing how DF participants 
construct the deservingness of refugees and economic migrants, and how they define a 




6 THE COLLECTIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE WELFARE 
DESERVINGNESS OF IMMIGRANTS  
 
The previous chapter focused on the analysis of different understandings of the welfare 
deservingness principles as articulated by DF participants in Norway and in the UK. In this 
chapter, the scope shifts from meanings to the social practice of how people construct the 
welfare deservingness of immigrants through their interactions with each other. This chapter 
aims to examine what considerations and principles are seen as more or less important 
when assessing immigrants’ welfare deservingness (related to RQ2 and RQ4). The focus is 
on the results of these discussions co-created by DF participants.  
As raised earlier, DF participants might not formulate concrete definitions of who they 
consider as immigrants. They might not know exactly the formal eligibility criteria of family 
migration or attaining refugee status, the criteria of acquiring long-term residency or 
citizenship. However, through their interactions participants do delineate what are those 
aspects and principles that they view relevant in relation to immigrants. Their perceptions 
might not reflect the statistics on immigration or the available research evidence, still these 
perceptions, concerns, judgements and uncertainties are real to those participants and often 
taken-for-granted for many other people. That is the reason we need to focus on and 
examine these perceptions (and misperceptions) to better understand how people think and 
talk about such social issues, on what pieces of information and considerations they rely 
when forming their opinions.  
The emergence of various considerations and perspectives in the DF discussions evidence 
that people do differentiate between immigrants along numerous and often cross-cutting 
dimensions, which affect also perceptions of immigrants’ welfare deservingness and 
preferences for in/exclusion. These dimensions are not limited to country of origin, 
motivations for migration or specific legal categories of immigrants, but considering also the 
legitimacy of moving to another country, the choice of the country of destination or the 
moral character of persons, etc. To elaborate more on this aspect, this chapter deepens the 
analysis of public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state by comparing the 
perceptions of welfare deservingness of refugees and economic migrants (including EU and 
non-EU nationals) as two specific subgroups of immigrants. However, as the analysis will 
show DF participants delineated lines of division not only between these two groups, but 
within the group of refugees and the group of economic migrants, too. 
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Refugees and economic migrants tended to dominate the discussions on immigration in both 
countries. The dominance of these two groups of immigrants can be associated with the 
strong contextual effects on discussions. The preoccupation with the issue of refugees and 
economic migrants resonates with the public discourse following the 2015 Refugee crisis and 
broader concerns about the increasing mobility of the labour force in Europe and worldwide. 
In addition to these two groups, family migration was raised as an issue in Norway. However, 
the related discussions were not as significant and comprehensive as in the case of refugees 
and economic migrants. Furthermore, family migration was not discussed by the British 
groups and the topic thus would not qualify for comparative analysis. While we cannot be 
certain why, one of the explanations for the lack of debate about family migration in the UK 
is that the perceptions of losing control over EU nationals’ free movement was so salient in 
the public and political debates that it overshadowed other concerns about immigration. 
Taking into account these considerations, this chapter focuses only on refugees and 
economic migrants. It aims to contribute to the scholarship on welfare deservingness, and 
more broadly to the scholarship on attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state, 
by elaborating on the dynamism of attitude-formation and the changing perceptions of 
welfare deservingness in relation to the specific groups of immigrants and specific social 
contexts debated.   
Although welfare deservingness claims are usually located in the realm of moral values and 
moral assumptions (Willen, 2012), this research is not restricted to the moral framing of 
deservingness and remains open to exploring a more practical approach to the topic of the 
deservingness of immigrants. In contrast to the moral conception of deservingness, practical 
understanding does not necessarily condition perceptions of deservingness on the needs and 
vulnerability of immigrants, but focuses more on acknowledging individual immigrants’ 
achievements and outcomes (Feather, 1999). People are more likely to positively evaluate 
those achievements that conform to the in-group’s internalized vision of “good citizens” and 
which meet the in-group’s perceived needs of the country and society. The DFs reveal that 
participants used different framings of welfare deservingness in relation to these two 
groups. While refugees’ deservingness is substantially influenced by a moral desire to 
promote solidarity, economic migrants’ deservingness is approached much more 
practically, with a stress on the need for conformity with the needs of the country of 
destination. Second, the chapter aims to elaborate on the hierarchy that exists between 
deservingness principles. Scrutinizing the differences in the ranking of DC in relation to these 
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two groups of immigrants enables us to analyse the key considerations and concerns that 
shape attitudes to refugees’ and economic migrants’ inclusion in the welfare state.  
Throughout the chapter it is argued that the application of DC differs in relation to specific 
groups of immigrants, also affecting the way their welfare deservingness is constructed. 
Consequently, the ranking of principles in terms of importance, weight, and impact on 
perceptions of welfare deservingness also varies. Focusing on DC, the analysis finds that the 
moral framing of deservingness judgements primarily relies on the Control and Need 
principles. However, the discussions about refugees also reveal the limits of moral 
obligations and the shift towards a more practical approach in relation to refugees, too. The 
practical approach – primarily applied to economic migrants – unfolds in consideration of 
Reciprocity and Attitude and stressing the need for conformity with the In-group needs as 
key factors in the perception of welfare deservingness. The analysis of this notable shift – 
emerging both in relation to refugees and economic migrants – sheds new light on the 
considerations shaping attitudes towards immigrants’ access to welfare. Furthermore, it 
highlights the significance of the expected interactions and relation between individual 
immigrants and the in-group represented by the state and the (majority) society. The 
analysis also identifies the dynamism and changing character of (in-group) expectations of 
immigrants in relation to specific groups of immigrants, specific circumstances, etc. which 
provide further information about how visions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants are 
constructed. 
 
6.1 REFUGEES AS PEOPLE IN CRISIS 
The DFs were conducted shortly after the peak of the 2015 Refugee crisis. The disputes 
concerning whether to welcome or refuse refugees were high on the political agenda and 
public discourse at a national and European level. The DF discussions reveal that refugee-
related issues, including their inclusion and welfare deservingness, are not seen in black and 
white. Accordingly, ambivalence frequently emerges – balancing between a desire to 
recognize the neediness of refugees and concerns about the exploitation of the refugee 
system and the welfare system. In this regard, there is a strong divide in terms of the 
dimension of time – i.e. in how participants view and reason about refugees’ deservingness 
at the time of arrival (Stage 1), and how participants evaluate refugees’ deservingness and 
their role in society in the longer term (Stage 2). This difference of attitudes related to 
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specific time periods enables us to track which considerations count, which DC play a central 
role in the short-term dimension, and how these criteria fade when evaluated using a long-
term perspective. In the first period of time – i.e., at the time of arrival, refugees are at the 
centre of attention. Refugees’ Neediness, their lack of Control over migration, and the moral 
obligations towards them are contrasted with in-group capacities for accommodating 
refugees. In the second period of time – i.e., when taking the long-term perspective – In-
group needs and interests are in focus. Therefore, expectations related to Reciprocity, 
Attitudes, and Identity are of greater significance in the debates. Accordingly, refugees are 
expected to adapt in order to be seen as more deserving. In the discussions, we cannot 
identify a strictly defined threshold between the initial short-term and long-term dimension. 
Still, differentiating these two periods can help us to better understand how the moral 
justifications for refugees’ welfare deservingness transform into more practical 
expectations about refugees in a long-term perspective.  
The discussion about refugees and the desired approaches to them varied significantly 
between the British and the Norwegian debates. A fundamental difference between the UK 
and Norway arose in terms of how participants viewed refugees. In the UK, refugees were 
often seen as a cost, a burden the country needed to shoulder, while in Norway a more 
optimistic approach prevailed, with refugees being seen as a resource, as labour force the 
country needed. In line with this conception, discussions examined how to facilitate 
refugees’ integration and the utilization of their resources and skills. Therefore, Norwegian 
participants were more open to providing targeted services for refugees – for example, 
language courses – to facilitate refugees’ integration, while in the UK the need for such 
measures was not raised at all.  
Despite these differences, there were also some similarities. First, in both countries there 
were suspicions about the exploitation of the refugee system. Therefore, the legitimacy of 
and reasons for asylum-seeking were taken seriously, and the return of asylum-seekers was 
supported in both countries. Similarly, the return of recognized refugees was considered 
desirable once the main reason for migration had ceased – i.e. when safety was restored in 
the country of origin. Both of these examples show participants’ concerns about the misuse 
of the refugee system and the weakening of moral justification for the accommodation of 
refugees. Study of these considerations – highlighting both the practical aspects that stress 
the usefulness of refugees, and moral reasoning focusing on refugees’ neediness – help us 
understand the application of various DC. The following sections elaborate on the 
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construction of refugees’ welfare deservingness in relation to the two aforementioned 
periods of time. 
 
6.1.1 Stage 1 – Solidarity with refugees at the time of arrival 
At the initial stage of arrival and application for refugee status, participants stress the 
principle of Control. Lack of control over the violent circumstances in the country of origin 
was the main justification participants employed to recognize the neediness of asylum-
seekers and refugees. The acknowledgement of this neediness – primarily understood as the 
need for a safe place to live – positively affects the welfare deservingness of refugees. The 
centrality of the Control principle is proved by considerations that any doubt about the 
control refugees have over their situation in the country of origin, or control over their 
migration, or any doubt about the legitimacy of requesting asylum, reduces perceptions of 
welfare deservingness. Both in the British and the Norwegian discussions participants clearly 
differentiate between legitimate asylum-seekers who deserve help, and asylum-seekers who 
cheat the system by pretending to be in need of protection. DF participants argue that the 
latter have economic motivations, and their migration is not undertaken to save their lives. 
Accordingly, they are often called “economic refugees” in both countries, as described in the 
following citations:  
 45: “Yeah - there are two differences, the people who are trying to get away from war CONTROL and then 
you've got the economic refugees who haven't really got a reason for leaving where they live except 
they want to get some more money CONTROL, ATTITUDE.” (UK) 
25: “The other thing is refugees, the ones who flee from something, war, hunger, catastrophe CONTROL, 
NEED or quite frankly fortune hunters who seek a better life for themselves ATTITUDE. Quite a few of them 
too.” (NO) 
 
While legitimate refugees enjoyed a higher level of informal solidarity, participants tended 
to call for the deportation of “economic refugees”. In the British discussions, participants 
questioned the motivation of legitimate asylum-seekers, suggesting that access to welfare 
benefits affects asylum-seekers’ choice of destination country:  
“I said earlier they should be travelling to bordering countries, not countries that are going to give them 
better benefits like Germany or the UK ATTITUDE.” (UK, Participant not identified) 
 
Such perceptions, and the difficulty of checking who refugees are, shifted the discussions to 
seeking other ways of fulfilling moral obligations towards refugees than accepting refugees 
in the country of destination. This acknowledgement of moral obligations but also distancing 
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from the need to accommodate refugees reveals how welfare deservingness and solidarity 
with refugees gradually decreased in the British discussions.  
In both countries, participants emphasised the need to return refugees if safety is restored 
in the country of origin. In this case, neediness and thus the welfare deservingness of 
refugees diminishes; this points to the desire to offer only temporary help.  However, in 
relation to welfare deservingness, not only individual, micro-level factors are taken into 
account. As described in Chapter 5, in-group capacities – or more precisely, the limits of these 
– affect perceptions of refugees’ welfare deservingness. This was especially the case in the 
British discussions, where refugees’ neediness was contrasted with that of vulnerable groups 
within the in-group, and internal social issues: 
68: “I mean it’s good having… you know, helping say Syrian peoples, I still think you need to help your 
own as well… IDENTITY […]  I understand the moral issues, I do understand moral issues and I know there’s 
a lot help with needs out there NEED but I do think charity starts at home and look after your own first 
that’s, you know, this country IDENTITY.  I’m not saying just the English person or a Jamaican person or 
Asian person, I’m not saying that, I’m saying try and sort out what’s here now and store what you’ve 
got left or what you can do to help others NEED, IDENTITY.” (UK) 
 
This specific case pinpoints how in-group capacity needs were combined with the Identity 
principle to limit the responsibilities of the state to providing help for only a limited period 
of time. In the Norwegian discussions, participants also raised concerns about the number 
of refugees arriving in the country. The questions what was manageable (how many 
refugees), and how the cost of accommodating refugees would affect the financing of the 
welfare state were raised, but these considerations did not lead to preferences for restricting 
the state’s responsibility for supporting refugees.  
While discussions about refugees touched upon other DC, these gained relevance during 
participants’ consideration of the second stage, reflecting on the long-term perspective. For 
instance, the Identity principle – stressing refugees’ cultural distinctiveness – was rarely 
considered. When cultural differences were discussed, even in Norway, this aspect was 
brought up more in regard to the second stage, as discussed in more detail in the following 
section. We could even argue that the acknowledgement of moral obligations towards 
refugees seemed to override considerations related to Identity and cultural differences. 
In Chapter 5, which analysed the use of specific DC, the principles of Attitude and Reciprocity 
were found to be the most dominant concerning immigrants in general. However, once we 
reduce the scope to discussions about refugees, and especially to the period of arrival (Stage 
1), the analysis reveals the dominance of moral considerations and justifications in the 
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construction of the welfare deservingness of refugees. Accordingly, the importance 
associated with specific DC becomes significantly realigned. In line with the findings above, 
Diagram 2 visualizes the centrality of the Control and Need principle at the first stage of 
arrival. The diagram also highlights the relationship between these two principles (that the 
neediness of refugees is acknowledged if refugees are seen to lack control over their 
migration). However, if refugees are perceived to have control over their migration, or are 
seen as being able to influence their choice of destination country, the legitimacy of seeking 
asylum in the country of destination is perceived to malign their moral character; 
consequently, perceptions of welfare deservingness decrease, too. Last, the diagram also 
presents the counter-balancing role of in-group capacities as justification for reducing the 
welfare deservingness of refugees.  
Diagram 2 - Construction of the welfare deservingness of refugees 
 
Notes: the diagram illustrates the importance of specific DC, the relations between the DC and their effect on 
increasing or decreasing perceptions of welfare deservingness.  
 
The analysis has shown how perceptions of the welfare deservingness of refugees change in 
light of new information and considerations. This section examined shifts related to the 
perceptions of neediness (non-neediness). The following section moves to an analysis of the 
second stage, arguing that as the time refugees spend in the country of destination passes, 
considerations affecting refugees’ deservingness are also reformulated.  
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6.1.2 Stage 2 – Increasing demands for activity  
While Stage 1 reflected the discussions at the time of asylum-seekers’ arrival in the country 
of destination, Stage 2 focused more on refugees’ lives in the country of destination. The 
related discussions raised predominantly practical instead of moral considerations 
concerning asylum-seekers’ welfare deservingness. As there were clear differences between 
the countries in terms of the comprehensiveness of discussions about refugees, the analysis 
of considerations related to Stage 2 primarily relies on the Norwegian discussions. The 
integration of refugees was one of the key topics in Norway, with a clear preference for 
seeing refugees as resources for the country; this also contributed to the more detailed 
discussion about the lives of refugees in the country. In the British discussions, a more 
restrictive approach emerged that focused on controlling refugees who enter the country, 
and a tendency to see refugees as a burden. Therefore, discussions concerned more how to 
stop refugees coming, or the need to return them to the country of origin, instead of focusing 
on their lives and integration in the UK.  
In both countries the risk of refugees becoming dependent on welfare was duly considered. 
As highlighted, the willingness to provide support for refugees was seen as temporary. This 
means that their stay in the country of destination may be terminated if the reasons for 
migration ceased. However, as no one can predict when a conflict may end in the country of 
origin, agreement about the need to provide temporary help can be also understood within 
the country of destination. The Norwegian discussions showed a willingness to provide help 
in the initial phase with housing, finding employment, and language courses. However, 
participants also articulated the requirement of certain returns in the long term, in line with 
the “rights-and-duties” principle, which constitutes one of the main pillars of Norwegian 
welfare society and one of the key criteria for being seen as a “good citizen”.64 Stressing such 
returns is how the principle of Reciprocity and Attitude becomes more important at the 
second stage in terms of assessing refugees’ welfare deservingness. The principle of Control 
shifts from perceptions of refugees’ control over migration to control over their situation and 
livelihood in the country of destination. However, the weight of the principle of Control is 
much less than in the first stage, as indicated in Diagram 2. Perceptions of immigrants having 
control over their situation feed into expectations of Reciprocity and Attitude. Both in the 
British and the Norwegian discussions there was a clear consensus on the need to obtain 
employment.  
 
64 For further details on visions of ‘good citizens’ see Section 5.2 
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In the Norwegian discussions we can observe a more comprehensive approach to refugees 
that acknowledges certain institutional barriers they might face and the extra help they 
might need to be able to utilize their skills. These barriers are associated with the lengthy 
process of recognizing refugee status, and with the shortcomings of the system of allocating 
refugees throughout the country – especially in municipalities with limited job opportunities. 
Two out of the three groups in Norway recommended issuing temporary work permits 
already during the process of recognizing refugee status, and employing refugees as soon as 
possible:  
11: “Today it takes years to find out, for asylum seekers to find out if they can stay here, they aren’t 
given the opportunity to get a job CONTROL.” (NO) 
19: “We have to improve out asylum policy. People are stuck waiting in the system for 25 years 
without getting a residence permit or work permit CONTROL, and that costs us money RECIPROCITY. They 
don’t work, they are stuck CONTROL, ATTITUDE, RECIPROCITY. They have nothing to do ATTITUDE. We have to 
improve the policy there NEED. I don’t know.” (NO) 
 
Furthermore, issues with the recognition of qualifications are raised, stressing the need to 
map immigrants’ skills and understand how these can be used in the labour market. These 
issues were seen as barring refugees from having Control over their situation and increasing 
their welfare demands.  
31: “I agree on using the resources when they get here NEED, RECIPROCITY. Find out which competence they 
have, how to use it the best way and put them to work NEED, RECIPROCITY.” (NO) 
 
The recognition of refugees’ limited responsibility for such difficulties also increased their 
welfare deservingness. In the British discussions, the responsibility was fully shifted onto 
individuals, with limited or no interest in the needs or difficulties of refugees in the labour 
market or in society in general. This marks an important institutional difference between the 
Norwegian and British welfare system which (respectively) stress collective/individual 
responsibility, as described in Chapter 4 and analysed in Chapter 5. 
In Norway, another aspect of the neediness of refugees was identified. Norwegian 
participants were in favour of providing psychological care for traumatized refugees as a 
preventive measure. Interestingly, participants associated potentially violent acts with the 
external circumstances of refugees and difficulty adapting to a completely new, peaceful 
environment in Norway, as articulated by Participant 15:  
15: “If you are brought up on violence and war and know nothing else, then it can be easier to turn to 
violence yourself even though you are living in peaceful surroundings ATTITUDE. Quite simply treatment of 
trauma and experienced violence NEED is important. Especially when we see that the immigrants are 
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people who fled for their lives, fled from war and violence.  … Yes. People who have experienced war 
have a hard time finding their place in the Norwegian society ATTITUDE, IDENTITY. A greater feeling of being 
homeless which could lead to radicalizing.” (NO) 
 
In this particular case, the principle of Control is raised in relation to the situation in the 
country of origin, where refugees’ lack of control over migration is used as a justification for 
the welfare deservingness of refugees. Here the neediness of refugees was also seen as a 
result of violent circumstances in the country of origin, outside of their control. This was 
perceived as increasing refugees’ deservingness in connection with the receipt of special 
services. In the British discussions, the radicalization of refugees was raised as well, but early 
employment was proposed as a preventative solution.  
In terms of the principle of Attitude, in Norway there were clear demands for learning the 
language, and learning about the Norwegian state and society. Thus, the expectations very 
much resemble the expectations associated with economic migrants. However, the key 
difference is that in relation to refugees it is seen as the responsibility of the state to facilitate 
refugees’ integration and ensure their access to support services. The understanding of the 
responsibility of the state is underlined by the perceptions of cultural differences between 
nationals and refugees. Therefore, the Identity principle enters the debate about 
deservingness. An awareness of cultural differences functions in the debates as reason for 
integration, with the argument that there is a greater need for the integration of refugees. 
The agenda behind integration is to reduce the effects of cultural differences on Norway, and 
make refugees respect and adapt to the country through their involvement: 
9: “I think that language and culture should be included in the same, not necessarily be two separate 
things. I experience that many see it as forced Norwegian courses is because we don’t respect the culture 
they come from, but it is important to focus on the fact that to partake in society, they have to learn 
something about how things are here even if they speak English ATTITUDE, IDENTITY. It is about focusing on 




Support for integration also emerges in the debates as regards preventing deepening of the 
gap between immigrants and the majority. A belief in social inclusion and a commitment to 
reducing inequalities are profoundly embedded in the vision of ‘good citizens’ in Norway, 
and actually developing this kind of commitment to these social aims is expected from 
refugees through the process of integration. As participation in the labour market and society 
is seen as essential for integration, perceptions of non-compliance with these expectations 
have detrimental effects on the welfare deservingness of refugees.  
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In the British discussion, the issue of refugees is approached rather along the line of how to 
better control it and how to limit the responsibilities of the state in terms of accepting and 
accommodating refugees. Participants said that refugees should be employed to prove they 
were not coming to the country because of welfare benefits. Moreover, fulfilment of the 
expectations of working and contributing was understood to be the responsibility of the 
individual, which is a major difference between the approach and understanding of the UK 
and Norway as regards the share of responsibilities of the state and refugees. While there 
were no specific proposals concerning how to limit refugees’ access to welfare in the British 
discussions, there was a clear preference for stopping offering any incentives that would 
attract more refugees to the country. 
In relation to the first stage, the analysis found that in-group capacity shaped and set limits 
on the perceptions of the welfare deservingness of refugees. In contrast, at the second stage 
it was In-group needs that influenced expectations towards refugees. Compliance with these 
expectations has a positive impact on the perceptions of refugees’ welfare deservingness, as 
also presented in Diagram 2.  
 
6.1.3 Changing perceptions of the welfare deservingness of refugees  
While in the DFs we can identify only the aforementioned two dimensions of time, we can 
assume that the third dimension would be the stage of acquiring citizenship in the country 
and becoming a formally equal citizen. However, the conditions of acquiring citizenship were 
only superficially discussed. Therefore, the analysis is restricted to the former two 
dimensions of time. Distinguishing the two stages allows us to study the ambivalent 
attitudes towards refugees. On the one hand, at the time of arrival (Stage 1) participants 
tended to share solidarity with refugees. It was acknowledged that they have no control 
over their living conditions and have no other choice but to leave their country and seek 
protection elsewhere. On the other hand, participants also shared concerns about the 
exploitation of asylum policy. Fears of refugees becoming dependent on welfare benefits, 
or the cost of their accommodation, were used to justify a preference for offering only 
temporary help and supporting the return of refugees once safety was restored in the 
countries of origin.  
The discussion about refugees also changed when participants discussed what should be 
demanded of refugees, and how to facilitate their integration into working life, and into 
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society. In this second dimension, we can identify a shift towards more practical 
considerations and expectations linked to Reciprocity and Attitude. Although these 
expectations resemble the expectations of economic immigrants, a key difference remains: 
stressing the responsibility of the state to support refugees’ integration. This notion of 
differentiated treatment was explicitly shared in Norway, while in the British discussion it 
was present more implicitly and subtly in that no restrictions were specifically proposed for 
refugees. This differentiated treatment may be associated with the acknowledgement of the 
legal status of refugees in the country, but also with moral considerations and assumptions 
in relation to refugees. While a practical approach prevails in discussions about refugees’ 
long-term stay in the country of destination, we can identify interactions between the moral 
and practical approach to the issue of refugees.  
The analysis of discussions shows how the specific ranking and hierarchy of DC is shaped 
according to these two dimensions of time. Additionally, along the moral and practical 
framing of arguments and justifications we can also identify a social hierarchy of refugees, 
as presented in Diagram 3. As shown in the analysis, recognition of neediness linked to 
perceptions of Control is at the heart of the morally framed assessments and justifications 
that emerge at Stage 1. In this respect, we can observe a shift during the discussions along a 
spectrum of perceptions from needy to non-needy refugees, the latter who are seen as 
people who exploit the welfare system. Such shifts also indicate considerations of the limits 
of neediness (horizontal axis). Along the practical framing of considerations participants 
distinguish refugees based on their usefulness for the country, stressing the needs of the 
country and in-group (vertical axis). Accordingly, we can distinguish four groups of refugees: 
1. Needy and needed, useful for the country of destination 
2. Needy but not needed, not useful for the country of destination 
3. Useful but not needy, exploiting the welfare system 
4. Not useful, and exploiting the welfare system 
 
At the first stage, moral justifications – perceptions of neediness – tend to override 
perceptions of usefulness. However, as the discussions develop, we find evidence of how 
perceptions of neediness and moral justifications change with the time immigrants spend in 
the country. A desire for the restoration of safety in the immigrants’ country of origin is the 
most clear-cut example of how the moral justification for solidarity diminishes and refugees’ 
welfare deservingness declines, unless they are seen as useful to the country of destination. 
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Thus, the accent shifts more to practical reasoning (Stage 2). In terms of perceptions of 
usefulness, we see different patterns in the two countries. Changing perceptions of 
usefulness are subject to the compliance of refugees with perceived In-group needs and 
expectations about Reciprocity and Attitude. While in Norway both the state and the majority 
society take responsibility for enhancing the usefulness of refugees, in the UK this kind of 
achievement is considered to be solely up to refugees themselves. 
Diagram 3 - Hierarchy of refugees, distinguishing four groups of refugees based on moral and practical 
assessments of welfare deservingness 
 
Note: the colour of the circles that represent the specific group of refugees represents the dominance of moral 
(purple) or practical (blue) framing of arguments in relation to welfare deservingness. 
 
In relation to both neediness and usefulness, perceptions change only in one direction. Shifts 
from needy to not needy unfold once moral justifications weaken and the initial reasons for 
neediness at the time of arrival cease to exist, or perceptions of refugees having Control over 
their situation in the country of destination replace perceptions of their Control over 
migration. The shift from non-useful to useful happens if refugees become economically 
active, their qualifications are recognized, or they receive the necessary training to allow 
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them to utilize their skills. To a certain extent, usefulness can also be understood as a 
measure of refugees’ adaptation to the country of destination in terms of the acquisition of 
new skills in the country of destination.  
Focusing on the group of refugees, the analysis found that, with time, the framing of 
arguments for the welfare deservingness of refugees shifts from moral to more practical 
understandings. Accordingly, the ranking and importance of specific DC is realigned, 
shifting attention from Control and Need to Reciprocity and Attitude. This shift to a more 
practical approach involves a certain similarity with the discussions on economic migrants, 
which stress a merely practical approach – avoiding moral considerations. The following 
sections elaborate on what stances shaped the discussions on economic migrants, and what 
factors affected perceptions of their welfare deservingness. 
 
6.2 ECONOMIC MIGRANTS 
The term ‘economic migrant’ usually refers to the legal category of immigrants who enter a 
foreign country with the primary purpose of working. However, the purpose of performing 
economic activity itself does not create a clear division between specific categories of 
immigrants, as the latter goal might be shared as much among refugees and family migrants 
as among economic migrants.65 Therefore, first, it is important to clarify how economic 
migrants66 were conceptualised in the DF discussions.  
In the discussions – in both countries – economic migrants are simply called ‘immigrants’, 
and the adjectives ‘economic’ or ‘labour’ are rarely applied. Still, immigrants’ economic 
motivations are clearly articulated by the DF participants. The perceived economic 
motivation for migration forms the key distinction between refugees and economic 
migrants. In the case of economic migrants, the free choice of immigration was taken for 
granted. This was seen as justified especially in relation to EU migrants due to freedom-of-
movement regulations. The possibility that migration might not involve a free and informed 
decision but a chance to break out of economic deprivation in the country of origin was not 
considered in any of the breakout group discussions. Therefore, economic migrants were 
 
65 International students stand out as their labour market activities might be limited due to their 
student status. However, this group was not at the centre of discussions in either country.  
66 Throughout the thesis the term “economic migrants” is used to make a clear distinction between 
specific groups of immigrants.  
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perceived to be in control of their migration and their choice of destination. This perception 
substantially shaped the discussions. Furthermore, it provided the ground for more confined 
considerations about economic migrants’ welfare deservingness, focusing on contributions 
and performance as the basis of practical, instead of morally driven assessments.  
As described in Chapter 5, due to perceptions of (in-group) needs for a foreign labour force, 
economic migration was at the centre of discussions in the Norwegian and the British DFs. 
However, the debate was more intense in the UK considering the salience of issues 
concerning EU migration in the 2015 parliamentary elections (that took place five months 
before the DF), and the prospects of the Brexit referendum. In line with the trends in public 
discourse, the British discussions reveal a restrictive approach focused on a regulated and 
selective immigration system:  
90: “I think the biggest issue is actually with the EU nationals because there is no limits, no control or 
nothing.  They can just come and do whatever they want to ATTITUDE so maybe just put more focus on the 
actual EU nationals, check who is working, who’s not working, how long have they been unemployed, 
whether they are actually coming here for work or whatever they’re coming ATTITUDE” (UK) 
 
45 “I would suggest that we go along the same lines as Canada and Australia and be very, very selective 
as to who comes into the country and because of that we’ve got to come out of the EU.” (UK) 
 
 
In both countries expectations of Reciprocity and Attitude prevailed. Primarily, these two 
principles influenced deservingness assessments, completely overshadowing perceptions of 
economic migrants’ Needs. Principles of Control and Identity tended to feed into and 
strengthen expectations related to employment. The following sections aim to detail how DF 
participants constructed the deservingness of economic migrants, and how Reciprocity and 
Attitude become the most relevant principles in terms of shaping perceptions of economic 
migrants’ deservingness.  
 
6.2.1 Perceptions of economic migrants’ control over their migration  
The perception that economic migration is based on an informed and free choice 
considerably influenced participants’ views about economic migrants’ welfare 
deservingness. This implied that migrants were seen as fully in Control of their migration. 
Accordingly, a similarly high level of responsibility and independence was expected from 
them during their stay in the country of destination. In the British discussions, such 
expectations unfolded in the form of preferences for obtaining jobs in advance of actual 
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migration, but also for securing the finances required to survive the period immediately after 
arriving in the country of destination.  
According to participants, economic migrants’ perceptions that the country of destination is 
a rich country and offers welfare benefits and services constituted relevant factors that are 
considered in advance, as also implied by Participant 80 and Participant 23:   
80 “My issue is if those benefits weren’t there, you haven’t got benefits in Australia you haven’t got 
many there, if those benefits wasn’t there how many people would actually flood to the country ATTITUDE, 
CONTROL.” (UK) 
23: “Fair enough that the labour immigrants come here to work ATTITUDE, but don’t come with an 
agenda ATTITUDE, CONTROL. Work for two years, and then maybe you go on maternal leave, then you can 
actually go for two years on unemployment benefit and then again report sick ATTITUDE.” (NO) 
 
Such stances were also underlined by reflecting on the gap in the living standards between 
countries of origin and destination. Furthermore, the differences in the value of social 
benefits, and individual interests were also mentioned as push factors for migrating to these 
countries, as Participant 69 stresses: 
69: “there shouldn’t be any incentive in that sense to come into this county because you’ll have people 
who come over from countries that are significantly, you know, worse off than we are because we’re a 
developed society ATTITUDE, CONTROL, because it’s a lot of money and they send that money back ATTITUDE.” 
(UK) 
 
Based on these considerations, economic migrants’ control over migration was taken for 
granted, thereby affecting perceptions of a low level of deservingness. Accordingly, Control 
over migration as a DC has a special place in Diagram 4, which visualises how the welfare 
deservingness of economic migrants is constructed. Perceptions of economic migrants’ 
Control over migration also served as justification for decreasing the state’s responsibility for 
supporting them in both countries. Thus, it shifted the focus to the economic migrant’s 
individual responsibility, their achievements, and performance in the country as a way of 










Diagram 4 - Construction of the welfare deservingness of economic migrants 
 
Notes: the diagram illustrates the importance of specific DC, the relations between the DC and their effect on 
increasing or decreasing perceptions of welfare deservingness.  
 
6.2.2 Perceptions of economic migrants’ misuse of the welfare system 
Perceptions of economic migrants’ misuse of the welfare system considerably affected 
willingness to share welfare with them. Furthermore, it strengthened the preference for 
demanding that they earn their entitlement to welfare benefits. In both countries, 
perceptions of the intentional use of welfare benefits and services were seen as highly 
problematic. The perceived intentionality was clearly associated with economic migrants’ 
control over their lives and the choice of using and enjoying the benefits offered by the 
welfare state: 
23: “I’m not saying that everyone, but many labour immigrants come in here and work, but some come 
here and work for two years, report sick or do something else, and then they have free-of-charge benefit 
from NAV [Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration] for another two years. ATTITUDE, CONTROL” (NO) 
 
“88 Well some people just come for the Health Service, they come over here for twelve months because 
they know there's a problem and they’ll get seen to straight away ATTITUDE, CONTROL where in the US you 
know or whatever you have to pay” (UK) 
 
In the British discussions, immigrants’ access to welfare benefits and services was almost 
taken for granted, but after the proposed two years of contribution participants also claimed 
they would prefer if economic migrants were followed-up and deported if they had been 
economically inactive in the long term:  
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64: “The security system doesn’t necessarily have to be a separate system.  If they are not violent or they 
contribute to the country, and they are unemployed, they are going to be, well they should be actively 
searching for work ATTITUDE.  If they, then that could tied in with their, like....Job Seekers and, you know, if 
you've been out of work for a year and a half and you not contributing then are there grounds to send 
them back and say ATTITUDE, RECIPROCITY , look it hasn't worked.” (UK)  
 
This stance – shared by other participants as well – stipulates the relevance of the economic 
benefits migrants bring to the country and the unacceptability of long-term unemployment, 
which in the eyes of participants meant taking from the welfare state instead of contributing 
to it. In Norway, the focus was primarily on the exploitation of cash benefits. In relation to 
EU migrants, participants were concerned about remitting cash benefits abroad. It was 
considered unfair to enjoy the generosity of welfare benefits in the countries of origin, where 
living standards are much lower compared to Norway. Furthermore, especially in relation to 
family policies and parental leave schemes, cash benefits were viewed as a disincentive to 
work and integrate:  
11: “Important to make demands for Norwegian participation in working life ATTITUDE. Remove benefits 
that allow people to stay at home ATTITUDE, for example cash benefit. Reversed intuitive for integration….” 
(NO) 
 
In this understanding, cash benefits were seen not only as hindering economic migrants from 
contributing to the welfare state, but also as drivers of separation, creating parallel societies 
and increasing social inequalities by discouraging social participation. While in relation to in-
group members Norwegian participants were not suspicious about the exploitation of cash 
benefits, they stated that they would prefer to offer more services to migrants instead of 
cash benefits. This preference also shows that in the Norwegian discussions the desire was 
not necessarily to limit migrants’ access to these benefits and services, but rather to limit the 
perceived exploitation of them, and to reduce barriers to integration.   
In addition to concerns about cash benefits, the British participants articulated issues related 
to social services. In this respect, the topic of the National Health Service (NHS) triggered 
disputes, and participants recommended restricting free access to NHS for non-Western 
migrants. The recommendations were seen as necessary for saving money to better cope 
with capacity issues and to invest more into more relevant sectors:    
 
40: “The NHS is one area that we are saying that we spend a lot of money on, so I mean in this case with 
non EU nationals, you know, it's fair enough that they don't have access to the NHS. If that's something 
that we are having an issue of doing cuts and jobs and all sorts are in place and education is something 
that we really want to, you know, develop and examine NEED, but it's a bit unfair for non EU nationals to 




Further capacity issues were identified in relation to education and housing, leading to 
arguments about overcrowding67 in the UK. As these capacity issues were associated with 
immigration, perceptions of a lack of capacity were used as arguments for restricting 
economic migrants’ access to services. Despite the fact that British participants tended to 
acknowledge the contributions and hard work of economic migrants within the NHS 
specifically, this did not change their preferences for limiting economic migrants’ access to 
services. This discrepancy also reflects on the uneven approach and differing weights 
associated with the perceptions of contributions of economic migrants, and perceptions 
about the exploitation of the welfare system. 
Debates about the misuse of the welfare system and the perceived imbalances between 
migrants’ contributions and take-up of benefits justified the more stringent expectations 
about the need for greater individual responsibility for earning access to welfare through 
employment and contributions. While, in relation to refugees, willingness to share solidarity 
with them was initially stronger during the first stage (at the time of their arrival), for 
economic migrants it was especially during the initial phase when their deservingness was 
questioned. For the latter it takes longer to prove their abilities, their contributions, to earn 
entitlement to social benefits, and it is only through such achievements that are they seen 
as more deserving. Thus, in the initial period participants argued for a higher level of self-
sufficiency. However, economic migrants’ self-sufficiency was not stressed only as an 
expectation in relation to enhancing Reciprocity, but also as part of compliant behaviour in 
both countries. In this regard, we encounter substantial differences between the British and 
Norwegian expectations related to Attitude, which also had some implications in connection 
with perceptions of economic migrants’ welfare deservingness.   
 
6.2.3 Requirements for self-sufficiency and the role of the Control principle 
In the British discussions, self-sufficiency was understood mostly in economic terms as 
financial independence from the state and its support, which meant that obtaining 
employment and working hard were the key expectations economic migrants needed to fulfil 
to be perceived as more deserving and earn access to benefits. Furthermore, expectations 
of being in control of their own (social) situation in the country of destination – the second 
 
67 The expression ‘overcrowding’ was used by participants in reference to population growth and 
consequently increasing demands for social and healthcare services.  
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aspect of the Control principle – also tended to feed into requirements related to the Attitude 
principle. As highlighted in Chapter 5, this perception of Control reflected on DF participants’ 
preferences that economic migrants should take responsibility for their own choices and for 
their life in the country of destination. As visualized in Diagram 4, discussions reveal that 
perceptions of economic migrants being in control of their own lives, affects and increases 
perceptions of their welfare deservingness through the recognition of a compliant Attitude. 
Recalling the description of ‘good citizens’ from the previous chapter, we can identify the 
reproduction of these patterns in relation to economic migrants.  
In comparison to the British discussions, where the economic framing of self-sufficiency 
prevailed, in the Norwegian discussions the centrality of employment and the requirement 
that migrants have their own income were complemented with certain cultural expectations. 
As part of self-sufficiency, economic migrants were supposed to be able to communicate and 
to participate in society. In contrast to the case with refugees, economic migrants’ eligibility 
for free Norwegian language courses was disputed. Most participants expected economic 
migrants to integrate on their own without the state’s support. In this regard, the role of 
employment and the workplace was strengthened as an environment for supporting 
integration and learning and practising the Norwegian language, coming into contact with 
Norwegians, and participating more broadly in society.  
While Norwegian participants expected economic migrants to adapt to the Norwegian way 
of life, responsibility was not fully shifted onto the individuals, as was the case in the British 
discussions. Discrimination in the labour market – particularly in the hiring process – 
emerged in the discussion as a key barrier to economic migrants’ labour market activities, 
being outside their responsibility as stressed by Participant 23:  
23: “One thinks immigration and that the problem is the immigrants. But we also have to think about 
how we receive them RECIPROCITY. Give them the opportunity to work. There is racism in Norway, but luckily 
not so much compared to other countries. If an immigrant wants to apply for a job, he actually has to 
be given the opportunity to work too, if not we will only face even more prejudice, that foreigners don’t 
work ATTITUDE. It isn’t easy to start working of you can’t get a job. CONTROL Many people try. One thing is the 
challenges when the immigrants come here, another is the challenge of what people think of them too. 
RECIPROCITY One has to be alert about that too.” (NO) 
 
The Norwegian participants critically reflected on racism and negative attitudes to 
immigrants in the majority society and among employers. In this regard, the stories of 
immigrants’ changing their names to Norwegian ones were seen as especially convincing 
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with regard to the claim that the majority society also needs to change and become more 
open to diversity, securing equal opportunities for all: 
14: “We are in need of a change in attitude in Norway, because we are a bunch of bloody racists, sorry 
for saying, but it doesn’t matter whether you are from the east or west of Europe, if you are African or 
American; we are racists regardless, and we have to stop it. We need an attitude changing campaign 
amongst employers to get people understand that it isn’t always that Norwegian guy with a bachelor’s 
degree that is the best person for the job IDENTITY, CONTROL. Because the kitchen is full of people with a 
doctor’s degree doing dishes, and that is awfully sad. Resources we actually need in the working life 
IDENTITY, NEED.” (NO) 
 
Through such considerations, participants acknowledged that immigrants’ Control over their 
situation is limited by external factors such as negative majority attitudes and discrimination.  
Thus, the Norwegian discussions reveal a distinctive approach to the Control principle which 
affects perceptions of economic migrants’ welfare deservingness positively: namely, 
responsibility for non-employment or under-employment is not blamed on immigrants.  
 
6.2.4 Perceptions of intergroup differences and the impact of the principle of Identity  
Both the inclusion of cultural expectations and awareness of the limits of individual 
responsibility in the Norwegian discussions suggest the importance of taking into account 
the potential effects of intergroup relations and interactions on the perceptions of the 
welfare deservingness of economic migrants. In this respect, the Identity principle is an 
important means of fostering social inclusion or strengthening group boundaries. In Welfare 
Deservingness Theory, we tend to assume the centrality of national identity. However, 
acknowledging the multiplicity of identities we expect that the principle of Identity can 
emerge in various ways in the discussions, which should be examined.  
Strong collective identity can be identified in the Norwegian DF discussions, with ethnic and 
civic elements. The emphasis on language, Norwegian culture, social values and principles, 
as well as the Norwegian lifestyle represent what makes Norwegians different from others 
(in-group identity). However, instead of exclusion and strengthening group boundaries, 
participants raised the requirements of better understanding Norwegian society and the 
functioning of the state as a means of integration. This suggests that the former is seen as 
something acquirable through learning and social participation. These expectations are both 
related to principle of Identity and Attitude. Considerations of cultural differences affect 
perceptions of welfare deservingness through compliance with these requirements. The 
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general understanding was that, through the process of learning about and experiencing how 
Norwegian society functions, economic migrants would also better understand their role and 
duties in the country of destination, and would be more motivated to comply with their 
collective responsibilities towards society. As described in Chapter 5, such collective 
responsibilities primarily touched upon respect for the “rights-and-duties” principle and 
promoting a fair balance between contributing and accessing welfare benefits. Participating 
fully in such a system of collective responsibility was understood as being a way to reduce 
potential misuse of the welfare system, which tended to be linked to cultural differences 
between migrants and the majority society. Cultural differences were primarily stressed in 
relation to non-Western migrants and especially to immigrant women and families. 
Therefore, the discussion of cultural differences often blurred the boundaries between 
economic and family migration and shifted the debate towards immigrant families and their 
life in the country of destination. 
In contrast to the Norwegian discussions, British participants did not raise cultural 
considerations in relation to immigration in general, nor to economic migrants specifically. 
Moreover, the discussions show that collective identification is not fixed on citizenship or 
ethnic identity. The division between working people and unemployed people living off 
benefits seemed to be much more relevant in the eyes of British participants. The centrality 
of this differentiation provides evidence for the effects of the salient public discourse on 
welfare dependency and the “undeserving unemployed” in the UK (Larsen 2006, 2013; 
Jensen and Tyler; 2015).68 This approach also points at the greater relevance awarded to 
individual character and individual performance instead of a more collective understanding. 
However, even working migrants were seen as sources or reasons for tension due to 
perceptions of competition for the same opportunities and concerns about the social 
mobility of in-group members. These fears served as justification for prioritising the in-group, 
as shared by Participant 40: 
40: “It’s an issue because it’s probably restricting our British citizens from having access to you know, 
like education, to job opportunities IDENTITY. It’s simply because, you know we have Europeans and other 
people from around the world coming in and it’s restricting and taking all the opportunities that we 
could possibly have. IDENTITY … It’s a problem because it’s like, you know, we’re trying to build up on our 
lifestyle and our career IDENTITY. […] 
And concentrate on the British citizens because they are your main priorities. […] They should be 
prioritised only so that their skills are developed and that’s what we should do, the government should 
be looking after our people first. IDENTITY” (UK) 
 





At the same time, all British breakout groups critically raised the question whether 
competition occurs if economic migrants do the jobs that English people are not willing to 
take. Participants recognized the hard work of economic migrants but they also appreciated 
the indispensable work of migrants in the healthcare sector.  
80: “If we back all those years immigration started purely because the people of England were too lazy 
to get off their bums and go and work IDENTITY we had to employ [unclear] to come into the country to do 
the job.” 
 
88: “A lot of my friends are Polish and to be fair they work really hard, they will do the hours, they will 
do the jobs ATTITUDE  but we won’t, we go we’re not doing that…” (UK) 
 
Despite calling for greater recognition of such accomplishments, these arguments were not 
fully translated when discussing migrants’ access to welfare benefits and services and did not 
affect preferences for a more restrictive approach. As mentioned earlier, this also signals 
that concerns about welfare dependency tend to be stronger than the recognition of hard 
work and the strong work ethic of some economic migrants. This also meant that it was more 
challenging to argue against such claims or to convince others about their misperceptions of 
the share of immigrants in the country, about the negative effects of the mediatization of 
certain welfare scandals, or the volume of benefit fraud. Such counter-arguments usually 
went unheard, and had a limited effect in terms of altering the discussion.69 These counter-
arguments were not supported by facts, but even when underpinned by statistics (as part of 
the information packages participants received before Day 2), these were often questioned 
during the debates.  
Comparing the British and Norwegian discussions, we can identify two very different forms 
of use of the Identity principle. In line with the institutional differences examined in Chapter 
5, the British DF participants stressed and encouraged individual responsibility, while the 
Norwegian DF participants put emphasis on compliance with the principle of collective 
responsibility. However, both approaches were aimed at the same goal – a high level of 
employment and contributions from immigrants.  
 
 
69 Chapter 7 is devoted to an analysis of the process of attitude-formation within the groups, 
focusing on the effects of group dynamics on the development of the discussion.  
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6.2.5 The role of In-group needs in relation to economic migrants’ welfare deservingness  
The previous sections reflected on the key considerations in the discussions which show the 
role of perceived In-group needs in framing and shaping perceptions of economic migrants’ 
welfare deservingness. The analysis of expectations of economic migrants revealed in both 
countries that the principles of Reciprocity and Attitude dominated stressing the need for 
labour force and addressing skills shortages in these countries. In relation to these In-group 
needs, discussions about the welfare deservingness of economic migrants are framed in 
practical terms (what they can offer, how they can benefit the country of destination). The 
comparison in Diagram 2 of refugees’ welfare deservingness and Diagram 4 of economic 
migrants’ deservingness shows that, in contrast to the situation with refugees, economic 
migrants’ needs do not affect perceptions of welfare deservingness. Actually, economic 
migrants’ needs are raised only occasionally – e.g. in relation to facilitating recognition of 
qualifications acquired abroad, which emerged as an issue in both countries. Even in such 
cases, the identified needs were related to facilitating their labour market activities – i.e. to 
meeting In-group needs, and were less about economic migrants’ need for support.  
The vulnerability of economic migrants was not considered. This also underlines the issue 
that it is primarily In-group needs that define who is seen as deserving. In both countries 
the role of employment and contributions – as expectations related to Reciprocity and 
Attitude – was central to the discussions. While principles of Control and Identity also shaped 
perceptions of economic migrants’ welfare deservingness, these considerations fed into 
expectations related to the principle of Attitude. Thus, their effect was conditional on 
economic migrants’ conformity with and adaptation to these attitudes. In contrast to the 
situation with refugees, moral considerations or perceptions of neediness were almost fully 
disregarded in relation to economic migrants.  
 
6.3 COMPARISON OF THE DEBATES ABOUT REFUGEES’ AND ECONOMIC MIGRANTS’ 
WELFARE DESERVINGNESS 
 
Throughout the analysis, particular attention was devoted to identifying and highlighting the 
different considerations, different social contexts, and different applications of DC, which 
together shaped the collective construction of the welfare deservingness of refugees and 
economic migrants as two specific groups of immigrants. The following two sections are 
designed to reflect on these findings in a comparative manner, drawing conclusions both in 
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relation to differences between refugees and economic migrants, as well as in relation to the 
country-specific differences that unfolded in the discussions on immigration.  
 
6.3.1 Differences between refugees and economic migrants 
In relation to refugees, we can first identify a morally driven approach to welfare 
deservingness, in which perceptions of lack of Control over migration from the country of 
origin and perceptions of neediness prevail. However, an important finding is how fragile 
these perceptions of neediness are, particularly in light of participants’ concerns about the 
abuse of asylum policies and welfare systems. Such concerns gradually shifted participants’ 
focus from a moral to a more practical approach to refugees’ welfare deservingness. This 
shift is also demonstrated by preferences for providing temporary support to refugees. To 
better understand this shift from moral to practical framing, it is important to distinguish 
between the initial period – the time of the arrival of refugees –, and a second, longer period, 
which allows refugees within the country of destination to be seen from a longer-term 
perspective. Accordingly, as visualised in Diagram 2, refugees’ welfare deservingness in Stage 
1 is underlined by moral considerations that overshadow assessments of refugees’ practical 
contributions. It is especially these practical considerations shaped by In-group needs and an 
assessment of who is useful to the country and to society that increased in Stage 2. 
Participants started raising expectations linked to Reciprocity and Attitude, with refugees 
accordingly needing to fulfil the requirements of employment and adaptation to the majority 
society to be seen as deserving. 
In contrast to refugees, for economic migrants it was especially with regard to the initial 
phase when DF participants tended to deny, or did not really consider, the welfare 
deservingness of economic migrants. This stance was primarily reasoned by the perception 
that economic migrants have full Control over their migration and their migration occurs due 
to free choice. This perception also implies taking greater individual responsibility for their 
lives in the country of destination. Participants require a high level of self-sufficiency, 
especially in the initial period, and economic migrants can gradually earn welfare 
deservingness through their achievements – through their employment and contributions, 
and their adaptation to the country of destination. However, any perceptions of misuse of 
the welfare system considerably counteracted recognition of economic migrants’ 
deservingness. The practical framing of welfare deservingness and the dominant role of 
Reciprocity and Attitude pervaded the discussions and, as depicted in Diagram 4, principles 
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of Control and Identity fed into and strengthened expectations related to the expected 
behaviour and attitude.  
 
6.3.2 Differences between the Norwegian and British discussions and conceptions  
The analysis found considerable differences with regard to how refugees and economic 
migrants are treated in the Norwegian and British discussions. Throughout the chapter it has 
been argued that the differences between the formulation of specific expectations can be 
traced back to institutional factors that influence how DF participants aim to meet perceived 
In-group needs. Furthermore, the articulated expectations are also shaped by the visions of 
‘good citizens’ and, accordingly, visions of ‘good immigrants’. However, in terms of perceived 
In-group needs, British and Norwegian participants stressed employment as a key criterion. 
The analysis finds that employment in itself is not only construed as an economically framed 
expectation of Reciprocity, but also as social expectation related to Attitude. A key difference 
between the two countries was that in Norway cultural expectations were also raised. 
Cultural expectations were used to justify improving refugees’ and immigrants’ 
understanding and commitment to collective responsibilities towards the state and society. 
This aspect reveals a further difference in relation to how expectations about refugees and 
economic migrants are framed in terms of individual and/or state responsibility. Strong 
collective responsibility as a part of Norwegian welfare identity – and a key pillar of the vision 
of ‘good citizens’ – is reflected in the expectation that refugees and economic migrants 
should comply with the “rights-and-duties” principle and commit to and fulfil collective 
responsibilities towards society and state. Second, the impact of this strong collective 
responsibility is also revealed in the view that the responsibility of finding work and 
integrating should not be shifted completely to immigrants, but the state and majority 
society should take part in facilitating the process. The preferred share of responsibilities 
between these three actors – individual immigrants, the state, majority society – tend to vary 
according to specific groups of immigrants. The state’s responsibility is seen as greater in 
relation to refugees, while in the case of economic migrants it is primarily the individual who 
is supposed to take action.  
In contrast to the Norwegian discussions, in the UK it was predominantly individual 
immigrants who were expected to take responsibility and to secure their livelihood in the 
country of destination. In accordance with the visions of ‘good citizens’, it was hard-work, 
individual effort, and achievements that was expected from immigrants. Complying with the 
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ideals of liberal-leaning welfare states, participants argued for reducing the state’s 
responsibilities towards immigrants – including refugees – and favoured more restrictive 
measures in relation to economic migrants’ access to welfare. Therefore, in the UK we can 
see a more individualised approach to immigrants’ welfare deservingness and, to certain 
extent, a lower level of solidarity with both refugees and economic migrants.  
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
Discussions about immigration in the British and Norwegian DFs reveal the dominance of 
Reciprocity and Attitude as the two most important principles through which welfare 
deservingness of immigrants is thematised. This chapter shed more light on how the salience 
of these two principles changes in relation to the diversity of immigrants, as well as the 
variety of situations and circumstances that are considered. Focusing on the social practise 
of constructing the welfare deservingness of refugees and economic migrants, the analysis 
found evidence that different approaches and different (moral and practical) framings of 
welfare deservingness emerge depending on the specific groups of immigrants. 
Accordingly, the role and importance of specific deservingness criteria tends to change, 
too. These findings point at the potential pitfall of treating immigrants as a homogeneous 
group when assessing the welfare deservingness of immigrants. This also confirms the need 
to distinguish between specific groups of immigrants, as in this regard different 
considerations and different social contexts and situations are taken into account.  
The second key contribution of this chapter is that the analysis reveals and evidence the 
dynamism of attitude-formation – the changes in perceptions of welfare deservingness not 
only in relation to the specific groups of immigrants, but also how these perceptions shift 
in relation to different time dimensions. Despite the substantial differences in the way 
refugees and economic migrants are treated in the two countries under study, the DF 
discussions reveal the relevance of the time dimension: namely, how the welfare 
deservingness of refugees and economic migrants is viewed from a short- and long-term 
perspective. Moreover, the chapter also describes how perceptions of in-group needs, as 
well as visions of ‘good citizens’, provide the lenses through which the welfare deservingness 
of refugees and economic migrants is assessed.  
Besides revealing the differences in the approach to welfare deservingness of these two 
groups of immigrants, this chapter also shed light on the dynamism of attitude-formation, 
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and on how perceptions of welfare deservingness change in the light of new information and 
new considerations. The next chapter is devoted to examining these changes, but from the 




7 WHY DO INTERACTIONS MATTER IN ATTITUDE RESEARCH? 
 
The previous chapter examined the social practise of how people delineate the welfare 
deservingness of immigrants and found considerable differences in how the deservingness 
of refugees and economic migrants is assessed. Moreover, the analysis revealed that 
perceptions of refugees’ and economic migrants’ welfare deservingness tend to change in 
light of new information, and how emerging ambivalence shapes the discussion about 
immigration. Identifying such shifts in attitudes raises the question how such dynamism in 
attitude-formation unfolds in the discussions. How do interactions between participants 
shape attitudes? Furthermore, the British DF ended with a vote in favour of restrictive 
measures towards immigrants, while the Norwegian sessions ended in inclusive policy 
proposals. This difference encourages us to scrutinize the process of attitude-formation to 
better understand what mechanisms explain such differences in respect of the direction and 
outcome of the discussions. Therefore, this chapter intends to analyse the process of 
attitude-formation within groups, with particular attention to the processes of interaction 
between participants. More precisely, this chapter examines: how participants raise new 
perspectives and shift the focus of discussions; how they raise questions and respond to 
them; how they respond to and engage with other participants’ claims; and how such 
interactions – that together form a reasoned debate, a deliberation – led to agreement 
about policy proposals on the second day of the DFs. 
Although deliberation aims to involve informed and informative, balanced and 
comprehensive discussion (Fishkin and Luskin, 2005), research shows that the outcome of 
and impact of discussions on attitudes can vary depending on the nature of the 
deliberations. As highlighted in Chapter 3, the composition of groups, participants’ 
predispositions, together with the homogeneity and heterogeneity of arguments shared 
within groups can affect the direction and outcome of discussions (Grönlund et al., 2015; 
Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2007; Luskin et al., 2007; Smets and Isernia, 2014; Sunstein, 
2002). Following up on these claims, this chapter aims to complement the findings of the 
previous chapters by focusing on the processes of deliberation within the small groups in 
order to reveal the details of how the break-out groups reached agreement about 
restrictive or inclusive policy proposals in the British and Norwegian DF discussions, 
respectively (addressing RQ4). Second, it elaborates on the impact of interactions on 
attitude-formation within the groups (related to RQ3).  
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While the previous chapters examined how the institutional and social context shape the 
discussions thematically – i.e. what issues and expectations participants perceive as 
important –, this chapter argues that the institutional and social context also influence the 
development and the outcomes of discussions – i.e. how the group agrees on policy 
proposals. The chapter draws on the findings of Sunstein (2002, 2009) and Kitzinger (1994), 
who stress the relevance of distinguishing between 1) deliberation within a like-minded 
group that builds on and reinforces similar opinions and preferences; and 2) deliberation 
in a group of people that share and negotiate conflicting views. As within the DF discussions 
differences emerged between the British and Norwegian groups specifically, the central 
argument of this chapter is that the institutional and social context had a substantial impact 
on the nature of the deliberations. Consequently, the impact of the interactions also varied 
in terms of attitude-formation in the British discussions, where there was a prevailing 
preference for restrictive approaches, and in the Norwegian discussions, where participants 
reconciled competing preferences for inclusion and exclusion. The analysis finds that the 
most widely used forms of interaction – such as sharing new perspectives, contestations, 
or repeating arguments – often serve different functions and have different meanings in 
deliberation aimed at reinforcing a predefined consensus than in deliberation involving 
conflicting views. To analyse these differences in the development of discussions and 
differences in the process of attitude-formation, this chapter presents two case studies – one 
British and one Norwegian discussion about immigration. The comparative analysis aims to 
contribute both to the field of welfare-attitude research, and to research on deliberative 
methods, by showing the importance of analysing the process of deliberation and examining 
the implications of such differences for the process of attitude-formation within groups.   
 
7.1 THE RELEVANCE OF DELIBERATION  
Deliberative methods are designed to generate shifts in attitude as a result of deliberation. 
This chapter does not focus on examining concrete changes in individual participants’ 
attitudes, but is rather interested in investigating the process of attitude-formation within 
groups as a whole, and elucidating how attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion are shaped 
through social interaction. Chapter 3 already raised that DFs are based on the assumption 
that social interaction is crucial both to encouraging individuals to articulate and justify their 
opinions and attitudes, and to fostering access to new information through learning about 
others’ attitudes and arguments about topics under discussion (Chappell, 2012). Following 
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Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2007), this chapter is committed to examining attitude-
formation through the process of interaction, duly taking into account group-level processes 
and social dynamics within groups which can shape the direction and the outcome of such 
deliberation.  
The formulation of policy proposals on the second day of the DFs can be understood as the 
articulation of the group’s (deliberated) attitude to immigration and preferences for 
immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state.70 Within the analysis, agreement about policy 
proposals is treated as the outcome of deliberation. Therefore, the analysis of the process of 
attitude-formation within the group relies on an examination of the process of interaction 
through which participants reach agreement about policy proposals. The scope of the 
analysis is restricted to attitude-formation in relation to inclusive and/or exclusive 
preferences. During the analysis, we focus on key moments and shifts in the discussions that 
affected and contributed to the agreement about policy proposals. Along with the 
examination of such shifts, the analysis aims to reflect on the role of social dynamics in 
shaping the discussion and attitudes within the group. 
 
7.1.1 Why are social dynamics important for understanding the process of attitude-
formation? 
The critical role of social dynamics and the relevance of homogeneity or heterogeneity of 
views in group discussion has been already elaborated in Chapter 3 focusing on the 
methodology of this research. Social psychology literature shows that people’s engagement 
and interactions in group discussions can be considerably affected by group influence 
(Forsyth, 2010). Both informational (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Festinger, 1954) and 
normative influences (Forsyth, 2010; Isenberg, 1986; Noelle-Neumann, 1993) can foster and 
reinforce the dominance of majority opinions, which strongly act against articulation of and 
considerations of minority, competing views. Thus, reducing also the scope for potential 
attitude-formation. These risks are advanced by Sunstein (2002, 2009) drawing attention to 
group polarization as a negative effect of group dynamics on attitude-formation.  
Sunstein (2002, 2009) argues that like-mindedness and the overwhelming dominance of a 
majority opinion lead to group polarization, which means that the opinions of participants 
become more extreme than their predispositions. According to Sunstein (2002), group 
 




polarization is likely to emerge in the absence of conflicting views when participants raise 
and consider only a limited pool of arguments and their ability to recognize and to deal with 
information biases is limited. He argues that, in contrast, individuals in mixed groups in which 
heterogeneous opinions are articulated have greater scope for re-consideration of their own 
stances and potential shifts in attitudes. Thus, Sunstein’s (2002, 2009) findings stress that 
the composition of groups in terms of the homogeneity and heterogeneity of opinions has a 
crucial impact on the process and outcome of deliberation, and also on attitude-formation.  
The risk of group polarization is particularly important to consider in the autumn of 2015 
following the peak of the Refugee crisis, and amidst the contested public discourse on 
immigration and the overpoliticisation of the issue it induced throughout Europe. In this 
heightened social context, it is even more important to analyse how deliberations developed, 
to identify the emergence of majority opinions and disentangle how participants react to and 
critically engage with such dominant views. Chapter 4 elaborated on the key tendencies in 
public discourse on immigration and immigrants’ access to welfare provision and revealed 
the existence of public misperceptions. Therefore, it is of particular importance to analyse 
whether participants were able to reflect on information biases and distorted portrayals of 
immigrants during the DF discussion, and, if so, under which conditions this happened. 
 As highlighted by Sunstein (2002) and by deliberative researchers (Dryzek, 2005; Fishkin, 
2011; Luskin et al., 2007; Mansbridge, 2010) heterogeneity of views is key to minimise the 
potential negative effects of group dynamics. Therefore, deliberative methods, including 
DF, adopted specific arrangements to promote diverse and informed discussions. So far, 
studies confirmed that representative sampling, the inclusion of diverse groups of people, 
professional moderation, the provision of balanced information and the availability of 
experts during discussions can effectively reduce risks of group polarization (Farrar et al., 
2009; Grönlund et al., 2015; Himmelroos and Christensen, 2014; Luskin et al., 2007).  
However, Smets and Insernia (2014) found that impact of participants’ predispositions on 
attitude-formation tends to vary depending on the specific issue. The authors found that 
participants’ predispositions tend to be much stronger concerning controversial issues such 
as immigration. Drawing on these findings and considering the contested nature of the 
issue of immigration at the time of conducting the DFs, this chapter analyses the process 
of deliberation focusing on the effects of homogeneity and heterogeneity of views in the 
DF discussion about immigration.  
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Focusing on interactions in group discussions, Kitzinger (1994) distinguishes between 
complementary and argumentative interaction. The author argues that complementary 
interaction builds on similarity and shared identity, along with shared preferences within 
groups. Although individuals raise various views and opinions, these function primarily to 
complement, specify, and underline shared preferences. In contrast, argumentative 
interaction is based on emerging differences and the competing views of participants. 
Thus, interactions serve the purpose of convincing other participants, and reconciling 
participants’ conflicting views. As argued by Kitzinger (1994), the analysis of both types of 
interaction enriches our understanding of attitude-formation. However, these two types of 
interaction induce different forms of discussion, which affects the process of attitude-
formation, too. Adhering to Kitzinger (1994), this chapter argues that both types of 
discussions are relevant for welfare attitude research, but it is important to stress these 
differences and to analyse what circumstances contribute to these differences in the 
direction and outcome of discussions.  
 
7.1.2 Interactions within DF discussions 
Analysis of the process of attitude-formation was carried out through the examination of 
interactions within DF discussions – distinguishing between ‘agreement’ and ‘disagreement’, 
‘New perspective’, ‘Contestation’, and ‘Repetition of previously raised new perspective’ as 
the specific forms of interaction.71 The initial expectation was that attitude-formation would 
be significantly influenced by the use of specific forms of interaction – e.g. frequent use of 
contestations or disagreements would induce greater shifts in the discussion. However, the 
analysis of interactions revealed that group processes within the discussions tended to be 
dominant and the functions of specific forms of interactions and their impact on attitude-
formation tended to vary depending on the nature of discussions. In other words, it is argued 
that the functions and impact of specific forms of interaction differed in the case of the 
complementary interactions characteristic of the British discussions, and the argumentative 
interactions characteristic of the Norwegian discussions (Kitzinger, 1994). 
 
71 For a more detailed description of these specific codes, please see Chapter 3 - Section 3.4.1.  
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Figure 18 - Share of different forms of interaction in discussion about immigration 
 
Notes: The chart illustrates the number of references to Immigration according to the specific forms of interaction 
coded. As whole references were coded, there may be overlaps in coding if within one reference different forms 
of interactions were identified. 
 
As depicted in Figure 18, discussion about immigration (including the debates on Day 1 and 
Day 2) in Norway and in the UK display very similar patterns in terms of the use of specific 
forms of interaction. The debates about immigration show the important role of ‘New 
perspective’ (41% and 36% of all references to immigration in the British and Norwegian 
discussions, respectively), suggesting that participants raised and exchanged various views 
and information on immigration. The dominant role of ‘Contestation’ (23% and 22% of all 
references to immigration in the British and Norwegian discussions, respectively) also 
underlines the fact that participants did challenge and question each other, thus contributing 
to the diversity of views discussed during the debates. The frequent use of ‘Repeating’ (19% 
and 24% of all references to immigration in the British and Norwegian discussions, 
respectively) shows that participants tended to return to previously shared views and raise 
the same arguments. While the findings presented in Figure 18 imply that both the British 
and the Norwegian discussions involved the same process of raising and considering various 
perspectives, the analysis finds substantial differences in terms of how the specific forms 
of interaction influenced the development of discussions and what meanings and functions 
these specific forms of interaction took within the DF debates. This means that, for 
instance, repetition served a different function in a context where the homogeneity of views 
as repeating previously raised arguments further strengthened the overwhelming 
consensus. In contrast, repetition might not have been as effective at shaping attitudes in a 
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The main line of division between the interactions in the British and Norwegian debates 
relates to the level of homogeneity or heterogeneity of articulated views and preferences in 
the groups. In line with Kitzinger’s (1994) distinction, in the British discussions emerged a 
very firm overall preference for controlling immigration and restricting immigrants’ access 
to welfare. As a result of the emerging consensus the British interactions fulfilled primarily 
complementary functions. While interactions raised new arguments and new perspectives 
about the issue of immigration, these interactions complemented, underlined, and 
reinforced earlier established preferences for restrictive measures. In contrast, in Norway 
we can observe a more contested debate about immigration in which the scope of 
discussions was not restricted to one specific approach. Thus, in the Norwegian debates we 
can identify argumentative interaction with greater shifts between inclusive and exclusive 
measures. 
In line with these differences between the use of complementary and argumentative 
interaction, we can identify distinctive effects on the process of discussions and on attitude-
formation in the British and Norwegian DFs. To elaborate on the process of discussions and 
attitude-formation, two case studies were selected for the purpose of elucidating 
deliberation about one Norwegian and one British policy proposal for immigration. Both case 
studies focus on policy proposals that were unanimously supported by all participants in the 
Afternoon Plenary Session. The unanimous support is important as it signals the collective 
recognition of the significance of the specific issue and the proposed measure across all 
breakout groups.  
 
7.1.3 The relevance of the institutional and social context 
Both case studies selected for analysis focus on discussions touching upon expectations 
related to the deservingness principles of Reciprocity and Attitude as key constituents of the 
visions of ‘good immigrants’. Chapter 5 elaborated on the differences in the understanding 
of these deservingness principles in these two countries and how these perceptions are 
shaped by the institutional and social context. As discussions about two unanimously 
supported policy proposals were selected for the case studies, these differences in 
understanding are relevant for the current analysis as well. However, this chapter argues 
that the effects of the institutional and social context are not limited to shaping the DF 
discussions thematically through agenda-setting, perceptions of the salience of the issue, or 
conceptualisations of ‘good citizens’. The analysis finds that the institutional and social 
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context influenced the development of the discussions, too. Considering the relevance of 
the pressure to conform in small group discussions, the institutional and social context can 
considerably shape group norms in relation to how immigration is talked about, what is 
considered a socially acceptable attitude to immigration, and what the desirable measures 
are for dealing with immigration. Through such influences the institutional and the social 
context can set the framework for the discussion, implying that specific opinions and 
reasoning are correct and socially acceptable (Forsyth, 2010). Accordingly, it is argued that 
liberal-leaning welfare institutions that emphasise individualism and a higher level of 
selectivity of welfare provision, together with the salient public discourse on welfare 
dependency and immigration, pre-determined the restrictive and selective perceptions 
about immigrants’ access to welfare benefits and services that emerged in the debates. 
Furthermore, the recent changes in immigration policies designed to limit non-EU 
immigration (as adopted by the Coalition Government)72 also reinforced restrictive measures 
as an unquestionable preference in all three British groups. In Norway, the social democratic 
welfare system which stresses universalism, a strong sense of collectivity as an ideal, and, 
accordingly, the shared responsibilities of the state, society, and the individual, and the 
centrality of the value of (and efforts to) reduce social inequalities drove participants in 
the discussions to consider more pro-active, inclusive measures for enhancing the 
integration of immigrants. However, perceptions of the growing immigrant population in 
Oslo, where the DF took place, an awareness of cultural differences and a strong nationally 
framed welfare identity, also pushed the discussions towards more protective measures and 
preferences for defining requirements for adapting to Norwegian society.  
Taking into account these institutional features, it is not surprising that in the UK the 
introduction of a selective immigration system and in Norway a proposal for language and 
employment requirements gained the support of all participants. Therefore, this chapter 
investigates the Norwegian Red Group’s discussion on language and employment 
requirements and the British Orange Group’s discussion about a selective immigration 
system. The Norwegian case study was chosen to analyse how the group coped with the 
reconciliation of clashing views about the visions of ‘good immigrants’. The British case study 
represents a discussion in which there was an overwhelming consensus about the preferred 
approach from the beginning to the end of the debate, but interactions between participants 
were key to clarifying concerns and to specifying and justifying their preferences and 
 
72 The recent policy developments are described in Chapter 4 – Section 4.3.1.3  
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priorities. The following sections are devoted to an analysis of the interactions to scrutinize 
the role and impact of interactions on attitude-formation. 
 
7.2 CASE STUDY 1: EXPECTATIONS OF RECIPROCITY AND ATTITUDE AND IN-GROUP 
NEEDS – A DISCUSSION OF PREFERENCES FOR CONTROLLED IMMIGRATION IN THE 
BRITISH DF 
Concerns about losing control over immigration and preferences for a restrictive approach 
to immigration widely resonated in the British DF discussions across all three breakout 
groups. As the issue was discussed on Day 1, participants were already familiar with the topic 
and a more focused discussion could develop on Day 2. Moreover, the issue was debated in 
the Day 1 Afternoon Plenary Session, thus further strengthening the overall consensus about 
the need for restrictions which might have contributed to the homogeneity of opinions 
within the groups, including the Orange group.  
This case study aims to investigate the process of discussions of the Orange group – 
especially focusing on the sections when participants deliberated about immigration control 
immigration and agreed on the following policy proposal:  
“Cap immigration, set a kind of points system, as such, of who you want in the country. And then to 
review that, if they're in this country bringing a skill, if they're unemployed for a long period of time, 
reviewing that in the unemployment stage. The rationale is to bring in skill sets and to bring in skilled 
workers, and to review their influence on the country that's actually affecting the income to the country.”  
 
The cited policy proposal clearly defines controlled immigration, which is constituted of the 
phase of selection and review, stressing the country’s sovereignty to decide who is needed. 
As participants discuss the key principles for selection, they also delineate the criteria for 
inclusion, reconciling In-group needs, and expectations of Reciprocity and Attitude.   
 
7.2.1 The process of discussions leading to the formulation of the policy proposal 
The deliberation represents a complex picture of how and why British participants prefer a 
more regulated immigration system. During the debate, economic arguments dominated the 
discussion and restrictive measures were supported to reduce the cost of immigration, a 
situation which can be associated with the heightened public discourse on immigration and 
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immigrants’ misuse of welfare benefits.73 Due to the high level of homogeneity of opinions 
in the group, there were no significant turning points in the discussion. This homogeneity of 
views also emerged in the survey conducted before the start of the DF discussions. Seven 
out of 11 participants stated that immigrants should work and pay taxes for at least one year 
before accessing benefits,74 raising concerns about potential group polarization according to 
Sunstein's (2002) findings.  
Throughout the analysis, specific attention is devoted to examining interactions between 
participants that generate shifts in the discussion. The analysed debate includes 127 
references and is divided into four sections, which are investigated one-by-one highlighting 
some of the key features of how participants interacted. For each section, the flow of 
discussions is illustrated, showing all the references made by the participants during the 
discussion analysed in the case study. The visualisation (see Diagram 5) indicates the specific 
forms of interaction, and the reaction it triggered (written in the arrows that connect the 
references). Furthermore, the illustrations show whether the reference makes a stand for 
inclusive or restrictive preferences and the shifts between inclusive and exclusive stances. 
Last, the illustrations also indicate the specific deservingness criteria specified by participants 
as a condition of inclusion or exclusion.  
 
7.2.1.1 Section 1: Need for immigration control – the limited role of disagreement 
Early in the debate, the group arrived at the assumption that there is a need to cut down on 
immigration and the group started to elaborate on why the immigration control and 
assessment of immigrants is needed. As the discussion developed, the group considered 
various perspectives and differentiated between working and non-working migrants as well 
as people in crisis and migrants who misuse the benefit system. Still, most of the arguments 
were ultimately raised as justification for controlling immigration and assessing immigrants, 
thereby prioritizing In-group needs.  
As depicted in Diagram 5, participants focused on restrictive stances, with preferences for 
inclusion emerging only in relation to refugees. However, the discussion soon shifted back to 
 
73 The key trends in public discourse on immigration and welfare use are scrutinized in Chapter 4 – 
Section 4.3.1.3 and 4.3.2.1.3 
74 Out of the remaining four participants, two did not answer the question, one participant stated a 
preference for requiring one year with or without employment and one participant prefered not to 
permit access to welfare benefits at all. 
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more restrictive preferences. Disagreements and counter-arguments were not effective to 
change the overall path of the discussions.  
At the early stage of the debate, disagreement emerged. However, as the following quoted 
section of the discussion shows, the reaction to it completely annulled the impact of the 
disagreement. 
Quotation 1 – Orange group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 5) 
 
P90: People are coming in and the UK has open doors for everybody, whoever wants to come 
here they just come in and that’s about it. EU national  [Inaudible] the majority of people 
coming here [inaudible] how many… 
 
P84: Well, no, it’s only a third.  It’s a third.  I was surprised by that because I thought it would 
be higher than that but in the EU itself it’s a third of immigrants are from the EU and they’re 
coming here to work. 
 P90: But how many of them are actually working?  That’s the question. 
 
P84: I mean, for me the big thing with that is if you haven’t worked in England for two, three, 
five years you’re not entitled to any benefits from the UK. 
 
P90: It is in place but the government is not actually following those rules because whoever is 
coming to the UK as an international has three months to get work.  If you’re inactive within 
three months you should leave the country. 
 
  
Participant 84’s disagreement is significant, as using the previously provided information 
package75 he corrected a very common misperception about the share of EU immigrants in 
the UK.76 While this correction opened the possibility to reflect on such misperceptions, 
Participant 90’s reaction shifted the attention, stressing employment and implicitly raising 
the issue of immigrants’ unemployment. Participant 84’s response confirms the common 
understanding of such implicit reference and perceptions about the issue of unemployed 
immigrants as he argued for conditional access to welfare. The discussion continued with 
participants elaborating on the reasons for immigration control, including the governments’ 
inactivity regarding the enforcement of rules. 
 
75 Before Day 2, participants received an information package that included statistics about key social 
issues. Details on the provision of information packages is elaborated in Chapter 3 – Section 3.3.1.4. 
The information package provided to British participants is available in Appendix 1 
76 Misperceptions concerning immigration in the UK are discussed in Chapter 4 – Section 4.1 
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Diagram 5 - Visualisation of the process of discussion - UK, Orange Group - Section 1.1 
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Diagram 6 - Visualisation of the process of discussion - UK, Orange Group - Section 1.2
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As the discussion developed, the common understanding and vision of ‘good immigrants’ as 
contributing and working immigrants was further strengthened. Participant 89’s statement 
on the need to differentiate refugees – “people in crisis” – from immigrants misusing the 
welfare system brought about a change in the debate, as Quotation 2 and Diagram 6 show.  
 
Quotation 2 – Orange group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 6) 
 
P89: But it’s two different immigration system if you look at it because you have people who 
are running from torture and killing.  Then you have people just coming because of the easy 
life and [inaudible] the benefits. So the government need to look at the people in crisis what 
are we doing to help them?  How are we going to help them?  How are we going to help them 
when they come and then help them to go back and live decent lives…? 
 P90: They’re in crisis.  It’s not the usual… 
 
P89: Yes, I know that’s what I’m trying to say there’s two immigration.  That’s the crisis thing 
but the people who are just coming over because they can come because they can go to the 
doctor now, they can get this, they can get that, that’s the bit…  [Inaudible] you do 
assessment so we’ve got 10,000 people coming over in the next two years, three years, do 
assessment, assess these people.  What are their skills, [inaudible]?  Who is good for the 
country, who’s not good because [voices overlapping].  You’ve got to assess people. 
 
P90: And that’s the [inaudible] how to help you?  UK is trying to help you thinking, how am I 
going to help you, but these people [inaudible].  If you’re coming over [inaudible] horrible 
situation and we should help these people but in ten years’ time these people will be here 
sitting on their arses, my apologies for that, and then she’s going to claim the benefits 
because this is how [inaudible] how to provide you.  No, you’re coming over, you assess and 
whether you are actually a refugee what is the chance of you returning to your country or not 
and if you stay [inaudible] so they can bring profit to the country. 
 
Participant 89 and Participant 90 articulated ambivalent attitudes – both sharing support for 
and concern about refugees. However, both ended up by arguing for the need for 
assessments and prioritising in-group needs in the selection process. Thus, their stances 
further deepened the economic approach to immigrants and stressed the limits to moral 
and humanitarian reasons for helping.  
As shown in both quotations, participants often employed differentiations which allowed 
them to reflect not only on why immigrants should be excluded, but also what qualifies 
immigrants for inclusion. Thus, such differentiations provided a means of articulating 
ambivalences and reflecting on the complexity of the issue, which could have widened the 
pool of arguments within the debates. However, the effect of these arguments was 
dependent on other participants’ reactions – i.e. how other participants responded to and 
engaged with these claims (Goodin, 2000). The fact that these reactions usually followed-up 
on negative phenomena reinforced the homogeneity within the group and thus step-by-step 
validated the consensus about the need to control immigration.  
 186 
 
7.2.1.2 Section 2: agreement about capping immigration  
Section 2 opened with the Moderator’s question about the issue of ageing population. 
However, the discussion revealed that concerns about population growth outweighed 
concerns about an ageing population. This indicates that within this group the argument that 
immigrants – as members of an active labour force (and as care-providers) – can help to 
reduce the negative effects of an ageing population was not considered at all. On the 
contrary, immigration was perceived as a threat. Therefore, participants proposed and 
debated the need to introduce an immigration cap, which also meant that the discussion 
focused on restrictive measures, as depicted in Diagram 1. As captured in Quotation 3, the 
perception of immigration as a threat was further strengthened in light of the uncertainty 
about how immigration would develop and how the population would grow. This uncertainty 
also increased the perceptions of participants about losing control over immigration and 
justified the need for capping immigration.  
Quotation 3 – Orange group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 7) 
  
P84: We said 10 million today but I saw a report two days ago that said it was going to be 20 
million.  So 85 million people will be here by 2040. 
  
P89: They project ten million and then they said they’re extending it just in case they have 
babies, they bring in extra family, so it’s 20 million. 
 
P83: But it’s getting so out of control.  This is where they need to have a cap on the 
population.  There has to be a general idea in terms of what is our population figure?  What 
can be sustained and how do we sustain that?  So there has to be a cap in place. 
  
P84: You can’t have an open borders policy which we have got within the EU and then cap it.  
You can’t.  You can’t have both. 
 
The contestations of participants highlighted the formal barriers to proposed policy, such as 
Participant 84 stressing the incompatibility of EU free-movement regulations and an 
immigration cap (raised twice in Section 2). However, none of the contestations opposed the 
proposal for capping immigration. Therefore, the group’s support for restrictions was not 
challenged. The absence of counter-arguments and the missed opportunity to discuss the 
more positive side of immigration – e.g. how immigrants could help the country to deal with 
the challenges of an aging population – reveals the one-dimensionality of the discussion. 
Furthermore, it underlines Sunstein’s (2002) claim that homogeneity within groups makes it 
difficult to identify and challenge potential biases in opinions.  
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Diagram 7 - Visualisation of the process of discussion - UK, Orange Group - Section 2.1 
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Diagram 8 - Visualisation of the process of discussion - UK, Orange Group - Section 2.2 
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7.2.1.3 Section 3: Immigration cap and gaining control over immigration 
Following up on the proposed immigration cap, participants raised the need to differentiate 
between specific groups of immigrants. Quotation 4 shows the role of contestations and the 
role of using examples in facilitating the discussion and requiring participants to specify their 
views and preferences.  
Quotation 4 – Orange group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 9) 
 M: So in terms of policy in 2040 we want to cap net migration per year. 
 P84: I think there’s two things.  I think it’s EU and non-EU, I think. 
 
P89: That’s what I’m saying, the refugees and EU people because it’s going to be a problem 
somewhere along the line. 
 
M: What about the people who are non-EU that aren’t refugees?  So like nurses from the 
Philippines? 
 P84: Well, that’s massive issue, isn’t it? 
 P85: You can’t… 
 
P90: For immigration this is quite strict they go through various assessments, they need to 
provide various documentation.  I think the biggest issue is actually with the EU nationals 
because there is no limits, no control or nothing.  They can just come and do whatever they 
want to so maybe just put more focus on the actual EU nationals, check who is working, who’s 
not working, how long have they been unemployed, whether they are actually coming here 
for work or whatever they’re coming [voices overlapping]. 
 P88: They need to have a job ready for them when they come here and that is possible. 
 P90: That could be or give them a limit like if [inaudible]. 
 
P88: If you got rid everybody from the Philippines there would be nobody in the hospitals, 
would there? 
 
Both the use of differentiation and the use of examples prompted participants to specify why 
people are more concerned about EU migration than about non-EU migration. Clarifying 
these differences helped participants to define how to gain control over immigration. As 
shown in Diagram 9, participants again stressed employment and In-group needs (for a 
skilled labour force) as the key criteria qualifying immigrants for inclusion. However, the 
focus of the discussion shifted from annual reviews and limits on who should enter the 
country to the need to monitor EU migrants living in the country to check whether they 
fulfil expectations.  
In Section 3 it was rather the Moderator who raised questions and tried to confront 
participants. However, these contestations were not effective enough to change the focus 
of discussion away from prevailing preferences for immigration control. Therefore, as the 




Diagram 9 – Visualisation of discussion about immigration - UK, Orange Group - Section 3   
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7.2.1.4 Section 4: The benefits of immigration 
In the second half of the discussion, the Moderator once again raised the issue of an ageing 
population, specifying the need for a larger active-age labour force and trying to challenge 
what implications the proposed immigration cap might have.  
Quotation 5 – Orange group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 10) 
 
M: […] So we’ve got a very small gap here which is people 59, 16 of working age.  So if 
you’re going to have loads and loads of old people, a shrinking gap here of people that 
naturally pay tax to support them how is capping immigration…I know they’re coming to 
jobs where there are jobs but if you’ve got lots of people coming in perhaps not for a 
specific job but they might come, they might set up a shop.  They might hire three people.  
They might create more employment.  What is capping it going to do in terms of restricting 
that?  Is that going to create a problem? 
 
P89: No, but why you’re capping it?  You’re capping it to [inaudible]. So every time you cap it 
if you have 10,000 people, [inaudible].  You’ve got to find a way to, it’s turning a wheel 
around. So it’s like us sitting there and not moving.  It’s moving so 5,000 people who don’t 
do anything. 
 
M: So with this policy and the cap how often should that be reviewed?  That should form 
part of the policy. 
 P89: Yearly. 
 P85: [Inaudible]. 
 P89: Yearly will do. 
 
P87: The more people you have in the country, they need to eat.  They need to have…they 
need clothes.  They need education of course and they will need somewhere to live 
therefore will that not benefit the building trade, the food suppliers whatever, all that.  They 
create a need for more of all of that. 
 
P84: I think none of us have got an argument with the fact that if somebody comes into 
England or Great Britain or whatever and starts work, pays their taxes, pays their dues, 
shops in England, buys a house, rents a house, we haven’t got a problem with that.  What 
we’ve got a problem with is… 
 P85: Freeloaders. 
 P84: …people coming and… 
 P85: Not contributing. 
 
P84: …absolutely so if they contribute welcome them in.  I mean to us we’ve always had that 
policy in England where we’ve let x amount of people in to do x.  As long as they’re working 
and contributing to the society they’re living in. 
 
The Moderator’s emphasis on different forms of immigrants’ economic activities and 
contributions gave rise to considerations about the positive side of immigration. First, 
Participant 87 elaborated on positive economic effects. Participant 84, in cooperation with 
Participant 85, contrasted economically active immigrants with “freeloaders”. This 
differentiation between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ immigrants reinforced the economically framed 
conditions of inclusion and the individual’s role in terms of their contribution to the economy 
in various forms. Furthermore, it underlined the consensus about the need for selective 
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Diagram 11 - Visualisation of discussion about immigration - UK, Orange Group - Section 4.2 
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measures that would allow in only those migrants who contribute, and to be stricter towards 
less economically promising migrants. 
This very strong economic understanding of immigration is further reflected in the responses 
to the Moderator’s question on the earlier raised costs of immigration. These primarily 
concerned the need to develop the infrastructure to meet the increased demand for 
services. Quotation 6 show how perceptions of limited capacities are used to justify the 
need for the immigration cap and adjusting immigration cap to the state’s capacities to 
provide the required services.  
Quotation 6 - Orange group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (See the highlighted section in Diagram 11) 
 M: So in terms of the government policy what should they do?  Twenty-forty, we’ve got 74 
million people what should the…? 
 P80: Well, that’s where they need to look at how many they’re letting in to how much they’re 
going to have to… 
 From now. 
 
P80: If they say we’re going to bring 20 people in you’ve got to build something.  So those 20 
people are already going to cost us x amount of money because we need to school them so 
they need to look at their costs against what they’re letting in as well. 
 P84: The big problem is that we need to spend money today that we’re not going to recoup… 
 
As depicted in Diagram 10, we can identify a change in the discussion, whereby participants 
extended their understanding of ‘good immigrants’. However, even these more positive and 
inclusive arguments tended to be limited to a discussion of economic benefits. This economic 
framing of the issue shows the limits of the discussion in the Orange group and the 
minimization of social and cultural aspects. The salience of economic considerations may 
also reflect the normative influences that led to the perception that only economic 
arguments are socially acceptable to be raised in the debate.  
To sum up, attitudes and opinions articulated throughout the debate show a high level of 
consistency within the group. There were no clashes of views or significant turning points in 
the discussion. This cohesion allowed the participants to elaborate why they wanted to 
restrict immigrants and how they wanted to achieve this. However, it also limited the 
discussion to one dimension; namely, to restrictive and selective policies. As shown in the 
analysis, there were various opportunities to consider other features of and other 
approaches to immigration. Nonetheless, the discussion always returned to justifying the 
need for controlling immigration. Therefore, the scope of attitude-formation tended to be 
limited and raised the risks of group polarization. Sometimes, the Moderator took on the 
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role of sharing dissenting views by adding in questions about the aging population or Non-
European, non-refugee migrants such as Filipino nurses. While this questioning tended to lie 
outside the remit of the rather passive role of a typical moderator, it can be understood as 
the Moderator’s attempt to give voice to dissenting views. Moreover, we must acknowledge 
that the Moderator’ questions helped to deepen the discussions and clarify the group’s 
preferences.  
We cannot ignore the relevance of the pressure for conformity within the small group 
discussions: the fact that only those participants became engaged in the discussion who 
tended to agree with the consensus. In the Orange group the involvement of participants 
tended to vary greatly. Four participants (Participant 81, Participant 82, Participant 86 and 
Participant 87) made less than five references during the debate. These four participants 
were the least active in the DF overall. While these participants’ silence needs to be taken 
into account, only in the case of Participant 87 do we suspect the participant of having 
dissenting views, but feeling deterred from articulating them in the group. Participant 87 
made only one pro-immigration reference in the discussion under analysis, which was shared 
after the Moderator’s attempt to direct the discussion to the more positive side of 
immigration. 
The Orange group’s debate shows the dominance of economic considerations. The reasons 
and justification for introducing the immigration cap and the annual review system relied 
almost exclusively on economic considerations. While participants stressed what kind of 
achievements and behaviour they expected from immigrants, there was complete silence 
about whether ‘good immigrants’ are or should be integrated into society, whether the state 
should facilitate integration (as something that can increase the overall benefits of 
immigration to the country). Only restrictions were considered in order to maximise the 
benefits of immigration and allowing only resourceful migrants to enter and stay in the UK. 
While participants shared different views and often ambivalent positions about immigration, 
in relation to policy preferences there seemed to be a pre-existing consensus. Considering 
the salience of the issue of immigration in the public discourse, the political framing of the 
latest immigration policy changes (since 2010), the institutional features of the liberal-
leaning welfare state towards individualism and the selective approaches, the acceptance of 
social inequality within society – these social influences underline a consensus towards 
restrictive policy preferences. The fact that this consensus emerged in all three breakout 
group discussions further strengthens the assumption that the institutional and social 
context substantially shaped the process of discussions, and consequently, attitude-
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formation. While in the British debates, measures facilitating inclusion that would support 
immigrants to become ‘good immigrants’ were not considered, integration was much more 
at the centre of the Norwegian discussion, as the following case study shows. 
 
7.3 CASE STUDY 2: EXPECTATIONS ABOUT RECIPROCITY AND ATTITUDE – DISCUSSION 
OF LANGUAGE SKILLS AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE NORWEGIAN DF 
In contrast with the predominance of economic arguments in the British discussion, the 
Norwegian participants shared both culturally and economically framed expectations about 
immigrants. In terms of learning the Norwegian language and obtaining a better 
understanding of Norwegian culture and society was a topic of all breakout groups and the 
latter achievements were deemed important characteristics of ‘good immigrants’. 
Furthermore, policy recommendations about language learning and cultural integration 
were unanimously supported by all participants in the Afternoon Plenary Session. The Red 
Group discussed language requirements the most extensively. Therefore, this case study 
analyses their discussion and the process leading to the formulation of this policy proposal:  
“Linguistic and cultural integration of immigrants through mandatory Norwegian language courses, 
requirements for work and self-sufficiency for economic migrants”.  
The wording of the policy proposal itself indicates some of the key points of the analysis of 
welfare deservingness – specifically, expectations related to Reciprocity and Attitude.  
 
7.3.1 The process of discussions leading to the formulation of the policy proposal 
In the Red Group, discussion about the relation between language skills and employment 
was only briefly debated on Day 1. In contrast to the British case study, where a firm 
consensus about the policy preferences was present from the beginning, the Red Group had 
a more contested debate concerning expectations about immigrants. Thus, agreement about 
policy proposals was reached through deliberation about participants’ competing views and 
priorities. The competing views primarily concerned finding the right balance between 
economic and cultural requirements for inclusion. Therefore, the debate included several 
turning points during which participants needed to negotiate their positions about 
conditions of inclusion and exclusion. In comparison to the British case study, the 




The heterogeneity of opinions among the participants is also underlined by the results of the 
pre-deliberation survey. Out of ten participants, four participants preferred the condition of 
at least one year of employment and tax payments, while two participants required 
citizenship, and two participants preferred immediate access to welfare benefits and 
services. The remaining two participants chose the “Don’t know” response. Through the 
deliberation, the shifts and turning points in the discussion reveal how ambivalence and 
divisions emerged about the criteria of inclusion/exclusion. The analysed debate is formed 
of 75 references and is divided into five sections, which will be examined one-by-one. 
 
7.3.1.1 Section 1 – agreement about the centrality of language learning 
From the beginning of the debate, language and culture were specified as among the 
priorities in relation to immigration. These preferences are in line with Norwegian 
immigration policies that put an emphasis on activation and integration programmes, 
including long-term language courses.77 Throughout the debate, language comprehension 
was considered both as a means for inclusion and for exclusion.   
Participant 9 was the first to take a very explicit stance, arguing why the requirement of 
learning the Norwegian language is more important and why language courses should 
precede any offer of economic support to immigrants.  
Quotation 7 – Red group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 12) 
 
M: Should there be different demands like you say? Benefits like teaching when talking about 
foreign workers or refugees? 
 
P9: We do have restrictions with for example work assessment allowance. Very specific 
though. But I think we should make more restrictions for the immigrants too. More than 
today. Maybe work assessment allowance is a bad example, but request that they go to 
Norwegian classes for example. The first thing you encounter when you come here is how 
things are, and if you aren’t prepared in any way, it is of little help that you get money to get 
started, when you have no idea of how society works to make use of those means. 
 Language and culture first. 
 P9: I think so. 
 More people agreeing. 
 
Participant 9’s argument is based on contrasting immigrants’ need for economic support 
and need for learning the language and learning about the culture of the majority society. 
The argument convinced the group and thus broad agreement unfolded about the centrality 
 
77 For further details, please see Chapter 4 – Section 4.3.1 
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of language and culture, as indicated in Diagram 12. This agreement defined the ground for 
a deeper discussion about language and culture. 
  
7.3.1.2 Section 2 - The challenge of defining the threshold of language requirements 
In line with the preliminary consensus, Section 2 further elaborates on the relevance of 
Norwegian language skills regarding the conceptualisation of ‘good immigrants’. Although 
Participant 1 attempted to shift the discussion to economic considerations, this suggestion 
was declined by Participant 11. Instead, Participant 11 formulated a restrictive suggestion 
(see Diagram 13) to require immigrants to pass a language exam as a condition of inclusion. 
However, this triggered objections within the group as Quotation 8 shows.  
 
Quotation 8 – Red group, Day 2 – discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 13) 
 
M: Many of you have mentioned request for activity. Should this be included under language 
and culture, or is it a new bullet point? 
 
P11: New bullet point. It doesn’t make sense otherwise. Mandatory Norwegian course, passed 
within a year or something.  
 P5: It has to be clear enough and be determined. That you have to pass.  
 P8: But I don’t like deporting people just because they failed Norwegian class. 
 Laughter. 
 P1: But be able to show that you have attended and participated and know something.  
 P11: There is a difference between refugees and economic immigrants, though.  
 P8: If there is a difference, then I completely agree. 
 M: Do we make different demands here now, for the different immigrants?  
 
P1: If you are to live in Norway, you have to know some Norwegian no matter where you 
come from.  
 
P11: Legally there is a difference between residence permit and work permit in the country, 
to become a Norwegian citizen. 
 
P1: I don’t think it should be a difference in language demand in those points. Even if you stay 
in Norway for a longer period of time, I think you should know some Norwegian. 
 P8: And what do we do with them if they don’t? Send them back to death?  
 
P1: No, but I think they should prove that they have attended Norwegian classes and know a 
little at least, even if it isn’t perfect. 
 P8: But what if they don’t?  
 
P9: I agree with you, but at the same time I believe everyone can learn something at some 
level. The hard part is deciding what counts as passed. That is the actual discussion. 
 
Quotation 8 demonstrates the central role of contestations (see Participant 8’s references) 
and the responses given to them in pushing the discussion further. As participants continued 
elaborating on the specificities of the requirements, they framed their arguments in a more 
practical manner – focusing on the length of stay, and on decreasing the requirements to the 
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minimum level of language comprehension. This shows that participants used more practical 
and simple arguments to convince others. Still, within the discussion tension arose about the 
potential consequences of non-compliance, primarily for refugees.  
In Section 2, competing views unfolded regarding the required level of language 
comprehension. Counter-arguments relied primarily on warnings about the potential 
consequences of non-compliance. Through these differences in opinions, participants faced 
the challenge and potential limits of defining an appropriate level of language 
comprehension as key criteria for inclusion, which may have contributed to the shift in the 
debate to economic considerations.  
 
7.3.1.3 Section 3 - Shift from cultural to economic considerations 
The third part of the discussion was marked by the first key turning point in the discussion, 
which reflected on the clash between two visions of ‘good immigrants’ – good immigrants as 
defined in cultural terms, and good immigrants conceived in economic terms. Therefore, this 
section focuses on the interactions that led to the turning point and how the group reacted 
and dealt with the disagreement. 
 
Quotation 9 – Red group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 14) 
 
P6: At the same time there are many jobs in which you don’t have to communicate in 
Norwegian. IT and such, should they also learn Norwegian?  
 
P1: You still live in Norway and go shopping in a Norwegian shop, then you should know how 
to say “I would like two plastic bags, please”  
 P6: You can say it in English. 
 P1: Yes, but this is Norway, right. 
 P6: But are you going to throw them out? 
 
P9: My point is not that you say “Hello, good bye”, but to learn the language is an important 
part of the culture, and kind of the same if you speak Norwegian, English, Urdu to be here. 
 
As depicted in Quotation 9, Participant 6 contested the issue of language requirements by 
drawing attention to jobs that do not demand Norwegian language skills, bringing 
considerations about immigrants’ employment back into the discussion. While the former’s 
question extended the practical approach to language as means of communication, it 
triggered nationally framed responses from other participants. Diagram 14 illustrates how 
these interactions – contestations and specifications – triggered shifts between more 
inclusive and more restrictive stances.  
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Diagram 12 - Illustration of discussion about immigration – NO, Red Group, Section 1 
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Diagram 13 - Visualization of discussion about immigration – NO, Red Group, Section 2 































































































































































Building on and showing support for such claims, Participant 11 repeated his earlier 
suggestion of requiring economic migrants to pass a language test. However, Participant 11’s 
rather radical proposal induced disagreement and led to the first turning point in the 
discussion:  
Quotation 10 - Red group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 14) 
 
P11: I am willing to go as far as to say that if you are an economic immigrant, but fail the test, 
you can’t be here. 
 
P10: I am against that actually. If you are an engineer from the US and come to Norway to 
work, and you communicate just fine in English. I mean, English is taking over more and more. 
English will take over in the end. I don’t think they should be punished for not learning 
Norwegian because they offer new knowledge to our society. 
 
P11: But we are talking about something else. About economic immigrants who have as 
purpose to settle down and work in the country, not temporary labour-… a difference 
between temporary and to work in a country. 
 10: Now I follow. 
 P5: If you come here and have decided to stay here, I think that has to be a condition. 
 
P11: If you are a citizen of the EU the only demand is that you have to be able to support 
yourself. 
 
P8: I think the request should be for the whole world. If you come from Africa, but support 
yourself and have a nice job, I feel it is weird to throw them out. If they pay tax, work, have a 
social life. 
 M: Regardless of the time limit? 
 
P8: The problem is those who come here and just enjoy the benefits without contributing. 
That problem need be stopped. I don’t see any problem with those who contribute, but don’t 
speak Norwegian.  
 
Through the last couple of interactions that included contestations, disagreement, and new 
perspectives, the discussion about language requirements completely turned around and 
economic considerations – skills, knowledge and expertise, employment and contribution – 
prevailed as conditions of inclusion as shown in Diagram 13. With the example of a US 
engineer, Participant 10 clearly distinguished his stance that involved prioritising economic 
considerations and in-group needs (for highly skilled people) – thereby taking an economic 
approach to the vision of ‘good immigrants’. In response, Participant 11 tried to clarify his 
suggestion, stressing long-term stay and the aim of settling down in the country, but then 
raised the criteria of self-sufficiency. In response, Participant 8 proposed to extend this 
criterion to all economic migrants. The comparison of non-contributing migrants and 
contributing migrants who do not speak Norwegian turned the focus of the discussion from 





7.3.1.4 Section 4 – Focus on the employment of immigrants and on the connection 
between language and employment 
In Section 4 the discussion turned to concerns about non-contribution and welfare use, 
shifting the focus to expectations about employment. The analysis elaborates how language 
requirements re-emerge, revealing another point of connection between employment and 
language skills.  
First, focusing on the issue of the non-contribution of immigrants – specifically asylum-
seekers and refugees in this specific case, the debate shifts to the conditions of accessing 
welfare benefits without making a contribution. As shown below, language skills were raised 
again as a prerequisite for accessing welfare benefits and framed as means of restricting 
immigrants’ access to welfare. However, reading Quotation 11, we can observe another 
example of competing views. While Participant 10 thought the requirement of language skills 
would delay the labour market involvement of refugees. Participant 11 argued that language 
is the foundation of finding employment, shedding light on the perceived link between 
language and employment.  
 
Quotation 11 - Red group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 15) 
 
M: Do you think that they have to attend this course first, and then they get their residence 
permit, or that it is withdrawn if you aren’t good enough or fail to pass a test? 
 Laughter. 
 P1: I guess to pass the test to get the permit, if not it’s a little backwards. 
 
P10: Then we will have even more asylum seekers waiting for even longer in the reception 
centres, I believe. If everyone has to… they can’t start anything unless they have passed the 
Norwegian course.  
 
P11: That is a problem today too. Many of those who sit there don’t have a need for asylum, 
no need to stay in Norway. Then you can regard them as economic immigrants instead. 
Should they be allowed to stay? 
 
P10: Then we need more trips, like Norway has done the last years. That if you are not from 
Eritrea, Somalia, Syria you are sent back.  
 P11: But earlier we talked about how we need that manpower, that we want them.  
 P10: Yes, then they have to be forced to work.  
 
P1: If we want them because of manpower, then they have to work. Not just sit back and 
enjoy the benefits, they have to get out in the labour market. 
 
P11: we talked about how language is the foundation for what you need to get out in the 
labour market. 
 
M: How do we make that more specific? Everyone doesn’t have to agree. Can we narrow it 
down a little?  
 
P11: If we say mandatory Norwegian course for everyone, but for economic immigrants we 
say it is an obvious condition that they pass a test. Most people want them out working, if not 




Diagram 15 - Visualization of discussion about immigration – NO, Red group, Section 4 
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Diagram 16 - Visualization of discussion about immigration – NO, Red group, Section 5




































RESTRICTIVE STANCES AND PREFERENCES

























The discussion shifted towards considerations on in-group needs for foreign labour force, 
which enhanced an emerging consensus about the expectation that immigrants (including 
refugees) should obtain employment as soon as possible, and employment should be the key 
criteria for staying in the country. Raising the connection between language skills and 
employment, Participant 11 repeated his initial suggestion, but he framed the need for 
passing the language exam as a means to getting employed in the Norwegian labour market. 
This time the proposal was not explicitly contested by others and the discussion continued 
on immigrant’s access to welfare benefits, which is not included in this analysis. 
 
7.3.1.5 Section 5 – Agreement about the criteria of self-sufficiency for economic migrants  
The analysis was resumed once the Moderator asked participants to formulate the final 
policy proposal. Taking the initiative, Participant 11 once again repeated his suggestion. 
However, this triggered opposition in the group.  
Quotation 12 - Red group, Day 2 – Discussion about Immigration (see the highlighted section in Diagram 16) 
 
M: We also have to give reasons for this. It is supposed to be written as a claim or a 
statement, ideally as a sentence.  
 
P11: But for non-refugees, then. For immigrants, not temporary work in Norway. They have to 
pass a Norwegian course and participate in the working life.  
 P6: The unemployed? As long as they have a job and pay tax. 
 P8: Shouldn’t we set work as number one? Instead of cultural integration? 
 
P11: If you want asylum, the way it is today, the asylum seekers are entitled to those rights 
whether they work or not. It is the others we want to make demands for per today. We agree 
that economic immigrants have to speak Norwegian and partake in the working life. 
 P8: I don’t think they have to speak Norwegian, but if the group thinks so, okay. 
 Laughter. 
 P10: I agree with you, though.  
 P1: Norwegian or English if you are supposed to stay here for a long time. 
 P11: I think we should go for partaking in working life. 
 P8: The language will come naturally after a while. 
 
As shown in Diagram 16 and Quotation 12, change was brought about by Participant 8’s 
disagreement. Articulation of his passive acceptance became a new turning point in the 
discussion as Participant 10 and Participant 1 supported him. Participant 11 accepted this 
turn in the discussion and proposed (once again) to include employment as the only 
requirement for economic migrants. While the discussion continued with specifying what 
qualifies as employment, this part of the final policy proposal was not challenged again in 
the discussion and therefore the analysis of the discussion ends at this point. 
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To conclude, the discussion reveals frequent movements between inclusive and restrictive 
measures, also reflecting the heterogeneity of views within the Red group. As participants 
explored the potential boundaries of inclusion, clashing views about the visions of ‘good 
immigrants’ emerged. While for some participants compliance with economic and social 
expectations – employment, contribution, social life – fulfilled the vision of ‘good 
immigrants’ and comprised sufficient reason for inclusion, others preferred cultural 
integration, including command of the Norwegian language. The fact that primarily economic 
arguments prevailed over cultural ones in the final formulation of the policy proposal should 
be interpreted within the context of such competing visions of ‘good immigrants’. Taking into 
account these differences, economic arguments – framed as expectations of Reciprocity, 
Attitude and also as In-group needs – were more convincing to the group, as there was 
overwhelming agreement that economic migrants need to work. Accordingly, 
unemployment and non-contribution were accepted as potential reasons for deportation. 
This conclusion was not contested by any participant. In contrast, the group could not agree 
on language requirements for economic migrants.  
To interpret the results of deliberation, the composition of the group needs to be considered. 
The Red Group included primarily younger participants (under 35 years old), which could 
have influenced the prioritization of economic considerations over cultural arguments. The 
younger generation, especially those who are better educated and situated in the area of 
the capital, tend to have more experience of working in multilingual workplaces, and 
different perceptions about the dynamic increase in the number of immigrants in the 
broader area of Oslo. These circumstances might have influenced their preferences 
regarding immigrants and their language skills. In terms of participation in the discussion, 
only two participants made less than five references during the debate. 
While in the Norwegian case study the dynamics of the discussion were enhanced by the 
emerging gaps between participants’ opinions and preferences concerning the thresholds of 
inclusion and exclusion, in the British discussion we can observe a high level of cohesion in 
terms of policy priorities. The following comparative analysis elaborates on how these 





7.4 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS – THE IMPACT OF INTERACTIONS ON ATTITUDE-
FORMATION 
7.4.1 Dynamism of attitude-formation 
Both case studies involved detailed analyses of the process of discussions leading to an 
agreement about the policy proposal. Throughout the analysis, particular attention was 
devoted to the key moments and arguments that pushed the discussions further, shifting the 
focus of the discussions and affecting attitude-formation. The case studies showed and 
underlined the dynamism of attitude-formation through social interactions. While in the 
British discussion the shifts along the inclusion and exclusion dimension were more 
moderate and remained within the scope of economic considerations on immigration, in the 
Norwegian discussion these movements towards inclusion and exclusion were more 
extensive and influenced by both cultural and economic arguments. The analysis also found 
that such differences in the dynamism of attitude-formation considerably depended on the 
homogeneity or heterogeneity of views in relation to preferred approaches to immigration. 
Focusing on this distinction, the following sections elaborate on the impact of homogeneity 
and heterogeneity of views on attitude-formation in groups.   
 
7.4.1.1 The impact of homogeneity 
Due to the strength of the consensus about the need for restrictive preferences in the British 
discussion, informational and normative influences pushed the discussions in one specific 
direction, which also limited the scope of attitude-formation. While participants did 
approach immigration from various perspectives – identifying the key issues, raising the role 
of the government, considering the needs and capacities of the country to receive 
immigrants, elaborating on the differences between EU and Non-EU migration – all these 
arguments were raised to justify restrictive policy measures. None of the participants tried 
to question the need for restrictions and the Moderator’s attempts to raise another 
perspective also failed to change the direction of the discussion.  
Placing the Orange group’s discussion into the wider institutional and social context reveals 
that such informational and normative influences were not activated within the Orange 
group only. As described in Chapter 4, in the post-2004 period the public discourse in the UK 
became particularly polarized about the advantages and disadvantages of immigration, 
inclining towards a negative portrayal of immigrants and the issues they are associated with. 
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While perceptions of issues – concerning social inequalities, the quality of public services, 
and labour market issues – were real, these were not genuinely caused by immigration 
(Alfano et al., 2016).78 However, in the public discourse immigrants have become scapegoats 
for these social issues. The way political parties approached and framed the issue and the 
policy changes they proposed also legitimized the need for restricting immigration as a 
solution to the issues raised. Therefore, the public discourse, the political framing79, and 
recent policy changes80 strengthened such public perceptions and preferences as being the 
right ones. Furthermore, individualism and selectivity as the key characteristics of the liberal-
leaning welfare state also enhanced such restrictive discourse. While deliberations offer the 
possibility to raise other approaches, challenging the dominant public discourse would have 
required the greater representation of people with firm pro-immigration attitudes who could 
have introduced other perspectives about the issue and policy priorities. In the absence of 
such arguments, majority opinion prevailed and potentially silenced the few participants 
who did not necessarily share the former opinions. Thus, the discussion of the Orange group 
was limited to one dimension.  
 
7.4.1.2 The impact of heterogeneity 
In contrast to the British case study, the Norwegian Red group’s debate on immigration 
demonstrated different group dynamics. While at the beginning there was overall agreement 
about the need to integrate immigrants and the importance of language, as the discussion 
developed a conflict unfolded about the desired strictness of language requirements. 
Therefore, participants needed to reconcile economic and cultural expectations about 
immigrants. Through the exchanges of arguments calling for more inclusive or more 
exclusive measures, the scope of informational influences was extended as participants 
familiarized with other perspectives about the issue. Participants specified, re-considered 
and made concessions as a result of the objections raised therein. As a result, in the end a 
minority opinion was able to change the outcome of the deliberation. 
 
78 For further information about the development of immigration policies and the relation of public 
discourse to immigration in the UK, see Chapter 4. 
79 Parliamentary Elections were held in May 2015 – few months before the DF. Immigration was a 
dominant issue of the electoral campaign (Leruth and Taylor-Gooby, 2019).  
80 Recall the Coalition Government’s pledges and measures restricting non-EU migration described in 
Chapter 4 – Section 4.3.1.3  
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The benefits of a heterogeneity of opinions are also revealed in the dynamism of shifts 
between inclusive and exclusive preferences. However, it is important to understand what 
enhanced this heterogeneity. First, the composition of the group is relevant. The Red group 
was a mixed group of people in terms of initial attitudes to immigrants, as presented in the 
pre-deliberation survey. Moreover, the Red group was constituted of younger participants, 
which could also have affected the group norms in terms of their willingness to sharing their 
own stances and openness to other’s opinions. Both of these factors could have enhanced 
the heterogeneity of opinions. In addition to this, this chapter also argues that this 
heterogeneity was facilitated by the Norwegian institutional and social context.  
The Norwegian DF discussions show that perceptions of the issue of immigration are driven 
by multiple – often intertwined – considerations which also emerge in preferences for more 
inclusive and more exclusive measures. Preferences for the inclusion and integration of 
immigrants are in line with the universalism principle of the Nordic welfare states, complying 
with the widely understood value of a high level of social equality within the country and 
acknowledging the need for an active labour force to maintain the generous welfare state. 
At the same time, perceptions of cultural differences between the majority society and the 
immigrants raised concerns about the potential issues immigration can cause if immigrants 
are not integrated. This tension, stemming from the institutional and social context, 
underlines the emergence of ambivalences, conflicting views, and more significant shifts 
between inclusive and exclusive stances. 
These findings support previous research (Grönlund et al., 2015; Luskin et al., 2007; Sunstein, 
2002, 2009) that confirmed the relevance of the composition of groups and the significance 
of the emerging homogeneity or heterogeneity of views within groups in relation to 
attitude-formation. Furthermore, the case studies provide evidence for the impact of 
institutional and social context on the development of the discussions. As the next step in 
the comparative analysis, the following section elaborates on how the specific forms of 
interaction influenced attitude-formation. 
 
7.4.2 The impact of interactions 
Drawing on the findings presented about the impact of a homogeneity and heterogeneity of 
opinions, we now focus on the meanings and roles specific forms of interaction – such as 




Examining how the specific forms of interaction shape attitudes, both case studies show the 
significance of contestations and new perspectives. Focusing on the concrete effects on 
attitude-formation, these two types of interaction cannot be separated because the effect 
of any argument or question that is articulated during a discussion depends on the reaction 
it triggers (Goodin, 2000). The discussions studied above deepened as a result of the 
combinations of contestations and the specifications that questions prompted. Through 
these interactions, attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion were better articulated. New pieces of 
information, the clarification of stances, and reformulation of policy suggestions helped to 
elaborate on attitudes and to shape the final policy proposal. Moreover, comparison of the 
two case studies sheds light on the variability in the function and effect of these interactions 
on the development of the discussions. In the case of the Norwegian debate, in the context 
of competing views these exchanges initiated a negotiation process in the group that 
affected preferences about the thresholds of inclusion and exclusion. In contrast, in the 
British discussions these interactions rather served to complement and reinforce 
participants’ views without participants needing to convince each other, and without 
triggering shifts in attitudes at the group level.  
In both case studies, occasions of disagreement were rare. Dissenting views were usually 
formulated as contestations or reflections on a new perspective. Therefore, pronounced 
disagreements tended to mark the development of discussions and affected the group’s 
preferences. However, we can observe that the effect of disagreements was more significant 
in the Norwegian discussion. The reason for this difference might be linked to the nature of 
the disagreements. In the British discussions, all disagreements relied on formal objections 
based on external sources of information. For instance, disagreements signalling the 
incompatibility of EU open border policies and an immigration cap were not presented as 
personal convictions but rather as a formal argument against the proposal. In contrast, in the 
Norwegian case study disagreements involved personal arguments against proposals, which 
might have been more powerful in making other participants to consider them. Thus, in the 
Norwegian discussions, disagreements were key to shaping the final policy proposal.  
Repeating as a form of interaction was also significant, especially in terms of signalling the 
importance of issues, justifications or objections to certain preferences. Repetition can  
function as expressing agreement if it involves repeating other participants’ thoughts or 
suggestions. Repeating the same arguments can especially influence uncertain or 
uninformed participants, generating a so-called “illusion of truth” (Chong and Druckman, 
2013). In the British discussions, repetitions further increased the common understanding of 
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the issue of immigration and strengthened consensus about the policy proposal. In contrast, 
in the Norwegian case study, other patterns emerged. Repeating arguments and questions 
formed an important part of the negotiation process and exploring participants’ visions and 
preferences, as in the case of the British case study. However, approaching the topic from 
the perspective of the impact of repetition on agreements about the final policy proposal, 
the repetition of Participant 11’s suggestion was not effective at convincing the group. On 
the contrary, it divided the group and contributed to shifting the discussion to other 
considerations and priorities.     
From the perspective of the impact of interactions on attitude-formation, the analysis 
highlighted the joint effect of contestations and new perspectives as specific forms of 
interaction. Furthermore, through the comparison of the British and Norwegian case studies 
it elaborated on the differences in the function and effect of specific forms of interaction 
depending on the homogeneity or heterogeneity of views within the group.  
 
7.4.3 Polarization and de-polarization effects  
So far, the findings of the chapter underline Sunstein’s (2002, 2009) argument about the 
importance of the heterogeneity of views in relation to the nature of deliberations and to 
the scope of attitude-formation this can trigger. However, based on Sunstein’s findings one 
more question remains to be asked: Did the British case study lead to group polarization, and 
did the Norwegian case study lead to de-polarization? To answer these questions, first we 
need to look at the specificities of the research design and the composition of the group. 
Second, we investigate (de-)polarization effects using the pre- and post-deliberation surveys 
to find out whether participants’ preferences shifted to more or less extreme positions.  
 
7.4.3.1 Research design and composition of the groups 
Both discussions shared the research design and thus also the special arrangements aimed 
at facilitating a comprehensive, and diverse debate. As described in Chapter 3, the special 
arrangements included a representative sampling method, the over-representation of 
specific minorities in breakout groups, the provision of information in the form of 
information packages, the availability of social policy experts during the discussions, and the 
professional moderation of discussions. The actual outcome of sampling and division into 
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breakout groups and the moderation of the group discussions could have created differences 
in the actual conduct of debates, but these are factors which cannot be strictly controlled.  
Previous research highlighted the relevance of the composition of groups in terms of 
participants’ initial positions about specific issues (Grönlund et al., 2015). As WelfSOC DFs 
were initiated to discuss a wide array of welfare topics, the possibility of screening specific 
attitudinal positions – in our case, pro- or anti-immigration attitudes – was out of question. 
The sampling and division of participants into breakout groups considered only the key socio-
demographic characteristics of participants. Therefore, within the DF there was no intention 
to affect group composition – the potential homogeneity or heterogeneity of opinion – based 
on participants’ dispositions. This meant that the emerging homogeneity or heterogeneity 
of views was incidental. Therefore, while the DF included specific arrangements to enhance 
diverse debates, participants’ dispositions were not controlled within the groups, allowing 
for the homogeneity or heterogeneity of views within the group to potentially change when 
discussing different issues. As the issue of immigration was highly salient when the DFs were 
conducted, the benefit of this arrangement was that we could analyse how powerful the 
mainstream discourses were in the given context.  
 
7.4.3.2 Group polarization or de-polarization 
Based on the differences identified between the two case studies, it is assumed that attitudes 
de-polarize in the Norwegian group, while attitudes in the British group tended to polarize. 
As noted, in the Norwegian group there was a relatively high level of heterogeneity in terms 
of participants’ dispositions to the timing of immigrants’ access to welfare benefits and 
services. Heterogeneity of views was characteristic of the group’s discussion about 
immigration. As expected, the post-deliberation survey showed changes in participants’ 
attitudes. While this research does not assume that such changes are constant, the changes 
do provide evidence that is of use in examining whether deliberations had polarization or de-
polarization effects. Table 3 shows that, among the Red group, attitudes to immigrants 
substantially homogenized and shifted to a moderate position of requesting at least one-
year of employment as a precondition for accessing social benefits. This outcome supports 
the findings of previous studies that deliberation in heterogeneous groups leads to the de-
polarization of attitudes (Himmelroos and Christensen, 2014; Luskin et al., 2007). However, 
we need to note that this effect applies to the whole process of deliberation, and is not 
limited to the discussion analysed within this case study.  
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In contrast to the Norwegian case study, the British discussion raised concerns of group 
polarization. The homogeneity of the group was demonstrated throughout the discussion. 
Moreover, the pre-deliberation survey also showed that seven out of eleven participants 
shared the same preference. However, this in itself would not necessarily lead to group 
polarization unless participants shifted to extreme standpoints. Looking at the results of the 
post-deliberation survey presented in Table 3, we observe mixed results. On the one hand, 
there was a slight homogenization effect as the number of participants preferring one year 
of employment increased to eight. On the other hand, we can identify a shift towards more 
extreme positions as the number of participants who evinced a preference for refusing to 
ever grant immigrants access to benefits and services also increased from one to three. 
 
Table 3 - Results of Before and After Survey, Norway, Red group and UK, Orange group 
When should 
immigrants obtain 




After a year, 
whether or 




taxes for at 












NO Red group - 
Before 
3 0 4 2 0 381 
NO Red group - 
After 
1 1 7 1 0 0 
 
UK Orange group - 
Before 
0 1 7 0 1 2 
UK Orange group - 
After 
0 0 8 0 3 0 
 
Focusing on the shifts towards the most extreme survey response, we confirm the group 
polarization effects of the deliberations. However, if we focus on the dominant preferences, 
the tendencies are unchanged. The interpretation of these findings is especially challenging 
as the most dominant preference of requiring one year of employment represents a 
moderate position among the survey responses. However, the analysis revealed a much 
more restrictive approach. This suggests that the survey questions are not suitable for use in 
reflecting on more complex standpoints that would allow participants to indicate their 
restrictive preferences. A second explanation is that pressures for group conformism are 
greater during the discussion, but the impact on individual attitudes is lower (Forsyth, 2010; 
Isenberg, 1986). As both of these possibilities have significant implications for attitude 
 
81 One participant from the Red group did not attend the DF on Day 2, who chose the “Don’t know” 
answer in the pre-deliberative survey. 
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research, the next chapter is devoted to exploring the process of attitude-formation at the 
level of individuals to reveal whether the attitudes expressed in the discussions are in line 
with the attitudes presented in surveys.  
 
7.5 CONCLUSION  
This chapter extended the scope of the analysis of attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in 
welfare states by stressing the relevance of examining the process of deliberation – how the 
group reaches agreement about policy proposals by the end of the DF. Firstly, this chapter 
argued that the research should not be limited to content analysis, but should investigate 
the process of the interactions through which participants share their attitudes and 
preferences. Secondly, to analyse the role and impact of interactions on attitude-formation, 
two case studies were presented. The analysis found substantial differences between how 
the discussions developed in the British and the Norwegian breakout groups. In the UK, the 
consensus about the need for restrictive measures emerged early on in the debate, and it 
dominated the whole discussion. As a result, the discussion concerned why these 
restrictions are seen as necessary and how to restrict immigrants’ access to the welfare state. 
Therefore, participants’ interactions were complementary, without questioning the need for 
restrictions. In Norway, we can observe a greater diversity of preferences, creating a 
broader framework for debate about competing approaches to immigration.  
While both processes of discussion are driven by the same forms of interaction – 
contestation, new perspective, repetition, etc. – their impact on attitude-formation is 
significantly different. In the British discussion attitude-formation unfolds through the 
process of deploying arguments that underline the consensus. In the Norwegian discussion, 
attitude-formation emerges through the reconciliation of competing preferences. Although 
both processes generate precious information about attitude-formation, these differences 
need to be considered as interactions take on different meanings and have different 
functions in the discussion depending on the homogeneity/heterogeneity of views. 
Accordingly, specific forms of interaction have different impacts on attitudes in the group.  
The findings of the analysis confirm previous research about the relevance of the 
composition of groups and the emerging homogeneity and heterogeneity of views within 
groups (Grönlund et al., 2015; Luskin et al., 2007; Smets and Isernia, 2014; Sunstein, 2002). 
However, the analysis also reveals that despite the specific research design that was 
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intended to facilitate the diversity of opinion in DFs, other factors influenced the direction 
and the outcome of discussions. This chapter found evidence for the impact of institutional 
and social context on the way the discussions developed. To be more specific, the analysis 
found that the high level of homogeneity within the British Orange group and the preference 
for restrictions was affected by the dominant negative public discourse about immigration. 
Furthermore, the institutional context – including immigration and welfare policies – 
enhanced a selective approach, further strengthening preferences for restriction as the 
correct response to the perceived issues. In contrast, competing views and preferences for 
inclusion and exclusion in the Norwegian discussions can be associated with the institutional 
and social context that enhanced both the value of and preference for social inclusion, and 
a preference for exclusion considering the greater awareness of the cultural differences 
between immigrants and natives.  
The effects of polarization and de-polarization were analysed using the results of pre- and 
post-deliberation surveys. While examination of the Norwegian case study confirmed the 
de-polarization of group participants’ attitudes, the British case study showed inconclusive 
findings whether participants’ attitudes shifted to a more extreme position. To better 
elaborate on the effect of deliberation on individual attitudes, the following chapter analyses 
the process of individual attitude-formation.   
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8 THE DYNAMISM OF ATTITUDE-FORMATION AT THE INDIVIDUAL 
LEVEL 
 
In this chapter, the focus of the analysis remains on the dynamism of attitude-formation. 
Chapter 7 focused on the dynamism of attitude-formation within groups. It elaborated on 
the impact of the emerging homogeneity and heterogeneity of views within groups, and on 
the impact of the institutional and social context on the development and outcome of 
discussions. Furthermore, it aimed to analyse concerns of group polarization. However, the 
findings about group polarization tended to be inconclusive – especially in relation to the 
British discussion. As the emergence and the extent of group polarization is measured by 
analysing shifts in individuals’ attitudes towards more extreme positions (Sunstein, 2002), 
the focus of this chapter shifts from group-level processes to the development of individual 
attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state. It is expected that deliberation and 
interactions have a different impact on 1) groups – on the overall development of the 
discussions (Chapter 7); and on 2) individual participants and their attitudes. Therefore, 
this chapter intends to analyse how participants articulated their attitudes and how their 
attitudes changed as a result of deliberation (related to RQ3).  
Although there is an expanding literature on deliberation that specifically looks at the drivers 
of changes in attitudes (Barabas, 2004; Farrar et al., 2009; Gerber et al., 2014; Luskin et al., 
2007), so far little attention has been devoted to the analysis of individuals’ narratives. This 
also implies that deliberative researchers tended to disregard the role of coherent, 
ambivalent, and contradictory attitudes and the potential differences in how these specific 
types of attitudes develop during discussions and how these attitudes are reflected in post-
deliberation surveys. While deliberation enables participants to elaborate on the complexity 
of attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in welfare states, including ambivalences and 
contradictory claims, pre- and post-deliberation surveys offer limited opportunity to express 
such complexity. The analysis finds that, especially in the case of participants with 
ambivalent attitudes, shifts in attitudes emerge in the discussions, but these shifts tend to 
disappear in the survey responses. This discrepancy raises the question what causes this 
lack of visible changes in survey responses. Addressing this question is important, as it has 
implications for evaluating the effects of deliberation. Similarly, it has implications for the 
study of group polarization, as the lack of visible changes in attitudes can also distort findings 
about group polarization.  
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In line with previous research, we argue that group conformism in public discussions can 
result in differences between publicly and privately shared attitudes (Fishkin, 2018; Luskin et 
al., 2007). However, this chapter argues that the latter is not only caused by group 
conformism. We also need to consider whether the pre- and post-deliberation surveys are 
appropriate for measuring shifts in attitudes which may be more subtle and nuanced than 
survey responses can capture. This consideration is particularly crucial in relation to 
participants with ambivalent attitudes, as the latter share both arguments for and against 
the inclusion of immigrants in the debates. Moreover, locating their ambivalent attitudes 
using a standardized questionnaire might be more challenging. To address both the impact 
of group conformism and the critical assessment of post-deliberation surveys, this chapter 
takes a more comprehensive approach to analysing shifts in attitudes examining shifts in 
attitudes not only in terms of changes between pre- and post-deliberation survey responses. 
Using four case studies, it complements the survey findings with an analysis of participants’ 
narratives about immigration during the two days of discussion. 
Acknowledging that the analysis of narratives and identification of coherent, ambivalent, and 
contradictory attitudes is possible only in the case of more active and talkative participants, 
this chapter examines the narratives of the two most active and most influential participants 
in the discussions of the Norwegian Red group and the British Orange group (analysed in 
Chapter 7). Thus, the selection of four participants was based on the (greatest) number of 
contributions made to the debate on immigration on Day 2. A further criterion was that the 
selected participants should have had significant impact on the development of discussions 
examined in Chapter 7.  
While the previous chapter investigated how the selected participants’ claims and 
interactions affected the outcome of discussions on immigration, this chapter analyses their 
overall narrative about the issue of immigration to reveal how their individual attitudes 
tended to shift during the deliberation. The key ambition of this chapter is thus to contribute 
to attitudinal research by 1) shedding light on the processes of individual attitude-formation 
through the analysis of individuals’ narrative during the DF, and 2) examining how the 





8.1 WHAT KIND OF CHANGES IN ATTITUDES CAN BE EXPECTED IN DF? 
 
One of the key distinguishing features of deliberative methods is the social learning effect of 
deliberation and a belief in the transformative nature of deliberation (Dryzek, 2005; Fishkin, 
2018; Luskin et al., 2002). Accordingly, the effects of deliberation were primarily measured 
in terms of changes in attitudes. Participants of DFs are expected to have more informed and 
enlightened attitudes as a result of reasoned debates, due to their accessing new knowledge 
and considering a variety of arguments (Goodin and Niemeyer, 2003; Luskin et al., 2002). In 
line with such expectations for attitude change, scholarly preoccupation with the analysis of 
changes in attitudes increased, exploiting before- and after-surveys to find evidence of 
change. While preliminary studies tended to focus on and analyse net aggregate shifts in 
before- and post-deliberation attitudes, it has recently been more widely acknowledged that 
not only concrete changes in attitudes prove the success of deliberation (Barabas, 2004). 
Fishkin (2018) himself claims that the effects of deliberation should not be reduced to 
specific changes in attitudes as there might be great variability in how deliberation influences 
individual considerations. 
Following Zaller and Feldman (1992), Barabas (2004) argues that survey responses can be 
understood as distributions of opinions which are underlined by specific considerations. 
Deliberation, access to new information and arguments raised for and against issues and 
policies affect the pool of available considerations. Thus, deliberations can help individuals 
to better locate their attitudes on the scale of available survey responses. “The central idea 
is that pre-deliberative opinions blend with new information obtained via deliberation (or for 
that matter from any other message generating process) to determine the post-deliberative 
opinions jointly” (Barabas, 2004: 689). Barabas (2004) calls this process “opinion updating” 
and argues that it can both lead to changes in attitudes and also to confirmation and the 
strengthening of individuals’ initial positions without any visible change in attitude.  
Drawing on these claims, this chapter aims to elaborate on the underlying process of 
attitude-formation by focusing on both changed and updated attitudes. Considering both 
the attitudes articulated in the DF discussions and attitudes presented in pre- and post-
deliberation surveys, this chapter distinguishes three types of post-deliberative attitudes:  
1. Changed attitude – convincing arguments leading to change in attitude; the 
expectation is that attitude change can be followed up both in individual narratives 
and post-deliberation surveys.  
 221 
 
2. No change, but updated attitude – initial position confirmed (Barabas, 2004), both 
pro- and counterarguments are equally convincing, thus individuals decide to stick 
to their initial position (Gerber et al., 2014); it is thus expected that individuals’ 
narratives will underline the updated attitude presented in the post-deliberation 
survey. 
3. Change in attitude in survey, but no change in attitude in the narrative – the change 
presented in post-deliberation surveys can be interpreted as clarification of 
individual positions on the scale of available survey responses (Barabas, 2004) – it is 
expected that individuals’ narratives will be coherent with their post-deliberative 
survey response.  
 
All three types of post-deliberative attitudes adhere to the theoretical ideal that deliberation 
leads to more enlightened and informed preferences. All three types draw on previous 
research findings about the power of reason (Farrar et al., 2009; Gerber et al., 2014; 
Himmelroos and Christensen, 2014) an on the relevance of participants’ predispositions 
(Barabas, 2004; Gerber et al., 2014; Smets and Isernia, 2014). The last two types of post-
deliberation attitude point out discrepancies between participants’ narratives and the 
attitudes presented in the surveys, implying certain inconsistencies. This chapter is dedicated 
to exploring the process of attitude-formation, relying on both the narratives and on the pre- 
and post-deliberation surveys to elaborate on these inconsistencies. The focus is restricted 
to the potential impact of group conformism in group discussion, which is often considered 
to cause differences between publicly and privately shared attitudes (Luskin et al., 2007). 
Second, these gaps also raise the need to critically assess whether surveys can appropriately 
measure shifts in attitudes (Rosenberg, 2014).   
While the previous chapters have discussed that some of the considerations induced 
ambivalence and contradictions in the debates, this chapter aims to disentangle how 
coherent, ambivalent, and contradictory attitudes emerge at the level of individual attitudes. 
This issue is especially pressing as surveys typically treat all attitudes the same way (Goerres 
and Prinzen, 2012), while people with ambivalent attitudes in particular might face 




8.2 DIFFERENTIATING COHERENT, AMBIVALENT, AND CONTRADICTORY ATTITUDES 
 
The social constructivist concept of attitudes encourages us to acknowledge the variety of 
considerations that underline attitudes including the ambivalent and contradictory stances 
behind public attitudes, which tend to be hidden in survey-based research (Goerres and 
Prinzen, 2012). Within the scope of this chapter, coherent, ambivalent, and contradictory 
attitudes are conceived solely in relation to participants’ pro- and anti-immigration attitudes, 
with a high level of dynamism expected with regard to pro-inclusion and pro-exclusion 
preferences between these two poles. As attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion are articulated 
in relation to multiple dimensions, coherent, ambivalent, and contradictory attitudes is 
studied primarily in relation to subdimensions – like references to selective immigration 
system, integration, refugees, economic migrants, etc – see Table 2 and 4 – Appendix 3. 
Focusing on subdimensions is seen as justified as we can observe a high level of selectivity 
and variability as to which dimensions participants consider relevant. Joining in the 
discussion about specific sub-issues and sharing views and arguments can also be 
understood as a sign of importance for participants.  
Coherent attitudes are understood as involving a consistent pro-immigration or anti-
immigration narrative in terms of raising various features and dimensions of the issue. The 
identification of coherent attitudes does not rule out the possibility of attitudes changing in 
the post-deliberation survey, as raised in Section 8.1.  
In terms of ambivalent attitudes, the research adheres to a definition by Wegener and 
colleagues (1995: 460): namely, “the extent to which one’s reactions to an attitude object are 
evaluatively mixed in that both positive (favourable) and negative (unfavourable) elements are 
included.” Although ambivalent attitudes are often conceived as weak attitudes, research 
findings show that an openness towards competing arguments, increased information 
processing, and a higher level of differentiation between stronger and weaker arguments 
make ambivalent attitudes strong and more stable  (Jonas et al., 1997). Moreover, Maio and 
Haddock (2004) find that, especially concerning controversial issues, ambivalent attitudes 
make people seem more knowledgeable and fairer, which can also strengthen their position 
within the group.  
As presented in Table 2 and 4 – Appendix 3 there were only few participants whose 
narratives about immigration revealed contradictory attitudes. It is important to note that 
within the discussions these participants were not explicitly confronted with their 
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contradictory stances and claims. Due to the low number of occurrences, the following 
analysis does not include any contributions from participants with contradictory attitudes. 
As the identification of coherent, ambivalent, and contradictory attitudes is only possible by 
analysing participants’ engagement in the discussion and narratives about immigration, four 
case studies were selected to examine shifts in attitudes and preferences for the inclusion of 
immigrants. However, the analysis of individual narratives has certain limitations. One of 
them is that only active participants’ narratives are extensive enough to provide sufficient 
data to qualify for the analysis. Therefore, drawing on the case studies presented in Chapter 
7, and utilizing readers’ familiarity with the discussions, the two most active and most 
influential participants were selected for this analysis. Along these criteria, Participant 8 and 
Participant 11 were selected from the Norwegian Red group and Participant 84 and 
Participant 90 were selected from the British Orange group. From these four participants, 
Participant 8 articulated a coherent pro-immigration attitude, while the remaining three 
participants shared ambivalent attitudes towards the inclusion of immigrants. Interestingly, 
a change in attitudes as represented in pre- and post-deliberation surveys was identified only 
in the case of Participant 8. The other three participants did not change their preferences in 
the post-deliberation survey.  
Focusing on the group of participants with ambivalent attitudes, we can observe a weaker 
tendency towards a change in attitudes, as supported by the post-deliberation surveys. As 
shown in Table 1 – Appendix 3, in the Norwegian DF nine participants articulated ambivalent 
attitudes towards the inclusion of immigrants. From these participants, four changed their 
attitudes in the post-deliberation survey. However, two of the participants changed their 
opinion from a “Don’t know” answer, which supports the claim that deliberation informs and 
reduces the uncertainties of participants. In the British discussions, eight participants were 
identified as sharing ambivalent attitudes – see Table 3 – Appendix 3. Among British 
participants with ambivalent attitudes only two participants changed their attitude in the 
post-deliberation survey. Here, one of them changed from a “No answer”. These patterns 
draw our attention to differences in the process of attitude-formation of participants with 
ambivalent and coherent attitudes. Moreover, focusing specifically on participants with 
ambivalent attitudes, it also raises the question what explains the lack of a shift in attitude 
in the pre- and post-deliberation surveys. This chapter argues that both group conformism 
as well as the limitations of the survey method contribute to such discrepancies.  
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To analyse the potential effects of group conformism during the process of attitude-
formation, this chapter proposes specific measures. Throughout the chapter, particular 
attention is devoted to examining 1) the occurrence and use of majority opinion; 2) counter-
arguments to majority opinion; 3) the acceptance of others’ arguments; 4) the uptake of 
others’ arguments, and 5) changes in views and arguments during the two days of 
discussion. 82  Using these indicators, individuals’ positions about the emerging majority 
opinion are examined and their engagement with majority opinion is assessed to reveal 
whether they contributed to the homogeneity or heterogeneity of views within the group 
discussion.  
While the WelfSOC pre- and post-deliberation survey included three questions about 
immigration, 83  only one question directly touched upon individuals’ preferences for 
immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state. Therefore, shifts in attitudes is analysed based on 
responses to the question “With regard to people who come to live in [country] from other 
countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and 
services as citizens already living here?” This question measures preferences for inclusion on 
a five-point scale. Responses range from the preference for granting immediate access to 
social rights as the most inclusive, and never granting social rights to immigrants as the most 
exclusive option, and in a broad understanding represent the different principles of 
conditional access to welfare provisions. 
The following four case studies are included to help examine the processes of attitude-
formation of three participants with ambivalent attitudes and one participant with a 
coherent attitude. The latter case forms an important part of the analysis as it draws 
attention to another way how the exclusive use of pre- and post-deliberation surveys can 






82 Definition of these principles was partly inspired by the indicators of quality of discussion in 
Gerber et al. 2016. 
83 Please see Table 1 and 3 – Appendix 3 for further details on survey questions and responses. 
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8.3 CASE STUDIES 
8.3.1 The narrative of a coherent pro-immigration attitude – Participant 8  
In the discussion by the Norwegian Red group, Participant 884 played a crucial role as he 
stood up for his dissenting views twice, as presented in Chapter 7. Following his intervening 
questions, the initial proposal of requiring immigrants to pass a Norwegian language exam 
was first detailed, and later substantially reformulated. However, in this chapter the focus is 
not on how his contributions affected the development of the discussion. The following 
analysis intends to analyse how Participant 8’s attitudes were articulated through his 
contributions to the debates and compared to the attitudes presented in the pre- and post-
deliberation surveys. Throughout the discussion, his views reflected a coherent pro-
immigration attitude, which relied on future-oriented considerations and on the conviction 
that immigrants will be both economically and socially needed in the country considering 
the challenges of an aging population. Participant 8 argued for open border policies and saw 
the benefits of the international mobility of resourceful migrants.  
During the discussions, the issue of deportation particularly engaged him in the discussion. 
First, he entered the conversation on policy proposals by raising questions and arguing for a 
differentiated approach to the potential deportation of refugees (due to failed language 
exams) considering the life-threatening circumstances in the country of origin. While he 
acknowledged the importance of language learning, during the discussion he took a more 
inclusive stance by emphasising economic activity and contributions as key criteria for 
staying in the country for all immigrants, regardless of the place of origin.  
The same rationale emerged when participants discussed the lengthy process of recognizing 
refugee status and expressed their discontent that asylum-seekers are not allowed to work. 
In accordance with other participants, Participant 8 condemned the inactivity of asylum-
seekers. This emphasis on economic activities considerably explains why Participant 8 views 
access to welfare benefits without contributing as the biggest issue. While he articulated a 
preference for stopping immigrants’ access to welfare without contributing, he did not make 
any suggestions about how to deal with this issue. His conviction about the value of 
employment was further elaborated in a reference when he described the global 
humanitarian benefits of employing immigrants.  
 
84 Participant 8 – Male, Age 25-34, Student, Education – Tertiary (Masters), Household income – 4th 
decile, Political affiliation Christian Democratic. 
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8.3.1.1 Challenging the emerging majority opinion 
The analysis of Participant 8’s contributions to the debate on immigration – constituting 24 
references of varying length – shows a coherent pro-immigration attitude. Table 4 
summarizes Participant 8’s engagement in the discussions concerning the key indicators for 
tracing the effects of group conformism. Within the discussions, he respected others’ 
arguments and sometimes took up and agreed with the argumentation of other participants. 
However, considering his overall participation we can observe that he was more likely to 
enter the discussions to challenge the developing majority opinion in the areas he viewed as 
most important – such as preventing the deportation of refugees, and promoting the 
economic activities of immigrants (seven occasions). While he showed a willingness to reach 
a consensus about policy proposals, he expressed his disagreement, what indicates the 
strength of his own beliefs. Based on these findings, we conclude that group conformism 
had no impact on Participant 8.  
Table 4 - Assessment of Participant 8’s participation in the discussions  
 Participant 8 - D2 
Occurrence and use of majority opinion 3 
Counter-argument to majority opinion 7 
Accepting others’ arguments 4 
Uptake of others’ arguments 2 
Change in views, arguments 0 
Raising a specific immigration issue 3 
 
8.3.1.2 Discrepancy between Participant 8’s narrative and post-deliberation survey 
response 
Based on his participation in the discussion, we cannot identify any shift in Participant 8’s 
opinions and attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion. However, this finding contrasts with the 
change in his post-deliberation survey response to the question about immigrants’ inclusion. 
Participant 8 was one of the few participants who preferred to grant immigrants immediate 
access to welfare benefits and services in the pre-deliberation survey, which position can be 
associated with his open border priorities. However, this preference may be less consistent 
with his discontent with migrants who do not contribute but enjoy welfare benefits. In the 
post-deliberation survey, he shifted to the requirement of one year, but without the 
requirement of work, which on the scale of survey responses represented a slightly more 
restrictive preference – also slightly reducing the inconsistency between his views in the 
debates and in the survey. This shift in preferences resembles the third type of post-
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deliberation attitude – as defined in Section 8.1 – showing no change in attitudes in the 
discussion, but clarifying his position in the post-deliberation survey, which better matched 
his narrative in the debate. On the one hand, this shift in preferences underlines the strength 
of deliberation in terms of clarifying the participant’s position on the scale of inclusive and 
exclusive preferences. On the other hand, it points at the difficulties survey respondents face 
when asked to choose the survey response that is most applicable to them, and how they 
weigh various standpoints and considerations to come to a conclusion that corresponds to 
the criteria presented in the pre-defined survey responses.  
Although the question on immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state is primarily considered 
here, it is worth checking Participant 8’s responses to the other two immigration-related 
questions. In line with his pro-immigration stances, he indicated that immigrants contribute 
more than they received (on the related 0-10 scale, he chose 01 in the pre-deliberation 
survey and 02 in the post-deliberation survey). In relation to the survey question concerning 
whether welfare benefits attract migrants to Norway, Participant 8 first took a neutral – 
neither agree nor disagree – position, and then in the post-deliberation survey disagreed 
with this proposition, which also supports his pro-immigration narrative.  
To conclude, the analysis of Participant 8’s narrative and survey responses shows that 
deliberation helps participants to clarify their own position in relation to the survey 
questions. In this particular case, we can observe that the change in attitudes presented in 
the post-deliberation surveys is not the result of changing opinions about the conditions 
of inclusion of immigrants, as during the discussion Participant 8 presented a coherent 
attitude, not adjusting to emerging, more restrictive majority opinions and preferences. 
This highlights that even people with coherent and unchanging attitudes to immigrants’ 
inclusion to the welfare state face difficulties choosing the most applicable answer in a 
survey situation.  
 
8.3.2 The narrative of complex and diverse considerations and ambivalent attitudes to 
immigrants’ inclusion – Participant 11  
Participant 1185 was the most dominant and most active member of the Norwegian Red 
Group, not only in relation to immigration, but overall to all topics discussed during the two 
days. Due to his intensive involvement in the debates (a total of 70 references to 
 
85 Participant 11 – Male, Age 25-34, Working full-time, Education – Tertiary (Masters), Household 
income – 8th decile, Political affiliation – Conservative. 
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immigration), we have access to a more nuanced description of his opinions and attitudes. 
Throughout the debate, his contributions reflected a complex approach to social issues. He 
brought important arguments into the discussions, but he also adopted a consensus-seeking 
attitude to reach agreement. Therefore, we can identify fluctuations in his views and 
emerging ambivalence both in terms of inclusive and exclusive stances, and in relation to 
the use of economic and cultural reasoning.  
Within the debates on immigration he took clear stances on immigrants’ employment, the 
role of education for enhancing immigrants’ labour market integration, access to welfare, 
integration and language and how these all are interlinked together. For instance, concerning 
income inequality, he elaborated on the negative effects of having immigrants employed in 
low-paid sectors also associated with greater need for welfare support. Therefore, he 
emphasized the role of education and re-training to prevent the deepening of the gap 
between nationals and immigrants.  
In line with these positions, he emphasised immigrants’ labour market integration. He 
reflected on cases in which immigrants refuse employment opportunities due to cultural 
reasons. However, he also showed awareness of employers’ discriminative practices – not 
giving a chance to people with foreign names. In the discussion he became the key advocate 
for strict language requirements as demonstrated in Chapter 7. Through the interactions and 
other participants’ objections, he clarified the differences between refugees and economic 
migrants in terms of free access to language courses (for refugees, but not for economic 
migrants), and regarding the consequences of non-compliance. Although he accepted 
dissenting views and his suggestion was re-formulated, he kept restating the relevance of 
language, which shows the importance he associated with language. While he mainly framed 
his preferences for defining language requirements in relation to employment, later he 
revealed that these are also linked to concerns about immigrants not adapting to Norwegian 
society. 
Regarding perceptions of cultural differences, he held several ambivalent positions, backing 
measures to support immigrants’ integration – e.g. in relation to housing policies he was in 
favour of settling immigrants in areas where the highest-income, predominantly Norwegian, 
population lives. At the same time, he was critical of the low level of female employment, 
blaming cultural differences for this. He claimed that access to welfare benefits has a 
particularly negative effect on immigrant women’s employment, which leads to delays in the 
integration of immigrant children as they do not attend childcare facilities. Therefore, he 
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argued for eliminating cash benefits that discourage employment, even if this requires that 
Norwegians lose access to them.  
Underlining his emphasis on employment, he agreed with the suggestion of enhancing 
asylum-seekers’ opportunity to obtain employment during the process of the evaluation of 
their applications. Furthermore, acknowledging that not all asylum-seekers are eligible for 
international protection, he raised whether non-eligible asylum-seekers should be admitted 
as economic migrants, arguing that there is need for manpower in Norway.  
 
8.3.2.1 Articulation of ambivalence increases the tendency to group conformism during the 
discussions 
As the above analysis shows, Participant 11 presented himself as a person who is aware of 
social issues and is able to distinguish various aspects – both positive and negative – of social 
issues and how they relate to each other. Accordingly, in his stances we can identify 
ambivalence. One the one hand, he supported immigration to address labour market needs 
and supported immigrants’ integration. On the other hand, he was also concerned about the 
potentially negative effects of immigration through increasing inequality in Norway. In his 
statements he often referred implicitly and explicitly to the need to maintain the status quo 
and to use integration to prevent any increase in social inequality. However, he also 
proposed exclusive measures for making immigrants adapt to Norwegian society and thus 
maintain the status quo. Therefore, in his narrative we can often identify the balancing and 
bringing in of different perspectives. However, the question remains, how were his 
contributions influenced by the group?  
As shown in Table 5, on Day 1 Participant 11 entered the discussion primarily by raising 
counter-arguments against the developing majority opinion on immigration. In comparison, 
on Day 2, devoted to formulating policy proposals, his participation changed. While counter-
arguments remained dominant in his contributions, he also supported and argued for the 
majority opinion. He also tried to push the discussions toward more restrictive preferences, 
as we can recall from Chapter 7. Despite this, he respected other participants’ disagreements 
and counterarguments and was willing to elaborate his proposals or to make concessions. In 
his contributions on Day 2 we can identify certain shifts in preferences. However, focusing 
on his overall narrative, it is questionable whether these shifts were fully due to persuasion 
or rather signs of group conformism. On the one hand, he himself articulated ambivalent 
positions, which enabled him to be more flexible throughout the discussions. On the other 
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hand, the fact that he kept returning to the same issues and raising new arguments in favour 
of them indicates that these shifts were rather aimed at reconciling differing views and 
facilitating consensus in the group. Therefore, we conclude that group conformism impacted 
the way he articulated his attitudes. The shifts in opinion were less significant, especially 
if we take into account his ambivalent positions and structured, complex considerations 
about immigration.  
Table 5 - Assessment of Participant 11’s participation in the discussions 
 Participant 11 - D1 Participant 11 - D2 
Occurrence and use of majority opinion 0 4 
Counter-argument to majority opinion 3 5 
Accepting others’ arguments 2 5 
Uptake of others’ arguments 1 8 
Change in views, arguments 0 3 
Raising a specific immigration issue 1 7 
 
8.3.2.2 Updating attitudes – deliberation strengthening initial positions 
Participant 11 articulated a largely pro-immigration attitude, but with restrictive 
preferences. Comparison of his stances to the attitudes presented in the surveys shows that 
his reasoning represents the second type of post-deliberation attitude defined in Section 8.1: 
an updated attitude. The effect of deliberation emerged more in the form of confirming 
and strengthening his initial attitude. Considering the wide-ranging arguments he raised 
both for and against the inclusion of immigrants, it might not be surprising that he chose the 
requirement of citizenship in both the pre- and post-deliberation survey. On the one hand, 
this choice is inconsistent with the views presented in the debates, where he argued for the 
requirement of one-year of employment before accessing benefits, but granting immediate 
access to some benefits to refugees. On the other hand, in more broadly interpreting the 
survey question, the preferences for citizenship, the second most restrictive measure among 
the five available options can be understood as a choice which resembled his preference for 
requiring immigrants to learn the Norwegian language and adapt to the Norwegian way of 
life. Thus, emphasising the more restrictive stances that he articulated on Day 2.  
While his attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion did not change, regarding the question whether 
immigrants are net contributors to the welfare system his survey responses changed from 
rather neutral (choosing 6 on a scale of 0-10) to a more positive (choosing 3) seeing 
immigrants more as contributors. Although on Day 2 Participant 11 articulated certain 
restrictive preferences regarding immigrant families and women’s access to benefits, his 
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overall narrative with both inclusive and exclusive stances counterbalances such restrictive 
proposals and justifies his post-deliberation response – updating rather than changing 
attitudes. Concerning the question whether welfare benefits encourage immigration to the 
country, he agreed/strongly agreed.  
To sum up, his contribution to the debates shows that his attitudes to immigration are based 
on various perceptions and considerations and, accordingly, his views tended to shift in the 
discussions. On the one hand, these shifts can be understood as attempts to balance the 
various aspects that were required to be taken into account. On the other hand, especially 
in the Day 2 discussions, we can identify the impact of group conformism in the shifts in his 
views and preferences. While his ambivalent positions unfold in the discussion, they are 
not revealed in the survey situation. Participant 11’s pre- and post-deliberation survey 
responses are largely consistent with the key arguments in his narrative and can be 
understood as a position of reconciliation towards the inclusion of immigrants. 
 
8.3.3 The narrative of an ambivalent attitude centred on the expectation of employment 
and contribution – Participant 84 
During the two days of discussion, Participant 8486 was the most active participant within the 
British Orange group. His overall participation in the debates shows ambivalent attitudes. 
The most salient threshold of inclusion for him was the requirement of employment and 
contributions.  
On Day 1 he joined the discussion about refugees, elaborating on the security issues involved 
with receiving refugees whose background is difficult to check. Focusing on security aspects, 
he stressed the difference between migration within the EU and the issue of refugees, but 
called for monitoring both types of immigration. In relation to economic migrants, he joined 
the discussion as other participants complained about the misuse of welfare benefits and 
raised the need to develop the skills of nationals instead of bringing in a foreign labour force. 
Participant 84 was the first to present another perspective that recognized the strong work 
ethic of Polish and Romanian migrants in comparison to British nationals. However, he also 
raised the issue of small income difference between working for minimum wage and taking 
up welfare benefits as a driver of the limited willingness of nationals to take low-paid jobs.  
 
86 Participant 84 – Male, Age 45-54, Working full-time, Education – Upper secondary, Household 
income – 8th decile, Political affiliation – Conservative. 
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On Day 2, Participant 84 took on the role of note-taker, which meant that he more frequently 
raised questions regarding the direction of the discussion and summarized the groups’ 
decisions about proposals. However, besides these references he also took an active part in 
the discussion primarily in relation to the requirements of employment and conditions of 
contributing before accessing welfare benefits. At the beginning of the discussion Participant 
84, using the data included in the information package,87 admitted that he also thought that 
the share of EU migrants was greater than in reality, and that EU migrants come to the UK to 
work. As a response to Participant 90’s question whether all of them work, Participant 84 
shifted the debate to immigrants’ access to welfare benefits, arguing that two, three, or five 
years of employment should be required before accessing benefits. While he echoed this 
preference several times in the debate, the fact that he mentioned different periods 
signalled his indecisiveness, and neither did he provide further arguments for any specific 
period. In his later references he tended to use “at least two years” or “two to five years”. 
Later, he also mentioned direct payments into the system worth two years of contributions 
as another form of potential contribution. This suggestion further proves the centrality of 
financial considerations and in-group interests behind his preference. He expected the 
government to keep control over welfare recipients, including immigrants, and to take 
measures and enforce deportation of immigrants in the case of non-compliance. During the 
debate Participant 84 also reflected on the migrants’ perspective, arguing that from their 
point of view it is a rational choice to be unemployed in a country with higher living 
standards. While he clearly indicated his disagreement with such conduct, he highlighted the 
financial considerations and the self-interest involved in accessing a higher level of benefits 
than in the country of origin, and the informed choice of migrants to move to another 
country.  
Agreeing with other participants, he also perceived an increase in capacity-related challenges 
in the areas of education, housing, and healthcare due to immigration. He claimed that this 
needs to be tackled by the state rejecting and not trusting the market to take care of such 
important services. He also found it problematic that investment in the development of 
infrastructure needs to be made now suspecting that related benefits would not return in 
the future. 
 
87 For more information on information packages provided before Day 2 of DF, please see Chapter 3 
– Section 3.3.1.4.  
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During the discussion about an immigration cap, Participant 84 repeated the need to 
differentiate between EU and Non-EU migration several times. Furthermore, he stressed the 
incompatibility of an immigration cap and EU open border policies. However, he did not 
elaborate on these stances, nor make any suggestions about how to reconcile the proposed 
immigration cap with free movement regulations within the EU. He only argued for selecting 
the skilled migrants needed for the country. Later in the debate he further detailed who is 
needed and who may be accepted in the country – expecting migrants to work, pay taxes, 
pay rent, or buy a house, and purchase goods. Moreover, he emphasised the need for a 
labour force as the key rationale behind allowing people to come to the UK.  
 
8.3.3.1 Tendencies to group conformism, but no significant shift in attitudes  
Analysis of Participant 84’s engagement in the discussion shows that on both days he 
articulated his attitude to immigrants in reaction to other participants’ stances by contesting 
or raising a new perspective on the issue. He rarely raised new agenda for the discussion.  
 
Table 6 - Assessment of Participant 84’s participation in the discussions 
 Participant 84 - D1 Participant 84 - D2 
Occurrence and use of majority opinion 1 5 
Counter-argument to majority opinion 2 6 
Accepting others’ arguments 0 1 
Uptake of others’ arguments 1 2 
Change in views, arguments 0 1 
Raising a specific immigration issue 0 0 
 
Comparing his participation on Day 1 and Day 2, Table 6 shows that Participant 84 took both 
sides – conforming with the majority opinion, but also articulating arguments against it. 
Although he raised counter-arguments, his narrative reveals that his arguments were often 
formal and lacked concrete justifications or alternative suggestions, which could have 
weakened their persuasive power. The only change in his views may be associated with the 
information provided in the information package regarding the share of EU migrants. While 
this change is related to the DF, it is not a result of interaction with other participants. 
Although we can identify tendencies towards group conformism, these do not seem to 




8.3.3.2 Updating attitudes - strengthened initial positions in the post-deliberation survey, 
and evidence for group conformism 
The way Participant 84 participated in the discussions, and the views he shared, are 
consistent in relation to attitudes to working and contributing migrants. Throughout the 
debate he primarily employed economic arguments and in-group interests to support his 
preferences for an immigration cap and conditions for accessing welfare benefits. This 
consistency is valid regarding his survey responses, where he indicated a requirement of at 
least one year of contribution as a condition for accessing the same rights as British citizens.  
Similarly, no change can be identified in relation to the other two immigration-related survey 
questions. It is worth to note, that in relation to the question about immigrants’ contribution, 
he thought immigrants receive more (choosing 9 on a 0-10 scale), which explains why he 
insisted on the requirement of at least two years contribution to the welfare state. However, 
within the discussions he does not elaborate on this view explicitly. 
To sum up, Participant 84 did not hold a clear pro-immigration attitude in the debates, but 
pointed out other aspects of immigration several times. The main ambivalence in his 
attitudes is based on the differentiation between contributing and non-contributing 
migrants, which he aimed to reconcile by imposing stricter conditions related to the 
requirement of contributing to earn access to welfare benefits and services. Based on the 
analysis of Participant 84’s narrative, and his pre- and post-deliberation responses, we can 
conclude that the deliberation strengthened, but did not change Participant 84’s attitudes. 
   
8.3.4 The narrative of an ambivalent attitude and positioning between in-group and out-
group identities – Participant 90  
Participant 9088 played a very specific role in the British Orange group as she was the only 
participant with a migration-related background, which fact also emerged in the discussions. 
Furthermore, in comparison to other topics, she was more active in the discussions about 
immigration on both days. Within the debates she represented both in-group and out-group 
identities and views, which makes her case particularly relevant for analysis. Throughout the 
debate she argued for a restrictive approach towards immigration control and immigrants’ 
access to welfare benefits, but ambivalences often emerged as she discussed these issues. 
 
88 Participant 90 – Female, Age 25-34, Working full-time, Education – Upper Secondary, Household 




She joined the discussion about immigration on the first day by arguing that issues with 
immigration stem from the government’s misconduct and lack of control over immigration.  
However, she also shared her perception that the issue of immigrants’ access to welfare 
benefits triggers discontent in majority society. Therefore, she called for more regulations 
and the requirement that immigrants contribute before accessing welfare benefits and the 
NHS specifically. When the group discussed the contributions of migrants, reflecting on the 
hard work and strong work ethic of Polish migrants, as stated by Participant 88, and 
contrasted this with the attitude of the in-group, Participant 90 revealed her Polish identity. 
She shared her experience of working long hours for low wages and not receiving any 
benefits as she did not qualify for them. Furthermore, she stated that she does not consider 
it fair that it is especially people on benefits (within the in-group) that accuse Polish people 
of taking their jobs. In reaction to her statement, Participant 81 clarified the difference 
between working migrants and migrants coming to take benefits. Others also confirmed their 
acceptance of contributing migrants, and Participant 90 stressed her condemnation of 
migrants who come only because of benefits. However, later in the discussion she raised the 
fact that the issue is the responsibility of the government, and individuals should not be 
blamed if the authorities allow them to enter.   
On Day 2 she took a much harsher position in the debates, in favour of strict immigration 
control especially in relation to EU migrants. Despite the fact that she is an EU migrant, she 
claimed that EU migration is out of control in contrast to Non-EU migration, which is based 
on more regulated procedures. According to her, the key differentiation is between working 
and inactive migrants. Although there are regulations that should ensure that inactive (EU) 
migrants leave the country, these are not enforced by the government. Thus, she 
emphasised again the responsibility of the government, but also admitted the difficulty of 
tracking inactive migrants. Throughout the debate she supported the proposal of an 
immigration cap and also suggested monitoring immigrants’ economic activities in the 
country and defining clear criteria for staying in the country. She claimed that long-term 
unemployed migrants (four-five years) should be deported. As a reaction to other 
participants’ concerns about the costs of infrastructure development, she suggested 
increasing the tax payments of newly arriving immigrants, which should also be paid by 
migrants who claim welfare benefits. She defended her suggestion by claiming she would 
not mind paying more tax if that guaranteed her stay in the country.   
Ambivalence also emerged concerning her stance on refugees. She recognized the neediness 
of refugees and was willing to provide help. However, taking a long-term perspective she 
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shared her concern that refugees become dependent on welfare benefits. Therefore, she 
argued for closely monitoring who is really eligible for asylum, and who could be returned. 
Furthermore, she stated that if refugees stay in the country then they should be expected to 
be of financial benefit – taking a clear stand on protecting in-group interests. 
 
8.3.4.1 Ambivalent attitudes with clear evidence for group conformism on Day 2 
Comparison of Participant 90’s engagement in the discussions on Day 1 and Day 2 reveals 
crucial differences. While on Day 1 she tended to be the voice of the minority opinion, 
bringing in the perspective and experiences of working immigrants, on Day 2 she became the 
main advocate of the majority opinion, calling for restrictions. This change in roles is 
indicated in Table 7. On Day 1, Participant 90 equally supported the majority opinion and 
challenged it. Thus, sharing both the in-group (the British majority) and out-group (immigrant 
minority) perspectives on immigration. However, on Day 2 we can identify a substantial 
decline in counter-arguments against majority opinions and she almost completely 
abandoned her reflections from the immigrants’ perspective. This change indicates the 
effects of group conformism, which may have been strengthened due to the immigration 
background of Participant 90 and her intention of proving her place in British society as a 
working and contributing ‘good immigrant’.  
Group conformism also influenced how she articulated her ambivalent positions. Although 
on Day 2, Participant 90 kept articulating and revealing ambivalence by elaborating on 
different aspects of immigration, this occurred less frequently than on Day 1. This shift is also 
indicated in the changes in her views and arguments on Day 2, as shown in Table 7.  
Table 7 - Assessment of Participant 90’s participation in the discussions 
 Participant 90 - D1 Participant 90 - D2 
Occurrence and use of majority opinion 5 8 
Counter-argument to majority opinion 5 1 
Accepting others’ arguments 0 1 
Uptake of others’ arguments 1 2 
Change in views, arguments 0 2 





8.3.4.2 Discrepancy between Participant 90’s narrative and the post-deliberation survey 
responses 
Within the debates, Participant 90 articulated rather restrictive attitudes to immigration. 
However, the way she articulated her views about immigration revealed ambivalence. She 
stressed the positive side of immigration in relation to working immigrants, defining a clear 
threshold for inclusion depending on the contribution of immigrants. This is consistent with 
her preference in the pre- and post-deliberation survey (requiring at least one year of 
employment and contribution). However, this lack of change in attitude contrasts with 
expectations based on her narrative, as on Day 2 she became one of the participants with 
the most restrictive preferences. Therefore, it is challenging to interpret her attitudes in the 
post-deliberation survey. First, we can argue that the former proposals, even if more 
restrictive, still rest on the principles of requiring employment and contributions. 
Furthermore, employment and making a contribution were the most salient issues she 
discussed during the debate. This interpretation would justify her choice in the post-
deliberation survey as a sign of a strengthened attitude. However, this unchanged choice 
also implies an inability to reflect on ambivalences clearly articulated in the debates. Second, 
we can argue that the shifts towards a more restrictive attitude were more likely to be the 
result of a higher level of group conformism on Day 2, not a result of changes in attitude 
as her focus remained on the same issues. 
Considering her view on the question whether availability of welfare benefits attract 
migrants to the country did not change. However, concerning the question about the 
contribution of immigrants, her position shifted to more restrictive stances seeing 
immigrants as receiving more benefits than they contribute (shifting from scoring 6 to 8 on 
the 0-10 scale), which underlines the effect of group conformism in relation to the most 
salient issue within the debates triggering restrictive proposals. Thus, lending support to the 







8.4 THE ADDED VALUE OF ANALYSING INDIVIDUAL NARRATIVES AND SURVEY RESPONSES 
TOGETHER  
Each case study demonstrated a particular narrative and a particular understanding of the 
issue of immigration, through which we could observe how the selected individuals 
articulated their views and attitudes. Some of the participants participated more extensively, 
bringing more wide-reaching considerations and arguments to the debates (as Participant 
11), while others were more selective about which aspects of their attitudes they wanted to 
share with the group, and elaborated on two or three specific aspects in the debates.  
Focusing on the process of attitude-formation, we can observe that the group and the 
interactions influenced both when and how individual participants engaged in the 
discussion (whether they joined the discussion to support or challenge the arguments and 
proposals shared therein) and in relation to which (sub)issue. However, shifts in individual 
attitudes often did not correspond to the changes in the group discussion. In other words, 
the key moments in the development of the discussion – as examined in Chapter 7 – did 
not necessarily have the same effect on individuals resulting shifts in individual attitudes. 
This was revealed in the narrative of Participant 84 with regard to the share of EU nationals 
among migrants, which was important for Participant 84 personally, but did not gain 
relevance in the group discussion. 89  Another example is the shift from language 
requirements to economic conditions for staying in the country in the Norwegian Red group, 
such as when Participant 11’s proposal was challenged and reformulated. While Participant 
11 accepted and agreed with the shift towards applying economic conditions, his later 
references revealed that he preferred to incorporate the learning of the Norwegian language 
into the proposals. Such differences in the impact of specific interactions on the group and 
on individuals imply the relevance of the dynamics between the group and the individuals 
(Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2007). This shows, that the reconciliation of varying views 
involves different processes at the level of the group, and at the level of the individual.  
Second, the case studies identified certain discrepancies between the attitudes presented in 
the discussions and the attitudes presented in the pre- and post-deliberation surveys. 
Accordingly, the case studies aimed to scrutinize the reasons for these discrepancies, 
focusing both on the role of group conformism and on an assessment of the appropriateness 
 
89 Limited reactions to statistical data can be due to personal beliefs and distrust in this form of 




of the survey method for revealing shifts in attitudes. Furthermore, the analysis found that 
these discrepancies tended to differ in the case of participants with ambivalent and coherent 
attitudes. The case studies showed that group conformism tended to be more influential in 
relation to participants with ambivalent attitudes. The complementary analysis of narratives 
and post-deliberation attitudes revealed that issues regarding the use of surveys emerged 
with participants with both ambivalent and coherent attitudes. The following sections 
address these differences between ambivalent and coherent attitudes and the effects of 
deliberation on individual attitude-formation.  
 
8.4.1 Studying the effects of deliberation on public attitudes  
The broader analysis of coherent, ambivalent, and contradictory attitudes showed that it was 
especially participants with ambivalent attitudes who were less likely to change their 
attitudes in the post-deliberation surveys – see Table 1-4 – Appendix 3. Three out of four 
case studies focused on the process of attitude-formation of participants with ambivalent 
attitudes, finding varying levels of group conformism in the DF discussions, and evidence for 
the limitations of surveys with regard to people with ambivalent attitudes.   
 
8.4.1.1 Ambivalent attitudes and group conformism 
Focusing on participants with ambivalent attitudes, the narratives of Participant 11, 
Participant 84 and Participant 90 indicate greater fluctuation between pro-inclusion and pro-
exclusion stances. However, the analysis also shows the broader tendency for deliberations 
to strengthen initial attitudes. To disentangle the reasons for this phenomenon of updating 
but not changing of attitudes, the case studies looked at the effects of group conformism, 
assessing the consistency of individual narratives about immigration and their survey 
responses.  
The case studies show that participants with ambivalent attitudes were more liable to group 
conformism. First, at the individual level, by having both positive and negative stances 
about immigration, the former tended to be more flexible in embracing the direction the 
group preferred. Second, in sharing both positive and negative considerations in relation to 
immigration, participants with ambivalent attitudes are also more dependent on how 
other participants react to this articulated ambivalence. The feedback (or lack of reaction) 
of other participants can essentially inform individuals about the level of openness toward 
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other, competing opinions within the group. The analysis of Participant 90’s attitudes 
reveals that group conformism greatly influenced her engagement in the discussion 
abandoning reflections on minority opinions on Day 2. Furthermore, in relation to one of the 
survey questions her response shifts to more restrictive preferences.  
These findings indicate that group conformism emerged in different forms and to a varying 
extent in the discussions. Both the use of the specific indicators of engagement with majority 
opinions (see Table 4-7) and the comparison of post-deliberation attitudes with the 
participants’ narratives captured different forms of group conformism during the 
deliberation. In the case of Participant 11 in the Norwegian Red group, group conformism 
unfolded in Participant 11’s narrative as he tended to use and support the majority opinion 
more, while counter-arguments decreased when comparing his participation on the first and 
second day. As described above, the highest level of group conformism was identified in 
relation to Participant 90. While on Day 1 she articulated minority views several times in the 
discussion, on Day 2 she advocated for the majority – restrictive – opinion. While her 
narrative clearly raises polarization effects – as discussed in Chapter 7; shift towards more 
restrictive stances in her survey responses occurred only in relation to the question on 
immigrants’ contribution, which was the most salient issue within the Orange group 
suggesting also stronger effects of group conformism.  
These findings show that group conformism acted to shape how people articulated their 
attitudes. However, this chapter also argues that group conformism alone cannot explain 
the discrepancies between the shifts in attitudes in the narrative and the lack of changes in 
the pre- and post-deliberation surveys. It is argued that this lack of change post-deliberation 
attitudes – in relation to the central question about conditions of immigrants’ inclusion in 
welfare state – is also caused by difficulty to reflecting on ambivalent positions that demand 
reconciliation of participants’ views.  
 
8.4.1.2 Ambivalent attitudes and the challenges of responding to survey questions 
One of the main critiques of public opinion surveys is that they involve the use of a rigid 
framework for measuring attitudes to a limited number of questions (Goerres and Prinzen, 
2012). Thus, what is captured in surveys is a more static picture of attitudes which does not 
enable participants to reflect on their understanding of the issue, or reveal ambivalent 
attitudes (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012). In a survey situation a participant is required to choose 
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only one answer – i.e. to reduce their position on an issue to a single response. As the case 
studies show, participants with ambivalent attitudes face a greater challenge reconciling 
their pro-inclusion and pro-exclusion preferences.  
This reconciliation or weighing of own views can activate various strategies for locating 
respondents’ positions within the available options. The case studies attempted to elaborate 
on the potential strategies based on the narratives of participants considering the high level 
of salience of particular issues, strong support for certain principles of inclusion (or 
exclusion), and the relative pro-inclusion – pro-exclusion stance represented on the scale of 
options. Furthermore, the literature assumes that people with ambivalent attitudes are 
more inclined to choose a moderate position (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012; Klopfer and 
Madden, 1980). This was the case of Participant 84 and Participant 90, but Table 3 – Appendix 
3 shows that in the UK out of the eight participants with ambivalent attitudes seven selected 
the median position in the post-deliberation survey. In Norway, similarly, seven out of nine 
participants with an ambivalent attitude chose the median response. Therefore, the question 
arises: if surveys require participants to reconcile and reduce their views to one statement, 
are they an appropriate means of measuring shifts in attitudes and assessing the effects of 
deliberations? The relevance of this question is also stressed by the case study that focused 
on a participant with coherent pro-immigration attitudes, for whom discrepancies also 
emerged. 
 
8.4.1.3 Coherent attitudes and the challenge of responding to post-deliberation surveys 
In contrast to the situation with participants with ambivalent attitudes, we cannot identify 
clear patterns of changing or updating attitudes among participants with coherent attitudes. 
As shown in Table 1 and 3 – Appendix 3, in both countries almost an equal number of 
participants changed and updated their attitudes as a result of deliberation. However, the 
case study that focused on the attitude-formation of Participant 8 highlights the tendency 
for discrepancies to emerge between the narrative and the post-deliberation survey 
responses. Participant 8 shared very coherent pro-immigration attitudes without any 
substantial shifts during the discussion. However, in the post-deliberation survey he changed 
his response, which based on his narrative rather reflects the difficulty of choosing the right 
response without relevant reference points in the pre-deliberation survey. While this proves 
the relevance of deliberations for clarifying participants’ opinions about issue, it distorts the 
findings on the effect of deliberation signalling a change in attitude even if individuals did 
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not change their positions about the issue. This finding points at the shortcomings of solely 
using pre- and post-deliberation surveys and highlights the need for the joint analysis of 
narratives and survey responses to improve how we measure the effects of deliberation.  
 
8.4.2 The benefits of using joint analysis  
Earlier studies questioned the impact of deliberation on attitude changes (Mackie, 2006; 
Mutz, 2008; Thompson, 2008), and the use of mean scores of opinion changes as evidence 
(Himmelroos and Christensen, 2014), but it has rarely been examined whether pre- and post-
deliberation surveys are appropriate ways of measuring shifts in attitudes. The analysed case 
studies revealed certain inconsistencies between participants’ narratives and attitudes as 
expressed in the surveys. Besides the effects of group conformism, the analysis found that 
the identified discrepancies may be associated with participants’ difficulties positioning their 
attitudes on the scale of available survey responses.  
Analysis of the DF discussions and processes of individual attitude-formation highlights the 
limitations of the pre- and post-deliberation surveys. First, the survey questions do not allow 
participants to distinguish between specific groups of immigrants, and we lack any 
information about how the former envision immigrants when they respond (Tourangeau et 
al., 2000). However, the discussions showed this was a highly relevant issue in terms of 
defining how to approach the inclusion of immigrants (we could identify considerable shifts 
in attitudes relative to the specific groups of immigrants). Second, surveys do not permit the 
articulation of the ambivalences and contradictions behind attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion 
(Goerres and Prinzen, 2012). In the discussions, both of these aspects – differentiations and 
ambivalence – were important in generating shifts in attitudes and affecting the 
development of discussions. Furthermore, in surveys we do not know what considerations 
the survey questions activate or what the respondent’s reasons are for choosing a position 
or a preference in relation to the survey question (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012; Tourangeau 
et al., 2000). These concerns can be mitigated if we analyse participants’ narratives as well 
as pre- and post-deliberation survey responses. While we cannot be certain about the exact 
reasons for choosing one response or the other, the narratives can reveal the details and 
complex considerations behind attitudes. Such joint analysis can better assess the effects of 
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deliberation on individual attitudes – i.e. whether it led to change in attitudes, the 
clarification of attitudes, or the strengthening of initial attitudes.90  
Joint analysis is also useful for improving the analysis of group polarization or de-polarization 
as a result of deliberations. The identified discrepancies between the narratives and the pre- 
and post-deliberation attitudes point at issues that could genuinely distort findings about 
group polarization if we were to base the analysis exclusively on a comparison of pre- and 
post-deliberation surveys. The seeming reluctance to change attitudes in the case of 
participants with ambivalent attitudes, and inclinations towards the median position, can 
significantly mask group polarization effects. However, the case study of Participant 8 also 
shows that although the participant did not change his attitude, he contributed to the de-
polarization of attitudes in the Norwegian Red group. As deliberative methods involve a 
limited number of participants, even such small details can affect the results of analysis on 
group polarization. Therefore, devoting attention to such discrepancies may be the first step 
to developing a better approach to studying group polarization.  
 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
The main contribution of this analysis was the examination of the process of individual 
attitude-formation. Furthermore, the analysis revealed the complexity and diversity of 
considerations which underline the shifts between inclusive and restrictive preferences. 
Accordingly, this chapter argued that both individual narratives and the pre- and post-
deliberation survey results need to be considered in order to identify shifts in participants’ 
attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state. The analysis of individual attitude-
formation was based on four case studies and showed that the interactions between 
participants substantially influenced the way participants shared their attitudes. The 
impact of interactions tended to be different on individual attitude-formation than on 
attitude-formation within the group. The analysis also found that the identified shifts in the 
narratives often did not correspond to the changes (or lack thereof) in the post-
deliberation surveys. This chapter has argued that both group conformism and the 
limitations of surveys contributed to these discrepancies.  
 
90 Within WelfSOC there were no follow-up surveys after the DFs, so we cannot assess the durability 
of these effects. 
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In distinguishing coherent, ambivalent, and contradictory attitudes, the analysis found that 
participants with ambivalent attitudes were most affected. On the one hand, they were more 
exposed to the effects of group conformism. On the other hand, the analysis also elaborated 
on the difficulty of choosing one single survey response and reducing the ambivalent 
attitudes, diverse considerations and arguments the participants raised in the discussions to 
one position on the scale of available – often vague – survey responses. However, such 
difficulties also emerged in the case study of the participant with a coherent attitude, for 
whom we could observe a change in attitude in the post-deliberation survey, but no shifts in 
his narrative. While this finding confirms the positive effect of deliberations in terms of how 
deliberation can help participants to clarify their attitudes, the identified discrepancies reveal 
that findings can be potentially distorted when exclusively using pre- and post-deliberation 
surveys to analyse the effects of deliberation.  
Although this analysis focused on a limited number of case studies, the findings provide 
important evidence of the need to complement the findings of pre- and post-deliberation 
surveys with the analysis of individual narratives. During the deliberations, participants 
expressed the complex considerations underlying their attitudes, which revealed shifts 
between preferences for the inclusion and exclusion of immigrants. These shifts can be 
clearly identified in their narratives, but tend to be hidden in participants’ survey responses. 
The joint analysis allowed us to critically reflect on the impact of group conformism in the 
discussions and on the limitations of surveys in terms of revealing shifts in attitudes. On the 
one hand, the analysis of narratives and reflections on the diversity of arguments behind 
attitudes mitigates the limitations of the surveys related to their very structured framework. 
On the other hand, surveys can be useful for revealing the impacts of group conformism. As 
pointed out, the analysis of both of these forms of expressing attitudes is relevant to 
improving the evaluation of the effects of deliberation, and that of group polarization in 




9 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION 
 
9.1 THE AIMS AND SCOPE OF THIS RESEARCH 
 
This thesis was dedicated to analysing public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare 
state in Norway and the United Kingdom. Taking a novel approach – using a combination of 
the deliberative method of democratic forums (DF) and discourse analysis –, the research 
was designed to study public attitudes through social interactions, and to scrutinize the 
dynamism of attitude-formation. The analysis of DF discussions and interactions between 
participants enabled us to investigate not only the question what considerations affect 
attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state, but also how these considerations 
and conditions of access to welfare tended to change depending on the specific groups of 
immigrants, the specific contexts, and social situations. This concluding chapter reviews the 
findings of this research, highlighting the key theoretical and methodological contributions 
it brought to the study of welfare attitudes, and elaborating on the implications for future 
research.   
First, in contrast to the most widely used methods of public opinion surveys, the DFs enabled 
participants to debate various aspects of immigration. Being able to observe and analyse 
how participants understand, approach, and link various aspects of immigration and the 
welfare state (that they are members of) revealed that attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in 
the welfare state did change in the course of discussion. The findings suggest that we should 
not simplify the issue of immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state as one single attitude – 
either ‘for’ or ‘against’ the inclusion of immigrants (en masse). On the contrary, confirming 
Hypothesis No. 1, the research found that attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion involve various 
considerations and create ambivalence, as people share both positive and negative 
perceptions of immigration and immigrants. Furthermore, people do differentiate 
between immigrants, thus preferences for inclusion and exclusion also vary depending on 
the specific groups of immigrants. Changes in attitudes can be identified considering the 
specific social contexts, which may be related to the in-group, to the welfare state in the 
country of destination, and to the social contexts and social situations that immigrants 
face. Throughout the thesis, this variance has been conceptualised as an abstract continuum 
between inclusion and exclusion, along which public preferences can shift – from being 
strictly against illegal immigrants or illegitimate asylum-seekers, being more open to 
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supporting legitimate refugees, or having a preference for stricter requirements towards 
economic migrants before granting them access to welfare provisions. However, as the 
research shows, differentiations and the specification of the conditionality of accessing 
welfare benefits and services do not stop at this broad level. DF participants debated and 
argued about their expectations of immigrants, which highlights one of the added values of 
DFs – that they grant a high level of autonomy to participants to elaborate on their opinions, 
experiences, attitudes, and preferences.  
This leads to our second key finding: that these movements along the inclusion-exclusion 
continuum differed between Norway and the United Kingdom, confirming Hypothesis No. 
3. While we can identify similarities between the two countries in terms of the specific policy 
areas and the key guiding principles of inclusion or exclusion (such as the requirements of 
contributions to the welfare state), the DF discussions unveiled crucial differences in 
understandings of the issue of immigration and the approaches proposed for specific groups 
of immigrants. Furthermore, confirming Hypothesis No. 2, the thesis found evidence that 
these differences can be traced back to the country-specific institutional and social 
context, which unfold both in perceptions of the in-group – i.e. what the needs and interests 
of the country of destination are – and in perceptions of the out-group – i.e. what the 
expectations towards immigrants are.  
The four main ambitions of this research were 1) to analyse how people talk about 
immigration and what considerations affect their attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion 
(addressing Research Question 1 and 2); 2) to capture and analyse the dynamism of 
attitude-formation (Research Question 4), and 3) to compare public attitudes to immigrants’ 
inclusion in the two case-study countries, including finding out more about why there was a 
more inclusive approach in Norway and a more exclusive approach in the UK (Research 
Question 3). Understanding the latter is considered particularly important for informing us  
about the opportunities for facilitating social inclusion in public debates in the future. Last, 
the thesis aimed 4) to assess the applicability of DF and discourse analysis for the study of 
welfare attitudes. In order to address these aims, content analysis of the DF discussions was 
conducted. Furthermore, the findings of the content analysis were complemented by an 
analysis of the process of attitude-formation. The research approached the investigation of 
public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion and the investigation of the dynamism of attitude-
formation from four (interrelated) perspectives, which were presented in the four analytical 
chapters of this thesis:  
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1) Drawing on Welfare Deservingness Theory, Chapter 5 analysed attitudes to 
immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state through DF participants’ perceptions of 
immigrants’ welfare deservingness elaborating on the diversity of considerations 
behind attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion. 
2) Deepening the analysis of attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion, Chapter 6 focused on 
the social practise of constructing welfare deservingness differentiating conditions 
of inclusion for refugees and economic migrants. 
3) Complementing the findings of the content analysis, Chapter 7 scrutinized the 
process of attitude-formation within the groups based on one Norwegian and one 
British case study with particular attention to interactions between participants and 
to the effects of group dynamics.  
4) Keeping focus on the analysis of the process of attitude-formation, Chapter 8 looked 
at the dynamism of attitude-formation from the perspective of individuals by 
analysing the narratives and pre- and post-deliberation survey responses of two 
Norwegian and two British DF participants.  
As the research addresses a complex issue, this complexity is also reflected in the theoretical 
framework. Therefore, it is important to review the theoretical foundations of the research 
in order to facilitate discussion of the research findings and the contributions of the research 
to the broader field of attitude research.  
 
9.2 THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RESEARCH  
As this research embarked on studying the diversity of considerations behind public attitudes 
and the dynamism of attitude-formation, it drew on four theories which formed the key 
pillars of the research approach. First, the fundamentals of this research were established on 
the social constructivist understanding of public attitudes. Accordingly, public attitudes 
were considered dynamic social concepts which are shaped by the institutional and social 
context and public discourse, and by social interaction (Converse, 2006; Tourangeau et al., 
2000; Wilson and Hodges, 1992). In line with this understanding, it was argued that public 
attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state are not static but fluid and dynamically 
developing. Deliberative methods such as DFs also adhere to the social constructivist 
understanding of public attitudes. Furthermore, DFs enable us to study attitudes through 
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social interactions. Thus, the method facilitates an analysis of the impact of the wider social 
context on public attitudes and how attitudes can vary in relation to different social contexts.  
Second, the topic of immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state involves intergroup relations. 
Therefore, the research builds on Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel et al., 1971) 
which claims that individual identity is shaped by group membership and gives rise to 
differentiations between the in-group – “us” – and the out-group – “them” (Tajfel et al. 1971; 
Turner 1975; Brewer 1979). Within the scope of this research intergroup differentiations 
were chosen as a means of analysing attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion arguing that 
understanding both the perceptions of the in-group and perceptions of the out-group are 
necessary to comprehend attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion. 
Third, to narrow the scope of the research, the research drew on Welfare Deservingness 
Theory (Van Oorschot, 2000; Van Oorschot et al., 2017) based on the assumption that people 
are more willing to include those whom they perceive as deserving. In line with Welfare 
Deservingness Theory, attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state were analysed 
through participants’ (in-group) perceptions of immigrants’ welfare deservingness (out-
group). Perceptions of welfare deservingness inherently involved considerations about the 
preferred relations between immigrants and the state, and about the preferred role of 
immigrants within the country of destination. This leads us to the Dynamic institutionalist 
approach to the study of welfare attitudes (Mau, 2003; Larsen, 2006, 2013; Sundberg, 2014) 
and to an analysis of how the institutional and the social context shape attitudes to 
immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state. Furthermore, the institutionalist approach gained 
particular significance in explaining the differences between the discussions about 
immigration in the Norwegian and the British DFs.     
These four theories were highly influential in developing the scope of the research. The 
application of these four theoretical approaches describes the complexity of the research 
approach and the ambitions of the research in terms of its contribution to the knowledge. 






9.3 DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Focusing on the central argument of this thesis about dynamically changing attitudes to 
immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state, the following sections elaborate on the evidence 
that supports this finding and disentangle how this dynamism of attitude-formation emerged 
in the discussions.  
 
9.3.1 The effect of perceptions of the in-group  
One of the foremost findings of the research is that the considerations that affect attitudes 
to immigrants’ inclusion are not restricted to perceptions about immigrants (out-group) in 
the country of destination. The discussions about immigration showed that perceptions 
about the in-group are equally important. Chapter 5, focusing on perceptions of immigrants’ 
welfare deservingness, elaborated on the interplay between perceptions of the in-group 
and perceptions of the out-group. By introducing the ‘Good Citizen – Good Immigrant’ 
Model, the analysis found evidence for how internalized country- and welfare-state-specific 
visions of ‘good citizens’ shaped expectations about immigrants and thus visions of ‘good 
immigrants’.  
Focusing specifically on considerations affecting attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion, the 
analysis revealed that of the five deservingness criteria – namely Reciprocity, Attitude, 
Control, Need, and Identity (Cook, 1979; Swaan, 1988; Van Oorschot, 2000) the principle of 
Reciprocity and Attitude dominated the debates. The frequent emergence of these two 
principles (often used in parallel) indicates the significance of considerations about 
contributions to the welfare state (Reciprocity) and expectations about adapting to the 
rules and interests of the country of destination (Attitude). The latter included the 
expectation that immigrants would not intentionally misuse the welfare system. However, if 
we look at the expectations linked to these deservingness principles, we can observe how 
the perceptions of the in-group influence what is required from immigrants. In the UK, the 
emphasis was put on different forms of economic contributions (associated with the 
principle of Reciprocity) and on the individual’s responsibility to be active in the labour 
market, thereby earning entitlement to welfare benefits, and to be financially independent 
from the state (Attitude). Perceptions of hard-work and a strong work ethic (Attitude) were 
also considered as characteristics of ‘good immigrants’. These expectations played a crucial 
role in justifying restrictive measures and a selective immigration system that favours skilled 
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immigrants who make limited demands for state support. In Norway, in addition to the 
desired economic contributions, participants also raised cultural expectations – concerning 
learning the language, learning about Norwegian society, and participating in society 
(Attitude). The latter expectations were justified as a means of integrating immigrants and 
making them understand and become committed to fulfilling the collective responsibility 
towards state and society.  
The differences between the understandings of these principles follow the key institutional 
differences between the British liberal-leaning and the Norwegian social democratic welfare 
system. These considerations reveal how these institutions become internalized in 
individuals and naturally emerge in the debates and in participants’ justifications for the 
inclusion or exclusion of (certain groups of) immigrants. However, not only does the 
institutional context have framing effects: the social context in the country, perceptions 
about social issues and the related public and political discourse also influenced how the 
issue of immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state was approached and discussed. We should 
stress here that the institutional and social context are highly intertwined, as perceptions 
about social issues and the related public discourse draw on and amplify institutional effects. 
To put it simply, the institutional context tends to provide the lenses through which people 
view society, its aims and values, and tends to be more stable and long-lasting, while the 
social context moderates the salience of perceptions about the issues, needs, and interests 
of society, and can be more dynamic and more responsive to recent social, political, and 
economic developments.   
The role of in-group perceptions was further strengthened as the analysis found that 
participants were less perceptive of immigrants’ neediness. In contrast, immigrants’ welfare 
deservingness was much more affected by perceptions of the (in-group’s) country’s needs 
and interests as well as the country’s financial and institutional capacities in both countries. 
For instance, perceptions about the need for a foreign labour force and the need to counter 
the challenges of ageing population (raised only in Norway) were important justifications for 
immigration and seeing immigrants as bringing benefits to the country. However, 
perceptions of limited institutional and financial capacities activated restriction mechanisms. 
This counterbalancing role of perceived institutional and financial capacities also points at 
the dynamism of attitude-formation with regard to how needs for immigration can be 
refined as participants engage in further consideration.  
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Based on these findings about the perceptions of the in-group, it was argued that articulated 
In-group needs and interests functioned as a framework within which immigrants’ welfare 
deservingness was considered, with the expectation that immigrants should meet these 
needs and contribute to attaining the desired social aims. Furthermore, Chapter 6 
elaborated on how the expectations linked to In-group needs changed depending on the 
specific group of immigrants, and how the fulfilment of these In-group needs could shift 
perceptions of immigrants’ deservingness and thus trigger movements along the 
aforementioned imaginary continuum between preferences for inclusion and exclusion. In 
line with this, the next section addresses the perceptions of the out-group.  
 
9.3.2 The effect of perceptions of the out-group  
Chapter 6 analysed the social practise of constructing the welfare deservingness of refugees 
and economic migrants. Thus, the research aspired to draw attention to the diversity of the 
immigrant population and argued for the need to stop treating immigrants as one 
homogeneous group. It was considered important to examine how participants approached 
immigrants – whether they treat them as one group. The discussions showed that the latter 
did further differentiate. However, the boundaries of the specific subgroups tended to be 
blurred in some cases. Besides the differences in how people assess and frame the specific 
situation and the deservingness of these groups, the analysis revealed ambivalences and 
shifts in preferences regarding the specific groups of immigrants. Such differentiation within 
the specific groups of immigrants provides further evidence for the dynamism of attitude-
formation and shifts in preferences for inclusion or exclusion.  
Focusing on the practise of constructing welfare deservingness, the analysis found 
substantial differences in the importance awarded the five deservingness criteria in relation 
to refugees and economic migrants. With regard to refugees, moral considerations related 
to the principles of Need and Control were most relevant. Perceptions of refugees’ lack of 
control over their migration, and over their situation in the country of origin (Control) was 
the basis of recognizing their neediness and deservingness. However, the analysis found 
that such moral judgements tended to be very fragile and any perceptions of cheating the 
refugee system or misusing the welfare system reduced solidarity with refugees. Thus, any 
indication of the control of immigrants – such as the choice of the destination country – were 
treated with suspicion in both countries and in most cases such perceptions implied a 
preference for exclusion and deportation.  
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The discussions on refugees in both countries gave rise to the articulation of ambivalence – 
as participants perceived it important to help refugees in a crisis situation, but shared 
concerns about the capacity of the state to accommodate them. Such ambivalences 
intensified once participants started to discuss the long-term stay of refugees in the country 
of destination, which stresses the centrality of the time dimension and the temporariness 
of solidarity with refugees. Shifting from a short-term perspective related to the arrival of 
refugees in the country of destination to a long-term perspective, we can observe how the 
argumentation changed. The moral framing of deservingness shifted to more practical 
considerations. When taking the long-term perspective, the assessment of refugees’ and 
economic migrants’ deservingness converged, and practical considerations and 
compliance with In-group needs superseded moral considerations. Thus, principles of 
Reciprocity, Attitude, and Identity prevailed and considerations about contributions and 
adaptation to the rules and values of the country of destination were seen as more relevant. 
The example of refugees provides evidence for changing attitudes that relate to 
considerations and perceptions of refugees’ lack of control over their migration and 
perceptions, and the emergence of stricter, more practical expectations when a long-term 
perspective is employed. 
In contrast to the situation with refugees, moral justifications were not raised in relation to 
economic migrants’ welfare deservingness, which fact is closely linked to the widely shared 
perception in both countries that economic migrants have full control over their migration 
and their movement to the country of destination occurs out of free choice (Control). This 
perception basically rules out any considerations of economic migrants’ neediness and 
justifies limiting state responsibility for their welfare and social security. This was especially 
the case in the British debates, in which participants required full financial independence and 
self-sufficiency in the first two years (at most) to earn entitlement to social rights 
(Reciprocity, Attitude). Preferences for self-sufficiency were seen as important in Norway, 
too. However, in Norway self-sufficiency was interpreted more broadly, including the 
requirement of participating in society (Reciprocity, Attitude). Furthermore, responsibility 
over labour market engagement was not fully shifted to the individual, as all three Norwegian 
groups critically reflected on discrimination in the labour market (Control). This also indicates 
recognition of collective responsibilities – the sharing of responsibility for the facilitation of 
immigrants’ integration between the state, majority society, and the individual.  
Both the British and the Norwegian debates revealed that economic migrants’ contributions, 
and adaptation to the rules and values of the country of destination, increased perceptions 
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of economic migrants’ deservingness and thus preferences for inclusion in the welfare state. 
However, perceptions of misuse of the benefit system had particularly detrimental effects. 
Perceptions of the intentional use of welfare benefits, long-term unemployment, and 
remitting benefits were seen as the biggest issues. Comparison of the two countries shows 
that these concerns were more salient in the British discussion, as all three small groups 
proposed policy recommendations for limiting immigrants’ access to welfare benefits and 
services. The British discussions show that perceptions of the misuse of the welfare system 
and welfare dependency had greater weight in the discussions than the perceived benefits 
of immigration, immigrants’ hard-work, or a strong work ethic. This imbalance also emerged 
in perceptions of immigrants – both refugees and economic migrants – as representing a cost 
to the state, explaining the overwhelming support for restrictive policy recommendations. In 
contrast to this, in Norway we can identify a preference for seeing immigrants – both 
refugees and economic migrants – as resources for the country. Considering the need for a 
labour force, especially in light of the challenges of an ageing population, integration was 
proposed as being able to moderate perceived cultural differences and prevent a potential 
increase in inequality. Thus, perceived concerns about the misuse of welfare were addressed 
by a desire for facilitating integration and reducing labour market discrimination.  
Focusing both on the policy proposals and on the justifications for immigration reveals 
further evidence about the significant interplay between in-group and out-group 
perceptions. The findings presented so far focused on the content of the debates. However, 
understanding the attitudes evinced in social interaction called for the analysis of the process 
of interaction to reveal how the latter affected attitude-formation and led to the final policy 
proposals. 
 
9.3.3 Processes of attitude-formation within the group 
Within the discussions, interactions between participants embodied the dynamism of 
attitude-formation. Therefore, Chapter 7 shed light on the process of interactions and on the 
impact of interactions on shifts in attitudes within the group that led to the final policy 
proposals deliberated by the group.  Focusing on attitude-formation within the group, the 
analysis highlighted the relevance of distinguishing the homogeneity and heterogeneity of 
views within the groups. It was argued that it is important to reflect on how agreement 
about restrictive or inclusive policy proposals was reached, as the process of discussion has 
implications for the scope of attitude-formation. Furthermore, the analysis showed that 
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homogeneity and heterogeneity of views influenced the meanings and functions of specific 
forms of interaction. For instance, introducing a new perspective in a discussion with an 
overwhelming consensus further underlined the majority opinion, but in a discussion with 
competing views it broadened the scope of discussions by leading to the consideration of 
other options or minority opinions. In terms of focusing on the homogeneity and 
heterogeneity of opinions in group discussions, the analysis found substantial differences 
between the British and the Norwegian case studies.  
The British case study – examining the Orange group’s discussion about immigration on the 
second day of DF – exhibited a high level of homogeneity of views. Accordingly, the 
agreement on policy proposals relied on a widely shared consensus about the need for 
immigration control in the UK. Although the Orange group approached the issue from various 
perspectives – discussing the role of the government, differentiating between EU and non-
EU citizens, elaborating on the needs and capacities of the country to welcome immigrants, 
etc. – most of the arguments reinforced the consensus about the need for immigration 
control. While the interactions shed light on the various considerations and reasons behind 
restrictive preferences, the former all strengthened the majority opinion and tended to 
discourage articulation of dissenting views and preferences. Therefore, interactions 
between participants were rather complementary. This also implied the more limited scope 
for attitude-formation, and raised the risk of group polarization – i.e. a shift towards more 
extreme preferences than the participants’ initial preferences (Sunstein, 2002).  
In the Norwegian case study – based on Red group’s discussion about immigration on the 
second day of the DF – agreement about policy proposals was reached through a more 
contested debate which required the reconciliation of conflicting views and differing 
preferences for the inclusion of immigrants. The heterogeneity of views facilitated 
considerable shifts in the discussions and also shifts between preferences for inclusion and 
exclusion. The process of reconciliation required participants to convince each other. 
Therefore, the interactions between participants had an argumentative character, thus 
creating greater scope for attitude-formation and encouraging other participants to re-
consider their own preferences in light of the new arguments. 
Although deliberative methods – including DF – employ a specific research design to facilitate 
greater heterogeneity of views and the de-polarization of views as a result of deliberation 
(Fishkin, 2011; Luskin et al., 2007; Mansbridge, 2010), Chapter 7 argued that other factors 
can shape the direction and the outcome of such discussions. The findings provide evidence 
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for the impact of the institutional and social context on the process of interactions. 
Accordingly, it was argued that the overwhelming consensus for restrictive measures in the 
British discussion reflected the key institutions – both welfare and immigration policies – as 
well as the particular social context (including the political and public discourse) in 2015. Both 
individualism and means-testing, two crucial features of the British welfare state, encourage 
selectivity and conditionality (Dwyer, 2000; Larsen, 2006; Sainsbury, 2012). Furthermore, a 
selective immigration system has been in force in relation to non-EU nationals, and 
restrictive measures were adopted after 2010 (Anderson, 2017). The public and the political 
discourse advanced immigration control and restrictions as the correct response to the 
challenges experienced in the UK. The joint effect of the institutional and the social context 
contributed to the framing of discussions on immigration and made a restrictive approach 
unquestionable within the British discussion, leading to the significant homogeneity of 
views. Findings about group polarization effects in the Orange group were mixed. We cannot 
clearly identify a shift towards more extreme preferences. Still, the discussions revealed the 
strength of the majority opinion about the need for immigration control, despite the fact 
that the British discussions (during the two days) also touched upon the benefits of 
immigration and recognized the contributions of immigrants to the country.  
In Norway, the policy proposals were more inclusive. However, it is important to stress that 
the discussions considered both preferences for inclusion and exclusion, as the Norwegian 
case study showed. This duality can be identified in the Norwegian institutional and social 
context. On the one hand, the Norwegian welfare state, in promoting the principles of 
universalism and egalitarianism, supports the reduction of social inequalities (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017). This feature was considered important in the 
DF discussions in relation to immigrants, too. Furthermore, due to the strong sense of 
collectivity, individuals are seen within (networks of) broader society, which helps with 
critical reflection not only on immigrants’ individual responsibility towards society, but also 
on the responsibility of society towards immigrants. This understanding fostered support for 
inclusive measures to enhance individual opportunities to work and contribute. On the other 
hand, the strong sense of collectivity, and the fact that welfare identity is an integral part of 
Norwegian identity (Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017), may also activate preferences for social 
closure. This understanding also emerged in the form of discussions about cultural 
differences and putting emphasis on adapting to Norwegian rules and values, and to the 
Norwegian way of life. The tension between preferences for inclusion and exclusion gave rise 
to ambivalences and conflicting views, as shown in the case study. The discussion of the Red 
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Group led to convergence between participants’ attitudes, thereby confirming de-
polarization effects. 
Chapter 7 focused on the process of attitude-formation within the groups, which also meant 
that the effect of each statement and argument was dependent on the reaction to it (Goodin, 
2000). Entering into interactions empowered participants to reinforce social norms and 
social expectations, which could have then unfolded in terms of an increase in openness, and 
greater consideration of every – popular and less popular – opinion. However, it also enabled 
participants to abandon and not listen to certain unpopular views and instead shift the 
discussion to other ideas and thoughts. We cannot determine whether the latter occurred 
consciously or subconsciously in the discussions, but it affected how discussions developed 
and the process of attitude-formation within the groups. However, at the individual level 
such silenced arguments can make a difference and induce re-consideration. This is why 
Chapter 8 was designed to examine the processes of individual attitude-formation and to 
uncover the differences in the effect of interactions at the level of the group and the level of 
the individual. 
 
9.3.4 Processes of attitude-formation at the individual level 
Chapter 8 used both the narrative of selected participants as well as their pre- and post-
deliberation survey responses to elaborate on the process of attitude-formation and on the 
impact of deliberations on the process of attitude-formation. This joint analysis enabled us 
to identify shifts in individuals’ attitudes to the inclusion of immigrants in the welfare state, 
but also to better understand the attitudes presented in the post-deliberation survey.  
Within the research, the effects of deliberation on public attitudes were understood in terms 
of changes in attitudes and the updating of attitudes (i.e. confirming pre-deliberation 
attitudes) as a result of deliberation (Barabas, 2004). An important element of the analysis 
was that it distinguished between the narratives of participants with ambivalent and 
coherent attitudes. Following this approach, the analysis found that participants with 
ambivalent attitudes were more inclined to update attitudes instead of changing them. 
The narratives exhibited shifts in preferences for the inclusion and exclusion of immigrants 
depending on various considerations, providing further evidence for the central argument of 
the thesis about the existence of changing, dynamic attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion. 
However, most often these shifts between preferences for inclusion and exclusion left no 
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mark on participants’ post-deliberative survey responses. This finding raises the question 
what explains the discrepancy between the narratives and the post-deliberation survey 
attitudes.  
The analysis found that participants with ambivalent attitudes were subjected to group 
conformism to a greater extent, as the former – in sharing both positive and negative 
perceptions – could be induced to support the majority opinion more easily. Evidence for 
the effects of group conformism emerged both in the narratives and during the comparison 
of attitudes presented in the discussions and in survey responses. In this respect, the analysis 
of Participant 90’s attitude-formation provides an interesting case as the effects of group 
conformism strengthened on Day 2, when discussing policy proposals. As a result, Participant 
90 shifted toward majority opinion in her narrative on Day 2. Moreover, in relation to one of 
the three survey questions she shifted towards more restrictive stances, which underlines 
the concerns about group polarization raised in Chapter 7.  
Chapter 8 argued that group conformism alone does not explain the identified discrepancy 
and lack of change in post-deliberation surveys. It proposed an alternative explanation – 
namely, that participants are challenged to match their ambivalent attitudes to one of the 
five potential responses to the survey question about immigrants’ inclusion, which might 
have discouraged them from changing their attitudes in the post-deliberation survey. 
Therefore, particular attention was devoted to examining various strategies for identifying 
the most suitable survey response in light of the attitudes and arguments shared during 
the discussions. These strategies related to the choice of a middle position in relation to the 
most salient issues participants discussed throughout the two days of discussion, or the 
individuals’ choice of a middle position between the most inclusive and most exclusive 
attitudes in the survey. Locating their own position in the range of survey responses also 
raised challenges for participants with coherent attitudes. The case of Participant 8 also 
shows that although the former had a coherent attitude to immigrants’ inclusion which did 
not change during the discussions, he changed his position in the post-deliberation survey.  
Based on the case studies, Chapter 8 pointed out that both group conformism and the 
limitations of the pre- and post-deliberation surveys have significant implications for the 
assessment of the effects of deliberation. These implications may be especially important 
for the evaluation of group polarization. Both group conformism and the limitations of 
surveys in terms of capturing more nuanced shifts in attitudes can distort findings about 
group polarization if the related analysis is based on a comparison of pre- and post-
 258 
 
deliberative surveys only. Therefore, Chapter 8 argued for the joint analysis of narratives and 
pre- and post-deliberation survey responses, which together can reveal not only the impact 
of group conformism, but also important information that helps better understand 
participants’ survey responses and improves the study of group polarization.  
The past sections reviewed the key empirical findings of the research, primarily focusing on 
the evidence for the dynamism of attitude-formation and the diversity of considerations 
underlying public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state. Drawing on these 
findings, the following section points out the key theoretical contributions to Welfare 
Deservingness Theory and Institutionalism – more precisely the Dynamic institutionalist 
approach to the study of welfare attitudes.  
 
9.4 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
As described above, the research draws on four theoretical foundations: namely, Social 
Constructivism, Social Identity Theory, Welfare Deservingness Theory, and Institutionalism. 
While all four theories were influential in the research, Social Identity Theory and intergroup 
differentiation were used mostly as a means of approaching the analysis of attitudes. 
Furthermore, the social constructivist approach had significant bearing on the whole 
research process, including the methodology, and the remaining two theories. Therefore, 
the findings related to Social Constructivism are appraised together with contributions to 
Welfare Deservingness Theory and Institutionalism. 
 
9.4.1 Welfare Deservingness Theory 
So far, literature on welfare deservingness has relied on quantitative research methods – 
primarily international public opinion surveys, and more recently, survey experiments (Van 
Oorschot et al., 2017). Therefore, our knowledge tends to be limited about people’s use and 
understanding of the five deservingness principles, and about the hierarchy of these 
principles. This is the area in which this research aimed to contribute. Before turning to the 
concrete contributions, it is important to stress that within the scope of this research only 
the welfare deservingness of immigrants was analysed and comparison to other welfare 
beneficiaries’ deservingness was not raised. 
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Focusing first on the use of the five welfare deservingness principles, this research confirms 
the universal applicability of these five criteria as all of them emerged in the discussions on 
immigration in both countries. However, the research also found that the understanding of 
these five criteria tended to differ in these two countries. Thereby, also shedding light on 
the impact of institutions on conceptualisation and the use of the criteria in the discussions 
on immigration. Furthermore, through the analysis of the specific understandings of these 
principles we could further specify the definitions of deservingness criteria. On the one hand, 
the analysis of the discussions revealed that deservingness criteria were used in a broader 
sense not restricted to immigrants’ access to welfare benefits and services. For instance, in 
the literature the principle of Attitude tended to be defined as compliance with the expected 
behaviour and being thankful for benefits received (Van Oorschot, 2000; Van Oorschot et al., 
2017). In contrast, in the discussions participants also expected immigrants’ compliance in 
terms of participation in the labour market and in society.  
While neediness is considered to be at the heart of deservingness judgements in general, it 
was an important finding that perceptions of immigrants’ neediness tended to be limited. 
In this regard, the finding that In-group needs were more influential with regard to 
perceptions of immigrants’ deservingness was crucial. Based on this finding, In-group needs 
were incorporated into the deservingness model as a subcategory of the Need principle. 
From the perspective of Welfare Deservingness Theory, it is thus considered particularly 
important to examine and test whether In-group needs also play such an important role in 
relation to other groups of welfare beneficiaries – such as retired, disabled, or unemployed 
people. While the DF discussions provide relevant data for analysing it, this objective was 
outside the scope of this particular research effort.  
Findings about the ranking and relations between these specific deservingness criteria also 
enhanced our understanding of how the deservingness of immigrants is assessed and which 
principles are considered important and why. Furthermore, revealing the linkages between 
the specific principles (for instance, between Reciprocity and Attitude) and the overlapping 
use of these principles also provided new information about how the same context and same 
requirements are approached from various perspectives of deservingness (represented by 
the specific deservingness criteria).   
The analysis of the practise of construction of the welfare deservingness of refugees and 
economic migrants shed light on the dynamism involved in how perceptions of 
deservingness change depending on the specific group of beneficiaries. Furthermore, 
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Chapter 6 also elaborated on changes in the framing of deservingness depending on the 
specific group of immigrants and on the time dimension. Distinguishing between the moral 
and practical framing of deservingness revealed differences in the hierarchy of deservingness 
principles. Moral framing mobilized perceptions of Control and Need, while practical 
framing stressed achievements related to Reciprocity and Attitude. These findings raise a 
question for future research: whether moral and practical framing of deservingness is 
applied to other groups of beneficiaries, and whether we can observe any shifts from one 
type of framing to another.  
Last, the analysis of DFs provided new evidence for the institutional approach to welfare 
deservingness (Larsen, 2006, 2013; Mewes and Mau, 2013; Van Der Waal et al., 2013), 
arguing that welfare institutions influence perceptions of welfare deservingness, and 
justifications for providing state support to specific groups of welfare beneficiaries. This leads 
us to the contributions of this research to knowledge about Institutionalism.  
 
9.4.2 Dynamic institutionalist approach to the study of welfare attitudes 
Within the broader institutional approach to the study of welfare attitudes, this research 
primarily draws on and provides new evidence about the Dynamic institutionalist approach 
to welfare attitudes represented by Mau (2003) and Larsen (2006, 2013). Inspired by 
Sundberg’s (2014) finding that public attitudes adapt to changes in institutions and to 
changes in social context, this research was intended to scrutinize the dynamic interplay 
between public attitudes and the institutional and social context. It focused on whether and 
how institutional and social context emerges in the DF discussions and how this influences 
public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state.  
Within the DFs, institutional patterns unfolded very clearly as participants started to 
debate the future of the welfare state in the UK and Norway. However, it was considered 
important to analyse how and in relation to which social issues or policies these patterns 
emerged. Within this research, the institutional context was understood in terms of 
immigration, welfare, and labour market policies. Following Sainsbury (2012), it was argued 
that understanding the issue of immigration, and specifically immigrants’ inclusion in the 
welfare state, requires the analysis of these three policy areas at least. In this respect, 
Chapter 4 found that both Norway and the UK have inclusive and exclusive elements 
regarding immigrants in their institutional system, which further increased the relevance of 
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the analysis in terms of the need to scrutinise which aspects are seen as more important by 
participants. Norway has an inclusive welfare system based on universalism (Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Pedersen and Kuhnle, 2017). However, there is a very strong sense of 
collectivity and welfare identity is an inherent part of the Norwegian identity (Pedersen and 
Kuhnle, 2017), which tends to counterbalance the inclusivity of welfare institutions. The 
labour market is highly regulated and more rigid towards foreigners, especially towards low-
skilled migrants (Halvorsen et al., 2016; Veggeland, 2016). In terms of immigration policies 
there is a differentiated system that offers more privileged treatment for EU and EEA citizens 
and stricter rules for Non-EU, Non-EEA nationals (Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012).  
The liberal-leaning British welfare system is considered to be more exclusive. Individualism 
– the key value and feature of liberal welfare regimes – suggests lower expectations for the 
individual towards society, but it also means limited interference and support from the state 
(Dwyer, 2000; Larsen, 2006; Sainsbury, 2012). While an open and less regulated labour 
market is more welcoming towards immigrants, the state has fewer responsibilities in terms 
of reducing the potential disadvantages created by the free labour market. As in Norway, 
immigration policies are differentiated, with a highly selective immigration system for Non-
EU nationals and free movement of EU nationals. The duality in the Norwegian and British 
system can also facilitate the dynamism of attitude-formation as the importance of specific 
institutional aspects can change depending on the specific groups of immigrants and on the 
specific social contexts considered. While institutions are relatively stable and path-
dependent, the discourse and the framing of policies are more flexible to adapt to new social 
contexts and new social challenges.  
These institutional features prominently emerged and shaped participants’ understanding of 
the issue of immigration and differences regarding how Norwegian and British participants 
perceived immigrants as “resources” or “costs” for the country. However, it should be 
stressed that the discussions also pointed at some misperceptions regarding the welfare 
state. Such misperceptions emerged in relation to the perceived generosity of the British 
welfare state and about immigrants’ access to welfare benefits and services. Participants’ 
argumentation showed that the considerations and concerns that influenced participants’ 
understanding of the issue of immigration were not devoid of the institutional and social 
context. We can very precisely identify how key public discourses and the framing of the 
respective policies are reproduced in the debates, confirming previous research findings 
(Larsen, 2014; Mau and Burkhardt, 2009; Soroka et al., 2016). The above-mentioned 
misperceptions about the welfare state also demonstrate the shortcomings of public and 
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political debates that often reproduce and misuse these misperceptions for their own 
political or economic interests. Focusing on Norway, an awareness of cultural differences 
between Norwegians and immigrants played a distinctive role in the Norwegian discussions 
and followed the centrality of language courses in Norwegian integration policies 
(Brochmann and Hagelund, 2012; Veggeland, 2016).  
The analysis of perceptions of welfare deservingness of immigrants presented in Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6 revealed very accurately the influence of institutional and social context on 
the understanding of the five deservingness principles, and on how participants formulated 
their expectations towards immigrants. From the perspective of actual preferences for the 
inclusion or exclusion of immigrants, the analysis showed that perceptions of social 
inequalities and concerns about the increasing gap between the majority and immigrants 
were important determinants of Norwegian participants’ support for integration measures 
and reducing inequalities. In contrast, in the British debates perceptions of social inequalities 
triggered preferences for prioritising the in-group. Together with scarcity perceptions, they 
were the key drivers behind a desire for more restrictive measures. These two distinctive 
approaches to social inequalities highlight the differences between the expected role of 
individuals within society and the share of responsibilities between the individuals and the 
state. Throughout the analysis, the differences between individualism in the UK and the 
strong sense of collective responsibilities in Norway emerged very promptly. This difference 
was particularly notable in relation to the understanding and use of the principles of Control, 
(in-group) Need and Attitude.  
Another important finding and contribution to the study of Institutionalism is that the 
influence of the institutional and social context emerged not only thematically, but also 
shaped the development and the process of discussions. Social expectations, social norms, 
and values also frame what issues and what measures are socially acceptable for debate. In 
this regard, the effect of the social context and the power of public and political discourse 
was found to be especially relevant. This feature was particularly notable in the British 
discussions. The overwhelming support for immigration control and concerns about 
immigrants’ misuse of the benefit system and the related costs for the state were rarely 
challenged. This finding also showcases participants’ misconceptions about immigration and 
immigrants’ access to and use of welfare benefits (Duffy and Frere-Smith, 2014; Baumberg 
Geiger, 2016). While it was expected that such misconceptions could be dealt with in the 
course of DF, the analysis found evidence of how dissenting views were silenced, especially 
on the second day of the DFs when participants formulated the concrete policy 
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recommendations for the future government. This also revealed that institutional effects 
were important not only thematically, but also in relation to the process of discussions.  
Focusing specifically on the process of attitude-formation and on the relevance of 
distinguishing the homogeneity and heterogeneity of views in groups, this research found 
that the institutional and social context can facilitate or constrain the emergence of 
dissenting views in the discussions. Chapter 7 found that the institutional and social context 
considerably define social desirability effects, shaping socially acceptable views and 
preferences. In the discussions this meant that the heterogeneity of views on immigration in 
the Norwegian Red group was facilitated by the institutional and social context that involved 
both support for and concerns about immigration. In contrast, in the British Orange group 
both the institutional and social context influenced the discussion about restrictions as viable 
measures for controlling immigration. Thus, this research adds one more factor to consider 
when assessing the process of discussions and the effects of deliberations.  
Based on these findings, the thesis argued that institutional differences and the specificities 
of the social contexts shaped how immigration was discussed in Norway and in the UK, 
indicating their importance as drivers of attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare 
state. Consequently, differences in the institutional and social context are claimed to explain 
the more inclusive approach in Norway and more restrictive approach and more restrictive 
policy recommendations in the UK.  
While this research chose Institutionalism, the findings evidence the crucial role of political 
discourse in shaping public attitudes. Furthermore, they indicate the need to continue and 
deepen research on political discourses and to better address how these discourses are 
internalised and used by ordinary people in future research projects. In this respect 
deliberative methods provide important resources. 
 
9.5 METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
The novelty of this research rests upon the research approach and the unique combination 
of DF and discourse analysis. Considering that research on welfare attitudes significantly 
relies on international public opinion surveys (Ervasti et al., 2012; Sundberg and Taylor-
Gooby, 2013), there is an increasing need for more qualitative research that elaborates on 
the reasons for and mechanisms behind attitudes, as well as on the dynamism of attitude-
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formation (Svallfors, 2012). Therefore, one of the key ambitions of this research was to 
assess the applicability of the deliberative method of DF for the study of welfare attitudes, 
and more specifically for the study of a complex issue such as immigration. As the research 
design of DFs includes standardized questionnaires for measuring pre- and post-deliberation 
attitudes, it also offers the possibility to scrutinise how deliberations and the discourse 
analysis of deliberation can complement and enrich our knowledge about public attitudes to 
immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state.   
The most important distinguishing feature of DF is that it grants participants a high level of 
autonomy to shape discussions. Accordingly, the researchers’ role and influence change and 
are limited, especially in comparison to other quantitative and qualitative methods. Thus, a 
bottom-up discussion could develop without specific questions being raised. This itself 
reveals the explorative character of the research: namely, analysing how people talk about 
and understand the welfare state and the issues of immigration.  
This explorative approach to data collection and to data analysis, allowed us to examine the 
issue of immigration as it emerged in the DF debates. The discussions developed and 
deepened as participants raised new arguments and new aspects of the issue, asked for 
clarifications, challenged each other and expressed their agreement or disagreement. 
Through these interactions, participants not only accessed new information but were 
confronted, too. They needed to react to others’ arguments, to defend their positions, to 
reflect on and re-consider some of their thoughts. Focusing on the discussions, the key 
added value and contribution of the DF is that the discussions were able to reproduce the 
institutional and social context through the participants’ interactions, arguments, and 
justifications. Despite the different composition of the three small groups in Norway and in 
the UK, overlaps emerged in terms of the key aspects, considerations, and policy proposals 
that were raised. Numerous personal stories and very specific arguments enriched the 
debates, and there were differences in the amount of detail included in statements and 
justifications, but the perceptions and approaches, as well as the guiding principles 
resembled country- and welfare-state-specific institutional features and corresponded to the 
wider public and political discourse. Although DFs in WelfSOC involved only a limited number 
of participants, the fact that the deliberations reproduced the institutional and social context 
increases the validity of the research and suggests the provision of valuable contributions to 
the field of welfare attitudes research.  
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The high level of autonomy of participants enabled us to scrutinize how people conceptualize 
immigrants, how they understand the issue of immigration (its benefits and disadvantages), 
and what the problems are that they want to tackle concerning immigration. The analysis of 
deliberation thus represents an important means of examining the complexity and multi-
dimensionality of considerations behind attitudes, and the context-dependency of 
attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state. In a survey situation the researcher 
cannot control who respondents have in mind when responding to questions about 
immigration and immigrants’ access to welfare benefits (Goerres and Prinzen, 2012). 
Throughout the research it was deemed important to examine how people perceive and 
categorize immigrants. An important example is how Norwegian and British participants 
distinguished “economic refugees” as a specific sub-group, referring to illegitimate refugees 
who have an economic motivation for migration rather than a desire to escape life-
threatening conditions in the country of origin. Moreover, the tendency to refer to economic 
migrants as “immigrants” in general was another important finding which can inform 
researchers and survey designers when they raise questions about immigration and 
immigrants. Furthermore, participants’ characterizations of immigrants (“good” and “bad”; 
“deserving” and “undeserving”) shed new light on attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion and 
changing preferences for inclusion, representing a new perspective about attitudes that 
complements the rather static view of attitudes in surveys. 
The structure of the DF encouraged participants to elaborate on their stances and to justify 
their preferences through interacting with and considering others’ views and arguments. 
Thereby, creating a dynamic and interactive framework for discussions and facilitating the 
contextualisation of the articulated attitudes. As shown in Chapter 8, participants’ 
narratives and engagement in the discussions revealed further details about participants’ 
attitudes and elaborated on ambivalences in attitudes. Furthermore, DF discussions 
enabled the analysis of the process of attitude-formation – how participants articulated their 
attitudes, which aspects of their attitudes were shared in the group, and how their attitudes 
shifted between preferences for inclusion and exclusion depending on the specific contexts. 
Therefore, the opportunity to analyse the dynamism of attitude-formation is a significant 
added value of DFs to the study of welfare attitudes.  
The longer duration of DFs, and the specific design of the discussions on Day 1 and Day 2, 
also enabled participants to learn about various perspectives on immigration and to reflect 
on the complexity of immigration-related issues. Setting up a role-play involving 
participants acting as policy advisors and formulating policy recommendations was an 
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effective tool for focusing the discussion on the desirable approach to dealing with 
immigration. The findings stressed the relevance of distinguishing the homogeneity and 
heterogeneity of views that emerged in the discussions when analysing the process of 
attitude-formation. The overwhelming consensus about policy recommendations in the 
British DF had a different impact on the development of the discussion, and created limited 
scope for attitude-formation compared to the case of the Norwegian discussions, which 
included competing views. While the preferences articulated in the British discussions 
corresponded to the overall public and political discourse and captured a particular social 
context, this consensus was so unquestionable that it prevented participants from 
considering other approaches to immigration. Comparing the discussions on Day 1 and Day 
2, we can observe that the issue of controlling immigration was already dominant on the 
first day, but there were more counter-arguments and a greater openness to seeing the 
benefits of immigration too. This finding reveals another layer of the context-dependency 
of attitudes, or more precisely, the context-dependency of attitude-formation. In this 
specific case, changes were generated as the context of the discussion changed, and 
participants needed to agree on policy proposals and solutions for the identified issues.  
While the paragraphs above intended to highlight how and why DF can contribute to the 
study of welfare attitudes, we need to duly acknowledge its limitations, too. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, one of the foremost limitations of the method is that it involved only a limited 
number of participants. DFs put particular emphasis on the selection of participants to create 
a diverse group which roughly represents the national population. Within WelfSOC the 
selection of participants was based on age, gender, education, marital and employment 
status, household income, ethnicity, and electoral preferences. We hereby admit that the 
small number of participants (34-35 participants/country) makes it especially challenging to 
create a group that is representative of all these characteristics. Therefore, as part of the 
research the representation of specific social groups and their participation in the discussions 
on immigration was checked.  
Based on the findings, age, education, and ethnic minority background needs to be 
highlighted, where certain level of divergence was observed compared to the national 
population. As described in details in Chapter 3, over-representation of the age groups 25-
34 and 44-54 years old was present in both countries. Based on the level of education, in 
Norway tertiary-educated participants, while in the UK participants who completed upper-
secondary education were overrepresented. The dominance of these two education-specific 
groups of participants also emerged in the discussions on immigration, further increasing the 
 267 
 
need to take this difference into account. Last, the share of participants with an ethnic 
minority background was slightly higher in Norway, while in the UK case-study over-
representation of participants was more significant. As described in Chapter 3 the 
composition of the British group of participants reflected more the share of ethnic minority 
members in Birmingham, the locality of the DF. These divergences need to be duly taken into 
account. However, the overall findings of the research and the similarities found across small 
group discussions (per country) encourage us to highlight the ability of deliberations to re-
create the specific institutional and social context. As mentioned earlier, despite the 
differences in the composition of breakout groups, the discussions raised similar perceptions 
of and approaches to immigrants, and similar conditions of inclusion, which resembled the 
country- and welfare-state-specific institutional and social context. Thus, the deliberations 
offer rich data about how the key characteristics of institutions and the specific features of 
the social context is discursively reproduced by participants. Accordingly, deliberations in DF 
represent an important opportunity for further research into public attitudes. However, 
successfully exploiting them also requires a high level of awareness of the context-
dependency of attitudes and attentiveness to the specificities of the context in which the DF 
discussions are conducted (Strandberg et al., 2019). 
Second, the essence of DF is the collective creation of knowledge through social interactions 
between participants. However, this also implies that group dynamics affect discussions. 
Group dynamics can significantly contribute to the discussions, but involve certain risks, as 
discussed in Chapter 7. In this regard, the composition of the group, the participation of 
group members, the dominance of certain participants, and the quality of moderation are 
crucial factors which can highly influence the quality of discussions. This is why it was seen 
as particularly important to devote special attention to the analysis of the process of 
attitude-formation in addition to the content analysis presented in the first part of the thesis. 
As stated in Chapter 7, both the emerging homogeneity and heterogeneity of views raise 
important insights that enrich our understanding of attitude-formation. However, we should 
stress these differences to provide a precise interpretation of the data and the processes 
involved in the discussions.  
Although the research design of the DFs conducted in WelfSOC was carefully planned and 
involved special measures for mitigating the potential limitations of the method, it could not 
control all of them. The limitations elaborated above need to be duly taken into account as 
much as the contributions of the analysis of the DFs. We acknowledge that the analysis of 
discussions and interactions between participants can broaden our knowledge about 1) 
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people’s understanding of complex social issues such as immigration, 2) the key 
considerations and reasons behind public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare 
state, and 3) the dynamism of attitude-formation. These findings and contributions lend 
empirical support to the applicability of, and the need for more deliberative research in the 
field of welfare attitudes. Therefore, let us review the key lessons learnt and formulate some 
recommendations for future deliberative research ventures.  
 
9.5.1 Recommendations for future deliberative researchers 
Deliberative research is highly dependent on the quality of the data – what participants share 
and how they interact with each other – which is one of the key limitations of this research 
method. Therefore, our recommendations concern primarily on how to enhance high quality 
and reasoned debates. Firstly, the structure and time-management of discussions is crucial. 
The aim to let participants discuss various welfare topics – not limiting the scope of WelfSOC 
research to one particular issue – was important and useful to analyse the development of 
different dynamics of attitude-formation, the different levels of understanding of specific 
welfare issues and how participants drew and perceived the linkages between various issues. 
However, proposing five topics per day seemed to be too ambitious, restricting the available 
time for discussion. Time-pressure was especially evident in the case of complex issues such 
as immigration, where deliberation can uncover the most and enable us to better understand 
how people formulate and reason their opinions, attitudes and preferences for or against 
inclusion of immigrants. In order to enhance more in-depth discussions, we would 
recommend to choose less (not more than three) topics per day and extend the available 
time-frame for one topic to one hour at least.  
Secondly, the structuring of Day 1 – focusing on identification of current issues – and Day 2 
– focusing on the future – was crucial to facilitate a quality and diverse discussion. The role-
play on Day 2 was especially important to encourage participants to concentrate more on 
how to solve the issues identified earlier, what also enabled participants to take a different 
approach to the same issue – revealing further standpoints, ambiguity or uncertainty related 
to specific aspects of the issue. Depending on the specific aims, researchers employing 
deliberative methods, should definitely consider what type of role-plays (policy-related or 
other forms of decision-making situations) could enhance the discussions the most. In 
addition to role-plays, the use of experiments could be considered and tested in order to 
further specify which contexts, which individual characteristics make a difference in relation 
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to preferences for inclusion or exclusion of immigrants. Experiments could entail provision 
of different information (statistical data) in terms of thematic coverage – e.g. data labour 
market participation of immigrants or educational level of immigrants – and more detailed  
data – e.g. more information the profile of immigrants accessing specific welfare benefits 
such as family status, length of stay in the country, etc. Thus, the experiments could add a 
further layer and deepen the discussions. 
Thirdly, the quality of discussions also depends on the critical question of inclusivity. As the 
aim is to encourage diversity of opinions, selection of participants and the composition of 
the small discussion groups is pivotal. The combined use of (relatively) representative sample 
and overrepresentation of specific minorities in small groups worked well in WelfSOC. While 
the topic of the DF should be kept broad – facilitating participants’ freedom to express what 
they deem relevant, the choice of principles of oversampling in small groups allows 
researchers to delineate the scope of the research by enhancing the voice of specific 
minorities within group discussions. While oversampling of certain minorities proved useful 
in WelfSOC, we also need to note that the specificities of the oversampled minorities – e.g. 
the group of self-employed – emerged in the discussions with varying strengths, being more 
salient and relevant in relation to some topics while less in relation to other. Due to the 
limited number of participants, research teams should prioritise certain (three or four) 
demographic characteristics that should be strictly kept during the selection process and 
leave greater flexibility in relation to the rest of the demographic characteristics. Enhancing 
heterogeneity of opinions cannot be controlled by the selection of participants only, the 
development of the discussion – including what information, what opinions are shared – 
highly depends on the group dynamics (as shown in Chapter 7). In this respect, the provision 
of information is especially crucial and should form a key element in the research design. 
Our last recommendation concerns the use of pre- and post-deliberation surveys, which 
provide an important insight into the analysis of attitude-formation during the DF. While in 
WelfSOC post-deliberation survey was conducted at the end of Day 2 discussions, it would 
have been particularly interesting to repeat the survey few weeks or months after the 
discussions. In future research it would be useful to extend the scope of post-deliberation 
surveys in order to examine and learn more about the effects of discussions on attitude-
formation in a longer time span. Although deliberative methods require careful 
methodological planning, these bottom-up discussions can contribute to the better 
understanding of ideas, perceptions and mechanisms behind welfare attitudes and can 
reveal ordinary people’s thinking about the welfare state and welfare beneficiaries. These 
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contributions make this method worth to apply and to further develop within the field of 
welfare attitudes research.  
 
9.6 WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM DEMOCRATIC FORUMS?     
The main motivation for conducting this research was to better understand what the 
conditions are for creating more inclusive welfare states that go beyond the ties of 
nationhood and which are able to mitigate social divisions between nationals and 
immigrants. That is the reason the research investigated processes of inclusion and 
exclusion. However, the contributions of the research are not restricted to a better 
understanding of attitude-formation; the benefits of the deliberations also need to be 
considered. In an era of increasing populism, when a decline in the ability to listen to each 
other and to differing arguments is occurring (Bächtiger et al., 2018), the need for 
deliberation is greater, especially in relation to complex and divisive issues such as 
immigration and immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state. Therefore, following the 
presentation of the key findings of the research, these findings are now considered from the 
perspective of implications for policy-making, and for future research.  
 
9.6.1 Policy implications  
 
The key tenet of deliberative democracy is that policy-making should not be restricted to the 
political elite, and that ordinary people should be more involved (Dryzek, 2005; Goodin, 
2008). One of the very first challenges for proponents of deliberative democracy was to 
overcome the critique that ordinary people are not informed or competent enough to 
participate in deliberation and influence policy-making (Rosenberg, 2014; Sanders, 1997). It 
is a valid and important question what information people access based on which they form 
their opinions and attitudes. In this regard, deliberative methods, including DFs, provide a 
reasonable platform for sharing and elaborating on the views of the public, which enables 
researchers and also policy-makers to comprehend what people know and how they 
perceive and understand the issues under discussion. Furthermore, DFs are designed to 
improve knowledge both as a result of interactions between participants, and by distributing 
evidence-based knowledge (Mansbridge, 2010; Fishkin, 2011; Bächtiger et al., 2018).  
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In this regard, WelfSOC DFs and in particular discussions about immigration, shed light on 
and inform policy-makers about people’s conceptions and misconceptions of immigration, 
and how people distinguish specific groups of immigrants and how they view immigrants’ 
duties and rights in the country of destination. In the UK, misconceptions emerged both in 
terms of the size of the immigrant population, but more importantly about immigrants’ 
excessive access to welfare benefits and services. The latter misconception was further 
reinforced by misperceptions about the generosity of welfare benefits. While unemployment 
benefits were considered as one of the key instruments of misusing the British benefit 
system, participants did not reflect on in-work benefits such as tax credits, in relation to 
which immigrants are slightly over-represented (Vargas-Silva, 2019) and which indicate the 
motivation of the latter to work, and the disadvantaged position of immigrants on the labour 
market. Considering that economic contributions were viewed as the key criteria for 
inclusion in the welfare state, the need to educate people about the reality of immigration 
and to encourage people to discuss these issues is clear. In Norway, misconceptions 
emerged concerning the length of the process of assessing eligibility for asylum. In all three 
groups this issue was flagged as a priority that needed change. Participants considered this 
period to be a waste of time and a waste of applicants’ skills and resources. Here we see the 
need to share more information about asylum-seekers’ stays in reception centres, and about 
opportunities for the employment of asylum-seekers.  
In relation to misconceptions, it is important to again stress the finding about the relevance 
of an emerging consensus or competing views and, accordingly, the composition of the 
groups and the openness of discussions. Discussions in which competing views were aired 
proved to be efficient at mitigating and critically reflecting on some of the emerging 
misconceptions – e.g. in relation to immigrant women’s access to welfare benefits, or linking 
the unemployment and underemployment of immigrants to discrimination on the labour 
market. In contrast, discussions in which there was an overwhelming consensus tended to 
be mired in misconceptions, and discouraged participants with conflicting views from 
opposing these arguments. First, this finding stresses the benefits and the need for a high 
level of diversity of views within groups in order to facilitate the exchange of information and 
consideration of various perspectives about the issue. Second, the discussions on the second 
day show that the main issue is not the competence of individuals to contribute to the 
discussions, or to propose policy recommendations, limitation rather emerges in form of 
the group dynamics that can reduce the scope of potential measures and solutions. 
Therefore, special attention needs to be devoted to analysing group dynamics and to 
 272 
 
improving the arrangements that minimise their negative consequences and guarantee a 
high level of autonomy for participants in terms of shaping the discussions.  
The findings about the substantial impact of the institutional and social context also point to 
important lessons for policy-makers. First, the significance of the framing of the issue of 
immigration should be stressed – i.e. whether immigrants are viewed as a cost or benefit 
in political and public discourses. The British and the Norwegian debates showed how this 
very basic framing had significant implications for the development of discussions and 
especially on the scope of policy preferences debated. The analysis found evidence for the 
impact of both institutional and social context. However, the thesis argued that welfare 
institutions have both inclusive and exclusive elements, and it is rather up to the more 
dynamically changing social context to define and shape what the desirable approach to 
immigration and to the specific groups of immigrants is. The DFs highlighted the power of 
public and political discourse to facilitate a more complex and comprehensive understanding 
of the issue of immigration considering both positive and negative aspects. 
Focusing specifically on the conditions of inclusion, labour market engagement was 
considered to be the most important issue in both countries. Therefore, in order to enhance 
the inclusion of immigrants, governments and policy-makers should focus on how to 
facilitate the employment of immigrants through reducing discrimination in the labour 
market and supporting recognition of qualifications acquired abroad, by providing language 
courses, requalification courses or other active labour market programmes. All these 
measures and services for supporting the employment of immigrants could increase the 
value of immigrants and their skills for countries of destination, which in the debates were 
articulated as the most convincing argument in favour of immigration and the inclusion of 
immigrants in the welfare state. In this respect, it is crucial to inform (in-group) people about 
the employment- and other related contributions of immigrants to the welfare system, to 
tackle key misperceptions, and to present a more balanced picture of immigrants.  
In view of growing social divisions, there is an immense need to conduct more public debates. 
Based on our experiences with DFs (and the positive feedback of the participants), we are 
convinced about the benefits of holding public debates on socially relevant and complex 
issues. First, it is important to help people access more information that goes beyond their 
own (selected and often closed) communities and sources of information, and to 
familiarize them with multiple aspects of issues and thus help them to attain a more 
informed opinion. Organizing DFs or similar public debates is a non-intrusive way of 
 273 
 
distributing information about the reality of immigration, including its benefits as well as 
costs and potential consequences, and connecting people with various backgrounds and 
views. Second, DFs can help to give voice to ordinary people. Governments should devote 
more attention to people and consult them more, especially in relation to difficult and 
polarizing social issues. Third, accessing and evaluating people’s experiences, perceptions 
and preferences can provide precious information about what is seen as acceptable or 
unacceptable in relation to immigration, and what the state’s responsibilities are towards 
immigrants. Thus, DFs can inform policy-makers at various levels of governance about what 
the most crucial concerns are that need to be tackled to reduce opposition to immigrants 
and how to better communicate about immigration.  
From the perspective of future research, deliberative methods as DFs and the high level of 
autonomy of participants to shape discussions are essential to improving the measurement 
of attitudes. On the one hand, these discussions can substantially complement the findings 
of public opinion surveys. On the other hand, the discussions can also help researchers to 
refine public opinion surveys – i.e. how questions and answers are formulated – and to 
better accommodate the diversity of considerations behind attitudes. 
 
9.7 CLOSING REMARKS  
This thesis was committed to analysing public attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the 
welfare state. Such analysis and better understanding of the conditions of inclusion of 
immigrants was viewed as important for enhancing the creation of more inclusive welfare 
states, which are able to reconcile social and ethnic heterogeneity with popular support for 
latter stressing inclusiveness, social cohesion, and the extension of social solidarity to 
immigrants. The research found that attitudes to immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state 
changed depending on the specific group of immigrants, and the specific social contexts 
and circumstances under consideration. This changing nature of attitudes suggests 
opportunity and greater scope for inclusion. Acknowledging the power of the institutional 
and social context, the power of framing, and the identification of key concerns and the 
resolution of the latter are among the first steps towards the greater inclusion of immigrants. 
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APPENDIX 1 – SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE RESEARCH DESIGN OF DEMOCRATIC FORUMS 
 
Table 1 – Review of policy proposals formulated by British and Norwegian Democratic Forum participants at the Final Plenary Session on Day 2 
POLICY PROPOSALS IN RELATION TO IMMIGRATION IN THE BRITISH DF POLICY PROPOSALS IN RELATION TO IMMIGRATION IN THE NORWEGIAN DF 
Introducing an immigration cap based on immigrants’ skill-level  Offering intensified training in language, culture and laws and regulations 
Restricting access to free healthcare services in the first two years – the costs of 
healthcare should be covered by the employer or the individual 
Issuing temporary residence permits and work permits (to get immigrants faster into 
the labour market) 
Restricting access to welfare benefits – entitlement for welfare benefits is 
conditional on at least two years (two to five years) of employment 
Supporting long-term job creation for those with permanent residence 
Introducing and ID card system that allows to track use of healthcare services 
and ensures the costs of services are paid 
Immigrants to assume greater personal responsibility for own integration  
Introducing a point-based system considering immigrants’ skill-level, language 
comprehension, health condition, criminal history and requirement of having a 
job offer and depositing certain amount of money to cover initial costs of staying 
in the country. 
Introducing a selective labour immigration system, as Australia and Canada 
Creation of a more robust return system for immigrants – deportation of 
criminals. 
Starting campaigns aimed at employers to hire immigrants 
Introducing an immigration cap – setting a point-based system based on 
skill-level and introducing a long-term follow-up of immigrants and their 
influence on the country 
Enhancing linguistic and cultural integration of immigrants through mandatory 




Introducing an immigration cap – setting a point-based system based on 
skill-level and introducing a long-term follow-up of immigrants and their 
influence on the country 
Issuing work permit from day one 
 
 






party in next 
election 






NORWAY: RED GROUP - YOUNG (under 35 years) overrepresented in the group 
1 221 Labour Female Under 
24 
Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
In full-time 
education 
No answer No 
2 166 Labour Female 25-34 Tertiary, Masters or equivalent 
level, or above 
In full-time 
education 
M - 4th decile No 
3 2 Conservative 
Party 
Female 25-34 Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working full time No answer No 
answer 
4 18 Red Party Female 25-34 Tertiary, Masters or equivalent 
level, or above 
Working full time F - 5th decile No 
5 69 Labour Female 35-44 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Working full time C - 3rd decile Yes 
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6 41 Labour Female 35-44 Tertiary, Masters or equivalent 
level, or above 
Working part time C - 3rd decile Yes 




Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working part time R - 2nd decile No 
8 119 Christian 
Democrats 
Male 25-34 Tertiary, Masters or equivalent 
level, or above 
In full-time 
education 
M - 4th decile No 
9 131 Conservative 
Party 
Male 25-34 Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working full time H - 10th decile No 
10 150 Liberal Party Male 25-34 Tertiary, Masters or equivalent 
level, or above 
In full-time 
education 
S - 6th decile No 
11 391 Conservative 
Party 
Male 25-34 Tertiary, Masters or equivalent 
level, or above 
Working full time P - 8th decile No 
NORWAY: BLUE GROUP - MIDDLE-AGED (35-54 years) participants overrepresented in the group) 
12 137 Labour Female 25-34 Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working part time R - 2nd decile Yes 
13 28 Socialist Left Female 25-34 Tertiary, Masters or equivalent 
level, or above 
In full-time 
education 
M - 4th decile No 
14 252 Conservative 
Party 
Female 45-54 Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working full time P - 8th decile No 
15 84 Centre Party Female 35-44 Tertiary, Masters or equivalent 
level, or above 
Permanently sick or 
disabled 
R - 2nd decile No 
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16 41 Labour Female 45-54 Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working part time P - 8th decile No 
17 42 Liberal Party Male Under 
24 
Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
In full-time 
education 
J - 1st decile Yes 
18 48 Labour Male 25-34 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Working full time R - 2nd decile Yes 
19 46 Conservative 
Party 
Female 35-44 Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Stay at home to 
look after house/ 
family 
S - 6th decile Yes 
20 89 Labour Female 45-54 Tertiary, Masters or equivalent 
level, or above 
Working full time H - 10th decile No 
21 150 Conservative 
Party 
Male 45-54 Tertiary, Masters or equivalent 
level, or above 
Working full time H - 10th decile No 
22 164 Conservative 
Party 
Male 55-64 Tertiary, Masters or equivalent 
level, or above 
Working full time D - 9th decile No 
NORWAY: GREEN GROUP – OLD-AGED (over 55 years) people overrepresented in the group 
23 68 Labour Male Under 
24 
Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working full time P - 8th decile Yes 
24 142 Conservative 
Party 
Male 25-34 Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
In full-time 
education 
R - 2nd decile No 
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25 112 Progress 
Party 
Male 35-44 Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working part time S - 6th decile No 
26 22 Conservative 
Party 
Female 45-54 Tertiary, Masters or equivalent 
level, or above 
Permanently sick or 
disabled 
F - 5th decile No 
27 71 Red Party Female 35-44 Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Unemployed, 
looking for job 
C - 3rd decile No 
28 31 Labour Female 45-54 Tertiary, Masters or equivalent 
level, or above 
Working full time H - 10th decile No 
29 49 Labour Female 45-54 Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working full time M - 4th decile No 
30 106 Labour Female 65+ Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Retired D - 9th decile No 
31 50 Socialist Left Female 65+ Tertiary, Masters or equivalent 
level, or above 
Retired S - 6th decile No 
32 22 Labour Male 55-64 Primary or less Permanently sick or 
disabled 
R - 2nd decile No 
33 103 Labour Male 65+ Tertiary, Masters or equivalent 
level, or above 
Retired K - 7th decile No 
34 0 Conservative 
Party 
Male 65+ Tertiary, Bachelors or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 








party in next 
election 






UNITED KINGDOM: GREEN GROUP – UNEMPLOYED people overrepresented in the group  
40 163 No Answer Female 25-34 Tertiary, Bachelor’s or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working full time M - 4th decile Yes 
41 190 No Answer Female 45-54 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Working part time S - 6th decile No 
42 3 Labour Female 25-34 Lower secondary education 
completed (ISCED 2) 
Stay at home to 
look after house/ 
family 
R - 2nd decile Yes 
43 33 Labour Male Under 
24 
Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
In full-time 
education 
K - 7th decile No 
44 483 Conservative Female 35-44 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Working part time D - 9th decile No 
45 347 Don't Know Female 65+ Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Retired M - 4th decile No 
46 255 Don't Know Male 35-44 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Working full time M - 4th decile No 
47 173 Don't Know Female 65+ Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Retired J - 1st decile No 
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48 130 Labour Male 45-54 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Permanently sick or 
disabled 
C - 3rd decile Yes 
49 86 Labour Female 45-54 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Working part time J - 1st decile Yes 
51 138 UKIP Female Under 
24 
Lower secondary education 
completed (ISCED 2) 
Stay at home to 
look after house/ 
family 
S - 6th decile No 
UNITED KINGDOM: YELLOW GROUP – ETHNICITY (participants with ethnic minority background overrepresented in the group) 
60 45 Don't Know Male 25-34 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Working full time J - 1st decile Yes 
61 47 Lib Dems Male 25-34 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Working full time M - 4th decile Yes 
62 43 Labour Male 25-34 Tertiary, Bachelor’s or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working full time D - 9th decile Yes 
63 115 Conservative Female Under 
24 
Upper secondary education 




64 129 Lib Dems Male 25-34 Tertiary, Bachelor’s or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working full time P - 8th decile No 
65 34 Don't Know Female Under 
24 
Tertiary, Bachelor’s or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working full time P - 8th decile Yes 
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66 164 Labour Male 45-54 Tertiary, Bachelor’s or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working full time H - 10th decile Yes 
67 304 Labour Male 25-34 Tertiary, Bachelor’s or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working full time P - 8th decile No 
68 267 Labour Female 35-44 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Working part time F - 5th decile Yes 
69 293 Labour Male 25-34 Tertiary, Bachelor’s or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working full time D - 9th decile No 
70 43 Lib Dems Male 55-64 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Working full time D - 9th decile Yes 
71 27 Don't Know Female 25-34 Tertiary, Bachelor’s or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working full time P - 8th decile Yes 
UNITED KINGDOM: ORANGE GROUP - SELF-EMPLOYED participants overrepresented in the group 
80 228 Conservative Female 45-54 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Working part time R - 2nd decile No 
81 33 Don't Know Female Under 
24 
Tertiary, Bachelor’s or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working full time D - 9th decile No 
82 31 Conservative Female 35-44 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Working full time H - 10th decile No 
83 72 Don't Know Female 45-54 Tertiary, Bachelor’s or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working part time S - 6th decile No 
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84 294 Conservative Male 45-54 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Working full time P - 8th decile No 
85 77 Conservative Male 65+ Lower secondary education 
completed (ISCED 2) 
Retired J - 1st decile No 
86 78 UKIP Male 25-34 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Working full time D - 9th decile No 
87 57 Conservative Female 65+ Tertiary, Bachelor’s or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Retired S - 6th decile No 
88 166 Don't Know Male 25-34 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 
Working full time H - 10th decile Yes 
89 195 Labour Male 45-54 Tertiary, Bachelor’s or equivalent 
level (3 years or less) 
Working full time K - 7th decile No 
90 96 Labour Female 25-34 Upper secondary education 
completed (ISCED 3) 










Table 9 – The Agenda of the WelfSOC Democratic Forums 
DEMOCRATIC FORUM DAY 1 DEMOCRATIC FORUM DAY 2 
Time Content Time Content 
9.00-9.30 FIRST ROUND OF QUESTIONNAIRE   
9.30-10.15 PLENARY – WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION 9.00-10.30 PLENARY – PRESENTATION OF STIMULUS + Q&A WITH EXPERTS 
9.30-9.45 Welcome and introduction (15 minutes) 9.00-9.15 Welcome +  “ice-breaking” discussion 
9.45-10.15 “What is welfare policy?” (30 minutes) 9.15-9.45 Stimulus presentation 
10.15-10.30  Break 9.45-10.15 Q&A session with experts 
10.30-11.00 Presentation of the five themes (lead facilitator) 
 
10.15-10.30 Break 
11.00-15.30 BREAKOUT SESSIONS 10.30-10.45 BREAKOUT SESSIONS – ROLE PLAY 
11.00-12.00 Explaining breakout sessions (5 minutes) 
First breakout session (25 minutes) 
Break (5 minutes) 
Second breakout session (25 minutes) 
10.45-12.15 Explaining breakout sessions (5 minutes) 
First breakout session (25 minutes) 
Break (5 minutes) 
Second breakout session (25 minutes) 
Break (5 minutes) 
Third breakout session (25 minutes) 
12.00-12.45 LUNCH 12.15-13.00 LUNCH 
12.45-14.25 Third breakout session (25 minutes) 
Break (5 minutes) 
Fourth breakout session (25 minutes) 
Break (5 minutes) 
Fifth breakout session (25 minutes) 
Break (15 minutes) 
 
13.00-14.00 Fourth breakout session (25 minutes) 
Break (5 minutes) 
Fifth breakout session (25 minutes) 
Break (5 minutes) 
14.25-17.00 PLENARY SESSION – FINDINGS AND PREPARATION FOR 
THE STIMULUS 
14.00-16.30 PLENARY SESSION – Q&A, PRESENTATION OF PRIORITIES AND 
VOTE 
14.25-16.30 Presentation of breakout discussions 
14.25-14.45: issue 1 (5-10 min presentation by 
rapporteurs,  followed by a 10-15 min whole-group 
discussion) 
14.45-15.05: issue 2 
14.00-14.30 Plenary Q&A session between participants and experts (i.e. 
research team members), in order to discuss/clarify any issues 
raised during breakout sessions 
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15.05-15.25: issue 3 
15.25-15.40: Break 
15.40-16.00: issue 4 
16.00-16.20: issue 5 
16.20-16.30: Break 
  14.30-14.45 Opening the “box for thoughts” and discussing any issues that 
have not been raised before the vote takes place 
16.30-17.00 Open session 14.45-16.15 Presentation of priorities and vote 




15.45-16.00: Intergenerational issues 
16.00-16.15: Labour Market 
16.15-16.30: Any other issues 







Excerpts of the Information Package provided to the Participants of Democratic Forums 










































Excerpts of the Information Package provided to the Participants of Democratic Forums 












Table 10 – The final coding scheme used for the analysis of DF discussions in Norway and in the UK 
Category 
of code 
Code (Node in Nvivo) Child-node 
Type of Argument  
 Beliefs  
 Claims for social change  
 Emotional arguments  
 Moral arguments  
 Norms  
 Opinion  
 Personal arguments  
 Rational arguments  
 Principles 
  Affordability 
  Equality - equal treatment 
  Fairness 
  Solidarity 
  Transparency 
  DC - Need 
  DC - Control 
  DC - Attitude 
  DC - Reciprocity 
 Values  
Differentiation 
 Characteristics (In-group) - age cleavage  
 Characteristics (In-group) - nationality 
cleavage 
 
 Characteristics (In-group) - social status 
cleavage 
 
 Characteristics (Out-group) - age cleavage 
  characteristics - out-group - old-age 
  characteristics - out-group - youth 
 Characteristics (Out-group) - nationality 
cleavage 
 
 Characteristics (Out-group) - social status cleavage 
  characteristics - out-group - poor 
  characteristics - out-group - rich 
Discussion Dynamics 
 Agreement 
  Reasoned 
  Unreasoned 
 Contestation  
 Disagreement 
  Reasoned 
  Unreasoned 
 Interruption  
 New perspective 
  Repeating, re-opening a previously 
mentioned new perspective 
 Response to contestation  
 Response to new perspective  
 Turning point  
Interests and Considerations 
 Collective interest  
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 Cultural considerations 
  Collective framing 
  Individual framing 
 Demographic risk  
 Economic considerations 
  Collective framing 
  Individual framing 
 Individual, self-interest  
Framing of issues 
 Prioritisation (x over y)  
 Problem  
 Solution (or its refusal)  
Rationale (developed in WelfSOC) 
 Economic impact  
 Societal impact negative  
 Societal impact positive  
Themes (developed in WelfSOC – only the theme of Immigration was extended) 
 Childcare and parenting  
 Disability  
 Education  
 Funding and or financing priority  
 Gender  
 Healthcare  
 Housing  
 Immigration 
  Border control, monitoring 
  Economic migrants 
  Integration and inclusion 
  Overcrowding 
  Refugees 
 Income inequality  
 Intergenerational issues  
 Population ageing  
 Labour market  
 Old-age pensions  
 Other - various  
 Social safety net  
 Taxation  
 Unemployment  
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Figure 1 - Annual population change 1992-2015 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics 
 












































































































Natural change Net International Migration & Other






(1) Increased a lot (2) Increased a little (3) Remain same
(4) Reduced a little (5) Reduced a lot
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Table 11 - Changes in public attitudes towards immigrants in Norway (2002-2015) 
Most immigrants make an important 
contribution to Norwegian working 
life 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Strongly agree (per cent) 18 21 21 24 26 31 33 26 31 29 32 29 32 30 
Agree on the whole (per cent) 48 45 47 45 46 41 42 45 47 45 48 43 45 42 
Neither agree nor disagree (per cent) 12 9 10 10 10 16 15 15 8 11 9 13 10 15 
Disagree on the whole (per cent) 14 18 15 13 12 8 7 9 10 10 8 10 9 7 
Strongly disagree (per cent) 5 6 6 5 5 3 2 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 
Don't know (per cent) 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Most immigrants abuse the system of social 
benefits              
Strongly agree (per cent) 14 14 13 12 12 11 8 9 10 10 8 11 8 8 
Agree on the whole (per cent) 27 25 27 25 24 20 19 20 21 25 24 21 21 17 
Neither agree nor disagree (per cent) 14 10 12 10 13 21 19 19 12 14 14 14 13 18 
Disagree on the whole (per cent) 30 33 31 30 33 27 32 34 35 32 34 33 33 32 
Strongly disagree (per cent) 13 15 15 20 16 18 19 17 19 16 16 17 21 20 
Don't know (per cent) 2 2 2 4 2 3 3 2 4 2 3 3 3 5 
Most immigrants enrich the cultural life in 
Norway              
Strongly agree (per cent) 24 31 27 36 31 32 33 32 34 35 34 32 36 36 
Agree on the whole (per cent) 39 39 39 35 37 35 38 38 38 39 39 37 33 35 
Neither agree nor disagree (per cent) 12 9 10 8 11 14 12 14 9 9 9 12 12 12 
Disagree on the whole (per cent) 14 13 14 11 13 11 10 10 10 11 10 13 13 8 
Strongly disagree (per cent) 8 7 8 8 7 7 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 6 
Don't know (per cent) 2 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 3 2 3 2 2 2 
Most immigrants are a cause of insecurity in 
society              
Strongly agree (per cent) 17 17 14 13 14 11 12 10 11 11 10 11 9 7 
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Agree on the whole (per cent) 28 28 27 27 27 23 21 23 25 24 23 24 19 19 
Neither agree nor disagree (per cent) 13 10 10 10 13 19 18 15 8 11 12 12 10 15 
Disagree on the whole (per cent) 25 28 31 26 28 27 29 33 33 29 31 30 31 30 
Strongly disagree (per cent) 16 17 16 23 18 19 20 19 21 23 23 22 29 27 
Don't know (per cent) 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 
All immigrants in Norway should have the same opportunities to have a job as 
Norwegians         
Strongly agree (per cent) 60 61 64 69 62 68 70 67 66 67 63 62 67 66 
Agree on the whole (per cent) 26 22 23 21 24 22 20 22 22 21 23 24 20 21 
Neither agree nor disagree (per cent) 4 3 3 3 4 5 5 4 3 3 4 3 4 5 
Disagree on the whole (per cent) 6 8 6 4 6 3 4 4 5 5 6 7 6 5 
Strongly disagree (per cent) 4 4 4 3 4 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 2 3 
Don't know (per cent) 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Source: Norway Statistics, 2002-2015 
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Figure 3 - Public preferences on immigrants' access to welfare benefits, 2013 
 














Non-EU nationals EU nationals
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(1) Immediately on arrival 2008 6.10% 13.40% 
(1) Immediately on arrival 2016 4.80% 12.40% 
Change -1.30% -1.00% 
   
(2) After a year, whether or not have worked 2008 5.40% 12.90% 
(2) After a year, whether or not have worked 2016 7.90% 14.70% 
Change 2.50% 1.80% 
   
(3) After worked and paid taxes at least a year 2008 48.00% 34.50% 
(3) After worked and paid taxes at least a year 2016 58.70% 37.20% 
Change 10.70% 2.70% 
   
(4) Once they have become a citizen 2008 32.10% 37.30% 
(4) Once they have become a citizen 2016 21.80% 34.00% 
Change -10.30% -3.30% 
   
(5) They should never get the same rights 2008 8.50% 2.00% 
(5) They should never get the same rights 2016 6.70% 1.70% 
Change -1.80% -0.30% 
 




Figure 4 - The level of income inequality in EU member states and Norway in 2015 
 



















Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income, 2015 
Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income before social transfers (pensions included in social transfers), 2015
% reduction in inequality due to social transfers
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Table 3 - Immigrants' after-tax income per consumption unit, 2015 
 Index (the whole population = 100) (%) Median EU-scale (NOK) 
Population in total 100 356600 
Immigrants, total 77 274800 
Western countries and EU countries91  84 300900 
Non-Western, Non-EU countries92 70 250200 
Source: Statistics Norway, 2015 









Source: Statistics Norway, 2015 
 
91 The EU/EEA, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 






















Income from work Capital income Transfers received
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Population in total 10 4 2 2 1 0 0 7 
Western countries and 
EU countries93  
3 1 1 2 1 0 0 6 
Denmark 11 2 1 2 1 0 0 8 
United Kingdom 6 1 1 1 1 0 0 6 
Sweden 4 1 2 2 1 0 0 6 
Germany 4 1 1 2 1 0 0 5 
Lithuania 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 6 
Poland 1 0 1 3 2 0 0 6 
Non-Western, Non-EU 
countries94 
2 4 4 3 2 2 5 8 
Afghanistan 1 2 4 3 3 4 8 10 
Eritrea 1 1 2 1 3 16 14 10 
Iraq 1 7 8 4 4 1 9 9 
Iran 1 6 5 3 1 1 3 6 
Somalia 1 2 4 2 6 9 20 13 
 
Source: Statistics Norway, 2015 
 
93 The EU/EEA, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
94 Asia, Africa, Latin America, Oceania except Australia and New Zealand, and Europe except the EU/EEA 
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Table 5 - DWP working age benefit claimants by world area of origin 
 





Table 6 - DWP working age claimants by client group and world area of origin, 2015 
 
Source: Department of Work and Pension
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Table 7 – OECD Employment protection indicators in OECD countries, 2013 
The OECD indicators  
Scale from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most restrictions), last year available 
          




















1.59 1.18 2.63 0.54 
Estonia 2.07 1.74 2.88 3.04 
Ireland 2.07 1.50 3.50 1.21 
Hungary 2.07 1.45 3.63 2.00 
Finland 2.17 2.38 1.63 1.88 
Slovak Republic 2.26 1.81 3.38 2.42 
Norway 2.31 2.23 2.50 3.42 
Denmark 2.32 2.10 2.88 1.79 
Spain 2.36 1.95 3.38 3.17 
Slovenia 2.39 1.99 3.38 2.13 
Poland 2.39 2.20 2.88 2.33 
Greece 2.41 2.07 3.25 2.92 
Austria 2.44 2.12 3.25 2.17 
Sweden 2.52 2.52 2.50 1.17 
Czech Republic 2.66 2.87 2.13 2.13 
Portugal 2.69 3.01 1.88 2.33 
Luxembourg 2.74 2.28 3.88 3.83 
France 2.82 2.60 3.38 3.75 
Germany 2.84 2.53 3.63 1.75 
Italy 2.89 2.55 3.75 2.71 
Netherlands 2.94 2.84 3.19 1.17 
Belgium 2.99 2.14 5.13 2.42 














Figure 6 Employment rate, rate of active population (15-64 years) - annual data 
 
Source: Eurostat, 1998-2015 
 
Table 8 - Hourly earnings in EUR in EU15 and EU10 countries and in Norway compared, 2014 
  Mean earnings in euro First decile earnings in euro 
 EUR % of EU15 EUR % of EU15 
Norway 30.8 173% 19.27 200% 
Denmark 27.61 155% 17.1 178% 
Finland 19.61 110% 12.35 128% 
Sweden 20.64 116% 14.07 146% 
Belgium 19.9 112% 12.75 133% 
Germany  17.78 100% 7.98 83% 
France 17.4 98% 9.93 103% 
Luxembourg 22.94 129% 11.67 121% 
Netherlands 17.89 101% 9.2 96% 
Austria 15.93 90% 8.31 86% 
United Kingdom 18.76 105% 8.53 89% 
Bulgaria 2.34 13% 1 10% 
Czechia 5.38 30% 2.53 26% 
Estonia 5.78 32% 2.5 26% 
Latvia 4.41 25% 1.93 20% 
Lithuania 3.91 22% 1.7 18% 
Hungary 4.64 26% 2.2 23% 
Poland 5.66 32% 2.25 23% 
Romania 2.79 16% 1.1 11% 
Slovenia 8.84 50% 4.45 46% 
Slovakia 5.33 30% 2.47 26% 
EU15 17.8 100% 9.62 100% 
EU28 15.23 86% 3.83 40% 









1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Belgium Denmark Germany
Ireland Spain Italy
Sweden United Kingdom Norway
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Table 9 - Working age population and total employment of individuals aged 16-64, 2013 


















% all low 
skill 
employment 
EU*  1,040 770 3 480 3 290 2 
EU8 
&EU2 
1,080 840 3 270 2 580 4 
Non-
EU 
4,190 2,610 9 1,430 9 1,190 9 
UK  33,910 24,300 85 13,440 86 10,860 84 
All  40,220 28,530 100 15,620 100 12,910 100 





APPENDIX 3 – SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS COMPLEMENTING CHAPTER 8 
 
Table 1 – Pre- and post-deliberation survey responses of Norwegian DF participants concerning the three immigration-related questions (identification of Coherent/Ambivalent/Contradictory 






When do you think 
immigrants should obtain 
the same rights to social 
benefits and services as 
citizens?1 
Do you agree or disagree 
that social benefits and 
services in [country] 
encourage people from other 
countries to come and live 
here?2 
Do you think people who 
come to live in [country] 
receive more than they 
contribute or contribute more 







Before After Before After Before After 
  
Part. 1 27 1 year Agree 
strongly 
Agree Receive Middle Coherent update 
Part. 2 19 Don't know 1 year Agree Agree 
strongly 
Don't know Receive Coherent change 
Part. 6 18 1 year Agree strongly Middle Coherent update 






Disagree Contribute Coherent change 
Part. 9 29 Don't know 1 year Agree strongly Middle Contribute Ambivalent change 
Part. 10 14 1 year Agree Middle Ambivalent update 
Part. 11 70 Citizen Agree Agree 
strongly 
Middle Contribute Ambivalent update 
Part. 12 31 Immediately 1 year Disagree strongly Contribute Contradictory change 
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Part. 14 34 Citizen 1 year Don't know Don't know Coherent change 
Part. 19 13 Citizen 1 year Agree strongly Middle Receive Ambivalent change 
Part. 21 28 Citizen Agree 
strongly 
Agree Receive Ambivalent update 
Part. 22 12 1 year Agree Agree 
strongly 
Contribute Contradictory update 
Part. 23 27 1 year Disagree Agree Contribute Middle Ambivalent update 
Part. 24 30 Citizen 1 year Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Agree Middle Ambivalent change 
Part. 25 23 1 year Agree Receive Middle Ambivalent update 
Part. 29 14 1 year - with 
or without 
work 
1 year Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Agree Middle Coherent change 
Part. 30 15 Don’t know 1 year Neither agree nor disagree Don't know Ambivalent change 
Part. 33 24 1 year Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Contribute Coherent update 
 
Notes:  
1 Answers to Question 1:  Immediately on arrival - “Immediately”; After living in [country] for a year, whether or not they have worked – “1 year - with or 
without work”; Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year – “1 year”; Once they have become a [country] citizen – “Citizen”; They 
should never get the same rights – “Never”; Don’t know/No answer 
2 Answers to Question 2: Agree strongly; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Disagree strongly; Don’t know 
3 Answers to Question 3 are on a scale of 0-10: From 0 to 3 – Contribute; From 4 to 6 – Middle; From 7 to 10 – Receive 
4 Change or update in attitudes is based on the comparison of answers to Question 1 – as the only question on immigrants’ inclusion in the welfare state 
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Part. 1 27 Coherent  update -    + - -  - + -  - 
Part. 2 19 Coherent change +    + + + + + - +   
Part. 6 18 Coherent update  + + -   ++ -  +  
Part. 8 24 Coherent change + + - + +    - + +   
Part. 9 29 Ambivalent change     + + + +  -   + - -  
Part. 10 14 Ambivalent update - - + +  -   + +   +  
Part. 11 70 Ambivalent update - + - - +  - -   - + + - +  + - -  + +  + + 
Part. 12 31 Contradictory change + +   + - + * + +  +   
Part. 14 34 Coherent change +    + + + +   + + + 
Part. 19 13 Ambivalent change - + +  + -     -  
Part. 21 28 Ambivalent  update + -  -   - - - + +   - -  
Part. 22 12 Contradictory update   - +   - + *    + + +  -  
Part. 23 27 Ambivalent update +  - +   + - + -  - +  + +  
Part. 24 30 Ambivalent change     + + - -   + +  
Part. 25 23 Ambivalent update + - - +   + + - -   - 
Part. 29 14 Coherent change     + + + + +  +   +  
Part. 30 15 Ambivalent change + + +     - - - -   
Part. 33 24 Coherent update + -   +   + - - + +   
 
Note: “+” means a pro-immigration (inclusive) reference; “-“ means anti-immigration stances (exclusive) reference; * means contradictory reference 
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Table 3 – Pre- and post-deliberation survey responses of UK DF participants concerning the three immigration-related questions (identification of Coherent/Ambivalent/Contradictory attitudes 






When do you think 
immigrants should obtain 
the same rights to social 
benefits and services as 
citizens?1 
Do you agree or disagree 
that social benefits and 
services in [country] 
encourage people from other 
countries to come and live 
here?2 
Do you think people who 
come to live in [country] 
receive more than they 
contribute or contribute more 







Before After Before After Before After 
  
Part. 40 46 Citizen Agree 
strongly 
Agree Receive Contribute Coherent update 
Part. 41 27 1 year Disagree Disagree 
strongly 
Contribute Coherent update 
Part. 44 101 1 year Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Agree Contribute Contradictory update 
Part. 45 65 No answer Citizen Agree strongly Receive Coherent change 
Part. 46 26 Never Agree strongly Receive Coherent update 
Part. 47 42 1 year Agree strongly Contribute Receive Coherent update 
Part. 48 17 1 year No answer Disagree Contribute Middle Ambivalent update 
Part. 49 15 Immediately Citizen Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Contribute Middle Coherent change 
Part. 51 35 1 year Agree strongly Contribute Coherent update 
Part. 63 14 1 year Agree strongly Middle Ambivalent update 
Part. 64 10 1 year Agree Middle Contribute Coherent update 
Part. 66 28 1 year Neither agree nor disagree Middle Ambivalent update 
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Receive Ambivalent change 
Part. 68 17 Citizen Never Disagree strongly Receive Contribute Coherent change 
Part. 69 25 Citizen Agree 
strongly 
Agree Contribute Receive Contradictory update 
Part. 80 23 1 year Never Agree strongly Contribute Receive Coherent change 
Part. 83 14 No answer 1 year Agree strongly Contribute Receive Coherent change 
Part. 84 34 1 year Agree Agree 
strongly 
Receive Ambivalent update 




Receive Middle Ambivalent change 
Part. 89 23 1 year Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
No answer Middle Receive Ambivalent update 
Part. 90 30 1 year Agree Middle Receive Ambivalent update 
 
Notes:  
1 Answers to Question 1:  Immediately on arrival - “Immediately”; After living in [country] for a year, whether or not they have worked – “1 year - with or 
without work”; Only after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year – “1 year”; Once they have become a [country] citizen – “Citizen”; They 
should never get the same rights – “Never”; Don’t know/No answer 
2 Answers to Question 2: Agree strongly; Agree; Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Disagree strongly; Don’t know 
3 Answers to Question 3 are on a scale of 0-10: From 0 to 3 – Contribute; From 4 to 6 – Middle; From 7 to 10 – Receive 























for the country 
Issues that make 
immigration 
problematic 
Part. 40 46 Coherent update       
Part. 41 27 Coherent update  +  - + - -   - -  
Part. 44 101 Contradictory update + - - * + + - * - - -  - + * + -  
Part. 45 65 Coherent change - - - + + - + - -  -  - 
Part. 46 26 Coherent update - +  - -    - 
Part. 47 42 Coherent  update - + - - - - -   
Part. 48 17 Ambivalent update   - - +   + 
Part. 49 15 Coherent change + -  - +  -  
Part. 51 35 Coherent update - - - + - - +   - - 
Part. 63 14 Ambivalent update + -    - +   
Part. 64 10 Coherent update   + +  - +    
Part. 66 28 Ambivalent update + - - + + - - - + + + 
Part. 67 24 Ambivalent change -  + + - -  - -  + - -  
Part. 68 17 Coherent change + - -   - - -  + - 
Part. 69 25 Contradictory update - -  + - * + -  - - -  - - 
Part. 80 23 Coherent change - + - -  - - - -  -  
Part. 83 14 Coherent change   + +   -  
Part. 84 34 Ambivalent update - - + +  - -  - - + + + -  
Part. 88 19 Ambivalent change  + - +  -  -    
Part. 89 23 Ambivalent update + -  -  + -  +  - 
Part. 90 30 Ambivalent update - + -  - + + - - - + -  + - -   - 
Note: “+” means a pro-immigration (inclusive) reference; “-“ means anti-immigration stances (exclusive) reference; * means contradictory reference 
